

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

*A
Reader
in
Theory
and
Research*

YOUNG . MACK

2381
~~5455~~ CW

S.I.E

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

*A
Reader
in
Theory
and
Research*



KIMBALL YOUNG
RAYMOND W. MACK
Northwestern University

EURASIA PUBLISHING HOUSE (P) LTD.

RAVINDRA MANSIONS,
RAM NAGAR, NEW DELHI-1

COPYRIGHT ©

American Book Company

Young and Mack: *Principles of Sociology, A Reader in Theory and Research*. Manufactured in the United States of America. All rights reserved. No part of this book protected by the copyright hereon may be reprinted in any form without the written permission of the publisher.

6, 7, 05
11510

*Published in India by Eurasia Publishing House
Private Ltd. New Delhi by arrangement with
American Book Co. New York*

Sole Distributors

S. CHAND & CO.

Ram Nagar	—	NEW DELHI
Fountain	—	DELHI
Mai Hiran Gate	—	JULLUNDUR
Hazrat Ganj	—	LUCKNOW
Lamington Road	—	BOMBAY

Price: Rs. 7.00

Preface

In the preparation of this book of readings, our aim has been to select the best scientific writing by social scientists, primarily from the professional journals. We have avoided the temptation to include popular treatments of social problems by journalists. The material is designed to accompany basic expository texts for the introductory course, though some instructors may wish to use it as a basic text in connection with lectures in theory.

Out of the wealth of available articles and monographs, the decisions as to what to include were not often easy. We have tried in all cases to select papers which are either models of research procedure or substantial contributions to middle-range theory. In a few instances, articles combine these two features in a manner representative of the best scientific writing. The major considerations which guided us in our final selection were (1) pertinence of the data to the central theme of a given chapter, and (2) adequacy of the author's interpretation for the construction of a larger theory of systematic sociology.

For those who wish to cite particular papers from this book, it should be noted that most of the selections have been reduced from their original length. It should also be noted that we have eliminated some tabular matter and many of the footnotes.

KIMBALL YOUNG
RAYMOND W. MACK

Evanston, Illinois

Contents

Preface

PART I INTRODUCTION

1 *Sociology and Social Science*

INTRODUCTION

JACKSON TOBY, Undermining the Student's Faith in the
Validity of Personal Experience

FREDERICK F. STEPHAN, Sampling

WILLIAM BRUCE CAMERON, The Elements of Statistical
Confusion, Or: What Does the Mean Mean?

PART II SOCIAL RELATIONS

2 *Social Groups and Social Categories*

INTRODUCTION

RALPH H. TURNER AND SAMUEL J. SURACE, Zoot-Suiters and
Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd Behavior

CHARLES R. WRIGHT AND HERBERT H. HYMAN, Voluntary Association
Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from
National Sample Surveys

3 *Cultures and Subcultures*

INTRODUCTION

S. KIRSON WEINBERG AND HENRY AROND, The Occupational Culture
of the Boxer

GORDON H. BARKER AND W. THOMAS ADAMS, The Social Structure
of a Correctional Institution

4 *Variability in Culture*

INTRODUCTION

OSCAR LEWIS, Peasant Culture in India and Mexico:
A Comparative Analysis

HORACE MINER, Body Ritual among the Nacirema

5 *Social Control*

INTRODUCTION 63

GRESHAM M. SYKES, Men, Merchants, and Toughs: A Study
of Reactions to Imprisonment 63ERWIN O. SMIGEL, Public Attitudes Toward Stealing as
Related to the Size of the Victim Organization 706 *Social and Cultural Change*

INTRODUCTION 77

W. F. COTTRELL, Death by Dieselization: A Case Study
in the Reaction to Technological Change 78SHELDON L. MESSINGER, Organizational Transformation:
A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement 847 *Socialization and Personality*

INTRODUCTION 91

WALTER C. RECKLESS, SIMON DINITZ, AND ELLEN MURRAY, Self Concept
as an Insulation Against Delinquency 91

MELVIN SEEMAN, Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership 94

8 *Social Structures and Functions*

INTRODUCTION 102

EVON Z. VOGT AND THOMAS F. O'DEA, A Comparative Study
of the Role of Values in Social Action in Two South-
western Communities 102EUGENE A. WEINSTEIN, Weights Assigned by Children to
Criteria of Prestige 1119 *Social Processes*

INTRODUCTION 116

LEONARD BROOM AND JOHN I. KITSUSE, The Validation of
Acculturation: A Condition to Ethnic Assimilation 117

PETER M. BLAU, Co-operation and Competition in a Bureaucracy 120

PART III SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

10 *Status and Role*

INTRODUCTION 127

RAY GOLD, Janitors Versus Tenants: A Status-Income Dilemma 127

GREGORY P. STONE AND WILLIAM H. FORM, Instabilities in
Status: The Problem of Hierarchy in the Community
Study of Status Arrangements 13611 *Social Class and Its Consequences*

INTRODUCTION 145

W. S. ROBINSON, Bias, Probability, and Trial by Jury 146

EVA ROSENFELD, Social Stratification in a "Classless" Society 152

CONTENTS

12	<i>Minorities in the Stratification System</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	160
	WILLIAM M. KEPHART, Negro Visibility	161
	LEONARD BROOM, The Social Differentiation of Jamaica	165
13	<i>Social Mobility</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	174
	ELY CHINOY, The Tradition of Opportunity and the Aspirations of Automobile Workers	174
	RAYMOND W. MACK, RAYMOND J. MURPHY, AND SEYMOUR YELLIN, The Protestant Ethic, Level of Aspiration, and Social Mobility: An Empirical Test	181
14	<i>Population and Resources</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	188
	RUPERT B. VANCE, Is Theory for Demographers?	188
	IRENE B. TAEUBER, Population Policies in Communist China	193
15	<i>Population Differentials</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	203
	WILLIAM FIELDING OGBURN, Population, Private Ownership, Technology and the Standard of Living	203
	ALBERT J. REISS, JR., AND EVELYN M. KITAGAWA, Demographic Characteristics and Job Mobility of Migrants in Six Cities	209
16	<i>Folk and Urban Communities</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	214
	KINGSLEY DAVIS, The Origin and Growth of Urbanization in the World	214
	SCOTT GREER, Individual Participation in Mass Society	223
17	<i>Human Ecology</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	230
	RAYMOND W. MACK, Ecological Patterns in an Industrial Shop	230
	LEO F. SCHNORE, The Separation of Home and Work: A Problem for Human Ecology	237
18	<i>Metropolitan Areas and Suburbs</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	246
	E. GARTLY JACO AND IVAN BELKNAP, Is a New Family Form Emerging in the Urban Fringe?	246
	WENDELL BELL, Familism and Suburbanization: One Test of the Social Choice Hypothesis	253

PART IV SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

19	<i>The Analysis of Institutions</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	261
	ERNEST W. BURGESS AND HARVEY J. LOCKE, The Family: From Institution to Companionship	261
	WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, Violence and the Police	264

20	<i>The Family</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	272
	SRIPATI CHANDRASEKHAR, Mao's War With the Chinese Family	273
	ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST, Flexibility and the Social Roles of the Retired	278
21	<i>Education</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	281
	MELVIN L. KOHN, Social Class and the Exercise of Parental Authority	282
	HOWARD S. BECKER, The Career of the Chicago Public Schoolteacher	291
22	<i>Religion</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	299
	JOHN L. THOMAS, S.J., Religious Training in the Roman Catholic Family	300
	LOUIS SCHNEIDER AND SANFORD M. DORNBUSCH, Inspirational Religious Literature: From Latent to Manifest Functions of Religion	306
23	<i>The Economic Order</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	310
	MORGAN C. BROWN, The Status of Jobs and Occupations as Evaluated by an Urban Negro Sample	310
	BERNARD KARSH, JOEL SEIDMAN, AND DAISY M. LILIENTHAL The Union Organizer and His Tactics: A Case Study	316
24	<i>Political Sociology</i>	
	INTRODUCTION	327
	MELVIN M. TUMIN, Readiness and Resistance to Desegregation: A Social Portrait of the Hard Core	327
	JOHN P. ROCHE AND MILTON M. GORDON, Can Morality Be Legislated?	337
	<i>Index</i>	343

PART I INTRODUCTION

1

Sociology and Social Science

Sociology is the scientific study of the structure of social life. Sociologists use the scientific method to learn how human groups are put together and how they function.

All human beings have to interact with other human beings in order to survive. People, in other words, are social; they live in groups. The focus of sociology is on this socialness, on group life. To develop generalizations or principles about what happens when people live in groups, the sociologist applies the scientific method—that is, he uses his own sense experience. He listens to what people are saying; he sniffs the ointment they are putting on their hair; he tastes the foods which they consider delicious and those which they reject; he feels the texture of their clothing; and, above all, he watches them. He notes the ways they greet one another and their rituals in parting; he sees the overt and the subtle ways in which they express approval and disapproval; he observes them at work, at worship, and at play; and he pays special heed to those situations in which what they *really* do differs from what they *say* they would do.

But there is more to the scientific method than observation. The observer must apply logic to what he has seen or heard or tasted or touched or smelled; his facts have no meaning until he interprets them. And, ideally, other observers must use their sense experience on similar information, interpret it, and arrive at the same conclusions.

Jackson Toby's paper "Undermining the Student's Faith in the Validity of Personal Experience" illustrates the hazards of relying on one's sense experience without filtering the information through a logical analysis. Social scientists are often unable to set up an experimental design for their work because our cultural values prohibit us from manipulating our fellow human beings in experiments as we would white mice. As a substitute for laboratory precision, we can use statistics to help us decide whether or not we should believe what our sense experience tells us. Had Toby's students followed the procedures recommended by Frederick F. Stephan in "Sampling," they would have been less likely to reach erroneous conclusions.

Like a slide rule, a rolling pin, or any other tool, statistics can be misused. Numerical analysis is not a guarantee of salvation. William Bruce Cameron's "The Elements of Statistical Confusion" offers valuable warnings against the careless misinterpretation of commonly used statistical terms.

Jackson Toby

Undermining the Student's Faith in the Validity of Personal Experience¹

After listening to me talk for a half-hour on research in the field of child socialization, a freshman raised his hand to comment, "In all of my eighteen years, I never came across any of those things you were talking about." The class laughed, but I found that other students are also unwilling to believe anything that they cannot confirm by their own experience. It does no good to point out that they get to meet in a lifetime only an insignificant proportion of the human race and that, moreover, a white Protestant New Yorker has little chance of knowing Southern Negroes, European priests, or even American farmers. Personal experience is so convincing that they discourse with assurance on topics about which I dare to make only the most tentative observations. At first I was non-plussed. Then I got an idea. If I could shake their confidence in the validity of personal experience, perhaps they would prefer the cautious, pedestrian conclusions of social science.

My program of subversion includes the following illustration of the limitations of "experience": I ask the class whether anyone has noticed, in traveling by bus or streetcar, that there are more public conveyances going by in the *wrong* direction. A few students agree that this is so. "You mean that, no matter which way you wish to go, more buses come by going in the opposite direction?" The class begins to mumble that you see the same number in both directions, that it only *seems* there are more buses coming the other way. The handful of students who spoke up first feel trapped and hasten to disavow their original position.

"No, it is not an illusion," I assure them, "you actually have observed more buses going in the wrong direction!" No matter which direction you want to go in? How can that be? Disbelief is writ large on their faces. "Suppose you want to travel *east*. A bus comes heading *west*. Do you take it?" Of course not, they snort. "You wait five minutes more, and another bus comes heading *west*. Do you take it?" No. "How many buses do you see heading west that day?" It depends on how long it takes for *my* bus to come. "As many as five?" Possibly. "How many do you see heading east?" They begin to catch on. Only *one* because, as soon as a bus comes going in my direction, I take it!

"Over the years you can accumulate quite a bit of experience testifying that public transportation companies are engaged in a conspiracy to frustrate your travel plans. Of course, it is neither the bus company nor a malevolent deity. You observe the comings and goings of buses while waiting for one, and this biases your conclusions. When buses go by in the wrong direction, you may fume, curse the bus company, or spend your time counting them. But no matter how many there are, you do not board any of them. Let one bus come on your side of the street, and you get on. This is your mistake. If you want to prove to yourself that paranoid conclusions are unjustified, you have to restrain the impulse to get someplace. Station yourself at the bus stop at 6 a.m. and stay there until sunset, counting the buses as they go by in *both* directions. This is the only scientific way to mobilize the testimony of experience on this problem."

So far, none of my students has been scientist enough to accept my challenge.

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1955, 20:717-718. By permission.

Frederick F. Stephan

Sampling¹

All sampling problems stem from the limitations that are imposed on observation. If one could observe directly all that one needs to know, there would be no occasion to make inferences about what has not been observed or to generalize one's knowledge. Science would merely be a systematic record of data, condensed, perhaps, by some convenient shorthand but never stretched over any void or extended into areas of ignorance. Of course, all the future, and most of the past and present is beyond the reach of direct observation. Generalization from limited observations is the rule, not the exception. Observation of a subject in a laboratory experiment and clinical examination of an individual are sampling operations in as fundamental a sense as are attitude testing or opinion surveying. When one studies a "unique case" or an organic system of interaction, the totality is perceived by the observer in terms of a set of partial and particular observations that fall short of complete knowledge and must be extended to processes of inference if they are to be more than historical facts. . . .

In studying a process of communication or some other complex system of human behavior and interaction, one is compelled to distribute one's efforts either evenly but thinly over the whole or more intensively over certain parts to the neglect of others. The most effective distribution will be different from one situation to another. The interrelationships that bind the parts into a system may likewise be observed through a selected set of parts or more superficially over the whole system. An anthropologist studies a culture, a language, or an institution through selected informants as well as by direct observation of some instances of behavior. A social psychologist can interview individuals or observe groups or do both. In any case, there is a sampling of individual and group expressions for the purpose of inferring the structure and functioning of the system.

There is no "best" method of sampling that can be followed blindly in all instances. The most effective sampling methods are those that are designed specifically to fit the situation in which they are to be used. They are based on the general theory of sampling derived from mathematical statistics and economic theory, and they take advantage of what is known in advance about the population, system of interaction, or process that is to be sampled. They are designed to achieve the specific purposes of the study as effectively as is possible under the limitations set by the funds, personnel time, and other resources that are available. In a word, they are tailored to fit the circumstances. In this respect they are like a manufacturing process that is engineered in terms of specifications set by the consumer and the technical equipment and cost relations of the plant. For simple jobs no elaborate planning is necessary; for some products thousands of dollars of preparatory work will be devoted to setting up the operation in order to produce the best results, taking into account many possibilities and considerations.

TWO RULES FOR THE AMATEUR SAMPLER

It would be a mistake to confine the discussion of sampling to the larger surveys,

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1950, 55:371-375. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

especially those nation-wide polls and canvasses that have done so much to stir up public interest in sampling and in which a careful job of sample design is feasible. For each such survey there may be scores of studies to be conducted on a smaller scale, geographically and financially. They may be more intensive and complicated in the variables they measure and the relationships they analyze. In the aggregate, and in some individual instances, they may turn out to be more important for research than some of the large-scale studies. So one may well ask, "Isn't there some simple dependable rule I can use to solve my sampling problem? I'm studying a limited group, not seeking a national average." Such a question deserves careful examination and a serious answer.

If it is put just this way, without any information about the population to be sampled and the resources that can be devoted to sampling, then one must necessarily sacrifice the advantages that come from fitting the sampling rule to the particular case. Hence, the answer could be, "Yes. You can have two choices."

Rule A is: Follow your common sense and select people by what seems to you to be a good way to get a group similar to the entire group in which you are interested. Test it with every convenient set of data you can obtain. Then be prudent in handling the results of your study, for you may be far off the beam without knowing it. As the airplane pilots say, you are "flying by the seat of your pants." With good luck you may not be too far off too often. If other phases of the study are correspondingly uncertain and not under full control, you are probably not adding a great deal to the total risks you are taking. If you are badly wrong, perhaps later experience, bitter though it may be, will set you right. If you are right, you have saved yourself a bit of trouble. This is the way you handle many other kinds of problems that you encounter, so perhaps you might as well do your sampling by the same rule-of-thumb method.

Rule B is for those who do not like to gamble or live dangerously. Such people may be less likely to make occasional brilliant discoveries or produce a flood of studies, but, like the tortoise, they may pass the hare before the race is finished. Rule B counsels: (1) Pin down very specifically the definition of the population

you are studying and the variables you wish to measure. (This may be no more than the arduous task of making up your mind about just what you will attempt.)

(2) Obtain a list of all the persons who make up that group or population or, lacking a list, divide the population into many small parts according to residence, place of work, or other suitable factors. Do this, however, in a way that tends to make each part a mixture of different kinds of people rather than a cluster of persons who are similar with regard to the variables you are studying. (This is where you may have to go contrary to your intuition.) (3) Select by some strictly random procedure enough of these parts to give you the number of persons you think you need after allowing for the loss of those you will not be able to study successfully.

You may even make up sets of persons or parts, well balanced on the variables you know about beforehand, until you have every person in the population in the same number of sets. Then select strictly at random one such set as a sample. (4) Proceed to study the sample but keep a complete record of persons you miss and what information you can find out about them. Analyze this information and the variation shown within the sample by those you do get. From this arrive at the best estimate you can of the accuracy of the sample in representing the population on each variable. Do not lean too heavily on statistical theory unless you have followed very meticulously the procedure it assumes has been followed. (5) Use every oppor-

tunity to check the sample with other dependable data. Possibly add certain questions to the study for this purpose. (6) Record and report your methods and deviations adequately so that others can repeat them or form a somewhat independent appraisal of the sample.

So much for Rules A and B. Sometimes they will work quite well. At other times the results will not be satisfactory unless greater care is taken with the sampling. This can be done in several ways. First, one can learn something more about sampling from the reports of previous surveys, though most reports offer little in the way of useful tests of sampling methods, and from technical publications in statistics and related fields. Second, one can get help from advisers who have developed expertness in research methods. Finally, one may seek to develop new methods appropriate for his own situation by his own ingenuity and experimentation. How much time and effort one gives to sampling should be determined by the general strategy of his research plans, seeking the most effective use of his resources and the greatest yield of results. In many small or casual studies very little benefit may result from improvement of the sampling procedure, but in larger and more important studies, there are great opportunities to attain a degree of accuracy with a well-designed and well-executed sample that cannot be attained by the crude sampling, no matter how large the cruder sample may be. Hence, these amateur rules should only be followed when the circumstances do not warrant a more technical treatment of the sampling problems.

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

The technical problems of a major sampling operation are too complex for detailed discussion in this paper. It is important that their general nature be widely known among those who produce or receive the results of research. Hence, a brief and simplified description of the principal kinds of technical problems is in order.

The first problem is that of the initial *specifications*. It is necessary to formulate rather specifically the purposes that are to be served by the sampling operation: the population of persons or other units of observation that are to be sampled; the variables that are to be observed; the accuracy of measurement that can be attained; the degree of accuracy required in the results; the resources that are available; and the other principal factors that will restrict the procedure and determine its suitability. If these conditions are vague, then there will be little basis for designing, or even for choosing, a particular sampling plan as better than other possible plans. If they are quite definite, they may establish automatically the general procedure or over-all plan for the sampling operation, leaving only the details to be determined.

A second problem is that of *design*. Within the limits set by the initial specifications one must shape up a general plan or a series of alternative plans to form a basis for organizing and solving the other technical problems. These plans will set forth the procedures by which the sample will be selected and the observations or interviews actually obtained for the sample. They may well proceed through to a trial run on the procedures that will be used to analyze the data and even to pretests, preliminary surveys, or preparatory runs of experiments. Concurrently or following this phase of designing, the more particular problems will be studied and solved, leading, finally, to the preparation of a complete plan of procedure with the necessary instructions and materials for its execution.

A third problem is that of *costs and resources*. In the simplest case the only cost

is the research worker's time. In larger surveys the costs are those of a far-flung corps of interviewers with travel, training, supervision, office expenses, payments to respondents, recording and tabulating equipment, and many other categories of expense. Sampling affects these costs by determining the number, location, and type of persons who must be reached and by regulating other phases of the operation. Very little has been published on the actual costs of opinion surveys. Even less has been done in genuine cost analysis to determine how each of many possible modifications of design would increase or decrease costs. Hence, design may rest heavily on judgment in attempting to minimize the total cost of a survey.

It may be necessary to obtain certain equipment and materials and to train personnel. Lists of persons or dwellings or maps may be needed. Tests may be given and data assembled preliminary to the selection of subjects for laboratory or clinical study. These phases of the sampling procedure affect the design and the effectiveness of the entire operation.

A fourth problem is that of the analysis of *accuracy*. A dependable estimate of the accuracy of the results of the study is needed in advance to guide the planning and after the completion of the study to guide its use. Frequently, only the roughest guesses about accuracy are possible. There are several devices by which improved estimates of the accuracy can be obtained if these devices are incorporated into the survey operation. The accuracy of the final results will be affected by many factors, and the estimate of accuracy may be built up from separate estimates of the effect of each or from over-all measurements such as those provided by previous surveys.

A fifth problem is that of *operation*, the actual execution of the procedures and plans that have been designed. This introduces many practical problems, some of which are rarely described or even mentioned in the textbooks on research methods. One of the most important is that of controlling the loss of part of the sample as a consequence of various difficulties and accidents in completing the observations and carrying them through the analysis. Subjects may fall ill, respondents may refuse to answer questions, lists and maps may have inaccuracies, records may be damaged or lost, severe storms or disasters may make field work impossible, and many other influences may disturb the performance of the operation. The resulting deviations from plan will vary in their seriousness, but, unless they are checked and controlled, they may invalidate the results of the most thorough planning.

The last problem is that of *presentation and use*. The ultimate criterion for appraisal of sampling methods is how well their results satisfy the purposes for which the research was undertaken. It matters little how accurately the data were recorded somewhere along the line if when the results of their analysis are put into practice they have been misunderstood, distorted, inadequately defined, or ineffectively utilized. This is a point on which there is sure to be disagreement. The research worker may deny that he has any responsibility for what happens after he completes his report. However, he cannot escape taking some account of the use of his results, since otherwise he could just as well design his study as a game to be played for its own sake. When one starts seriously to design a procedure, all efforts are directed by the ultimate objective. They fail to the degree that it is not attained. Hence, errors of application and use must be considered in judging the appropriateness of a sample design or in comparing two or more methods. There is a great job to be done, and it is only barely started, of explaining sampling to the potential users of research results. It is very difficult to correct misconceptions and to instruct research workers in effective methods of interpreting and using the research product. An attitude of restrained confidence is not learned easily; investigators may err in the direction of blind faith or excessive caution. They should

learn that the results of sampling are just as trustworthy as other information if one takes account in each instance of the degree of accuracy that has been attained.

William Bruce Cameron

The Elements of Statistical Confusion, Or: What Does the Mean Mean?¹

Scientific writers assure us that mathematics is rapidly becoming the language of all the sciences. In my own field, sociology, a casual survey of the journals shows that it already competes strongly with sociologese, which is an argot singularly difficult to displace. In any field which strives for impartiality and objectivity in its descriptions of nature, the cool and dispassionate language of numbers has its appeals, but statistics, that promising young daughter of mathematics, is constantly threatened with seductions into easy virtue hardly matched since the *Perils of Pauline*.

The basic value and potential fault of numbers is that they are remote from reality, abstract, and aloof from the loose qualitative differences which immediately impinge upon our senses. Numerous selections, generalizations, and discriminations take place before any aspect of sense experience can be reduced to a number, and most of the time we are hardly aware of these abstractions even as we make them. The simplest and most basic statistical operation is counting, which means that we can identify something clearly enough that we can recognize it when we meet it again, and keep track of the number of such events which occur. This sounds simple enough until we actually try to count objects, such as, let us say, students in various colleges in the university. It is easy enough to simply count everyone who enrolls, but deans, board members, and newspaper reporters want to know how many there are in various divisions. Suppose a student is finishing his undergraduate work and taking a few graduate courses as well. Is he one undergraduate, one graduate, or one of each? If someone takes a single course in evening college, is he then one evening student, or only one-fifth of a student? (Remember, we are trying to keep our private passions out of this description!) How many times he should be counted obviously depends on what it is we are trying to count, and for administrative purposes it may be best to count his *appearance* in each of these divisions; but unfortunately, any public listing of 5000 appearances is very likely to be interpreted as 5000 skinsful of student body, whereas we might find only 3000 epidermal units, or if you prefer clichés, 3000 noses. Equally obvious, 100 evening college students taking one two hour course each are in no meaningful way equivalent to 100 day students, each with a sixteen hour load. The moral is: Not everything that can be counted counts.

RATIOS, RATES AND PERCENTAGES

If we have counted things to our satisfaction, we can express the numerical value of one class of objects in terms of the number of some other, as a fraction or rate or

¹ From the *Bulletin* of the American Association of University Professors, 1957, 43:33-39. By permission.

ratio (*e.g.*, one teacher to each twenty-five students). The meaning of this, of course, depends first of all on how we counted teachers and students. To avoid argument with academics, we might better redefine our units as people who meet classes, and enrollees. Also we must remind ourselves that the real persons do not necessarily, if indeed ever, confront each other in the frequencies the ratio suggests. The ratio is merely a casual guess as to the most likely arrangement to expect by chance, and contrary to the opinion of some people, academic affairs rarely proceed entirely by chance.

One of the most useful modifications of the ratio is a statement of relationships in percentage, or a ratio standardized to a base of one hundred. A minimum of four mathematical operations have been performed to obtain a percentage: two classes of events have been counted, the frequency of one has been divided into the frequency of the other, and the result multiplied by one hundred. Considered in this way, it is obvious that there is plenty of room for simple errors, but the simplest of all is the bland acceptance of the end figure as a kind of real object having a life of its own. In other words, people tend to treat percentages like match sticks, or houses, or dollar bills, rather than high-powered abstractions.

A parable: A teacher took a job as instructor at X college, and the second year he received a raise of ten per cent. The third year enrollment fell off, and the college was forced to cut everyone's salary ten per cent. "Oh well," he said philosophically, "easy come, easy go. I'm right back where I started." Not if he was a math teacher, he didn't! If this example trapped you, figure it out on paper with a starting salary for the instructor of, say \$30,000, which is just as realistic as thinking that ten per cent equals ten per cent, if you have not first made certain that the two percentages are computed from the same, and reasonable, base. Even comparing figures as percentages of the same base is misleading if the base figure is not understandably related. . . . The sober, unhappy point is that both of these two kinds of errors are offered constantly in newspapers, journals, speeches, and elsewhere, and often the author blandly omits any definition of the base whatsoever, *viz*: "Things are looking better. Business volume is up ten per cent!"

Moral: 400 per cent is better in baseball than in taxes.

AVERAGES

Our society has so often eulogized man's best friend that only the most obtuse statistician would conclude that a typical man-and-his-dog average three legs, but every day good average people make errors just as gratuitous on the average in using averages. To speak of the average height of a group of men and women, or the average age of the audience at a grade school play, may yield results which, while less shocking, are fully as bizarre. Here again, as with most common statistical devices, few people really understand mathematically what the formulas mean, and yet they develop a kind of mystical feel for their use. "Average man" calls up an image of the man who lives across the alley. "Average day" means one distinguished from the rest neither by drama nor by excessive monotony. In fact, most people's approach to the whole business of averages is so intuitive that when the statistician writes "mean" they automatically translate it to "feel," because the mean is meaningless.

To be sure, the sophisticated . . . have learned that "average" includes medians and modes, and many even know that for some reason salaries are better discussed in terms of the median . . . , but very few people have learned that there are times when you should not "take an average" at all. Most of us go ahead and take 'em

on general principles, just like Grandpa took physic. Of course, when Grandpa had appendicitis, the physic killed him. You can't go against nature (or God) that way. But nature (or God) is less prompt in punishing statistical errors, with the result that many folks develop a real talent for sin.

Moral: "How mean can you get?"

CORRELATION

This is one of the handiest devices yet devised, and correspondingly, one of the least understood. Unless you have had a course in statistics, you probably do not know the formulas for this one, which may be just as well, considering how many people take means, and how popular a catch-word correlation has become. Most people think it is a high-powered word for cause. Actually, it is not. In fact, "it" is not anything, because "it" is a "they." While correlation customarily refers to Pearsonian r (because this is an easy formula for people with easy consciences), there are numerous ways of computing correlations, each with subtly different meanings, but all with one thing in common: correlations are simply mathematical statements about the degree to which some varying things tend (or don't tend) to vary together. J. S. Mill painstakingly explained, a long time ago, that even when causes were somehow involved, you could not safely infer that one of the variables in the correlation was causing the other; but Mill is out of fashion these days, and correlations are popular. Perhaps a good example of spurious causal reasoning might be the very high positive correlation between the number of arms and the number of legs in most human populations, which clearly proves what I have claimed all along, that arms cause legs.

There is no point in the math-fearing layman's even trying to grasp when and how to use the various correlation formulas. You simply must study some mathematics to gain even a hint of the restrictions, because the restrictions grow in part out of the kind of data with which you deal, and in part out of the mathematical assumptions you make in trying to get the job done. If the mathematical assumptions are not met reasonably well by the data (and they almost never are!), the resulting statement about relationships among the data is in greater or lesser part grounds for libel. But data, like nature and God, are slow to respond to statistical calumny; so let us only seek to protect the reader.

Two other forms of correlation are beginning to appear in public, with their own characteristic misinterpretations. These are multiple and partial correlation.

If correlation means the mathematical relation between two sets of variables, then multiple correlation means relationships between three sets or more. Fair enough? This is especially handy when trying to describe a complex set of interactions, such as rush hour traffic or the stock market, or many human behaviors in which opposing and cooperating forces are working, pushing and shoving, not working in any clearcut simple direction, but nonetheless producing some kind of result. The "feel" most people have for correlation carries over into multiple correlation, with probably not much greater inaccuracy. Instead of feeling one thing affecting another, they can go on feeling several things affecting another.

The real fun comes with partials. Multiples are confusing "because of" (or correlated strongly with) the fact that they describe complex situations. Partial is confusing because with them we symbolically do what we can't do in actual practice (but would love to!): we simplify the situation by making everything hold still except the one thing we wish to examine.

"Now," says the layman, "you're getting somewhere. I *knew* there was a simple

answer to all this if you'd just produce it. What was that partial correlation for income and juvenile delinquency again?" Alas, we are worse off than before, because with multiple correlation we convinced him the problem was complicated (although not for exactly the reasons he supposed); but now we have inadvertently proven to him that it is all very simple, and that all effects may be understood in terms of simple, discrete causes. If I become inarticulate here, it is because in my town a layman (nice average sort of man) published a statement in which he said income had virtually no relation to juvenile delinquency, and cheerfully cited a partial correlation to prove it.

What he did not know, and I failed to explain to him, was that partials rule out the joint effects of several variables *mathematically*, although these effects may be present and important *empirically*. For example (and here my analogies really strain their mathematical bonds!), in samples of water, the multiple correlation between hydrogen and oxygen and the phenomenon called wetness is high. The partial correlation for hydrogen and wetness, holding oxygen constant, is near zero. The same goes for the partial between oxygen and wetness, with hydrogen held constant. At this point I hope the readers bellow in a chorus, "You idiot, it takes both hydrogen and oxygen *together* to produce water!" Amen, and it probably takes low income, broken homes, blighted residential property, and a host of other things, all intricately intertwined, to produce juvenile delinquency. To say that the partial correlation with low income, all other factors held mathematically constant, is near zero, does not mean we can forget it in real life. It more probably means that this one factor is the constant companion of all the rest.

Clearer illustration of multiple and partial correlation may be seen in the *State Fair* mince pie, to which each member of the family surreptitiously added brandy. Each did just a little, but the whole effect on the judge was a lulu. To attribute some portion of the binge to any single person's brandy contribution would have only symbolic meaning, and hardly be identifiable empirically, but it could not be ruled out. Camels may ultimately collapse under straws.

CURVES, PROBABILITIES AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Most teachers have been exposed to the Normal Curve, usually in the form of an edict from the administration concerning the proper distribution of grades to hand out. In fact, in one institution some misguided administrator computed the percentage distribution of grades for my class of six students and compared it to the proposed institutional curve. The curve is what you might expect to find if the frequencies of events ranged around some mid-point purely by chance, like the impact points of artillery shells fired as exactly as possible at a given target. The mathematical specifications of the curve are complicated, but the basic point to remember is that this is a curve of chance occurrences; in fact, some people call it the curve of error. If any factor, however small, consistently biases the possibilities of events, they will not group themselves in this sort of curve, and it is sheer tyranny for us to insist that they should do so. It is true that over a large number of cases (say ten thousand) of students taking a given test with a similar general background of ability and interest, the grades will *approximate* this sort of curve. But the principle on which the curve is predicated says explicitly in fine print that any given small portion (sample) of those ten thousand (universe) might pile up at either end or in the middle, or be found scattered all over it from here to Hoboken. This small sample, colleague, is your class and mine, and it may not be

just your imagination: it is perfectly possible, statistically, that they really are all F's this year! Another year they may be all A's.

Moral: The normal curve will never replace the *Esquire* calendar.

The theory of sampling is a beautiful and fearful thing to behold, and none but the statistical priesthood should be trusted to gaze upon it. But the laity should at least become pious and agree to some key points in the creed. First of all, size of sample is much, underline *much*, less important than almost everything else about the sample. A carefully designed sample of two hundred cases can tell more than a sloppily collected sample of two thousand. The basic problem in sampling is to get a sample which faithfully represents the whole population, or universe, from which it was drawn. All the elaborate machinery of sampling is set up to serve this purpose, and if the rules are not followed, the sample might as well not be drawn at all. Good sampling is neither cheap nor easy, while bad sampling is sometimes both. The casual layman who wants to know how to make a sample is best advised as was the man who asked a doctor at a dance what he would advise in a hypothetical case of illness. You will recall that the M. D. seriously said, "I would advise that man to see a doctor." The best advice before trying to draw a sample is to see your local statistician. Otherwise, don't do it yourself unless you are sure you know how.

Moral: A free sample may be good for a disease you don't have.

The question which must be answered about most information derived from sample surveys is: "Is this statistically significant?" What this means is: "Could the kind of frequencies of events we have discovered have occurred purely by chance?" On this kind of answer rests our confidence in the Salk vaccine, radar, strategy in sales campaigns, and many other kinds of events where the improvement or change we seek is not total but is nevertheless desirable. In some cases, as small a change as two or three per cent may be significant—that is to say, is not likely to have occurred merely by chance; while in others, a twenty or thirty per cent change may not be significant. The techniques of determining significance are a serious study in themselves, but the common sense cautions in using them may be summed up in two statements: a difference that does not make a difference is not a difference; and: there is a vast difference between something's being statistically significant and something's being important.

PART II SOCIAL RELATIONS

2

Social Groups and Social Categories

The study of social groups is a basic concern of sociology. The present chapter contains two papers which discuss some pertinent features of group life.

The selection on the zoot-suiters by Ralph H. Turner and Samuel J. Surace shows clearly the function of social beliefs and stereotypes in providing a satisfactory interpretation of crowd behavior. However, one significant point in this paper is that certain hypotheses were not borne out by the findings. This is an important methodological fact. The student should not always expect to confirm his hypotheses. Such negative findings are part of the baggage of research work.

The piece by Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman on membership in voluntary associations reveals that, as shown by a national survey and certain local surveys as well, such associations have a limited place in this country today. Yet there are noticeable differences in extent of participation with respect to such factors as economic status, rural or urban residence, interest in public affairs, voting behavior, and support of local charities.

Ralph H. Turner and Samuel J. Surace

Zoot-Suiters and Mexicans:

Symbols in Crowd Behavior¹

The purpose of this paper is to test a hypothesis concerning the symbols with which a hostile crowd designates the object of its action. The hypothesis is that hostile crowd behavior requires an unambiguously unfavorable symbol, which serves to divert crowd attention from any of the usual favorable or mitigating connotations surrounding the object. The hypothesis has been tested by a content analysis of references to the symbol "Mexican" during the ten-and-one-half-year period leading up to the 1943 "zoot-suit riots" in Los Angeles and vicinity.

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1956, 62:14-20. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis under examination is related to two important characteristics of crowd behavior. First, crowd behavior is *uniform* behavior in a broad sense, in contrast to behavior which exposes the infinitely varied attitudes of diverse individuals. Many attitudes and gradations of feeling can be expressed in a group's actions toward any particular object. However, the crowd is a group expressing *one* attitude, with individual variations largely concealed.

In non-crowd situations uniform behavior may be achieved by majority decision, acceptance of authority, or compromise of some sort. But crowd behavior is not mediated by such slow and deliberate procedures. Within the crowd there is a readiness to act *uniformly* in response to varied suggestions, and, until such readiness to act has spread throughout the crowd's recruitment population, fully developed and widespread-acting crowd behavior is not possible.

The response in the community to shared symbols is crucial to this uniformity of action. Ordinarily, any particular symbol has varied connotations for different individuals and groups in the community. These varied connotations prevent uniform community-wide action or at least delay it until extended processes of group decision-making have been carried out. But, when a given symbol has a relatively uniform connotation in all parts of the community, uniform group action can be taken readily when the occasion arises. To the degree, then, to which any symbol evokes only one consistent set of connotations throughout the community, only one general course of action toward the object will be indicated, and formation of an acting crowd will be facilitated.

Second, the crowd follows a course of action which is at least partially sanctioned in the culture but, at the same time, is normally inhibited by other aspects of that culture. Mob action is frequently nothing more than culturally sanctioned punishment carried out by unauthorized persons without "due process." Support of it in everyday life is attested to in many ways. Organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and other vigilante groups act as self-appointed "custodians of patriotism" and are fairly widely accepted as such. The lynching of two "confessed" kidnapers in California in 1933 was given public sanction by the then governor of the state on the grounds of its therapeutic effect on other would-be criminals.² The legal system in America implicitly recognizes these supports by including statutes designed to suppress them.

Hostile acting crowd behavior can take place only when these inhibiting aspects of the culture cease to operate. Conflict between the norms sanctioning the crowd's action and the norms inhibiting it must be resolved by the neutralization of the inhibiting norms.

There is normally some ambiguity in the connotations of any symbol, so that both favorable and unfavorable sentiments are aroused. For example, even the most prejudiced person is likely to respond to the symbol "Negro" with images of both the feared invader of white prerogatives and the lovable, loyal Negro lackey and "mammy." The symbol "bank robber" is likely to evoke a picture of admirable daring along with its generally unfavorable image. These ambiguous connotations play an important part in inhibiting extreme hostile behavior against the object represented by the symbol.

The diverse connotations of any symbol normally inhibit extreme behavior in

² Cf. *Literary Digest*, CXVI (December 9, 1933).

two interrelated ways. First, the symbol evokes feelings which resist any extreme course of action. A parent, for example, is normally inhibited from punishing his child to excess, because affection for him limits the development of anger. Pity and admiration for courage or resolute action, or sympathy for a course of action which many of us might like to engage in ourselves, or charity toward human weakness usually moderate hostility toward violators of the mores. So long as feelings are mixed, actions are likely to be moderate.

Second, the mixed connotations of the symbol place the object *within the normative order*, so that the mores of fair play, due process, giving a fair hearing, etc., apply. Any indication that the individual under attack respects any of the social norms or has any of the characteristics of the in-group evokes these mores which block extreme action.

On the other hand, unambiguous symbols permit immoderate behavior, since there is no internal conflict to restrict action. Furthermore, a symbol which represents a person as outside the normative order will not evoke the in-group norms of fair play and due process. The dictum that "you must fight fire with fire" and the conviction that a person devoid of human decency is not entitled to be treated with decency and respect rule out these inhibiting norms.

We conclude that a necessary condition for both the uniform group action and the unrestricted hostile behavior of the crowd is a symbol which arouses uniformly and exclusively unfavorable feelings toward the object under attack. However, the connotations of a symbol to the mass or crowd do not necessarily correspond exactly with the connotations to individuals. The symbol as presented in the group context mediates the overt expression of attitudes in terms of sanction and the focus of attention. The individual in whom a particular symbol evokes exclusively unfavorable feelings may nevertheless be inhibited from acting according to his feelings by the awareness that other connotations are sanctioned in the group. Or the individual in whom ambivalent feelings are evoked may conceal his favorable sentiments because he sees that only the unfavorable sentiments are sanctioned. He thereby facilitates crowd use of the symbol. Furthermore, of all the possible connotations attached to a symbol, the individual at any given moment acts principally on the basis of those on which his attention is focused. By shielding individuals from attending to possibly conflicting connotations, the unambiguous public symbol prevents the evocation of attitudes which are normally present. Thus, without necessarily undergoing change, favorable individual attitudes toward the object of crowd attack simply remain latent. This process is one of the aspects of the so-called restriction of attention which characterizes the crowd.

While unambiguous symbols are a necessary condition to full-fledged crowd behavior, they may also be a product of the earlier stages of crowd development. In some cases sudden development of a crowd is facilitated by the pre-existing linkage of an already unambiguous symbol to the object upon which events focus collective attention. But more commonly we suspect that the emergence of such a symbol or the stripping-away of alternative connotations takes place cumulatively through interaction centered on that object. In time, community-wide interaction about an object takes on increasingly crowd-like characteristics in gradual preparation for the ultimate crowd action. It is the hypothesis of this paper that *overt hostile crowd behavior is usually preceded by a period in which the key symbol is stripped of its favorable connotations until it comes to evoke unambiguously unfavorable feelings.*

THE "ZOOT-SUIT RIOTS"

Beginning on June 3, 1943, Los Angeles, California, was the scene of sporadic acts of violence involving principally United States naval personnel, with the support of a sympathetic Anglo community, in opposition to members of the Mexican community which have come to be known as the "zoot-suit riots." "Zooter" referred mainly to two characteristics. First, zoot suits consisted of long suit coats and trousers extremely pegged at the cuff, draped full around the knees, and terminating in deep pleats at the waist.³ Second, the zooters wore their hair long, full, and well greased.

During the riots many attacks and injuries were sustained by both sides. Groups of sailors were frequently reported to be assisted or accompanied by civilian mobs who "egged" them on as they roamed through downtown streets in search of victims. Zooters discovered on city streets were assaulted and forced to disrobe amid the jibes and molestations of the crowd. Streetcars and busses were stopped and searched, and zooters found therein were carried off into the streets and beaten. Cavalcades of hired taxicabs filled with sailors ranged the East Side districts of Los Angeles seeking, finding, and attacking zooters. Civilian gangs of East Side adolescents organized similar attacks against unwary naval personnel.

It is, of course, impossible to isolate a single incident or event and hold it responsible for the riots. Local, state, and federal authorities and numerous civic and national groups eventually tried to assess blame and prevent further violence. The most prominent charge from each side was that the other had molested its girls. It was reported that sailors became enraged by the rumor that zoot-suiters were guilty of "assaults on female relatives of servicemen." Similarly, the claim against sailors was that they persisted in molesting and insulting Mexican girls. While many other charges were reported in the newspapers, including unsubstantiated suggestions of sabotage of the war effort, the sex charges dominated the precipitating context.

METHOD

In the absence of any direct sampling of community sentiment in the period preceding the riots, it is assumed that the use of the symbol "Mexican" by the media of mass communication indicates the prevalent connotations. Any decision as to whether the mass media passively reflect community sentiment, whether they actively mold it, or whether, as we supposed, some combination of the two processes occurs is immaterial to the present method. Ideally we should have sampled a number of mass media to correct for biases in each. However, with the limited resources at our disposal we chose the *Los Angeles Times*, largest of the four major newspapers in the Los Angeles area. It is conservative in emphasis and tends away from the sensational treatment of minority issues. In the past a foremost romanticizer of Old Mexico had been a prominent member of the *Times* editorial staff and board of directors.⁴

In order to uncover trends in the connotation of the symbol under study, one newspaper per month was read for the ten and one-half years from January, 1933, until June 30, 1943. These monthly newspapers were selected by assigning consecutive days of the week to each month. For example, for January, 1933, the paper

³ The zoot suit apparently developed in the East and was associated with the Negroes in Harlem. But in southern California Mexican youth became the recognized wearers of this garb.

⁴ Harry Carr, author of *Old Mother Mexico* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931).

printed on the first Monday was read; for February, the paper printed on the first Tuesday was read. After the seven-day cycle was completed, the following months were assigned, respectively, the *second* Monday, the *second* Tuesday, etc. To avoid loading the sample with days that fell early in the first half of the month, the procedure was reversed for the last half of the period. Then, to secure an intensive picture of the critical period, consecutive daily editions were read for one month starting with May 20, 1943, through June 20, 1943. This covered approximately ten days before and after the period of violence. Any editorial, story, report, or letter which had reference to the Mexican community or population was summarized, recorded, and classified. The articles were placed in five basic categories: favorable themes, unfavorable themes, neutral mention, negative-favorable mention, and zooter theme.⁵

1. *Favorable*: (a) Old California Theme. This is devoted to extolling the traditions and history of the old rancheros as the earliest California settlers. (b) Mexican Temperament Theme. This describes the Mexican character in terms of dashing romance, bravery, gaiety, etc. (c) Religious Theme. This refers to the devout religious values of the Mexican community. (d) Mexican Culture Theme. This pays homage to Mexican art, dance, crafts, music, fifth of May festivities, etc.
2. *Unfavorable*: (a) Delinquency and Crime Theme. This theme includes the specific mention of a law violator as "Mexican," associating him with marihuana, sex crimes, knife-wielding, gang violence, etc. (b) Public Burden Theme. This attempts to show that Mexicans constitute a drain on relief funds and on the budgets of correctional institutions.
3. *Neutral*: This is a category of miscellaneous items, including reports of crimes committed by individuals possessing obvious Mexican names but without designation of ethnic affiliation.
4. *Negative-Favorable*: This category consists of appeals which *counter* or *deny* the validity of accusations against Mexicans as a group. For example: "Not all zoot-suiters are delinquents; their adoption by many was a bid for social recognition"; "At the outset zoot-suiters were limited to no specific race. . . . The fact that later on their numbers seemed to be predominantly Latin was in itself no indictment of that race" (*Los Angeles Times*, July 11, 1943, Part I, p. 1).
5. *Zooter Theme*: This theme identifies the zooter costume as "a badge of delinquency." Typical references were: "reat pleat boys," "long coated gentry," coupled with mention of "unprovoked attacks by zoot-suited youths," "zoot-suit orgy," etc. Crime, sex violence, and gang attacks were the dominant elements in this theme. Almost invariably, the zooter was identified as a Mexican by such clues as "East Side hoodlum," a Mexican name, or specific ethnic designation.

If the hypothesis of this paper is to be supported, we should expect a decline in the favorable contexts of the symbol "Mexican." The change should serve to produce the type of symbol suggested by the hypothesis, a symbol dominated by unambiguously unfavorable elements.

FINDINGS

The favorable and unfavorable themes are reported alone in Table 1 for the ten and one-half years. The table by itself appears to negate our hypothesis, since there is no appreciable decline in the percentage of favorable themes during the period.

⁵ In judging references to be favorable or unfavorable, it was asked whether the report tended to encourage (a) an increase or a decrease in social distance between the reader and the Mexican and (b) a definition of the Mexican as an asset or a liability to the life of the community. The following is the full list of themes and subthemes.

TABLE 1

FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE MENTION OF "MEXICAN" DURING THREE PERIODS

Period	Favorable Themes	Unfavorable Themes	Percentage Favorable
January, 1933—June, 1936	27	3	90
July, 1936—December, 1939	23	5	82
January, 1940—June, 1943	10	2	83
Total	60	10	86

Indeed, even during the last period the mentions appear predominantly favorable, featuring the romanticized Mexican. However, there is a striking decline in the total number of articles mentioning the Mexican between the second and third periods. Treating the articles listed as a fraction of all articles in the newspapers sampled and using a subminimal estimate of the total number of all articles, the *t* test reveals that such a drop in the total number of articles mentioning Mexicans could have occurred by chance less than twice in one hundred times. We conclude, then, that the decline in total favorable and unfavorable mentions of "Mexican" is statistically significant.

While the hypothesis in its simplest form is unsubstantiated, the drop in both favorable and unfavorable themes suggests a shift away from *all* the traditional references to Mexicans during the period prior to the riots. If it can be shown that an actual substitution of symbols was taking place, our hypothesis may still be substantiated, but in a somewhat different manner than anticipated.

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF ALL THEMES BY THREE PERIODS

Period	Percentage Favorable	Percentage Unfavorable	Percentage Neutral	Percentage Negative-Favorable	Percentage Zooter	Total Percentage	Total Number
January, 1933—June, 1936 ..	80	9	11	0	0	100	34
July, 1936—December, 1939 ..	61	13	23	3	0	100	38
January, 1940—June, 1943 ..	25	5	32	8	30	100	40

From the distribution of all five themes reported in Table 2 it is immediately evident that there has been no decline of interest in the Mexican but rather a clear-cut shift of attention away from traditional references. The straightforward favorable and unfavorable themes account for 89, 74, and 30 per cent of all references, respectively, during the three periods. This drop and the drop from 61 to 25 per cent favorable mentions are significant below the 1 per cent level. To determine whether this evidence confirms our hypothesis, we must make careful examination of the three emerging themes.

The *neutral* theme shows a steady increase throughout the three periods. While we have cautiously designated this "neutral," it actually consists chiefly of unfavorable presentations of the object "Mexican" without overt use of the symbol "Mexican." Thus it incorporates the unfavorable representation of Mexican, which we assume was quite generally recognized throughout the community, without explicit use of the symbol.

The *negative-favorable* theme, though small in total numbers, also increased. At first we were inclined to treat these as favorable themes. However, in contrast to the other favorable themes, this one documents the extent of negative connotation which is accumulating about the symbol "Mexican." By arguing openly against the negative connotations, these articles acknowledge their widespread community

sanction. When the implicitly favorable themes of romantic Mexico and California's historic past give way to defensive assertions that all Mexicans are not bad, such a shift can only reasonably be interpreted as a rise in unfavorable connotations.

The most interesting shift, however, is the rise of the *zoot-suit* theme, which did not appear at all until the third period, when it accounts for 30 per cent of the references. Here we have the emergence of a new symbol which has no past favorable connotations to lose. Unlike the symbol "Mexican," the "zoot-suiter" symbol evokes no ambivalent sentiments but appears in exclusively unfavorable contexts. While, in fact, Mexicans were attacked *indiscriminately* in spite of apparel (of two hundred youths rounded up by the police on one occasion, very few were wearing zoot suits), the symbol "zoot-suiter" could become a basis for unambivalent community sentiment supporting hostile crowd behavior more easily than could "Mexican."

It is interesting to note that, when we consider only the fifteen mentions which appear in the first six months of 1943, ten are to zooters, three are negative-favorable, two are neutral, and none is the traditional favorable or unfavorable theme.

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF ALL THEMES FROM MAY 20 TO JUNE 20, 1943

Theme	Percentage of All Mentions*
Favorable	0
Unfavorable	0
Neutral	3
Negative-favorable	23
Zooter	74
Total	100

* Total number = 61.

In Table 3 we report the results of the day-by-day analysis of the period immediately prior to, during, and after the riots. It shows the culmination of a trend faintly suggested as long as seven years before the riots and clearly indicated two or three years in advance. The traditional favorable and unfavorable themes have vanished completely, and three-quarters of the references center about the zooter theme.

From the foregoing evidence we conclude that our basic hypothesis and theory receive confirmation, but not exactly as anticipated. The simple expectation that there would be a shift in the relative preponderance of favorable and unfavorable contexts for the symbol "Mexican" was not borne out. But the basic hypothesis that an unambiguously unfavorable symbol is required as the rallying point for hostile crowd behavior is supported through evidence that the symbol "Mexican" tended to be displaced by the symbol "zoot-suiter" as the time of the riots drew near.

The conception of the romantic Mexican and the Mexican heritage is deeply ingrained in southern California tradition. The Plaza and Olvera Street in downtown Los Angeles, the Ramona tradition, the popularity of Mexican food, and many other features serve to perpetuate it. It seems quite probable that its force was too strong to be eradicated entirely, even though it ceased to be an acceptable matter of public presentation. In spite, then, of a progressive decline in public

presentation of the symbol in its traditional favorable contexts, a certain ambivalence remained which prevented a simple replacement with predominantly unfavorable connotations.

Rather, two techniques emerged for circumventing the ambivalence. One was the presenting of the object in an obvious manner without explicit use of the symbol. Thus a Mexican name, a picture, or reference to "East Side hoodlums" was presented in an unfavorable context. But a far more effective device was a new symbol whose connotations at the time were exclusively unfavorable. It provided the public sanction and restriction of attention essential to the development of overt crowd hostility. The symbol "zoot-suiter" evoked none of the imagery of the romantic past. It evoked only the picture of a breed of persons outside the normative order, devoid of morals themselves, and consequently not entitled to fair play and due process. Indeed, the zoot-suiter came to be regarded as such an exclusively fearful threat to the community that at the height of rioting the Los Angeles City Council seriously debated an ordinance making the wearing of zoot suits a prison offense.⁶

The "zooter" symbol had a crisis character which mere unfavorable versions of the familiar "Mexican" symbol never approximated. And the "zooter" symbol was an omnibus, drawing together the most reprehensible elements in the old unfavorable themes, namely, sex crimes, delinquency, gang attacks, draft-dodgers, and the like and was, in consequence, widely applicable.

The "zooter" symbol also supplied a tag identifying the object of attack. It could be used, when the old attitudes toward Mexicans were evoked, to differentiate Mexicans along both moral and physical lines. While the active minority were attacking Mexicans indiscriminately, and frequently including Negroes, the great sanctioning majority heard only of attacks on zoot-suiters.

Once established, the zooter theme assured its own magnification. What previously would have been reported as an adolescent gang attack would now be presented as a zoot-suit attack. Weapons found on apprehended youths were now interpreted as the building-up of arms collections in preparation for zoot-suit violence. In short, the "zooter" symbol was a recasting of many of the elements formerly present and sometimes associated with Mexicans in a new and instantly recognizable guise. This new association of ideas relieved the community of ambivalence and moral obligations and gave sanction to making the Mexicans the victims of widespread hostile crowd behavior.

⁶ *Los Angeles Times*; June 10, 1943, Part I, pp. 1, A.

Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman

Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys¹

INTRODUCTION

Several recent studies have demonstrated the need for a thorough reappraisal of the commonly held belief that Americans are a nation of joiners . . .

Unfortunately, most investigators of the problem have had to work within serious limitations imposed by the nature of their data. In some instances, the sampling

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1958, 23:284-294. By permission.

5-45-55 2381

procedures available to the investigator could not provide adequate data. In other instances, while the researcher was fortunate enough to have access to representative samples, the findings relate to such circumscribed and limited universes as small local communities, a single metropolis, or one social class within a particular city. What has been missing in the literature is evidence of the voluntary association memberships of Americans in general and of important sub-groups within the nation, derived from adequate sampling of the general population. The present paper provides data that partially meet this need.

More specifically, the paper presents evidence bearing on the following problems: (1) the pattern of membership in voluntary associations of adult Americans in general, and of specific sub-groups, such as racial and religious minorities; (2) some correlates of membership which might be considered determinants, for example, socio-economic status, urban or rural residence; and (3) some of the correlates of membership which might be considered consequences of significance to theories about such functions of voluntary association membership for society as interest in politics, voting, and charitable activity.

METHOD AND DATA

Solutions of these problems are provided by secondary analysis of recent survey data, where the universes studied often approximate the national adult population and where the samples have been drawn through probability designs. Through good fortune, a number of nationwide and local surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center have contained one or more questions on voluntary association memberships. These items provide substantial information on the actual magnitude and pattern of voluntary association membership of the American people and of sub-groups within the general population. Secondary analysis of these surveys can also provide evidence about numerous sociological determinants of membership, which have figured in past speculative discussions but have seldom been supported by much empirical data, for example, the effect of urbanization upon membership. In addition, the surveys often contain data on possible determinants of membership which have rarely been treated, either speculatively or empirically, in past writings. Thus data are available on various situational factors which might facilitate or impede membership and participation, such as parenthood, residential mobility, travel time to work, and the like. For many of these latter analyses, it is necessary to consult sample surveys which were conducted on local rather than national populations, but here too all the inquiries have the merit of being based on large samples drawn by a probability design. Therefore, though limited to the cities or counties involved, they still constitute reliable evidence concerning hypotheses based on representative sampling. Finally, by secondary analysis tabulation of voluntary association membership is possible, not only by hypothesized determinants, but also by the customary questions asked in such surveys about attitudes, opinions, interests, conduct, and so on. In this manner, some empirical perspective may be obtained on the fundamental question of the functions of organizational membership for citizens in a democratic society.

Admittedly there are serious limitations to such secondary analysis. Foremost among these is the reliance put upon questions not primarily designed for the study of voluntary association memberships. Since data on such memberships were only incidental to the primary purposes of the surveys, the questioning in this area is not as thorough as might be desired. Furthermore, the wording of

HERBERT H. HYMAN
C. 7. 05

questions about membership varies from study to study, hence complicating the analysis. Nevertheless, we believe that these inherent limitations of secondary analysis are more than offset by the gains which have been outlined above.

The bulk of the analysis to be presented is based on two national probability samples of the adult, non-institutionalized population of the United States, over 21 years of age. The first sample contains 2,809 men and women, and the second 2,379. The studies were conducted in the years 1953 and 1955. In addition to the national data, findings on voluntary association membership were available for representative samples from NORC studies of the following localities: a large metropolitan area (New York metropolitan area represented by a probability sample of 1,053 cases drawn in 1951); a medium sized Western metropolis (Denver represented by a probability sample of 920 cases obtained in the spring of 1949); a small city and surrounding county (Findley and Hancock County, Ohio, represented by 535 cases drawn in May, 1952). The local findings on magnitude of membership and its social distribution are not presented in detail, although, where confirmation or contradiction occurs, some brief reference will be made. They will be used to examine hypotheses about particular variables, however, which are not demonstrable on a national scale.

FINDINGS

Memberships of Americans

Data from the national surveys confirm the conclusions drawn by previous researchers based on local studies, which showed that a sizeable group of Americans are not members of any voluntary associations and that only a minority belong to more than one such organization. . . . Data from two surveys [were used], one of which inquired about the voluntary association membership of *any* member of the family, the other survey pertained to activities of the respondent himself. Calculated either way, voluntary association membership is not a major characteristic of Americans. Nearly half of the families (47 per cent) and almost two-thirds of the respondents (64 per cent) belong to no voluntary associations. About a third of the families (31 per cent) and a fifth of the respondents belong to only one such organization. Only about a fifth of the families (21 per cent) and a sixth of the respondents (16 per cent) belong to two or more organizations. These findings hardly warrant the impression that Americans are a nation of joiners.

Data on the types of organizations to which Americans belong are also revealing. In the 1953 survey, which contained an account of organizations to which any family member belonged, only two (unions and fraternal or secret societies) have relatively large memberships, 23 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. Next in order are neighborhood-ethnic-special interest groups (8 per cent), veterans' organizations (7 per cent), civic organizations (5 per cent), church sponsored organizations (3 per cent), youth organizations (2 per cent), and professional and learned societies (2 per cent). These findings provide national perspective on the data recorded by former studies of local populations, such as the Detroit Area Study, in which unions and fraternal organizations also accounted for more of the citizens' voluntary memberships than any other type of association.

Racial and Religious Subgroups

. . . Figures [were collected] on the membership patterns for two types of subgroups within American society: racial and religious. Comparison of Negro and white respondents shows that voluntary association membership is somewhat more

characteristic of whites than Negroes. Less than half (46 per cent) of the white families and 63 per cent of the white respondents belong to no associations in contrast to 60 per cent of the Negro families and 73 per cent of the Negro adults. And nearly a quarter (23 per cent) of the white families belong to two or more organizations in contrast to only 11 per cent of the Negro families.

Differences in rates of membership also distinguish the major religious subgroups of the population. Whether measured on a family or individual basis, the highest rate of membership is found among the Jews. On a family basis, the next highest participants in voluntary associations are the Catholics (56 per cent), and the least active are the Protestants (51 per cent). Data on individual memberships, however, are different, with a higher percentage of Protestants than Catholics belonging to any organizations.

Interesting comparisons with national data on memberships of religious subgroups are available from the local studies of New York City and Denver. In both cities the ordering of memberships agrees with the national sample on individual memberships: the rate of membership is highest for Jews, next for Protestants and lowest for Catholics. In New York, 64 per cent of the Jewish respondents reported membership in at least one voluntary association, 54 per cent of the Protestants and 37 per cent of the Catholics. In Denver, the membership rates were 77 per cent for Jews, 65 per cent for Protestants and 55 per cent for Catholics. Thus the Catholic membership rates in these urban settings appear lower than those of the Jews and Protestants, as in the 1955 national survey.

Social Stratification and Membership

On the local level, several studies have demonstrated a relationship between the social status of the respondent, as measured by a variety of indices, and membership in voluntary associations. These studies generally agree that there is an increase in the percentage of memberships in formal associations the higher the status of the respondents. The magnitude of the difference in membership between classes varies considerably, however, from study to study. For example, Komarovsky found that 60 per cent of working class men in her sample of New Yorkers belonged to no voluntary association in contrast to only 53 per cent of white collar workers. Similarly Dotson's study of families in New Haven reported that 70 per cent of the working class adults in his sample belonged to no organizations. On the other hand, Bell and Force in a study of San Francisco report that even in low status neighborhoods about three-quarters of the men belong to at least one formal group.

Data from the national samples support the correlation between social status and membership. Table 1 presents data on the membership of the 1955 sample classified by five indices of social status: family income, education of respondent, interviewer's rating of family's level of living, occupation of head of household, and home ownership. Whichever index of status is used, an appreciably higher percentage of persons in higher status positions belong to voluntary associations than do persons of lower status. For example, fully 76 per cent of the respondents whose family income falls below 2,000 dollars do not belong to any organizations in contrast to only 48 per cent of those whose income is 7,500 dollars or more. Furthermore, there is an increase in the percentage of persons who belong to several organizations as social status increases. For example, only 7 per cent of the lowest income group belong to two or more associations in contrast to 30 per cent of the highest income group. Similar findings are obtained from inspec-

tion of the data on education, level of living, occupation, and home ownership, as examination of Table 1 reveals.

TABLE 1
INDICES OF STRATIFICATION AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP, 1955*

	Per Cent Who Belong to:			
	No Organization	One Organization	Two or More	No. of Cases (100%)
A. Income level				
Under \$2,000	76	17	7	385
2,000-2,999	71	17	12	304
3,000-3,999	71	18	11	379
4,000-4,999	65	21	14	450
5,000-7,499	57	22	21	524
7,500 and over	48	22	30	328
B. Education				
0-6 years	83	12	5	348
7-8 years	73	17	10	522
9-11 years	67	20	13	495
12 years	57	23	20	610
1-3 years of college	46	24	30	232
4 years of college or more	39	25	36	170
C. Level of Living (Interviewer's rating)				
Very low	92	7	1	125
Below average	81	14	5	580
Average	61	22	17	1,318
Above average	43	25	32	288
Very high	18	18	64	44
D. Occupation				
Professional	47	24	29	259
Prop., mgrs., officials	47	24	29	294
Farm owners	58	28	14	265
Clerical and sales	59	21	20	240
Skilled labor	68	19	13	447
Semi-skilled labor	77	14	9	492
Service	73	18	9	142
Non-farm labor	79	16	5	155
Farm labor	87	13	0	54
Retired, unemployed	77	11	12	35
E. Home ownership				
Owns home	57	22	21	1,407
Rents	75	16	9	968

* Data exclude union membership.
(Source: NORC Survey 367.)

One set of findings warrant special mention. The pattern of voluntary association membership among different occupational levels indicates even less participation among blue collar workers than had been noted in previous local studies. For example, from 68 to 87 per cent of the blue collar workers belong to no organizations (not counting union membership), in contrast to 59 per cent of the white collar workers and 47 per cent of the businessmen and professionals. The higher rate of voluntary association membership among businessmen and professionals is clearly documented by the national data, which show that 29 per cent of the

members of these two occupational categories belong to two or more organizations, in contrast with only 5 to 13 per cent of the blue collar workers. These data extend to the national level a relationship noted by Komarovsky in her New York study, namely that it is only in the business and professional classes that the majority is formally organized.

Urbanization and Voluntary Association Membership

Voluntary associations customarily have been identified as characteristic of the urban way of life, and membership in such associations has been assumed to be more common for city residents than rural people. Recent observers, however, have noted that the spread of urbanization in America is reducing such differences between city and country. Williams,² for example, has noted that "Formally organized special-interest associations are most highly developed in urban areas, but have increasingly pervaded the open country as well." Nevertheless, we have lacked specific information on the differential rates of voluntary association membership of residents of various sized communities. A breakdown of national survey data provides considerable information on this question.

From the 1953 national survey it is possible to determine the number of associational affiliations of family members living in counties of varying degrees of urbanization, taking the size of the largest city in the county as a crude index of its degree of urbanism. Three types of counties can be examined: (1) highly urbanized counties, those with at least one city of 50,000 population or more; (2) moderately urbanized, with at least one city of 10,000 to 50,000 population; and (3) least urbanized, having no city of 10,000 or more. Examination of the memberships of residents of these three types of counties reveals that only 57 per cent of the families who live in highly urbanized counties have members in at least one voluntary association, 53 per cent of those in moderately urbanized counties, and 41 per cent of those living in the least urbanized or predominantly rural counties. Thus some correlation appears between the degree of urbanization and voluntary association membership, although the difference between the most urban and least urban counties is not great.

But the type of county is only a crude index of the social atmosphere within which the citizen lives. Within each county, for example, there are areas of more and less urban nature. Therefore a finer breakdown is desirable in order to determine more precisely the relationship between urbanism and membership in voluntary associations. Table 2 presents data on membership according to urban, rural non-farm, and rural farm residences within each type of county.

Several interesting findings emerge. First, it appears that, with one exception (rural farm residents in moderately urbanized counties) the relationship between urbanization of county and membership in voluntary associations persists. That is, more of the residents of highly urbanized counties belong to organizations than do persons living in similar types of neighborhoods but in less urbanized counties. For example, only 42 per cent of the urbanites in highly urbanized counties belong to no organization, in contrast with 46 per cent of the urbanites in moderately urbanized counties, and 54 per cent in the least urbanized.

Secondly, within each type of county, rural farm residence is more closely associated with non-membership than is either rural non-farm or urban residence. For example, within highly urbanized counties 67 per cent of the rural farm resi-

² Robin Williams, *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951, pp. 467-468.

TABLE 2
URBANISM AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP, 1953

Place of Residence									
Per Cent of Families Whose Members Belong to:	Metropolitan Counties (with City of 50,000 or more)			Other Urbanized Counties (with City of 10,000-50,000)			Primarily Rural Counties (Have No Town of 10,000)		
	Urban Residence	Rural Non-farm	Rural Farm		Urban	RF	Urban	RNF	RF
No organization	42	40	67	46	46	53	54	52	70
One organization		37	21		34	28		24	21
Two or more organizations	58	23	12	54	20	19	46	24	9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Cases	1,394	193	48	294	115	134	110	264	252

(Source: NORC Survey 335.)

dents belong to no voluntary association, in contrast to only 40 per cent of the rural non-farm residents and 42 per cent of the urbanites.

Third, there is *no* appreciable difference between the membership rates of urbanites and rural non-farm residents within any type of county. This finding, in connection with the second, suggests an interesting hypothesis about the spread of urbanism into American suburban and rural areas. If the countryside were becoming urbanized then one might expect that rural-urban differences would be minimal in counties which contained large cities and maximal in counties still rural. Such is not the case, at least with respect to voluntary association membership. True, the urban pattern of membership prevails in rural non-farm areas but it does not extend to rural farms. Furthermore, an anomaly (requiring further substantiation) appears in that rural farm persons living in *moderately* urbanized counties resemble their urban and rural non-farm neighbors more than do ruralites in either highly urbanized or heavily rural counties. Perhaps this finding means that rural-urban differences in general are polarized—being greatest in both highly urban and highly rural counties and least in partially urbanized areas.

Some Situational Determinants of Membership

In this section some data from the Denver survey are examined to clarify certain situational factors which might be presumed to affect urban participation in voluntary associations. Specifically, data are presented on the effect of length of residence in the community, length of residence at the same address, type of residence (for example, single family dwelling versus apartment), travel time to work, and family status (for example, single, married with children or without children). The presumed influence of such factors is illustrated by the hypothesis that long-time residents in the community or in the neighborhood are more likely to be involved in formal organizations. Or, persons living in apartments might be expected to participate less in voluntary associations than those living in single family dwellings. Persons who spend less time commuting to work, it may be argued, should have more time to devote to organizations and therefore should show a higher incidence of membership. Similarly, single men and women, who are unencumbered by children, might have more spare time and hence be more

apt to belong to voluntary groups. Table 3 presents data which fail to support several of these arguments.

TABLE 3
SOME SITUATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP:
EVIDENCE FROM DENVER SURVEY

	Percentage of Each Type Who Belong to Voluntary Associations	No. of Cases in Base
A. Residential history		
Born in Denver or lived there at least 20 years	65	504
Lived in Denver less than 20 years	62	404
Lived in Denver at present address over 20 years	63	200
Lived at present address for 5 to 20 years	67	346
Lived at present address less than 5 years	60	358
B. Residential mobility		
Moved to Denver from place of under 2,500 population	61	272
Moved from place of 2,500 to 25,000 population	60	205
Moved from place larger than 25,000	64	281
C. Type of residence		
Single family house rented	57	81
Multiple family dwelling, rented	59	165
Apartment building, rented	60	117
Owned, all types of dwelling	67	512
D. Travel time to work		
45 minutes or more daily	60	81
35-44 minutes	70	185
30-34 minutes	64	256
25-29 minutes	66	192
Less than 25 minutes	57	205
E. Family status		
Men: Not married	66	79
Married, no children under 18 years old	74	182
Married, with children under 18 years old	82	162
Women: Not married	51	149
Married, no children under 18 years old	53	174
Married, with children under 18 years old	56	174

(Source: Denver Community Survey, NORC-12B.)

None of the residential factors shows a systematic relationship with the incidence of affiliation with voluntary associations. For example, persons born in Denver are hardly more likely to belong to voluntary associations than those who have arrived recently. Apartment dwellers are slightly more likely to be voluntary association members than persons renting houses. Commuters who spend more than 45 minutes getting to work are about as likely to belong to organizations as are those people who have to travel only 25 minutes or less.

Only two of these situational factors—home ownership and family status—seem related to voluntary association membership. Home ownership as a determinant of membership, as brought out above, is related to social stratification. The data on family status show that married persons are more likely to be members of organizations than single persons; and that men and women with children are more likely to be members than childless couples. One might hypothesize that

children—and perhaps the expectation of children—draw adults into participation in the voluntary associations in the urban community. This finding corroborates that of Janowitz in his study of Chicago residents in which he notes that neighborhood involvement often centers around activities connected with the rearing of children in a metropolis. As Janowitz remarks, on the neighborhood level, “children are not only the best neighbors in the community but they lead their parents to neighborhood community participation and orientation.”³

Civic Involvement of Voluntary Association Membership

In this final section, data from the Denver Survey are presented which demonstrate psychological and behavioral differences between citizens who are members and those who are not members of formal organizations. Admittedly the data do not indicate that such differences can be attributed solely to the respondents' patterns of associational membership. Clearly several factors already established as correlates of membership (for example, high socio-economic status, occupation, place of residence) may also account for differences in political interest, voting and charitable acts of members and non-members. The authors feel, however, that comparison of members and non-members without controlling these associated factors is proper insofar as the purpose is solely to *describe* the differences between persons who are or are not members of voluntary associations, regardless of the ultimate causes of such differences. Hence Table 4 presents simple comparisons between the formally organized and unorganized, concerning their interest in political topics, voting records, and contributions to charity.

TABLE 4
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND BEHAVIOR ASSOCIATED WITH VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION
MEMBERSHIP: EVIDENCE FROM DENVER SURVEY, 1949

	Persons Who Were Members of:	
	No Organizations	One or More Organizations
A. Per cent who said they take “a great deal” of interest in:		
Presidential elections	73	84
Unemployment in the U. S.	53	57
The Denver public schools	33	50
City planning in Denver	31	50
Labor Relations	31	45
The situation of Denver Negroes	23	35
B. Per cent who voted in each of the following elections:		
1944 Presidential	36	40
1946 Congressional	27	36
1947 City charter	15	24
1948 Primary	24	34
C. Per cent who report making a contribution to the Community Chest in Denver		
Total Cases	56	72
	335	585

(Source: Denver Community Survey, NORC-12B.)

³ Morris Janowitz, *The Community Press in an Urban Setting*, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952, p. 124. Janowitz's remark is made in connection with family structure as a determinant of readership of the community press, but its import extends to other forms of involvement in community activities.

Several measures of interest in public affairs (including presidential elections, unemployment, labor relations, minority problems, public schools, and city planning) indicate that persons belonging to voluntary associations are more concerned with such topics than are non-members. For example, fully 84 per cent of the Denverites who belonged to any voluntary association said they took a great deal of interest in presidential elections, in contrast with only 73 per cent of the non-members. And members were more likely than non-members to be interested in city planning, 50 per cent to 31 per cent respectively.

Political interest is backed by participation in the political process, insofar as participation is measured by voting. Data on behavior in four elections—the 1944 Presidential, 1946 Congressional, 1947 City Charter, and 1948 Primary—indicate in every instance a greater percentage of voting among Denverites who were members of voluntary associations than among non-members.

Finally, in the non-political sphere of community life, charity, 72 per cent of the persons belonging to associations reported having made a contribution to the Community Chest in Denver in contrast to 56 per cent of the non-members.

Thus three separate measures—interest in social issues, voting, and support of community charities—show that voluntary association participants are more involved civically than the non-members. Further research might fruitfully be addressed to such questions as the following: (1) to what extent does the citizen's interest in public affairs lead him to join voluntary associations; (2) to what extent do the voluntary associations contribute to their members' interest in public affairs; (3) to what extent is membership in one or more voluntary associations functional for the citizen who has a great deal of interest in public affairs? Questions of this order, however, fall beyond the scope of this secondary analysis.

SUMMARY

A secondary analysis of two national and several local surveys provides evidence on the topics: the pattern of membership in voluntary associations of Americans in general and of such specific subgroups as class and religion; some possible determinants of membership, for example, socio-economic status; and certain correlates of membership which relate to civic participation, for example, interest in public issues and voting.

The major findings are listed below in abbreviated form. In each case, the major source of data, that is, national or local survey, is indicated in parentheses. Subject to the qualifications noted above, the major findings are:

(1) Voluntary association membership is not characteristic of the majority of Americans (National).

(2) A relatively small percentage of Americans belong to two or more voluntary associations (National).

(3) Membership is more characteristic of the white than Negro population (National).

(4) Membership is more characteristic of Jewish than Protestant persons, and of Protestant than Catholics (National).

(5) Membership is directly related to socio-economic status, as measured by level of income, occupation, home ownership, interviewer's rating of level of living, and education (National).

(6) Membership is more characteristic of urban and rural non-farm residents than of rural farm residents (National).

(7) Membership does not appear to be related to a variety of situational factors, for

example, length of residence in the community, length of residence at the same address, type of dwelling unit, commuting time to work (Denver).

(8) Membership is related to family status, being higher for couples with children than without (Denver).

(9) Membership is accompanied by a greater interest in such public affairs as unemployment problems, city planning, and public schools (Denver).

(10) Membership is associated with voting in Presidential, Congressional, and local elections (Denver).

(11) Membership is associated with support for local charities (Denver).

3

Cultures and Subcultures

Culture is shared, learned behavior. Certain ideas, attitudes, and values are expected and accepted in any society. The widespread acceptance of a set of attitudes and values results in widely shared behaviors. These patterned behaviors found throughout a society are called its culture.

Within the society, particularly if it is specialized and urban-industrial, will be found groups or categories of people who share subcultures. Such groups or categories will participate in the total culture; they will share the behaviors which most members of their society have learned, but they will also have learned a set of behaviors peculiar to their group.

An example of a subculture within the boundaries of the culture of contemporary United States is the value system and behaviors of the prize fighter. In "The Occupational Culture of the Boxer," S. Kirson Weinberg and Henry Arond emphasize the impact of ethnic minority status and of low socioeconomic status in shaping the boxer's occupational subculture.

Gordon H. Barker and W. Thomas Adams, in "The Social Structure of a Correctional Institution," illustrate a point which is pertinent to the understanding of any social organization: the way in which a group is put together helps determine the patterns of behavior which will be shared and learned by members of the group. This is particularly easy to see, of course, when the structure is to a great extent imposed upon the members, as it is in a prison or any other relatively authoritarian situation.

The values of a group help determine how its members will organize their activities; the kind of organization they set up shapes their patterns of behavior. The constant interplay of social structure and culture can be seen in both of the selections in this chapter.

S. Kirson Weinberg and Henry Arond

The Occupational Culture of the Boxer¹

Herein is described the culture of the professional boxer as discovered by personal experience, by reading of firsthand literature, and by interview with sixty-eight boxers and former boxers, seven trainers, and five managers.² The aspects covered are recruitment, practices and beliefs, and the social structure of the boxing world.

RECRUITMENT

Professional boxers are adolescents and young men. Nearly all are of low socio-economic background. Only two of our fighters might possibly have been of middle-class family. Most are immigrants to the city and are children of such. Their residences at the time of becoming boxers are distributed like the commoner forms of social disorganization, being almost all near the center of the city. Nearly all Chicago boxers lived on the Near South and Near West sides. There is an ethnic succession of boxers which corresponds to that of the ethnic groups in these areas. First Irish, then Jewish, then Italian, were most numerous among prominent boxers; now, Negroes (Table 1).

TABLE 1
RANK ORDER OF NUMBER OF PROMINENT BOXERS OF VARIOUS ETHNIC
GROUPS FOR CERTAIN YEARS*

Year	Rank		
	1	2	3
1909.....	Irish	German	English
1916.....	Irish	German	Italian
1928.....	Jewish	Italian	Irish
1936.....	Italian	Irish	Jewish
1948.....	Negro	Italian	Mexican

* Data tabulated from *World's Annual Sporting Record* (1910 and 1917); *Everlast Boxing Record* (1929); *Boxing News Record* (1938); and *Ring* (1948 and 1949). The numbers in the succeeding years are: 103, 118, 300, 201, and 149. There may be biases in the listings, but the predominance of two or three ethnic groups is marked in all the years. The Irish were very much above others in 1909 and 1916 (about 40 per cent of all boxers listed); in 1948 nearly half of all boxers listed were Negro. The Jews and Italians did not have so marked a predominance.

The traditions of an ethnic group, as well as its temporary location at the bottom of the scale, may affect the proportion of its boys who become boxers. Many Irish, but few Scandinavians, have become boxers in this country; many Filipinos, but very few Japanese and Chinese.

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1952, 57:460-469. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

² One of us (Arond) has been a boxer, trainer, and manager. We first determined some common values, beliefs, and practices by a few unstructured interviews. We used the material thus gained to plan guided interviews which would help us sift out what is ethnic from what belongs properly to boxing culture. Mr. Leland White helped in the interviewing.

The juvenile and adolescent culture of the lower socioeconomic levels provides a base for the boxing culture. Individual and gang fights are encouraged. The best fighter is often the most admired, as well as the most feared, member of a gang. A boy who lacks status tries to get it and to restore his self-esteem by fighting.³ Successful amateur and professional boxers furnish highly visible role-models to the boys of the slum; this is especially so among urban Negroes at present. Since he has otherwise little hope of any but unskilled, disagreeable work, the boxing way to money and prestige may appear very attractive. As an old-time manager put it, "Where else can a poor kid get a stake as fast as he can in boxing?"

Since the ability to fight is a matter of status among one's peers, is learned in play, and is the accepted means of expressing hostility and settling disputes, boys learn to fight early.

One fighter thought of becoming a boxer at the age of ten, because he could not participate in team games as a child; his mother insisted that he had a "bad heart." He stated: "I tried to fight as soon as I got old enough, to be the roughest, toughest kid on the block." He fought so frequently and was arrested so often for fighting that one policeman told him that he might as well get paid for it. At the age of fourteen he participated in fights in vacant lots in the neighborhood. Because of his prowess as a fighter, the other boys in the neighborhood began to respect him more, and he began to associate status with fighting. When he was about seventeen, an amateur fighter told him about a gymnasium where he could learn to become a "ring fighter" instead of a "street fighter." He claimed: "I love fighting. I would rather fight than eat."

Most boxers seem to have been influenced to become "ring fighters" by a boxer in the neighborhood or by a member of the family. One middleweight champion claimed that he "took after" his brother, followed him to the gymnasium, imitated him, and thus decided to be a boxer before he was fifteen years old. Another fighter was inspired by a neighbor and became his protégé. He continually followed his hero to the gymnasium and learned to fight himself. Eventually the neighbor induced his manager to take his protégé into the stable. A third fighter has stated:

I was twelve when I went to the gym first. If there's a fighter in the neighborhood, the kids always look up to him because they think he's tough. There was an amateur in my neighborhood and he was a kind of hero to all us kids. It was him that took me to the gym the first time.

A former welterweight and middleweight champion who has been boxing since he was eleven years old has written in a similar vein:

I didn't do any boxing before I left Detroit. I was too little. But I was already interested in it, partly because I idolized a big Golden Gloves heavyweight who lived on the same block with us. I used to hang around the Brewster Center Gym all the time watching him train. His name was Joe Louis. Whenever Joe was in the gym so was I. He was my idol then just like he is today. I've always wanted to be like him.

Some managers and trainers of local gymnasiums directly seek out boys who like to fight and who take fighters as their models. One such manager says that

³ Some juveniles who fought continually to retrieve their self-esteem and also in sheer self-defense later became boxers. One adolescent who was half-Negro and half-Indian was induced to become a boxer by a trainer who saw him beat two white opponents in a street fight. Another boxer admitted that he fought continually because other boys called him a "sissy." A third boxer fought continually because he was small and other boys picked on him. This compensatory drive among boxers is not unusual.

he sought boys who were considered the "toughest in the block" or "natural fighters." He would get them to come to the gym and to become amateur boxers. He entered some in tournaments, from which he received some "cut," then sifted out the most promising for professional work.

It is believed by many in boxing circles that those in the lower socioeconomic levels make the "best fighters":

They say that too much education softens a man and that is why the college graduates are not good fighters. They fight emotionally on the gridiron and they fight bravely and well in our wars, but their contributions in our rings have been insignificant. The ring has been described as the refuge of the under-privileged. Out of the downtrodden have come our greatest fighters. . . . An education is an escape, and that is what they are saying when they shake their heads—those who know the fight game—as you mention the name of a college fighter. Once the bell rings, they want their fighters to have no retreat, and a fighter with an education is a fighter who does not have to fight to live and he knows it. . . . Only for the hungry fighter is it a decent gamble.

It can be inferred tentatively that the social processes among juveniles and adolescents in the lower socioeconomic levels, such as individual and gang fights, the fantasies of "easy money," the lack of accessible vocational opportunities, and the general isolation from the middle-class culture, are similar for those who become professional boxers as for those who become delinquents. The difference resides in the role-model the boy picks, whether criminal or boxer. The presence of one or several successful boxers in an area stimulates boys of the same ethnic groups to follow in their footsteps. Boxing, as well as other sports and certain kinds of entertainment, offers slum boys the hope of quick success without deviant behavior (although, of course, some boxers have been juvenile delinquents).

Within the neighborhood the professional boxer orients his behavior and routine around the role of boxer. Usually acquiring some measure of prestige in the neighborhood, he is no longer a factory hand or an unskilled laborer. He is admired, often has a small coterie of followers, and begins to dress smartly and loudly and to conceive of himself as a neighborhood celebrity, whether or not he has money at the time. Nurtured by the praise of the trainer or manager, he has hopes that eventually he will ascend to "big-time fights" and to "big money." The money that he does make in his amateur and early professional fights by comparison with his former earnings seems a lot to him.

OCCUPATIONAL CULTURE OF THE BOXER

The intrinsic occupational culture of the boxer is composed of techniques, illusions, aspirations, and structured roles which every boxer internalizes in some measure and which motivate him both inside and outside the ring. At the outset of his career the boxer becomes impressed with the need for training to improve his physical condition and to acquire the skills necessary to win fights and to avoid needless injury. When he has such status as to be sought out by promoters, he assigns a specified interval for training before the bout. But in the preliminary ranks he must keep himself in excellent physical shape most of the time, because he does not know when he will be summoned to fight. He may be booked as a substitute and cannot easily refuse the match. If he does, he may find it difficult to get another bout. The particular bout may be the chance he has been hoping for. The fighter is warned persistently by tales of the ritualistic necessity of "getting in shape" and of the dire consequences if he does not. "There is no more pitiable

sight." stated one boxer, "than to see a fighter get into the ring out of condition."

The boxer comes to regard his body, especially his hands, as his stock-in-trade. Boxers have varied formulas for preventing their hands from excess swelling, from excessive pain, or from being broken. This does not mean a hypochondriacal interest, because they emphasize virility and learn to slough off and to disdain punishment. But fighters continually seek nostrums and exercises for improving their bodies. One practiced Yogi, another became a physical cultist, a third went on periodic fasts; others seek out lotions, vitamins, and other means of improving their endurance, alertness, and punching power.

"You have to live up to being a fighter." This phrase justifies their deprivations and regulated living. There is also a cult of a kind of persevering courage, called a "fighting heart," which means "never admitting defeat." The fighter learns early that his exhibited courage—his ability, if necessary, to go down fighting—characterizes the respected, audience-pleasing boxer. He must cherish the lingering hope that he can win by a few more punches. One fighter was so severely beaten by another that the referee stopped the bout. The brother of the beaten fighter, a former fighter himself, became so outraged that he climbed into the ring and started to brawl with the referee. In another instance a boxer incurred a very severe eye injury, which would have meant the loss of his sight. But he insisted on continuing to fight, despite the warnings of his seconds. When the fight was stopped, he protested. This common attitude among boxers is reinforced by the demands of the spectators, who generally cheer a "game fighter." Thus the beaten fighter may become a "crowd-pleaser" and may get matches despite his defeat. On the other hand, some fighters who are influenced by friends, by wives, or by sheer experience recognize that sustained beatings may leave permanent injuries and voluntarily quit when they are beaten. But the spirit of the code is that the boxer continue to fight regardless of injuries. "If a man quits a fight, an honest fight," claimed one fighter, "he has no business there in the first place."

Fighters who remain in the sport are always hopeful of occupational climbing. This attitude may initially be due to a definite self-centeredness, but it is intensified by the character of boxing. Boxing is done by single contestants, not by teams. Emphasis is on the boxer as a distinct individual. The mores among boxers are such that fighters seldom admit to others that they are "punchy" or "washed-up." One fighter said: "You can tell another fighter to quit, but you can't call him punchy. If you do, he'll punch you to show you he still has a punch." He has to keep up his front.

Further, the boxer is involved in a scheme of relationships and traditions which focus upon building confidence. The boxing tradition is full of legends of feats of exceptional fighters. Most gymnasiums have pictures of past and present outstanding boxers on the wall, and identification with them comes easy for the incoming fighters. Past fights are revived in tales. Exceptional fighters of the past and present are compared and appraised. Second, the individual boxer is continually assured and reassured that he is "great" and that he is "coming up." As a result, many fighters seem to overrate their ability and to feel that all they need are "lucky breaks" to become champions or leading contenders. Many get self-important and carry scrapbooks of their newspaper write-ups and pictures.

The process of stimulating morale among fighters is an integral accompaniment of the acquisition of boxing skills and body conditioning. The exceptions are the part-time fighters who hold outside jobs and who are in the preliminary ranks.

They tend to remain on the periphery of the boxing culture and thus have a somewhat different perspective on the mobility aspects of the sport.

Since most bouts are unpredictable, boxers usually have superstitions which serve to create confidence and emotional security among them. Sometimes the manager or trainer uses these superstitions to control the fighter. One fighter believed that, if he ate certain foods, he was sure to win, because these foods gave him strength. Others insist on wearing the same robe in which they won their first fight: one wore an Indian blanket when he entered the ring. Many have charm pieces or attribute added importance to entering the ring after the opponent. Joe Louis insisted on using a certain dressing-room at Madison Square Garden. Some insist that, if a woman watches them train, it is bad luck. One fighter, to show he was not superstitious, would walk under a ladder before every fight, until this became a magical rite itself. Consistent with this attitude, many intensify their religious attitudes and keep Bibles in their lockers. One fighter kept a rosary in his glove. If he lost the rosary, he would spend the morning before the fight in church. Although this superstitious attitude may be imported from local or ethnic culture, it is intensified among the boxers themselves, whether they are white or Negro, preliminary fighters or champions.

When a fighter likes the style, punch, or movement of another fighter, he may wear the latter's trunks or one of his socks or rub him on the back. In training camps some fighters make a point of sleeping in the bed that a champion once occupied. For this reason, in part, some take the names of former fighters. All these practices focus toward the perspective of "filling the place" or taking the role of the other esteemed fighter. Moreover, many fighters deliberately copy the modes of training, the style, and the general movements of role-models.

Since fighters, in the process of training, become keyed to a finely balanced physical and emotional condition and frequently are irritable, restless, and anxious, they also grow dependent and suggestible. The superstitions and the reassuring statements of the trainer and manager both unwittingly and wittingly serve to bolster their confidence.

Before and during the bout, self-confidence is essential. Fighters or their seconds try to unnerve the opponent. They may try to outstare him or may make some irritating or deflating remarks or gestures. In the ring, tactical self-confidence is expressed in the boxer's general physical condition and movements. His ability to outslug, to outspar, or to absorb punishment is part of his morale. The ability not to go down, to outmaneuver the other contestant, to change his style in whole or in part, to retrieve his strength quickly, or to place the opponent off-balance inevitably affect the latter's confidence. A fighter can *feel* whether he will win a bout during the early rounds, but he is always wary of the dreaded single punch or the unexpected rally.

Boxers become typed by their style and manner in the ring. A "puncher" or "mauler" differs from a "boxer" and certainly from a "cream puff," who is unable to hit hard. A "miller," or continual swinger, differs from one who saves his energy by fewer movements. A "butcher" is recognized by his tendency to hit hard and ruthlessly when another boxer is helpless, inflicting needless damage. A "tanker" is one who goes down easily, sometimes in a fixed fight or "set-up." The "mechanical" fighter differs from the "smart" fighter, for among the "smart" fighters are really the esteemed fighters, those who are capable of improvising and reformulating their style of devising original punches and leg movements, of

cunningly outmaneuvering their opponents. and of possessing the compensatory hostility, deadly impulsiveness, and quick reflexes to finish off their opponents in the vital split second.

Boxers have to contend with fouls and quasi-fouls in the ring. At present, these tactics seemingly are becoming more frequent. They may have to contend with "heeling," the maneuver by which the fighter, during clinches, shoves the laced part of his glove over the opponent's wound, particularly an "eye" wound, to open or exacerbate it, with "thumbing" in the eye, with "butting" by the head, with having their insteps stepped on hard during clinches, with punches in back of the head or in the kidneys, or with being tripped. These tactics, which technically are fouls may be executed so quickly and so cleverly that the referee does not detect them. When detected, the fighter may be warned or, at worst, may lose the round. The boxers are thus placed in a situation fraught with tension, physical punishment, and eventual fatigue. They may be harassed by the spectators. Their protection consists of their physical condition and their acquired confidence. Moreover, the outcome of the fight is decisive for their status and self-esteem.

The boxer's persistent display of aggression is an aspect of status. Thus his aggression becomes impersonal, although competition is intense. Thus two boxers may be friends outside the ring, but each will try to knock the other out in a bout, and after the bout they may be as friendly as competition permits. Furthermore, the injury done to an opponent, such as maiming or killing, is quickly rationalized away by an effective trainer or manager in order to prevent an access of intense guilt, which can ruin a fighter. The general reaction is that the opponent is out to do the same thing to him and that this is the purpose of boxing: namely, to beat the opponent into submission. The exception is the "grudge fight," in which personal hostility is clearly manifest.

In a succession of bouts, if the fighter is at all successful, he goes through a fluctuating routine, in which tension mounts during training, is concentrated during the fight, and is discharged in the usual celebration, which most victorious fighters regard as their inevitable reward. Hence many boxers pursue a fast tempo of living and spend lavishly on clothes, women, gambling, and drink, practices seemingly tolerated by the manager and encouraged by the persons who are attracted to boxers. Many boxers experience intense conflict between the ordeals of training and the pursuits of pleasure.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Boxers comprise a highly stratified occupation. Rank is determined by their rating in a weight division, by their position in a match, and by their status with stablemates who have the same manager. Annually, for each weight division, fighters are ranked. The champion and about twenty leading contenders are listed on top. The other fighters are listed into "A," "B," and "C" categories. Many local preliminary fighters are not listed. Only the first twenty contenders and the "A" category seem to have any importance. Of 1,831 fighters listed for 1950, 8.8 per cent comprised the champion and leading contenders; 16.9 per cent were in the "A" category; 74.3 per cent were in the "B" and "C" categories.

To determine the vertical mobility of fighters, the careers of 127 fighters were traced from 1938 onward. Of these, 107, or 84.2 per cent, remained in the local preliminary or semiwindup category. Eleven boxers, or 8.7 per cent, became local headliners, which may be in the "A" category. They had been professional boxers for an average of almost eight years. Eight boxers, or 7.1 per cent, achieved national

recognition, that is, among the first ten leading contenders. They also had been professionals for an average of almost eight years. One fighter became the champion after twelve years in the ring.

The boxers who remain in the sport believe that they can ascend to the top because of the character of the boxing culture, in which the exceptional boxer is emphasized and with whom the aspiring boxer identifies. When the boxer ceases to aspire, he quits or becomes a part-time boxer. Yet the aspiring hopes of many boxers are not unfounded, because climbing in the sport does not depend upon ability only and also can be a result of a "lucky break."

RELATIONSHIPS OF THE BOXER

Boxers live in a wide social milieu of trainers, managers, and promoters. The boxer and trainer usually form the closest relationships in the boxing milieu. At one time, many managers were trainers, too; and a few owners of local gymnasiums still combine these roles, but their number has declined. Furthermore, the relationships between boxer and trainer are becoming increasingly impersonal. Consequently, the careful training and social intimacy which characterized the conditioning of many boxers by trainers in the past has also declined.

Generally, the specialized trainer or trainer-manager represents the authority-figure to the boxer, transmits boxing skills to him, and becomes his anchor point of emotional security. The trainer's relationship with the boxer becomes crucial to his development. The effective trainer polishes his skills, compels him to train regularly, and distracts him from worrying about the fight, and he can control him by withdrawing praise or can restore his morale when he has lost. For example, a trainer reviewed a lost fight to his charge so skilfully that the boxer began to believe that his opponent had won by a few lucky punches. Had he averted these "lucky" punches, the fighter felt that he would have won. His confidence restored, he renewed his training with added vigor and determination.

The trainer may be of distinct help to the boxer during the bout. Frequently his "second," he may advise him of his opponent's weaknesses and of his own faults. In addition, he can be a continuing source of confidence to the fighter. A fighter recalled that before a bout his trainer became ill. He felt alone and somewhat diffident when the fight began. He regained his confidence in the third round, when he felt that his opponent could not hurt him. Since the trainer can become so emotionally close to the fighter, he can help or hinder him, depending upon his insight and knowledge of boxing. Though very important to the fighter, the trainer is not a powerful figure in the boxing hierarchy, and some trainers are as exploited as are fighters by the managers.

One boxer has characterized managers as follows: "Some managers are interested in the money first and in the man second; other managers are interested in the man first." Our observations lead us to infer that the vast majority of managers at the present time are in the first category. They regard boxing as a business and the fighter as a commodity and are concerned mainly with making money. To do so, they are compelled to please the promoters and to sell their fighters' abilities to the promoters. Unless the manager is also a trainer, he is not concerned with the techniques of boxing, except to publicize his charge and to arrange matches which will bring the most revenue.

While the boxer devotes his aggressions to training and fighting, the manager slants his aggressions to machinations for better matches and for more money. Having few illusions about the fight business, acquainted with and often accepting

its seamier side, he conforms to the standard managerial pattern of having the advantage over "his" boxers in every way. First, managers are organized into a guild, and, though some managers will try to steal boxers from one another, they usually bar fighters who run out on managers. (One boxer, on the other hand, tried to organize fighters into a union. His efforts were squelched quickly, and he was informally blackballed from fighting in New York City.) Second, many managers try to keep their fighters financially and, if possible, emotionally tie to them. Some managers will encourage fighters to borrow money from them and usually will not discourage them from squandering their earnings. One manager stated characteristically: "It's good to have a fighter 'in you' for a couple of bucks." By having fighters financially indebted to them, they have an easy expedient for controlling individuals who are unusually headstrong. Some fighters are in the continual process of regarding every fight as an essential means for clearing their debts.

Legally managers cannot receive more than one-third of the fighters' purses, but many do not conform to this rule. Frequently, they take one-half the purse, or they may put their fighters on a flat salary and get the rest. Some managers tell their preliminary fighters that the purse was less than it was actually and thus keep the rest for themselves.

Furthermore, many managers abuse their fighters so as to make money quickly. They may overmatch them with superior fighters, "rush" them into too many fights, force them to fight when they are out of condition, and hint that the fight is "fixed" and instruct them indirectly to lose. A few managers will match their fighters in another state when they are barred in one state because of injuries; they will obtain matches before the required sixty days have elapsed after their fighters have been knocked out. Fighters may be severely hurt, even ruined, by these tactics.

Some managers, however, are concerned mainly with building up their fighters and doing everything possible to develop their maximum ability; but these managers are in the minority. In short, managers have no informal standards to protect their boxers and are guided chiefly by their own personal considerations in these activities.

Since many ruthless individuals and petty racketeers who know little about boxing are increasingly drawn into this sport with the prime purpose of making money quickly, boxers tend to have little, if any, protection from managers except that provided by boxing commissions, whose rules can be evaded without difficulty. Moreover, it is extremely difficult for a boxer to climb or get important matches unless he has an effective manager.

THE BOXER AND THE PROMOTER

The boxer's relationship with the promoter is usually indirect. Yet the promoter is the most influential person in the boxing hierarchy. He is primarily a showman and businessman, emotionally removed from the fighter, and regards him chiefly as a commodity. His aim is to get the most from his investment. Thus the "show" comes first, regardless of the boxer's welfare. To insure his direct control over many boxers, the promoter, who legally cannot be a manager, may appoint one or a series of "managers" as "fronts" and thus get shares of many boxers' earnings, as well as controlling them. Furthermore, he can reduce the amount of the fighter's share because the nominal manager will not bargain for a larger share. In effect,

most boxers are relatively helpless in dealing with promoters, especially at the present time, because of the monopolistic character of boxing.

When a potentially good fighter wants to meet leading contenders, the manager may have to "cut in" the promoter or "cut in" some other manager who has connections with the promoter. Thus the mobility of the fighter depends in large part upon the manager's relationship to the promoter. When the manager does not have this acceptable relationship and is unwilling to "cut in" a third party, he will not get the desired matches.

Since the promoter is concerned primarily with attracting a large audience, he tries to select and develop fighters who will draw customers. Thus the fighter must have "crowd-pleasing" qualifications in addition to ability. In this connection, the race and ethnic group play a part. A good white fighter is preferred to a good Negro fighter; and in large cities, such as New York and Chicago, a Jewish fighter is considered highly desirable because the majority of fight fans are Jewish and Italian. Despite the efforts of promoters to attract white fighters, especially Jewish fighters, few Jewish fighters have emerged because the role-models and practices in the local Jewish communities have changed. Even Negro fighters, despite their dominance of the sport in quality and quantity of fighters, are increasingly turning to other sports because the role-models are slowly shifting.

The fighter whom a promoter does select for grooming can easily be made mobile once he has shown crowd-pleasing tendencies. He can be, as it were, "nursed" to the top by being matched with opponents who are easy to beat or by meeting "set-ups" who are instructed to lose. Thus he builds up an impressive record and is ready for big-time fights. Hence, it is difficult to tell how competent a fighter is on his early record alone, for his record may be designed for publicity purposes. When a fighter has won all or nearly all of his early matches and then loses repeatedly to leading contenders, he has been "nursed" to the top by the promoter, unless the fighter has incurred an injury in one of his later fights. In these ways the promoter can influence decisively the occupational career of the boxer.

EFFECT UPON THE BOXER

The punitive character of boxing, as well as the social relationships in the boxing milieu, affects the boxer-participants during and after their careers in the ring.

First, the physical effects of boxing, which are intrinsic to the sport, operate to the boxer's detriment. Although boxers may cultivate strong bodies, the direct and indirect injuries from this sport are very high. In addition to the deaths in the ring, one estimate is that 60 per cent of the boxers become mildly punch-drunk and 5 per cent become severely punch-drunk. The severely punch-drunk fighter can be detected by an ambling gait, thickened or retarded speech, mental stereotypy, and a general decline in efficiency. In addition, blindness and visual deficiency are so pervasive that eye injuries are considered virtually as occupational casualties, while misshaped noses and cauliflower ears are afflictions of most boxers who are in sport for five or more years. Despite these injuries, attempts to provide safeguards, such as headguards, have been opposed by the fans and by many boxers because such devices presumably did not "protect" and did not fit into their conceptions of virility and presumed contempt for punishment.

Second, the boxing culture tends to work to the eventual detriment of the boxer. Many boxers tend to continue a particular fight when they are hopelessly beaten

and when they can become severely injured. Many boxers persist in fighting when they have passed their prime and even when they have been injured. For example, one boxer, blind in one eye and barred from fighting in one state, was grateful to his manager for getting him matches in other states. Another old-time boxer has admitted characteristically: "It's hard to quit. Fighting gets into your blood, and you can't get it out." Many fighters try to make one comeback, at least, and some fight until they are definitely punch-drunk.

Boxers find further that, despite their success in the sport, their careers terminate at a relatively early age. Since their physical condition is so decisive to their role, when they feel a decline in their physical prowess, they tend also to acquire the premature feeling of "being old." This attitude is reinforced by others in the sport who refer to them as "old men," meaning old in the occupation. Since boxing has been the vocational medium of status attainment and since they have no other skills to retain that status, many boxers experience a sharp decline in status in their postboxing careers. As an illustration, of ninety-five leading former boxers (i.e., champions and leading contenders), each of whom earned more than \$100,000 during his ring career, eighteen were found to have remained in the sport as trainers or trainer-managers; two became wrestlers; twenty-six worked in, "fronted for," or owned taverns; two were liquor salesmen; eighteen had unskilled jobs, most commonly in the steelmills; six worked in the movies; five were entertainers; two owned or worked in gas stations; three were cab-drivers; three had newsstands; two were janitors; three were bookies; three were associated with the race tracks (two in collecting bets and one as a starter), and two were in business, one of them as a custom tailor. In short, the successful boxers have a relatively quick economic ascent at a relatively young age in terms of earning power. But the punitive character of the sport, the boxers' dependence upon their managers, and their carefree spending during their boxing careers contribute to a quicker economic descent for many boxers. Their economic descent is accompanied by a drop in status and frequently by temporary or prolonged emotional difficulties in readjusting to their new occupational roles.

Gordon H. Barker and W. Thomas Adams

The Social Structure of a Correctional Institution¹

Every social grouping develops patterns of interrelationships that have significance for the members of those groupings. These patterns are sometimes called the social structure and such a structure exists in every assemblage of persons which is more than temporary.

The social structure of an institution which handles more than one hundred boys in a special capacity has a very definite effect on the population of that institution. On occasion this effect may be negative. In fact, there are many important ways in which this social structure may clearly create problems which can be detected through an analysis of the culture patterns that develop among the boys who reside in such institutions as Reformatories, State Industrial Schools, and Orphanages. This paper attempts to analyze this effect of the social structure in a boy's Industrial School which houses two hundred boys or more.

¹ From *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, 1939, 49:417-422. By permission.

Groupings in general vary according to many factors and the effects of these groupings are subject to scrutiny by trained personnel as well as by lay persons. For example, the impact of the family grouping with its emphasis on intense interaction between the parent figures through the male and female role and mother-father roles and their children is very different from that pattern in a community grouping where the roles are more diversified and less personal and intense. The child in the family structure is affected by the intensity and emotional attachments in the interaction. His learning is very different from the learning that occurs in a broader and more impersonal social structure such as a public school system. The social structure of the community is broad and general for the most part and the roles are less distinct. The learning or socialization that occurs in community living is again different from that which exists in the family or the school. . . .

The social structure of an institution which is geared toward re-education of delinquent boys is indeed of a vast range. The major aspects of the structure are centered around an authoritarian system of adult personnel playing the role of the supervisor and the educator of the child. The boy is expected to accept a pattern of submission to the dominance of the adult. He is expected to defer to the demands and decisions and directives of the adult figures. These adults are different from parents because the child is not expected to identify himself emotionally with them as he would with his mother or father. Identification and emotional attachment do not exist for him in this adult-leader situation. His response in learning and development is different from the family life that he has had prior to his commitment to the institution. His learning is based on his ability to conform to the requirements of the personnel in charge. There is very little in the way of idealization and emulation between the authoritarian personnel and the child in the school. The many aspects of contact are different and almost indescribable in the family setting, whereas in the institution, the contact tends to be linear and categoric with little variation in quality.

Another major difference is the existence of a homogeneity in terms of sex. The student population is composed of boys entirely in a special age grouping. The adult personnel is composed of both men and women. The impact of the male population is very different from that of the social structure of the community in which the boy lived prior to his commitment. The very definite problems with sexual matters and identification of this age group are naturally different from those of the broader culture outside. The institutional structure has a profound impact in that at best it is but a substitute, albeit an inadequate substitute of necessity.

CULTURE PATTERNS REVEAL INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

Many problems develop in institutional living, some of which are easily detected through the culture patterns that spring up among the boys. A culture pattern is a way of doing something which is distinct and can be observed as a real and persistent expression over a period of time. . . .

One thing stands out clearly in the relations of the existing culture patterns. This problem of relationships is called polarity. Issues tend to become polarized in extremes very easily in the institutional structure. The barriers between the children and the adults are frequently very rigid and the social distance is acute. Polarity often occurs between ethnic or racial groups with an intense amount of negative feelings developing. There are strong polarities in regard to sexual manifestations. The boys with problems over sexual identification often find themselves alienated from the others through various culture patterns that develop.

Polarity means the absence of good communication lines for the most part. Acceptance of another individual is often impeded by the effect of rigidity of ideas and interaction. Once a person becomes categorized, he often finds that his entire actions are judged in terms of the limited perception of his category that has developed. Polarization often means a reaction by the institutional personnel that becomes entrenched against a particular child or group of children. The possibility of learning or modification is endangered.

In order to break down the barrier in communication that develops through the polarization of issues, a member of the adult personnel must have extraordinary skills and a vast perspective about the total institution. It is difficult for the personnel, for example, to help a child work through a feeling of being considered a bully. The label or concept circulates throughout the institution and thus persons react to the child as if he were expressing his aggressiveness and dominance in all phases of his group living. To effect a change in this situation, the adult person must understand the nature of the interaction of the child with his peers, the feelings he has toward adult-child relationships, his own self-concept, and many other factors. Frequently, institutions reinforce bad self-concepts and behavior patterns by making them seem synonymous with the child in every action he portrays.

The boys outside correctional institutions are not confronted with the same kinds of problems that boys within the gates face. The structure of the institution has many important functions in this regard. For example, a boy in school may have an acute disagreement with a boy next to him and have an impending fight scheduled later in the day. This may become lost in the larger community when the boys leave the schools and have the freedom to go with those whom they choose and where they choose. The freedom of movement is very different for a boy in the larger community structure from what it is for the boy in the institution. If conflicts develop along very personal lines in which there is a desire to engage in fighting, the boys are kept in close association and the tight social structure produces intensity of response. The boys do not have the freedom to get out of the impact of the situation they create when there is a flare-up of hostility. Some courses of action seem to demand immediate attention with little ability to alter the situation. Relationships have a tendency to move under greater stress and tension in a closed structure such as an institution than they do in the broader social systems of the public schools and the neighborhoods.

The behavior problems of the institutional child permeate the closer situational living more intricately than they possibly would in the public school. The boys are forced to live with the problems in all phases of their lives in closed institutions.

The culture patterns of the children in the correctional institutions often are diagnostic of the problems that are created and manifested among the boys. When there is an ability to gain insight from the culture patterns as to the important issues and problems to be dealt with in the institution, the staff that is trained to handle such problems is at a great advantage. Some of these culture patterns are now discussed at length.

"BIG SHOTISM" AS A CULTURE PATTERN

In almost all groupings, power-status hierarchies develop. There is no exception in an Industrial School. The function of the "big-shot" is deeply significant to the entire social structure of the institution. The person who achieves a position of power and dominance over the other boys is the big-shot. There seem to be two distinct types of power leaders. The one is the boy who achieves his position through

brute force. He is able physically to best anyone who counters him. He usually has a cluster of lieutenants who administer his feelings and force throughout the groupings that exist. He solicits favors from others and takes things from them without having to worry about the effects of being detected by the administration. The other boys are afraid to resist in any way. The power arrangement here is very important because a shift in power means a great deal to the entire functioning of the population of the school. There is an intense interplay between the minority groups and the position of the big-shot. Often the size and strength of the minority ethnic group determine which person will be the big-shot.

A very significant thing develops in many institutions. There tend to be very high rates of delinquency among various ethnic groups which seem to have low status positions in the dominant culture. In the southern part of the United States, there are high rates of crime and delinquency among Negroes. There are also high rates in large urban areas. The population of Negroes in some state institutions is frequently very high. In the southwestern and western states, the rates of delinquency are very high among the Spanish-American and Mexican-American children. In some state institutions in these areas, the population of the institution is the reverse of the regular population because the Spanish-Americans are the minority group in these states as a rule. With the tables turned, there are often needs to retaliate against the members of the institutions who are non-Spanish. The reaction is often hostile and aggressive.

Shifts in institutional population often influence patterns of interaction. For instance, if the big-shots and power leaders in a company assignment follow an ethnic line and they are removed either through parole or isolation due to misconduct, the status hierarchy is changed and the new groups begin to vie for power and control. Vengeance and seeking of retribution often provoke a battle between the groups. The symbols and ways of doing things indicate the particular problems that are responses to the problems of ethnic or racial conflicts. When a person in charge is aware of the expressions of prejudice and racial hatred and their effects in the status hierarchy and the total institution, he has an enormously useful insight that he can implement professionally for the purpose of controlling situations.

The second type of leader that often develops in the institution is the so-called charismatic leader. This person holds the groups in his power through their emotional attachment to him. He does not have to apply a strong-arm method of control. He still dictates the events and can have control of the persons with whom he deals and he tends to be the real decision-maker among the boys, but his control is through their identification with his appeal as a strong person. His control is often very tenuous due to the impact of the institutional structure because he finds himself constantly being judged by both the boys and the administrators. Any wrong move that would deflect his character means a problem for him in terms of his mastery of the others around him. There are fewer charismatic leaders than big-shots in institutions for correction.

SEXUAL IDENTIFICATION AS A CULTURE PATTERN

Perhaps the most important cluster of culture patterns exist in the area of sexual identification and dilemma. There are many expressions of these problems in the institutional structure. The boys who come to Industrial schools are usually in the prepuberty or puberty stage and have a sufficient amount of anxiety about their new sexual role. There are times when they wish to experiment with the new surges in their bodies and the new emotional states that exist for them. The contagion of

a large group of boys frequently arouses exaggerated responses. The past training and socialization of the boys means a good deal also in the manner in which the new energies and interests are expressed. There are several striking culture patterns that develop and an analysis of them is very much needed.

In recent studies and observations, there appears to be a large number of children who come to the correctional institutions who were living with their mothers only. Many of the boys have been deserted by their fathers at a very early age and thus the boys have grown up with their mothers. In other cases there are family relationships which indicate that the boys have had a very poor relationship with their fathers due to some form of personal disorganization that the fathers have experienced, such as alcoholism, imprisonment, mental illness, physical incompetence and long records of unemployment and others. Thus the end result is that the fathers have not been good role models for the boys and they have thus failed to assist their children in formulating male role requirements in the culture and internalizing the social skills to play the male role adequately.

Thus a boy may come to the school with a good deal of anxiety about his role position and the needed skills to handle himself properly or, in some cases, he may come with the need to understand what the expectations of the culture are for him as a young man and an eventual male adult. Coupled with this failure to experience this very essential identification and idealization with the adult male figure in the form of the father is the fact that most of these boys have been forced to learn almost exclusively from female figures. Many have mothers who are dominant in their attachment to the child. The over-identification with the feminine figure and the feeling that the mother is the only one who can give warmth and support combine to produce a dependency on the female figure. The anxieties here are very keen. The child also experiences the pressures in his socialization of the compulsion to express his masculinity when he reaches this pre-adolescent and adolescent age. The demands are clear in the culture that he should play the male role and not do anything that would subject him to being called a sissy or too much like a girl. With his identification with the mother and the lack of internalization of male role requirements, he often experiences a good deal of anxiety. Then, his age also indicates that he is developing biologically with a surge of new sexual energy. The dilemma is often very great. If he is left with his peer group as the instructor, he often feels a need to overreact and prove how very tough and masculine he really is and thus his behavior becomes anti-social because he frequently confuses masculinity with being tough and bad and hard. Much delinquency is precisely an expression of this very personal masculine protest.

POLARITY AS A VARIATION OF SEXUAL IDENTIFICATION

Another variation of the problem of sexuality and dilemma can be noted in a polarity that springs up among the boys. When a boy indicates that he is probably possessed with too many feminine traits and has failed to demonstrate his ultra-masculine compulsiveness, he finds himself in a conflict situation. The boys who fall in the category of being feminine, weak, and cowards are called by various names. They may be called "fruits" or "crackouts" or "chickens." They are resented and attacked by the other boys who see themselves as the tough and strong boys. There is a definite polarity that exists between these groups. Social relationships follow these lines in great part. There is also a vague feeling that the matter of

legality and conformity to the institution's rules are associated with being the "crackout" or the "fruit."

The failure to have had a significant identification and emotional attachment with the father in early childhood produces many problems for these boys who come to Industrial schools. There is resentment and belligerence toward the male figure because of the desertion and alienation that has existed between the child and his father. The above discussion indicates the effects of the over-identification with the female figure and the reaction formations that develop. There are also culture patterns that exist which clearly indicate the further problems that the boys have with their male identification anxieties. Again the aspect of polarity is very important. The males with whom the boys would identify are the adult personnel in the institution. These might be teachers, the shop attendants, the administrators, the clinical and social service personnel and others. If a boy identifies with one of the male personnel, the other boys begin to tell him that this man "is your daddy." Such a statement is said with resentment and anger, and to be told that one of the employees is "your daddy" is a negative and destructive thing. Further dynamics of the situation are very involved. In the first place the boy may feel that the male figures have been desertive and often objectionable people in his past life. There is some resentment. A boy feels he should not trust a man because of the past experiences of desertion and hatred from the father. Again, if he does identify with the male, he is aligning himself with the adult authoritarian structure of the institution and such a process holds much negative sanction among the boys. Then the sexuality angle develops because if a boy tells another boy that a particular male figure in the institution is "your daddy," the ultimate meaning is that this man must be having sexual relations with the mother of that boy. The emotional dynamite here is vast. The tension is again increased when such a culture pattern has an important place in the lives of these children.

A further aspect of the problem of polarity in the institutional social structure appears. There is reason to believe that in some institutions some boys are actually strengthened in their delinquent adjustments. The dynamics involved here are very intense and subtle. Many boys come to a correctional institution with some very deep personal anger and hostility toward their worlds and significant people in them. They have often been brutalized to the point where they manifest a hardened exterior with a very deeply embedded cynicism and anger toward the parent figures and the broader social systems. They often react against the dominant value structure and develop the feeling that anything that is valuable and acceptable for the dominant culture is wrong for them and vice versa. The boy becomes polarized in regard to the feeling that he cannot become a significant figure in the culture around him and thus he develops a feeling of alienation from the culture. If he has been brutalized through vindictive and cruel punishment or observation of very distraught parent figures, he frequently develops strong feelings of cynicism and hostility and further alienates himself from the world around him. He frequently begins to strike out aggressively against legalized norms and the people whose function it is to administer control in the culture. He begins to feel that he cannot possibly accept legitimate standards because a compromise would mean weakness or laying himself open to be hurt further in his relations with people who he feels are so very different from him. If an institution has within it a structure of punishment and discipline that is largely corporal and vindictive and prolonged punishment, the chances are that the boy who functions with alienated feelings and deep

hostility will be further reinforced in these feelings and become a dangerous or potentially explosive individual. Some institutions insure the world of having murderers and destructive criminals and delinquents through their treatment program if it is one that deals with conflicts through abuse and terror and irrational retribution. The real movement of the individual in this situation seems to be further alienation from the dominant culture. The alienation is colored with hostility and rigorous cynicism. The world is cruel and the only way to cope with it is by being more cruel and strong. This description is frequently too real in too many cases of children who become brutalized and express their dismay and anger through the most atrocious behavior patterns.

CULTURE PATTERNS WHICH EMPHASIZE WEAK AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE CHILD

Another culture pattern that exists in the institutional structure refers to the problem of self-concept and the fact that people do act in terms of the way they deeply feel about themselves. When a boy comes to the school, he is accepted into the group of boys either with ease or with varying amounts of difficulty. He is scrutinized by the boys and then is evaluated by them in terms of his abilities and toughness and the factors of confidence among the boys and the polarity with the administrative staff. He is also viewed as an individual. Unfortunately, the boys tend to select the physically maladjusted or psychologically inhibiting aspects of the other children and then to use them further to strengthen any negative feelings that the boy might have about himself. If he has a number of pimples on his face, he is referred to as "pimples." If he has a limp in his walk, he is referred to as the "crip" or "popo." If he has scars on his face or body, he is called "scars." If he is overweight, he is called "blimp." If he is underweight, he is called "boney." There are many of these negative nicknames that are given to the boys. Very rarely is there a positive one. There seem to be strong indications that the boys are attempting to deride the fellow students, apparently in the belief that it heightens their own status to do so.

Most of the boys who are sent to Industrial schools have fairly negative self-concepts. They see themselves as being very worthless and bad individuals. The institutional structure often creates a psychological situation which reinforces these negative self-concepts. The manner in which a person feels about himself is very meaningful in terms of his behavior in specific situations.

A correctional institution is a very complicated place with many events occurring every day. Every interpersonal relation that develops is important in the total structure of social interaction. The culture patterns that exist are often very good indicators of the individual and group problems that exist. These culture patterns need to be thoroughly understood and dealt with by the staff that is trained to rehabilitate the children. . . .

4

Variability in Culture

Although culture everywhere reveals many universal and common features, variability in culture patterns is equally evident. Variation in man's accepted ways is largely the consequence of the wide range of choices open to him in solving his many problems. The present chapter consists of two selections which demonstrate this fact.

The paper by Oscar Lewis clearly shows that while village life the world over has many common features, there are also wide diversities in the day-by-day life. These divergences are doubtless due primarily to two things: differences in the history of the respective villages and differences in topography and climate.

Horace Miner's delightful and informative piece reveals what to us seems almost a pathological concern with the human body but which to the Nacirema represents the most sacred value in their whole existence.

Oscar Lewis

Peasant Culture in India and Mexico:

A Comparative Analysis¹

I. INTRODUCTION

Although peasantry still constitutes almost three-fourths of the world's people and makes up the bulk of the population in the underdeveloped countries, it has been relatively neglected by social scientists as a special field of study; anthropologists have specialized in primitive or tribal societies; sociologists, in urban societies; and rural sociologists, in modern rural societies. Thus, the great majority of mankind has had no discipline to claim as its own. A comparative science of peasantry is only now beginning to take form.

In this paper I want to compare . . . some of the similarities and differences between the North Indian village of Rānī Kherā and the Mexican village of Tepoztlan. The major purpose of this comparison is to contribute toward our

¹ From *American Anthropologist*, 1955, 57, Part 2 (Memoir, No. 83): 145-170. By permission.

general understanding of peasantry. It is recognized that there is something about being a peasant which makes peasantry seem so similar all over the world, even in the most different historical and cultural settings. On the other hand, it is also true that the cultural setting and the general nature of the larger society of which peasantry is a part must undoubtedly influence the forms of peasant life and the very nature of the people.

Comparison between a Mexican and an Indian village presents problems over and above those encountered in comparing villages within a single country or a single great tradition. Items which exist in one and not in the other are simply not comparable. For example, Tepoztlan has no caste system, and Rani Khera has no *compadre* system. In Tepoztlan the *municipio* is the landholding unit (for communal lands); in Rani Khera the village is the landholding unit. How are we to weigh the influence of such items on the total culture pattern of the community? Both the caste system and the *compadre* system are cohesive forces in social life. but can we equate them? The answer is probably "No," but the matter of weighting is not so easy.

The difference in size of communities may also be important. Tepoztlan is over three times as large as Rani Khera, and it may be that some of the matters to be discussed are related to size of population. Then there is the difference in topography and climate. Tepoztlan is in a hilly, mountainous area, while Rani Khera is on a level, almost treeless plain. However, this difference reflects national differences and to this extent our choice may inadvertently have been advantageous. . . .

In regard to climate, both are relatively dry areas. But the average annual rainfall in Tepoztlan is approximately sixty inches, while that of Rani Khera is less than thirty. This difference is less important than it seems, because in both cases the rains come within the four-month rainy season, and there is practically no rain for seven or eight months of the year. In both communities the greatest felt need is more water for irrigation. . . .

II. TEPOZTLAN AND RANI KHERA COMPARED

Tepoztlan is a Catholic village of about thirty-five hundred people, fifteen miles from Cuernavaca, the state capital, and sixty miles south of Mexico City. It is an ancient highland village which has been continuously inhabited [for] at least two thousand years. Two languages are spoken in Tepoztlan: Spanish and the indigenous Nahuatl. About half the population is bilingual, the other half speak only Spanish.

Rani Khera is a Hindu village of eleven hundred people, about fifteen miles from New Delhi, the national capital. It is only two miles from a major highway which runs to Delhi. It is an old village which was conquered about seven hundred and fifty years ago by the *Jāts*, an ethnic group which is now the dominant caste in the village. The language spoken is a local dialect of Hindi mixed with a sprinkling of Punjabi. Only a few people speak English.

Both villages may be designated as peasant societies in the sense that both are old and stable populations with a great love of the land, both depend upon agriculture, both are integrated into larger political units such as the state and the nation and are subject to their laws, both exist side by side with cities and have been exposed to urban influences for long periods of time, and both have borrowed from other rural areas as well as from urban centers but have managed to integrate the new traits into a relatively stable culture pattern. Moreover, both communities exist by a relatively primitive technology and depend upon hoe culture as well as

plow and oxen in agriculture; both produce primarily for subsistence but also participate in a money economy and use of barter; both are relatively poor, have a high incidence of illiteracy, a high birth rate and a high death rate; and, finally, both communities have lived under foreign domination for long periods in their history and have developed that peculiar combination of dependence and hostility toward government which is so characteristic of colonial peoples.

A. Settlement Pattern

So much for the broad similarities. Now let us examine some differences. One of the first things that impressed me about village Rani Khera and other Indian villages, as compared to Tepoztlan, was the village settlement pattern—or rather the absence of pattern—the greater density of population, the greater crowding, the housing shortage, the shortage of space for animals, and, in general, an atmosphere of much greater poverty.

Unlike Tepoztlan . . . with its relatively well-ordered grid pattern of streets at right angles, its plaza and market place, its *palacio*, or government building, and its central church, in Rani Khera there is no orderly arrangement of streets, many of which are narrow dead-end alleys, there is no village center, no government or public building for the village as a whole. The *patvārī*, or keeper of village land records, who is an official of the Revenue Department, lives with one of the better-to-do families and has no official residence as such. Were a new *patvārī* installed, he would have to make his own lodging arrangements.

In Tepoztlan the houses are spread out, and most house sites have their own patio, corral, and orchard; in Rani Khera the houses are crowded together, and, unlike Tepoztlan, which has many vacant houses, there was not a single available house for our field workers in Rani Khera. . . .

Another thing which stood out in Rani Khera because of its contrast with Tepoztlan was the much greater separation of the sexes. The preferred arrangement for family living is to have two residences, one for the women and children, another for the men and the cattle. There are also two *caupāls*, or men's houses, one for each division of the village, which are used for male smoking groups and other social gatherings.

B. Land and Economy

I have said that agriculture is important in both villages. But here the similarity ends. In Rani Khera agriculture is much more intensive than in Tepoztlan. Of the 784 acres of Rani Khera, 721, or well over 90 per cent of the total area, is under cultivation, as compared with only 15 per cent in Tepoztlan. Moreover, Tepoztlan depends almost entirely on a single crop, namely, corn, with beans and squash of minor importance, whereas Rani Khera has a diversity of crops which include, in order of importance, wheat, millets (*juār* and *bājra*), gram, sugar cane, and hemp. Unlike Tepoztlan, which has no irrigation and produces only one crop a year, Rani Khera grows two crops a year on about one-fifth of its lands which are under canal and well irrigation.

The apparently greater agriculture resources of Rani Khera are tempered by serious limiting factors. Rani Khera has practically no grazing lands and no forest resources. Indeed, the scarcity of trees was brought home to me by the fact that each of the thirty-seven trees in the village is listed in the village *patvārī* records. This makes for a crucial fuel shortage so the valuable cow dung has to be used for fuel instead of fertilizer, and the cattle have to be stall-fed rather than pastured. By contrast, Tepoztlan has very rich forest resources (almost 50 per cent of the

total area), and these provide ample firewood and charcoal both for domestic consumption and for sale.

Still other differences in the village economy need to be mentioned. In Tepoztlan over 90 per cent of the 853 families engage directly in agriculture as cultivators, and until recently even the shopkeepers and artisans would close shop to plant corn when the rains came. In Rani Khera only 53 per cent of its 150 families engage directly in agriculture, i.e., are cultivators, and most of these belong to a single caste, the *Jāts*.

The importance of this difference . . . is related to a fundamental difference in social and economic structure of the two villages. In Tepoztlan the family is much more of a self-sufficient unit, free to engage in a variety of activities and occupations, and it cherishes this self-sufficiency and independence from others. In Rani Khera the specialization of occupations along caste lines makes for a greater dependence of the villagers upon each other. But it is a dependence organized along hierarchical lines, institutionalized in the traditional, semifeudal *jajmānī* system of reciprocal obligations in economic and ceremonial affairs among the various castes.

In both villages there are privately owned and communally owned lands. The communal lands of Tepoztlan are truly communal in the sense that any member of the *municipio* of Tepoztlan has equal rights to their use. However, the communal lands of Rani Khera are held by the *Jāts* on a share basis, and the rights of the *Jāt* families in the communal, or *sāmīlāt*, lands are proportionate to the size of their holdings of private land.

In Tepoztlan about 80 per cent of all the land is communally held either as municipal lands or, since the Mexican Revolution, as *ejidal* lands. In Rani Khera about 7 per cent of the lands are communally owned, and most of these consist of the village house sites, the village pond, roads, and some uncultivable areas. Traditionally, the communal lands in North India were intended to serve as pasture and woodland. In both Rani Khera and Tepoztlan the communal lands have been a source of constant strife, but for different reasons. In the former it was between families within the village who attempted to appropriate communal lands for themselves. In the latter it was between villages, concerning the rights of villages to the communal lands. It is important to note that in both cases the communal lands are not subject to taxation. In the case of Tepoztlan this means that about 80 per cent of its total area is tax-free.

Population pressure on the land is considerable in both communities. But whereas Tepoztlan has 1.5 acres of cultivable land per capita, Rani Khera has only three-quarters of an acre. The advantage for Tepoztlan is even greater than is indicated by these figures, for, whereas Rani Khera has practically no other land, Tepoztlan has an additional 8 acres per capita of forest and grazing lands, and about 10 per cent of this area can be used for growing corn by the primitive method of cutting and burning the forest to make temporary clearings.

In Tepoztlan only about 36 per cent of the families had private landholdings, as compared to 52 per cent of the families in Rani Khera. But, while the landless families of Tepoztlan have access to the rich resources of the communal lands, the landless of Rani Khera have to depend primarily upon nonagricultural occupations. It may be noted that in both communities hoe culture is looked down upon as a last resort of the poor. In Rani Khera about fifteen low-caste families raise vegetables as a part-time occupation on land rented from the *Jāts*.

The size of private landholdings shows fundamental similarities in both communities. Holdings are very small. . . .

As might be expected, there is a striking difference between the two communities in regard to the respective role of livestock in the economy and the attitude toward livestock. In India there is an ancient cattle complex, and most people are vegetarians. In Mexico domesticated cattle are relatively recent, dating back to the Spanish Conquest. The cattle industry was never very important and never became well integrated with the economy. In Tepoztlan there is relatively little livestock, and most of it is of poor quality. Investment in cattle is viewed as precarious. By contrast, the little village of Rani Khera supports a remarkably large number of livestock and this with practically no grazing resources. . . .

C. Social Organization

It is in the field of social organization that we find the most remarkable differences between these two peasant societies. Indeed, they seem like separate worlds, and I might add that, by comparison with Rani Khera, Tepoztlan, in retrospect, seems much less complicated and much more familiar, very Western-like, and almost North American. Undoubtedly one of the reasons for this is the fact that the Spanish Conquest left its indelible mark on Mexican culture. Spain, for all its cultural idiosyncrasies in sixteenth-century Europe, was part of the Western European culture pattern.

The distinctive aspects of the social organization of village Rani Khera as compared to Tepoztlan can be discussed in terms of (1) the more pervasive role of kinship; (2) the presence of a caste system; (3) the existence of multiple factions based on kinship; and (4) the differences in the role of the village as a community.

1. *The role of kinship.* — In Rani Khera kinship plays a major role in the ordering of human relations and is the basis of most social and political groupings such as the *ṭolās* and *pannās*, the smoking groups, the factions, the castes, the panchayats, or councils, and the inter-village networks. The extended family is strong and forms a basic unit for individual identification. The caste system acts as an integrating and cohesive factor in village life, primarily within the castes and to some extent between castes. Caste members are bound by kinship, by common traditions, interests, and social interaction. The castes in turn are bound by economic interdependence resulting from the specialization of occupations, and this is formalized by the *jajmānī* system of reciprocal obligations.

In Tepoztlan kinship is a much less pervasive force: the nuclear family predominates, the extended family is weak (the elaborate *compadre* system seems designed to make up for this), and social relations and social solidarity are organized around religious, political, and other nonkinship bases. The independence and individualism of the nuclear or biological family in Tepoztlan make for an atomistic quality in social relations. And while these discrete family units are organized into larger units such as the *barrio*, the village, and the *municipio*, these organizational forms are relatively impersonal and do not impinge as directly upon the lives of the individuals as does the extended family, the faction, and the caste in Rani Khera. In Rani Khera the extended family, the faction, and the caste are the units which demand one's loyalties and channelize most of one's life-activities. But by the same token they provide the individual with a much greater degree of psychological security than is present in Tepoztlan, and this in turn affects the quality of community life.

The role of kinship organization on the political level is also markedly different in the two villages. In Tepoztlan the connection between the village and the state and federal government is in terms of elected officials who vote as members of their *demarcación*, an arbitrary division of the village for secular purposes. The officials do not represent kinship units nor even the barrios. But in Rani Khera the political organization and the kinship organization are more closely intertwined. Each of the two headmen (*lambardārs*) of the village represents a *pannā*, which is essentially a kinship unit consisting of related patrilineal lineages.

2. *The caste system.* — In Rani Khera the caste system organizes life in terms of hierarchical principles and plays up the status differences between groups. In Tepoztlan there is no caste system, and the society is much more democratically organized. In Rani Khera there are 150 households representing twelve castes as follows: seventy-eight *Jāt* families, fifteen Brahman, twenty *Camār* (Leatherworker), ten *Bhangī* (Sweeper), seven *Kumhār* (Potter), five *Jhīva* (Water Carrier), four *Dhobī* (Washerman), four *Khātī* (Carpenter), three *Nāī* (Barber), two *Chipi* (Calico Printer), one *Lohār* (Blacksmith), and one *Baniyā* (Merchant).

The *Jāts* are by tradition agriculturists and own all the land of the village, including the house sites, i.e., the land upon which the houses of the other castes are built. In a sense, then, the other castes, even the Brahmans, are in the village at the sufferance of the *Jāts*. The village is officially known as a *Jāt* village, and clearly the *Jāts* dominate village life. Even the formal organization of the village into two *pannās*, each with its *lambardār*, or headman, is solely in terms of the *Jāts*. The lower castes tend to live on the outskirts of the village and are not part of this formal organization despite the fact that some of the lower-caste families are ancient inhabitants.

In Tepoztlan the picture is very different. No one group dominates the life of the village. Each family, whether rich or poor, owns its house site and house, has recognized status, and can proudly say, "This is my village." The quality of interpersonal relations among Tepoztecs is comparable with what exists within the single caste of *Jāts*, that is, status differences are played down at least on a verbal level, and wealthy individuals are careful not to "pull rank."

In Rani Khera the caste system divides the village and weakens the sense of village solidarity. The caste generally represents a distinct ethnic group with its own history, traditions, and identifications, and each caste lives in more or less separate quarters of the village. There are separate wells for the *Harijans*, or untouchables; dining and smoking between higher and lower castes are still taboo; low-caste persons (this does not include *Baniyā*, *Khātī*, or *Nāī*) will not sit together on the same carpai, or cot, with a *Jāt* or Brahman; and when government officials come to the village and call meetings to explain the new community development projects, the *Harijans* may attend, but they stay off to one side in the audience and "know their place." In a sense, then, each caste, or at least those with larger representation in the village, forms a separate little community. The social structure of the village therefore has somewhat the quality of our urban communities with their variety of ethnic and minority groups and a high degree of division of labor.

In Tepoztlan the population and the tradition are much more homogeneous, and there is nothing comparable to the divisive effects of the caste system. Perhaps the nearest approximation to segmentation in the village results from the organization of separate barrios, each with its own chapel, patron saint, and *esprit de corps*.

The barrios, like the castes, can be thought of as sub-communities within the village . . .

The caste system in Rani Khera is undergoing changes and in some ways may even be said to be breaking down. The proximity to Delhi, the Gandhian movement against untouchability, the preaching of the Arya Samaj (a reformed Hinduism movement), and increased off-farm employment opportunities as a result of the past two world wars have all had some effect.

Perhaps the greatest change in the caste system has occurred in relation to the occupational structure, i.e., caste and occupation are now less synonymous than formerly. Some of the *Jāt* families no longer cultivate their land, and their children have become schoolteachers or taken miscellaneous jobs in Delhi. The Brahmins no longer carry on their priestly functions. Most of them are occupancy tenants of the *Jāts*, but only four are cultivators; one family sells milk, another does tailoring, and the remainder are employed in jobs outside the village. Though the *Camārs* are Leatherworkers by caste, only two are now shoemakers, and they no longer skin the dead cattle. The substitution of Persian Wheels for the earlier system of drawing water with leather buckets threw some of the *Camārs* out of work; three families are weavers, four rent land from the *Jāts* for vegetable gardening, four are employed outside the village, and the remainder earn a living in the village by combining part-time agricultural labor with cattle raising. Of all the castes, the *Bhāngīs*, or Sweepers, seem to have shown the least change in occupation.

There have been other changes. Children of all castes now attend the village school, and there is no discrimination or segregation in the seating arrangements . . .

However, despite all these trends, the caste system is still very strong in the village.

3. *Factions*. — In both villages there are factions, but their structure, functions, and role in village life differ greatly. We will first consider factions in Rani Khera and then in Tepoztlan . . .

In Rani Khera factions are an old, ingrained pattern in village life and must be considered as a basic structural aspect of traditional village organization along with castes, *tolās*, *pannūs*, *gotras*, and other groupings. . . . The factions are generally referred to by the name of their leaders or by a nickname of the leading lineage represented in it.

Factions follow caste lines. However, factions from different castes may and do form blocs or alliances . . .

The factions are relatively small and cohesive kinship groupings which act as units in defense of family interests. The major issues which lead to court litigations between factions and sometimes result in the development of new factions are quarrels over the inheritance of land and the adoption of sons, quarrels over house sites and irrigation rights, sexual offenses, murders, and quarrels between castes. The villagers sum it up by saying that factions quarrel over wealth, women and land.

But factions also have positive, co-operative functions. All factions operate as more or less cohesive units on ceremonial occasions, particularly births, betrothals, and marriages; in the operation of caste panchayats; and in recent years in district board, state, and national elections. Moreover, all factions have one or more of their own hookah-smoking groups, which serve as informal social groups in which there is almost daily face-to-face contact.

Jāt factions have a few additional functions. They act as units in co-operative

economic undertakings such as moneylending and the renting of land. In principle no faction will rent land to members of other factions if there is anyone in its own ranks that needs land. In the case of mortgaging, faction solidarity is even more striking, for there has not been a single case within the last five years of land mortgaged outside one's own faction.

Members of hostile factions will not attend each other's ceremonial celebrations, will not visit each others' homes, and, as a rule, will not smoke hookah together, except at the home of a member of a neutral faction. In panchayat meetings the representatives of hostile factions can be counted upon to marshal vicious gossip about rivals. However, direct attack in public is rare; indirection is developed to a fine art. Because members of hostile factions do not cease talking to each other and continue to be polite in formal greetings, there is always the possibility of improving relations or of joining temporarily with one hostile group against another.

There are some occasions when members of hostile factions unite for some common action. The major occasions are funerals, building of village wells, cleaning the village pond, and repairing subcanals for irrigation, and participation in a few festivals such as *Tij* and *Holi*. There is also a tradition of presenting an appearance of village unity to the outside. For example, if two men of hostile factions have married daughters in the same village, each, whenever he visits that village, must visit the daughter of the other and pay the customary rupee to symbolize the fact that she, like his own daughter, is a daughter of the village.

In Tepoztlan factions are political groupings rather than kinship groupings and reflect diverse social and economic interests. The factions are fewer in number, only two as a rule, and are larger and more loosely organized. Faction membership is less stable and faction loyalty more tenuous. In Tepoztlan, unlike Rani Khera, brothers may be members of hostile and opposed factions. In Rani Khera, first, second, and even third cousins are generally members of the same faction.

One of the major cleavages in Tepoztlan was between the *Bolsheviks* and the *Centrales*. These groups became clearly delineated in the early twenties when two socialistically oriented Tepoztecanos from Mexico City, who were members of the Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos, returned to the village to organize the peasants in defense of the communal lands against the sons of the ex-*caciques* who controlled the local government and allegedly were exploiting the forest resources of the *municipio* in their own interests. The *Bolsheviks* had their greatest strength in the smaller and poorer barrios of the upper part of the village, while the *Centrales* were strongest in the larger central barrios. To some extent this grouping corresponded to class distinctions, since, in the days before the Mexican Revolution of 1910-20, most of the *caciques* and well-to-do merchants lived in the center of the village.

In contrast to the predominantly private familial objectives of factions in Rani Khera, the objectives of the factions in Tepoztlan were broadly social and political. The aim was to dominate the local government and to appeal to the voters in terms of broad public issues. In the twenties the slogan was "Conserve the Communal Forests," and in the thirties the new organization known as the *Fraternales* had the slogan "Union, Justice and Civilization."

Since the middle thirties the factional groupings have more and more become political groupings which align themselves for or against the government in power. The establishment by Tepoztecanos of two competing bus lines from Tepoztlan to

Cuernavaca has led to bitter quarrels and violence and has again split the village into hostile groupings.

4. *The village as a community.* — The comparative consideration of the question, "Is the village a community?" is more complex than it seems, for there are numerous dimensions of "community," such as the ecological, physical, social, economic, political, religious, and psychological . . .

There is yet another aspect of the problem, namely, what is the quality of social relations, of mutual interdependence of persons or social groups within each village? We must be ready to deal with the possibility that, although Village A does not define the physical area of social, economic, and other relations as clearly as does Village B, yet the quality of such relations in A or subgroups within it may be so much more cohesive as to justify our saying that there is more community within A (as well as the villages into which this spills over) than there is in B. With these observations in mind, let us first consider those aspects of community which Rani Khera and Tepoztlan share and then go on to consider some of the more important differences.

Both Tepoztlan and Rani Khera are corporate bodies which enjoy legal status and can take suits to law courts. Both are units of taxation for the respective revenue departments. In both cases the greater part of the social, economic, and religious activities takes place within the village. The village is home and there is relatively little out-migration, but more in Tepoztlan than in Rani Khera. Of Tepoztlan it can be said that most villagers are born there, live and work there, and die there. This cannot be said of Rani Khera, for the married women were not born there, and the daughters of the village will not die there. Yet the very designation "daughter of the village" speaks eloquently for the sense of village consciousness.

In both villages, despite the existence of schisms and factions, there are occasions when the villagers act together as a unit for some common goal such as the building of a road or a school, drainage of a pond, or the defense of the village against attack from the outside . . .

One of the important differences between our two villages is related to the contrast in settlement pattern between highland Mexico and the Indo-Gangetic Plain. The Mexican pattern is that of relatively self-contained nuclear groupings or pockets of a small number of villages centrally located within *municipios*, so that the density of population decreases almost to zero as one moves from the center or seat of the community to the periphery. In North India, on the other hand, there is an almost even and continuous scatter of large numbers of villages, so that no distinct pattern of groupings emerges. Thus in Mexico the physical groupings of villages practically define and encompass the social and political groupings, whereas in India the physical pattern gives much less of a clue, and one must trace out the specific kinship and other alignments which organize villages into units. This contrast between the centripetal settlement pattern of Mexican villages and the amorphous pattern of India applies also to the internal settlement pattern of the villages, so that the Mexican village stands out more clearly as a centrally organized unit.

From an economic point of view, the village of Rani Khera is a more clearly isolable and self-contained community than the village of Tepoztlan. Village boundaries are clearly fixed and contain within them the land resources upon which the villagers depend for their livelihood. In Tepoztlan the larger *municipio* is

the functional resource unit. Village boundaries are ill-defined and are essentially moral boundaries, whereas the municipal boundaries are clearly demarcated. It is within the bounds of the *municipio* that the everyday world of the Tepoztecan exists. Here the farmers work the communal lands, cut and burn communal forests, graze their cattle, and hunt for medicinal herbs.

From the point of view of village government Tepoztlan stands out as a more clearly organized and centralized community. When I first studied Tepoztlan, local government seemed very weak indeed, but by comparison with Rani Khera and North India in general, it now seems extremely well developed, what with elected village presidents, councils, judges, the collection of taxes for public works, police powers, and the obligations of villagers to give twelve days a year for co-operative village works. The traditional local government in Rani Khera is much more informal and consists of caste panchayats which cut across village lines. Only recently has the government established a new statutory local panchayat with taxation powers, which, however, has not been effective so far.

Village-wide leadership in Tepoztlan is formally expressed by the local government. In Rani Khera it does not yet exist, and the idea of positive, constructive leadership in the public interest is only now beginning, particularly in connection with the establishment of public schools. As yet, there are no village heroes or outstanding citizens who are popular for their contribution to village welfare as a whole.

In Tepoztlan there is more verbalization about village community spirit. Candidates for political office always speak in terms of "*mi pueblo*" and promise to improve their village. The fact that officials may in fact do very little and may even steal public funds is another matter. But at least the sense of village identification and loyalty exists as a potential ideological force. Village solidarity is also reflected, albeit in a negative sense, by Tepoztecan characterizations of the surrounding villages of the *municipio* as "assassins," "dull-heads," "primitive," and "backward." Moreover, the bogeyman used to frighten children is often a man from a neighboring village. In Rani Khera there were no comparable designations of neighboring villages, most of which contain related lineages.

The difference in the role of the village as a community can also be appreciated if we examine marriage in both cases. In Tepoztlan over 90 per cent of the marriages take place within the village, and, lest this be thought a function of the larger size of the village, we can point out that 42 per cent of the marriages were within the same *barrio* within the village. The single important rule in marriage is not to marry close relatives, and this generally means eliminating first, second, and third cousins.

In Rani Khera the question of whom one can marry is much more complicated. Marriage is controlled by a combination of factors, namely, caste endogamy, village exogamy, limited territorial exogamy, and *gotra*, or sib, exogamy. Translated this means: (1) you must marry a member of your own caste, i.e., a *Jāt* must marry a *Jāt*, a Brahman, a Brahman, etc.; (2) you must marry out of your village; (3) you must not marry into any village whose lands touch upon the lands of your own village; (4) if you are a *Jāt*, you cannot marry into any village known as a *Dabas* village, the *Dabas* being the predominant *gotra* in the village (this automatically eliminates twenty villages from marriage, for there are twenty villages which form a *Dabas* panchayat unit); (5) finally, you cannot marry into your father's *gotra*, your mother's *gotra*, or your mother's mother's *gotra* (this again

eliminates a whole series of villages). As a result of all these prohibitions fathers or go-betweens must go long distances to find eligible mates for their daughters, and for months before the marriage season they literally scour the countryside for husbands. Remember that residence is of course patrilocal for males.

Our study of Rani Khera showed that the 266 married women living in the village came from about 200 separate villages at distances up to forty miles. We found also that the average distance between spouses' villages varied considerably by caste, with the lower castes, who are less numerous, having to go much longer distances. If we now examine the other side of the picture, that is, the daughters who marry out of the village, we find that over 220 daughters of Rani Khera married out into about 200 villages. Thus, this relatively small village of 150 households becomes the locus of affinal kinship ties with over 400 other villages. This makes for a kind of rural cosmopolitanism which is in sharp contrast to the village isolationism in Mexico.

D. The People

Finally, we come to a brief comparison of the people in both villages . . . Tepoztecs are a reserved, constricted people who tend to view other human beings as dangerous and the world in general as hostile. Children are required to be obedient, quiet, and unobtrusive, and parents play upon children's fears to maintain control. There is a certain pervading air of tension and fearfulness among Tepoztecs; the individual and the small biological family seem to stand alone against the world.

Despite the much smaller size of village Rani Khera, one has the impression that there are more people there. Crowds gather easily around the visitor and follow him down the narrow streets and in and out of houses. One rarely sees a solitary figure. Children play boisterously in large groups; men chat and smoke hookahs in groups. Women go to the well or collect cowdung together. The low value placed upon privacy in Rani Khera is in marked contrast with Tepoztlan, where privacy is so valued that one gets the feeling of an apartment-house psychology in this ancient village.

Faces are different in the two villages. In Tepoztlan, outside the home, faces are generally unsmiling, unrevealing masks. In Rani Khera faces seem more secure. Children are more open-faced and laughing, old men are bland and peaceful, young men restless but unrebelling, women straight and proud. Here too there is individual reserve and formalized behavior, but it does not seem to make so much of an undercurrent of hostility and fear as in Tepoztlan.

The women of Rani Khera work even harder than the women of Tepoztlan, but they appear less drab and bemeaned. They seem strong, bold, gay, and sharp-tongued. Their skirts and head scarves are brilliantly colored and spangled with rhinestones and mirrors. Heavy silver jewelry on their ankles, wrists, and necks seems to validate their worth as women. Even with their faces modestly covered, the women of Rani Khera seem more independent than Tepoztec women and have less of a martyr complex.

It must be remembered that these observations on the people of Rani Khera are highly impressionistic and deserve more careful study.

III. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, I believe our comparative data from these two villages demonstrate the wide range of culture that can exist in peasant societies. When I left

for India in 1952, I expected to find many similarities between Indian and Mexican peasant communities, this despite my earlier critique of the folk-society concept. I did find similarities, but on the whole I was more impressed by the differences. The similarities are greatest in material culture, level of technology, and economics, and the differences are greatest in social organization, value systems, and personality. In terms of raising the standard of living the problems seem much the same, for the bulk of the population in both villages is poor, illiterate, landless, and lives so close to the survival margin that it cannot afford to experiment with new things and ideas. However, the poverty of the Indian people seems so much greater and the agrarian problems so overwhelming and complex as to defy any easy solution even on the theoretical level.

In stressing the range of variation possible under the rubric of peasant society, I do not intend to suggest that the concept "peasant society" is not meaningful or useful as a classification for comparative research. However, it is not sufficiently predictive in regard to cultural content and structure to take the place of knowledge of concrete reality situations, especially in planning programs of culture change. For both applied and theoretical anthropology we need typologies of peasantry for the major culture areas of the world, such as Latin America, India, Africa, etc. Moreover, within each area we need more refined subclassifications. Only after such studies are available will we be in a position to formulate broad generalizations about the dynamics of peasant culture as a whole. The difficulties encountered in this paper suggest that a typology of peasant societies for Mexico or Latin America would hardly serve for North India. However, once we had adequate typologies for both areas, meaningful comparisons could more readily be made.

Rani Khera and Tepoztlan face many common problems. In both villages population has increased rapidly in the last thirty years, means of communication have been improved, there is greater dependence upon a cash economy, education is increasingly valued, and the general aspiration level of the people is going up. But there have been no comparable changes in the agricultural production.

We have seen that both villages are meaningful units for comparative study. However, our analysis has shown the complexities involved in evaluating the extent to which each village is a community. From some points of view it would seem that Tepoztlan is more of an organized and centralized village community, that is, in terms of the internal settlement pattern, the greater ethnic homogeneity of the population, the formal organization of village government with elected and paid village officials, the religious organization with a central church, the village market and plaza, and the absence of multiple intervillage networks based on kinship.

From the point of view of ecology Rani Khera is a more clearly defined and self-contained community than Tepoztlan. Moreover, if we define community in terms of the degree and intensity of interaction and interdependence of people, then we might conclude that, despite the divisive effects of castes and multiple factions within castes, there is more community within Rani Khera than within Tepoztlan. Villagers in Rani Khera seem psychologically more secure and relate better to each other. There is a greater readiness to engage in co-operative activities within kinship and caste. The villager spends a greater proportion of his time in some group activity, in smoking groups, in the extended family, in co-operative economic undertakings, and in the caste councils. There is more frequent visiting and more sociability. It is tempting to view the greater verbalization about village

identification and solidarity in Tepoztlan as a psychological compensation for the actual atomistic nature of social relations. And by the same token the absence of such verbalization in Rani Khara may reflect the greater cohesiveness of social relations.

One conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that separate institutions or aspects of culture develop at different rates, within limits, in accord with particular historical circumstance. It is this factor which creates serious difficulties in the construction of societal or cultural typologies which are not historically and regionally defined. This would also help explain how Tepoztlan and Rani Khara can be so similar in terms of economics and so different in terms of social organization.

Horace Miner

Body Ritual among the Nacirema¹

The anthropologist has become so familiar with the diversity of ways in which different peoples behave in similar situations that he is not apt to be surprised by even the most exotic customs. In fact, if all of the logically possible combinations of behavior have not been found somewhere in the world, he is apt to suspect that they must be present in some yet undescribed tribe. . . . In this light, the magical beliefs and practices of the Nacirema present such unusual aspects that it seems desirable to describe them as an example of the extremes to which human behavior can go.

Professor Linton first brought the ritual of the Nacirema to the attention of anthropologists twenty years ago, but the culture of this people is still very poorly understood. They are a North American group living in the territory between the Canadian Cree, the Yaqui and Tarahumare of Mexico, and the Carib and Arawak of the Antilles. Little is known of their origin, although tradition states that they came from the east. According to Nacirema mythology, their nation was originated by a culture hero, Notgnihsaw, who is otherwise known for two great feats of strength—the throwing of a piece of wampum across the river Pa-To-Mac and the chopping down of a cherry tree in which the Spirit of Truth resided.

Nacirema culture is characterized by a highly developed market economy which has evolved in a rich natural habitat. While much of the people's time is devoted to economic pursuits, a large part of the fruits of these labors and a considerable portion of the day are spent in ritual activity. The focus of this activity is the human body, the appearance and health of which loom as a dominant concern in the ethos of the people. While such a concern is certainly not unusual, its ceremonial aspects and associated philosophy are unique.

The fundamental belief underlying the whole system appears to be that the human body is ugly and that its natural tendency is to debility and disease. Incarcerated in such a body, man's only hope is to avert these characteristics through the use of the powerful influences of ritual and ceremony. Every household has one or more shrines devoted to this purpose. The more powerful individuals in the society have several shrines in their houses and, in fact, the opulence of a

¹ From *American Anthropologist*, 1956, 58:503-507. By permission.

house is often referred to in terms of the number of such ritual centers it possesses. Most houses are of wattle and daub construction, but the shrine rooms of the more wealthy are walled with stone. Poorer families imitate the rich by applying pottery plaques to their shrine walls.

While each family has at least one such shrine, the rituals associated with it are not family ceremonies but are private and secret. The rites are normally only discussed with children, and then only during the period when they are being initiated into these mysteries. I was able, however, to establish sufficient rapport with the natives to examine these shrines and to have the rituals described to me.

The focal point of the shrine is a box or chest which is built into the wall. In this chest are kept the many charms and magical notions without which no native believes he could live. These preparations are secured from a variety of specialized practitioners. The most powerful of these are the medicine men, whose assistance must be rewarded with substantial gifts. However, the medicine men do not provide the curative potions for their clients, but decide what the ingredients should be and then write them down in an ancient and secret language. This writing is understood only by the medicine men and by the herbalists who, for another gift, provide the required charm.

The charm is not disposed of after it has served its purpose, but is placed in the charm-box of the household shrine. As these magical materials are specific for certain ills, and the real or imagined maladies of the people are many, the charm-box is usually full to overflowing. The magical packets are so numerous that people forget what their purposes were and fear to use them again. While the natives are very vague on this point, we can only assume that the idea in retaining all the old magical materials is that their presence in the charm-box, before which the body rituals are conducted, will in some way protect the worshipper.

Beneath the charm-box is a small font. Each day every member of the family, in succession, enters the shrine room, bows his head before the charm-box, mingles different sorts of holy water in the font, and proceeds with a brief rite of ablution. The holy waters are secured from the Water Temple of the community, where the priests conduct elaborate ceremonies to make the liquid ritually pure.

In the hierarchy of magical practitioners, and below the medicine men in prestige, are specialists whose designation is best translated "holy-mouth-men." The Nacirema have an almost pathological horror of and fascination with the mouth, the condition of which is believed to have a supernatural influence on all social relationships. Were it not for the rituals of the mouth, they believe that their teeth would fall out, their gums bleed, their jaws shrink, their friends desert them, and their lovers reject them. They also believe that a strong relationship exists between oral and moral characteristics. For example, there is a ritual ablution of the mouth for children which is supposed to improve their moral fiber.

The daily body ritual performed by everyone includes a mouth-rite. Despite the fact that these people are so punctilious about care of the mouth, this rite involves a practice which strikes the uninitiated stranger as revolting. It was reported to me that the ritual consists of inserting a small bundle of hog hairs into the mouth, along with certain magical powders, and then moving the bundle in a highly formalized series of gestures.

In addition to the private mouth-rite, the people seek out a holy-mouth-man once or twice a year. These practitioners have an impressive set of paraphernalia, consisting of a variety of augers, awls, probes, and prods. The use of these objects in the exorcism of the evils of the mouth involves almost unbelievable ritual torture

of the client. The holy-mouth-man opens the client's mouth and, using the above mentioned tools, enlarges any holes which decay may have created in the teeth. Magical materials are put into these holes. If there are no naturally occurring holes in the teeth, large sections of one or more teeth are gouged out so that the supernatural substance can be applied. In the client's view, the purpose of these ministrations is to arrest decay and to draw friends. The extremely sacred and traditional character of the rite is evident in the fact that the natives return to the holy-mouth-men year after year, despite the fact that their teeth continue to decay.

It is to be hoped that, when a thorough study of the Nacirema is made, there will be careful inquiry into the personality structure of these people. One has but to watch the gleam in the eye of a holy-mouth-man, as he jabs an awl into an exposed nerve, to suspect that a certain amount of sadism is involved. If this can be established, a very interesting pattern emerges, for most of the population shows definite masochistic tendencies. It was to these that Professor Linton referred in discussing a distinctive part of the daily body ritual which is performed only by men. This part of the rite involves scraping and lacerating the surface of the face with a sharp instrument. Special women's rites are performed only four times during each lunar month, but what they lack in frequency is made up in barbarity. As part of this ceremony, women bake their heads in small ovens for about an hour. The theoretically interesting point is that what seems to be a preponderantly masochistic people have developed sadistic specialists.

The medicine men have an imposing temple, or *latipso*, in every community of any size. The more elaborate ceremonies required to treat very sick patients can only be performed at this temple. These ceremonies involve not only the thaumaturge but a permanent group of vestal maidens who move sedately about the temple chambers in distinctive costume and headdress.

The *latipso* ceremonies are so harsh that it is phenomenal that a fair proportion of the really sick natives who enter the temple ever recover. Small children whose indoctrination is still incomplete have been known to resist attempts to take them to the temple because "that is where you go to die." Despite this fact, sick adults are not only willing but eager to undergo the protracted ritual purification, if they can afford to do so. No matter how ill the supplicant or how grave the emergency, the guardians of many temples will not admit a client if he cannot give a rich gift to the custodian. Even after one has gained admission and survived the ceremonies, the guardians will not permit the neophyte to leave until he makes still another gift.

The supplicant entering the temple is first stripped of all his or her clothes. In every-day life the Nacirema avoids exposure of his body and its natural functions. Bathing and excretory acts are performed only in the secrecy of the household shrine, where they are ritualized as part of the body-rites. Psychological shock results from the fact that body secrecy is suddenly lost upon entry into the *latipso*. A man, whose own wife has never seen him in an excretory act, suddenly finds himself naked and assisted by a vestal maiden while he performs his natural functions into a sacred vessel. This sort of ceremonial treatment is necessitated by the fact that the excreta are used by a diviner to ascertain the course and nature of the client's sickness. Female clients, on the other hand, find their naked bodies are subjected to the scrutiny, manipulation and prodding of the medicine men.

Few supplicants in the temple are well enough to do anything but lie on their hard beds. The daily ceremonies, like the rites of the holy-mouth-men, involve discomfort and torture. With ritual precision, the vestals awaken their miserable charges each dawn and roll them about on their beds of pain while performing

ablutions, in the formal movements of which the maidens are highly trained. At other times they insert magic wands in the supplicant's mouth or force him to eat substances which are supposed to be healing. From time to time the medicine men come to their clients and jab magically treated needles into their flesh. The fact that these temple ceremonies may not cure, and may even kill the neophyte, in no way decreases the people's faith in the medicine men.

There remains one other kind of practitioner, known as a "listener." This witch-doctor has the power to exorcise the devils that lodge in the heads of people who have been bewitched. The Nacirema believe that parents bewitch their own children. Mothers are particularly suspected of putting a curse on children while teaching them the secret body rituals. The counter-magic of the witch-doctor is unusual in its lack of ritual. The patient simply tells the "listener" all his troubles and fears, beginning with the earliest difficulties he can remember. The memory displayed by the Nacirema in these exorcism sessions is truly remarkable. It is not uncommon for the patient to bemoan the rejection he felt upon being weaned as a babe, and a few individuals even see their troubles going back to the traumatic effects of their own birth.

In conclusion, mention must be made of certain practices which have their base in native esthetics but which depend upon the pervasive aversion to the natural body and its functions. There are ritual fasts to make fat people thin and ceremonial feasts to make thin people fat. Still other rites are used to make women's breasts larger if they are small, and smaller if they are large. General dissatisfaction with breast shape is symbolized in the fact that the ideal form is virtually outside the range of human variation. A few women afflicted with almost inhuman hypermammary development are so idolized that they make a handsome living by simply going from village to village and permitting the natives to stare at them for a fee.

Reference has already been made to the fact that excretory functions are ritualized, routinized, and relegated to secrecy. Natural reproductive functions are similarly distorted. Intercourse is taboo as a topic and scheduled as an act. Efforts are made to avoid pregnancy by the use of magical materials or by limiting intercourse to certain phases of the moon. Conception is actually very infrequent. When pregnant, women dress so as to hide their condition. Parturition takes place in secret, without friends or relatives to assist, and the majority of women do not nurse their infants.

Our review of the ritual life of the Nacirema has certainly shown them to be a magic-ridden people. It is hard to understand how they have managed to exist so long under the burdens which they have imposed upon themselves. But even such exotic customs as these take on real meaning when they are viewed with the insight provided by Malinowski when he wrote:

Looking from far and above, from our high places of safety in the developed civilization, it is easy to see all the crudity and irrelevance of magic. But without its power and guidance early man could not have mastered his practical difficulties as he has done, nor could man have advanced to the higher stages of civilization.

5

Social Control

All societies have their systems of regulations which are associated with their social practices and values. These we call their norms or standards of social control.

Gresham M. Sykes gives us a picture of the social interaction and control functions among prisoners and between prisoners and prison guards. He postulates four basic types of personality adjustment of the prisoners in their efforts to cope with the severe restrictions which our society imposes upon them. Erwin O. Smigel presents empirical evidence of the divergence of public attitudes and opinions regarding stealing from government agencies, from "big" business, and from "little" business. His article is a neat demonstration of variation in interpretation of the possible legal consequences of such antisocial conduct.

Gresham M. Sykes

*Men, Merchants, and Toughs:**A Study of Reactions to Imprisonment¹*

Many have argued that however much the prison may be softened by an accent on rehabilitation, the custodial institution must fail as an instrument of reform. We are urged to "break down the walls," to eliminate "useless relics of barbarism." In plain fact, however, there is no escape from the necessity of confining large groups of criminals under conditions of deprivation for some time to come. Probation and other alternatives to imprisonment may be used more frequently, new forms of therapy may be employed more widely, and psychiatric services may replace solitary confinement. But even the most sanguine reformer cannot expect the complete elimination of the custodial institution in the short-run future. If the criminals confined in state and federal prisons are not to be dismissed as hopelessly lost from the ranks of the law-abiding, we must find a way of converting the custodial institution into a therapeutic community while still maintaining the high degree of control called for by the tasks of custody and internal order.

¹ From *Social Problems*, 1956, 4:130-138. By permission.

Students of this problem have, in recent years, increasingly turned their attention to the inmate social system. Existing sociological theory is sufficient to let us guess that it is not the details of prison architecture or recreational programs which play a major part in resocializing the offender. Rather, it is the daily patterns of social interaction—of inmate with inmate and guard with inmate—which must eventually determine whether or not the prison succeeds in reforming the prisoner. . . .

We are . . . confronted with two vital theoretical issues. First, to what extent and in what way does the existing inmate social system create, maintain, or strengthen criminal modes of behavior? And second, how can those aspects of inmate interaction which work against rehabilitation be modified? It seems clear that insofar as criminals in prison learn to play social roles which involve force, fraud, and chicanery in interpersonal relationships, the custodial institution is serving as a training ground for criminality rather than adherence to legal norms; and to the extent that these exploitative tactics are supported or reinforced by the social structure of the prison, the transformation of the custodial institution into a therapeutic community is faced with a major barrier. Before this barrier can be surmounted, we need more precise information about the nature and distribution of these social roles, and their determinants and consequences.

This paper, therefore, is an attempt to throw some light on (a) the prevalence of exploitative roles in the inmate social system, i.e., roles which involve force, fraud, and chicanery in inmate relationships; (b) the correlation between exploitation and allegiance to the inmate population; and (c) the status of individuals playing exploitative roles in the inmate social system.

The data for this paper are based on a random sample of one hundred and fifteen adult male criminals confined in a maximum security prison located on the eastern seaboard of the United States. It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the institution is a "typical" one; yet there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that prisons—and particularly maximum security prisons—have a remarkable tendency to over-ride the variations of time and place. Custodial institutions appear to form a group of social systems differing in detail but alike in their fundamental processes, a genus or family of sociological phenomena.

Information about the behavior of the inmate while in prison was secured from his official record, the files of the disciplinary court, and questionnaires administered to the guard of the inmate's cellblock and the shop officer of the prisoner's work detail. The use of prison officials to assess the behavior of inmates—as opposed, let us say, to the use of fellow prisoners—has certain admitted disadvantages. But three points should be noted: (a) the officials have had the opportunity for prolonged and detailed observation in a wide variety of situations; (b) the officials were asked for relatively objective facts rather than more subjective evaluations; and (c) there is some reason to doubt if inmates would be any more dispassionate in their description of one another than would officials, even if the suspicions of prisoners could be allayed successfully.

The crimes which brought the men in the sample to prison range from murder to desertion, but four general categories account for a majority of the offenders: 24 per cent have been convicted of felonious homicide, 24 per cent of burglary, 20 per cent of robbery, and 12 per cent of larceny in a variety of forms. The median

age of the group is 35 years and 63 per cent have had less than nine years of formal schooling. Negroes comprise 38 per cent of the sample. The reports of the institution's psychologist indicate that 55 per cent of the group are average or better in mental level, the remainder being classified as full normal, inferior, borderline, or deficient. In the matter of psychological abnormality, 24 per cent are said to have "no psychosis," 25 per cent are labelled "psychopathic personality," and 30 per cent are diagnosed as "constitutional defective." The terms epileptic, chronic alcoholic, constitutional inferior, and neurotic exhaust the rest. A large share—65 per cent—have experienced confinement in a penal institution for a year or more prior to their present imprisonment and only 16 per cent exhibit no previous criminal record. Half of the sample has been in the prison for three years or more and 25 per cent can look forward to being detained on their release for questioning by the police and possible trial in connection with other crimes. These are the outstanding characteristics of the group of prisoners to whose patterns of interaction in the inmate social system we now turn.

PATTERNS OF EXPLOITATION

In the literature of criminology, the totalitarian structure of the maximum security prison is usually presented as a striking anomaly in a democratic society. The detailed regulations extending into every area of the individual's life, the constant surveillance, and the wide gulf between the rulers and the ruled—all are portrayed as elements of a repressive regime.

But the loss of liberty, although it is fundamental to all the rest, is only one of the many deprivations posed by confinement. The prisoner is also faced with the loss of material goods and services, heterosexual relationships, personal autonomy, symbolic affirmation of his value as an individual, and a variety of other benefits which are more or less taken for granted in the free community. In one sense these are simply frustrations inflicted by society as a penalty for crime, but it is important to recognize that they represent profound threats to the captive's ego as well. The inmate is stripped of the usual marks of status in a culture which tends to equate material possessions with personal worth. The preoccupation with homosexuality, commonly observed among prisoners and guards alike, is evidence in part of the anxieties about one's masculinity which appear among men without women. And as Bettelheim has tellingly noted in his materials on the concentration camp, individuals under guard are subject to the ego-threat of losing their identification with the normal adult role; i.e., inmates are under pressure to accept a picture of themselves as weak, helpless, or dependent.

One solution for the deprivations posed by imprisonment lies in the exploitation of fellow captives by means of manipulation and conniving. Sharp dealings in the exchange of goods stolen from the supplies of the mess hall, workshops, and maintenance details; trickery and fraud in gambling; sycophancy to secure one's ends; never "giving" but always "selling"; hoodwinking officials to effect the transfer of another inmate either to eliminate an unwelcome competitor or to make a position available for a confederate—all are forms of a manipulative mode of adjustment to the frustrations of prison life whereby escape from frustration is bought at the expense of other prisoners. In the argot of the institution studied, the individual who adopts such a role is frequently called a *merchant* or *peddler*. A rough measure

of this mode of adjustment for the inmates in the sample is provided by the ratings of the cellblock guard and shop officer accorded each prisoner on four items. The items, couched in the work-a-day language of the institution, consist of questions about the inmate's behavior and the dichotomized responses form a Guttman scale with a coefficient of reproducibility of .95. The items appear on the scale—from highest to lowest frequency of positive responses—as follows: (a) skill in “figuring angles”; (b) “stinginess” toward other inmates; (c) “gypping” other inmates in transactions; and (d) “brown-nosing” other inmates for personal gain.

These tactics of exploitation, so largely compounded of fraud or chicanery, are clearly distinguishable from another pattern of reaction to the deprivations of prison life which involves the use of violence as a means to gain one's ends. The inmates speak of the *tough* or *gorilla* who establishes a satrapy based on coercive force; weaker or more fearful inmates are intimidated into providing the amenities of life, sexual favors, and gestures of deference. Actually, it would appear that three types of violence crop up in the patterns of interaction among inmates and only one of these can be accurately labelled as *instrumental* violence. The explosive, expressive violence generated in a quarrel and the smouldering violence of the man who is pushed to the limits of endurance also exist. The items in the questionnaire administered to the guards with the design of eliciting information about the inmates' use of violence as a means show some ambiguity. None the less, four questions concerning the prisoner's proneness to the show of force provide a scale which apparently measures instrumental violence fairly successfully. The pattern of dichotomized responses has a coefficient of reproducibility of .98 and the questions, again in order of frequency of positive responses from highest to lowest, deal with the following topics: (a) arrogant or overbearing behavior; (b) the show of physical “toughness”; (c) the use of force “to get things”; and (d) starting fights with other inmates. The last item, which might appear on the surface to reflect expressive, rather than instrumental, violence, seems to reveal a use of force to insure dominance instead of an outburst of anger.

Since the scale of manipulation and the scale of instrumental violence are each composed of four dichotomized items, there are five ranks in each scale; and if we group the ranks on each scale into “highs” and “lows” (scale types 4-3-2 versus scale types 1-0), we can classify the inmates in the sample into four major patterns of adjustment. (See Table 1.) At this point we must be cautious, since the classification of individuals into particular patterns of adjustment is based on the arbitrary division of the two scales which in turn are marked by the weakness of a small number of items. But bearing these limitations in mind, there seems reason to believe that a large proportion of the inmate population is playing social roles which involve the exploitation of fellow-prisoners through force, fraud, or chicanery.

TABLE 1
PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT AMONG 115 ADULT MALE PRISONERS

Pattern	Scale Score		Percentage of sample
	Scale of “manipulation”	Scale of “Instrumental violence”	
I	high	high	35
II	low	high	10
III	high	low	30
IV	low	low	25

PATTERNS OF LOYALTY TO THE INMATE SOCIAL SYSTEM

A number of writers have hypothesized that building iron bonds of loyalty to other prisoners as a group is an important part of turning an inmate into a hardened criminal while in prison. The individual supposedly learns to identify himself with other offenders, to develop a sense of alliance with a criminal world which is in conflict with the forces of law and order. However, we do not believe this to be true; instead, we suspect that the individual who becomes most deeply enmeshed in criminal modes of behavior is the individual who is alienated from *both* fellow-prisoners and prison officials.

Now it is true that the percentage of inmates defined by the guards as individuals who would probably side with the inmate group in an ultimate crisis of loyalties such as a riot is 45 per cent, 50 per cent, 12 per cent and 3 per cent in the patterns of adjustment I, II, III, and IV respectively; in this limited sense, inmates who play the role of exploiter and who are presumably being "trained" in criminal modes of behavior tend to identify themselves with fellow offenders. (See Table 2.) Yet solidarity with other criminals is perhaps not best measured by how the individual may behave in a rare crisis; rather, we should look to the more common acts of betrayal and disloyalty which take the form of "ratting" or "squealing" on fellow inmates.

If the betrayal of a group member to the enemy is the touchstone of solidarity, the cohesiveness of criminals in prison is sadly lacking—41 per cent of the individuals in the sample are identified by the guards as men who "squeal" on their fellow prisoners. . . . And it is the exploiter who tends to engage in this form of disloyalty. (See Table 2.) To a large extent, informing on fellow inmates is another

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE OF PRISONERS IN PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS

Selected characteristics	Patterns of Adjustment (in percentages)				Level of significance*
	I	II	III	IV	
1) side with inmates in a riot	45	50	12	3	.01
2) inform on fellow inmates	55	50	38	21	.05
3) will "go straight"	18	17	24	76	.01
4) committed offenses in prison	53	83	32	28	.01
5) not respected by other inmates	57	33	38	7	.01
6) feared by other inmates	80	58	27	25	.01

* Computed by means of chi square for 4x2 contingency tables.

form of exploitation, since it usually involves an attempt to secure preferential treatment at the expense of others or a skillful tactic of internecine warfare whereby officials are gulled into settling inmate grudges. But it is exploitation with a difference, in that it more or less requires a clear breach in the individual's identification with the inmate population.

It is doubtful if this lack of allegiance to other criminals is a token of ideological commitment to the forces of law and order or that it even represents the bare beginnings of reformation. Rather, it would appear that the reverse is true—that the inmate who is alienated from fellow prisoners to the extent that he exploits and betrays them for his personal aggrandizement is a man who has set his face against all normative demands. A rough indication of this is given by the guards' estimates

of which inmates will "go straight" when released. The data show that the inmates in pattern IV receive this accolade far more frequently than the inmates in patterns I, II, and III. (See Table 2.) And it is certainly true that exploiters present more serious behavioral problems in prison than do non-exploiters. When we examine the disciplinary record of the inmates in the sample, we find that the percentage of individuals convicted of offenses against the institutional rules is highest in the exploitative patterns of adjustment. (See Table 2.) Although many of these infractions represent rebellion against the officials, it is also true that a large number of these detected violations involve coercion and deceit in inmate-inmate relationships. In short, there is reason to believe that in so far as the individual's role in the inmate social system of interaction influences criminality, it does so not by inculcating a sense of identification with the criminal world—as represented by fellow criminals in prison—but by habituating the individual to a war of all against all.

Before we leave this admittedly complex and difficult issue, one further point should be noted. The question can be raised as to whether there are not "islands of solidarity" within the larger inmate group in the form of tightly-knit cliques made up of exploiters. It is true that our materials show that all 16 of the prisoners identified as "clique-men" in the sample are to be found in patterns of adjustment I and II, but unfortunately, the questionnaire data are not sufficient to give us a definite answer about the extent of solidarity within the clique. However, unstructured interviewing of guards and inmates indicates that cliques of exploiters are at best an uneasy alliance, often marked by suspicion and a rigid stratification in terms of domination and subordination, and that they are held together by fear rather than mutual identification.

PATTERNS OF RESPECT

In many social groups certain roles are accompanied by both the respect of others and more material rewards. These two benefits, buttressing one another, often provide an adequate picture of the motives which lead an individual to assume a particular part in the system of interaction. In the prison, however, exploitation is the major route to winning goods and services beyond the subsistence level and the exploiter tends to stand low in the eyes of his fellow prisoners—the percentage of inmates characterized as "not respected" in the exploitative patterns of adjustment is higher than in the non-exploitative pattern. (See Table 2.)

This fact is particularly interesting in the light of the frequently held assumption that it is the role of the *tough* (however it may be labelled) which is accorded the highest prestige in the society of the prison. Undoubtedly there is a good deal of ambivalence on this score. . . . It is possible therefore, that although many inmates fear and condemn the individual who manipulates and coerces them,² they still aspire to reverse their roles. The exploitative prisoner may exercise great influence in the life of the prison—not as an admired leader to whom others willingly subordinate themselves, but as a model for behavior which is viewed with both disparagement and desire; and we can presume that the actual assumption of the exploiter's role is accompanied by a series of rationalizations which justify taking advantage of companions in misery.

However, the fact that individuals who score low on both scales of exploitation tend to be respected seems to be due to something more than refraining from the use of manipulation and violence. The sample data indicates that these individuals

² See Table 2.

are characterized as inmates who "keep their promise," exhibit bravery, possess a certain aloofness which is perhaps best described as "personal dignity," and so on, with a significantly greater frequency than prisoners in patterns of adjustment I, II, and III. The vocabularies of the guards and inmates do not have any clear-cut term to designate the cluster of behavior patterns which is accorded respect in the inmate social system, but the phrase *real man* seems to be used more than any other; and the traits which go into the argot-role of *real man* appear not simply as a lack of exploitation but also, and more positively, as mutual aid and personal worth.

From a structural point of view, this role has an obvious utility to the compressed prison population existing under conditions of prolonged deprivation. It calls for cooperation rather than conflict, restraint rather than license, an ability to endure hardship rather than a readiness to resort to individualistic striving—the requisites of group survival in a threatening environment. Yet it is a role in the inmate social system which is filled by relatively few prisoners, partly, we suspect, because of the ambivalence of the prestige system, partly because prestige and material rewards do not coincide, and partly because criminals in prison are peculiarly unfitted both by previous experience and inclination to adapt themselves to the need of the collectivity.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In describing the reactions of men to imprisonment, we may be describing four basic patterns of adjustment to any situation which involves some degree of goal frustration. It is not surprising, therefore, that Parsons' "directions of deviant orientation" bears a close resemblance to these patterns: the active, aggressive use of other people as a means, both by the manipulation of verbal symbols and by violence; the use of one or the other of these methods of exploitation but not both; and the more passive, withdrawn, and conforming mode.

The maximum security prison, however, is unique in the extent of the frustrations imposed, the enforced intimacy among those who are frustrated, and the prior training in deviance possessed by inmates. The result would seem to be a social group marked by a high degree of internal exploitation where fellow sufferers are scorned as powerless victims even more than the custodians are despised as symbols of oppression. Far from being a prison *community*, men in prison tend to react as individuals and refuse to suspend their intra-mural conflict when confronting the enemy, the prison officials. Those who dominate others are viewed with a mingled fear, hatred, and envy; and the few who manage to retreat into solidarity may well be penalized in the struggle to evade the poverty-stricken existence—both material and immaterial—prescribed by the institution.

If we are correct in assuming that the more exploitative roles of the inmate social system provide practice in deception and violence, the problem of changing the custodial institution into a therapeutic community becomes in part the problem of decreasing the number of individuals who play the part of *merchant* or *tough*. Since these roles seem to be rooted in a major problem of the inmate group—the frustrations or threats of the prison environment—it might be argued that we could reduce the number of prisoners playing these roles by lessening the frustrations. Unfortunately, attempts in this direction have often failed because the patterns of exploitation have reappeared at a higher or more complex level; increases in freedom of movement, inmate responsibility, and material possessions have set the stage for

more bitter struggles with higher stakes. Indeed, there seems to be some reason to doubt whether the rigors of prison life can ever be lessened sufficiently to solve the problem. There are many good arguments for improving the lot of the prisoner, but a proven increase in the number of reformed criminals is not one of them.

An alternative (and at present theoretically unpopular) solution lies in strict control by prison officials. Inmates are in effect to be forced out of exploitative roles by making it impossible or extremely difficult for prisoners to follow such patterns of adjustment. This position has many difficulties. For one thing, it opens the door to brutality or simple indifference to inmates' legitimate needs—but a serious reconsideration of its place in programs of therapy is called for.

In any event, it is evident that the inmate social system is marked by strong centrifugal forces which hamper the task of rehabilitation in that they spring from the widespread existence of force and guile in interpersonal relationships. At the same time, the fact that the inmate population does not form a closely allied group of criminals united in their conflict with the prison officials offers some hope of constructing a situation which moves the individual in the direction of reform.

Erwin O. Smigel

Public Attitudes Toward Stealing as Related to the Size of the Victim Organization¹

This study concerns attitudes toward stealing from each of three categories of organizations: small business, large business, and government. It was conducted in an effort to determine how size of the victim organization affects public attitudes toward stealing. The study seemed important not only for the immediate issue, but also for possible insights into attitudes toward bureaucracy, especially its impersonal aspects, and for what it could add to an understanding of the relationship between organizational size and attitudes in general. Usual assumptions pertaining to the effect of organizational size on attitudes suggest the following hypothesis: If obliged to choose, most individuals would prefer to steal from, and be more approving of others stealing from, large scale, impersonal rather than from small scale, personal organizations.

To explore this hypothesis a systematic random sample of 212 non-transient adults of Bloomington, Indiana, was drawn and interviewed in their homes. These individuals in addition to background information queries were given fifteen hypothetical situational questions, a set of five for each type of organization, involving stealing from government (GOV), large business (LB), and small business (SB). The respondents were asked to approve or disapprove, using Likert scale categories, of stealing under a variety of circumstances. The first section of this paper analyzes situational question responses. A second section examines responses to a forced choice hypothetical circumstance query. Respondents were requested to select the one organization—GOV, LB, or SB—from which they would prefer to steal if forced by necessity. They were then asked to give reasons for their selection or rejection of each organization.

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1956, 21:320-327. By permission.

THE SITUATIONAL QUESTION ANALYSIS

Cross correlations between each of the organizations indicate that respondents generally disapprove of stealing regardless of the size of the organization. Despite this general disapproval, important differences in degree of disapproval were found. The Stealing Attitude Scores (Table 1) show greatest disapproval toward stealing from SB and lesser disapproval toward stealing from LB and GOV. Although differences in degree of disapproval between LB and GOV are negligible, the results, at least for the large versus small dichotomy, support the hypothesis.

TABLE 1
ATTITUDES TOWARD STEALING

Stealing Attitude Scores	Type of Organization					
	Government		Large Business		Small Business	
	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent
6-10 (strongly approve to approve)	(0)	0	(2)	1	(0)	0
11-15 (approve to indifferent)	(13)	6	(7)	3	(5)	2
16-20 (indifferent to disapprove)	(133)	63	(129)	61	(101)	48
21-25 (disapprove to strongly disapprove)	(66)	31	(73)	34	(106)	50
Total	(212)	100	(212)*	100	(212)	100

* Includes one case not tabulated.

When the Stealing Attitude Scores of people with various backgrounds are compared, some further differentiation is discovered. In terms of socio-economic status it was found that regardless of organizational size, the lower the SES, the greater the approval of stealing.² Similar results were obtained by separate analysis of occupation and education. In general, on Counts' occupational scale, respondents who rated lower were more approving than were those who rated higher. The same consistency was found in connection with level of education. Respondents with less than thirteen years of schooling were less disapproving of stealing than were those with more education.

Although relationships between approval or disapproval and social class exist, the various socio-economic levels seem to be affected differentially by the size of the victim organization. Table 2 demonstrates that lower socio-economic respondents show the greatest proportional difference in scores between government and small business. A 77 per cent proportional difference resulted for lower SES as compared with 38 per cent for upper respondents, indicating the differential effect of organizational size upon subjects' attitudes. Respondents, then from lower socio-economic levels, are more affected by size of organization than are those from upper levels.

Comparable relationships of the following sort were also found:

1. *Sex.* Stealing Attitude Scores for the sample of 110 men and 102 women differ, with females more inclined to approve of stealing than males. However, men who approved did so to a greater degree than did women. Analysis of the differences in scores between GOV and SB, for both men and women, in the most disapproving column (21-25) testifies that size of the victim organization also affects men

² This finding is consistent with attitudes concerning "chiseling" unemployment compensation from the government. However, this lesser disapproval on the part of lower SES respondents probably does not justify any conclusions about a greater morality on the part of the upper classes.

differently than women. Females, although more approving of stealing, showed the greatest proportional attitudinal difference against stealing when SB is the victim: 67 per cent compared to a 54 per cent difference for men.

2. *Religiosity.* Analysis of religiosity and Stealing Attitude Scores indicates nominally religious respondents as more critical of stealing than respondents not claiming religion. Examination of the most disapproving category reveals no change in the proportionate difference of attitude from GOV to SB. However, non-religious respondents were least disapproving of stealing from LB. Comparison between low disapproval and high disapproval scores for religious and non-religious respondents, using LB as the base for non-religious subjects in this instance, indicates that non-religious interviewees show the greatest proportional difference: 81 per cent as against 56 per cent for religious respondents.

3. *Veterans.* Although male veterans of World War II were more approving of stealing than were male non-veterans, veterans were more affected by size of the victim organization. Comparison of differences between GOV scores and SB scores shows that veterans differed 86 per cent; non-veterans only 47 per cent.

Note has been taken that: (1) Nearly all respondents disapproved of the stealing behavior outlined in the situational questions, regardless of size of the victim organization. (2) Intensity of disapproval varied with size of the organization. Respondents were more disapproving of stealing from SB than from LB or GOV.

TABLE 2

DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES OF RESPONDENTS FROM TWO SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVELS:
PERCENTAGES WHO STRONGLY DISAPPROVE OF STEALING

SES Level	N	Victim Organization			Proportional Difference*
		SB	LB	GOV	
		Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	
Upper	(62)	58	42	42	38
Lower	(146)	46	31	26	77
Both SES Levels	(208)	50	34	31	61
Unclassified	(4)
Total Sample	(212)				

* Difference between GOV and SB over GOV per cents times 100.

(3) Further variations in attitudes were related to other social elements such as SES, sex, religiosity and group membership. (4) Additional differences in attitudes as affected by organizational size were observed within each of these social units. (5) The influence on stealing attitudes of any one background classification seems to depend on its relationship to one or more classifications.

FORCED CHOICE STEALING PREFERENCE

To arrive at the basis for these differences in attitudes, each respondent was asked to choose the type of organization from which he would rather steal if in need and he felt he had no other choice. Interviewees were then requested to explain their preference. In general respondents remained faithful to their strong disapproval of stealing from SB. However, the forced stealing question produced an altered order of stealing approval: LB now became the preferred first choice, then GOV and finally SB. The forced stealing choice reveals more than a change in order;

of greater significance is the large number who preferred to steal from LB rather than from GOV as compared to the negligible difference in approval between LB and GOV when the situational questions were employed. Now 102 respondents preferred to steal from LB; 53 from GOV; and 10 from SB. Of the remaining subjects nine did not distinguish between LB and GOV, five did not differentiate at all, thirty refused to steal under any condition, and three would not answer the question.

Respondents who made a stealing choice used two basic lines of reasoning to explain their preference—these involved consideration of the principles of least evil and/or least risk. The majority had registered their disapproval of stealing when they answered the situational questions. The selection question forced them to make a stealing preference for themselves. This placed them in a situation many found objectionable. To modify this position, most respondents decided from which organization stealing was the lesser evil before choosing their victim.

The second major line of reasoning involved the principle of least risk. The possibility of being caught and punished for theft seems to have a strong influence on stealing preference. However, this reasoning often runs counter to the first. Respondents who conceive of the problem in terms of both concepts and who cannot integrate them must weigh and evaluate the principle of lesser evil against the principle of least risk. Although these themes run through most of the reasons advanced by respondents for their stealing, different categories of interviewees see these ideas in different ways. An analysis of these various categories of stealing preference and reasons advanced for stealing choice in its relationship to size of the victim organization follows.

SB as the Preferred Victim

Of the 212 respondents, only eight men and two women preferred to steal from SB. Their mean scores for the situational questions are slightly lower than those of subjects in other categories, and they show a greater predisposition toward cheating SB than do other respondents. This is the only category where the mean score for SB is not the most disapproving score. The order of mean scores from the most disapproving to least disapproving for these individuals is: LB 20.0, SB 19.5 and GOV 18.6 (the most disapproving score for each classification is 25).

Their reasons for choosing SB as the potential victim were relatively simple and direct. Selection was made mainly on the principle of the least risk. Even if caught, these respondents felt that the small business man, who was on personal terms with his customers, would be more lenient than the managers of LB or GOV. A woman respondent put it: "The small businessman would be more human; he would give you a break. Big businessmen are cold-blooded and the government of course, might catch you."

The risk factor seemed to operate as a deterrent for these respondents. They did not feel more justified in cheating SB as against the other organizations, but they perceived the situation as involving the least risk. Only one respondent felt morally justified in stealing from SB. Most were afraid of the consequences of stealing from large scale organizations. Government especially inspired the fear of being caught and sentenced. The replies indicate that were it not for the fear of punishment, these individuals might have preferred to steal from the larger organizations. Their use of the principle of least risk seems to run counter to the original hypothesis which implies that the respondents would be more kindly disposed toward personal small business than toward impersonal large business. However, the findings

revealed that though the personal element is recognized, it is evaluated in conjunction with fear of discovery and punishment. For these respondents the principle of least risk seems to have more importance for their decisions on stealing than the principle of least evil.

LB as the Preferred Victim

One hundred and two members of the sample preferred to steal from LB. The overwhelming popularity of this type of organization reverses the disapproval order elicited by the situational questions. The mean scores for these questions indicated only minor attitudinal differences, especially between GOV and LB: 20.8 for SB, 19.6 for LB and 19.4 for GOV.

The forces making for favorable attitudes toward stealing from large scale business seem more complex than those involved in creating similar attitudes toward small business. Many reasons for and against stealing from LB were offered. Some involved conflicts of values which were difficult to resolve. Most respondents based their choice of LB as the victim on the principle of lesser evil, feeling that stealing from big business was not as bad as stealing from small business because LB was impersonal, powerful and ruthless.

While few respondents specifically mentioned the term "impersonal," they often implied it: "They're corporations." "Big business deals with you at arm's length; you can deal with it in the same way." For some, bigness and impersonality bred resentment and distrust. Two grounds were offered for this feeling; one concerned weakness generally associated with bureaucracy, the other the notion that big business is ruthless. Reasons advanced under the first classification claimed that LB wasted time, space, and energy. Second category reasons were more varied, for example: "I'm more callous toward big business because they're more ruthless." "After all they cheat you." "Why don't they pay a living wage?"

Many regarded big business profits as excessive and this belief was used by some as a basis for their resentment. Examples are numerous: "They have the highest margin of profits and can afford the loss better; besides they allow for it." "Big business has tremendous capital, a part of which they've cheated from me." Distrust and resentment of big business led 21 per cent of the individuals who would rather

TABLE 3
PRIMARY REASONS FOR PREFERRING TO STEAL FROM LARGE BUSINESS

Reasons for Stealing Choice	N	Per Cent
Can afford it best, or has tremendous capital	(69)	67.7
Allows for it: raises prices, is insured	(13)	12.8
They cheat you; they're ruthless	(8)	7.8
Less chance of being caught	(4)	3.9
Provides the greatest opportunity	(3)	2.9
No reasons offered	(5)	4.9
Total	(102)	100.0

steal from LB to apply the "eye for an eye" principle in making their decision. They believed that big business robbed them either by outright theft, or by charging exorbitant prices. In either event, this "behavior" on the part of LB provided justification for those who chose to steal from LB since they considered this decision the lesser evil. Another 68 per cent legitimated their preference for victimizing LB on a "Robin Hood" philosophy. For them robbing the rich to give to the poor—in this instance themselves—was a lesser evil.

ERWIN O. SMIGEL

Some preferences appeared based mainly on the principle of least risk. In all, seven per cent believed that LB provided more opportunity for theft with less chance of discovery or punishment. The anonymity of big business is believed to offer greater opportunity for stealing from LB rather than SB. The choice between the two large scale organizations was made in favor of LB as the victim because of the respondents' greater fear of government. As one man expressed it: "There is no sense stealing from the government because the FBI is smarter than the police."

Grounds for stealing preference, even in the abstract, have been presented as if they were mutually exclusive, as if there were not a multiplicity of reasons which had to be considered and weighed before decision could be made. This is not so. The impersonality, the inconsiderate materialism, the opportunity offered by the anonymity big business provided were among the elements in favor of choosing LB. Many individuals who extended these reasons also had "cause" for not preferring LB, such as admiration for the big businessman, or intense dislike for government, or the belief that the small businessman might be more lenient if he caught them. Special difficulty arose when decision had to be made between LB and GOV where both organizations were considered big and both stand accused of bad bureaucratic practices.

Generally, however, grounds for preferring to steal from LB were related to reasons for not stealing from SB. One combination of reasons reads: "A man has to be very small to take from the little man. LB can afford it. If you clip government, you just clip yourself and what's more, you have a good chance of being caught." Table 4 shows the relative frequency of these reasons.

The data presented for this category again point out that while bigness and its corollaries play important parts in affecting the decision to steal from LB, these

TABLE 4
REASONS FOR NOT STEALING FROM GOVERNMENT AND SMALL BUSINESS, BY RESPONDENTS WHO CHOSE LARGE BUSINESS AS THE VICTIM*

Government		N	Per Cent
Reasons for Not Stealing from Government			
It's stealing from yourself		(23)	29.5
Would get caught by GOV and penalty might be stiffer		(18)	23.1
Needs its money		(15)	19.2
Stealing from GOV affects other citizens in the community		(13)	16.7
Patriotism		(7)	9.0
Lack of opportunity		(2)	2.5
Total		(78)	100.0
Small Business		N	Per Cent
Reasons for Not Stealing from Small Business			
SB does not have too much money		(42)	76.3
Identification: Small like yourself, or member of community		(8)	14.6
Might know small businessman		(5)	9.1
Total		(55)	100.0

* Figures in this table do not equal 102 for each division GOV and SB since all respondents did not offer negative reasons for their stealing preference.

factors alone were often not sufficient to determine this choice. Many other reasons were offered. The pro and con of the particular choice appears to have been considered before final decision was made, and the principles of lesser evil and least risk run through the majority of the reasons proffered.

GOV as the Preferred Victim

Fifty-three members of the 212 sample chose to steal from government. Their mean scores (20.9 for SB, 20.2 for LB, and 19.5 for GOV) for the situational questions are slightly higher than those for respondents who chose SB or LB. The mean scores demonstrate that members of this category both preferred to steal from GOV and were less disapproving of others stealing from government.

The task of choosing a victim appears less complicated for these individuals than for those who preferred to steal from LB, but more complicated than for those who elected to steal from SB. Fewer secondary reasons for their choice were offered. Clear-cut primary reasons often coincided with reasons for not stealing from either SB or LB. Intense dislike for government also helped make for definite preferences.

TABLE 5
RESPONDENTS' PRIMARY REASONS FOR PREFERRING TO STEAL FROM GOV

Reasons	N	Per Cent
Can afford it best, or collects a great amount of tax money	(17)	32.1
Taking back own money	(8)	15.1
Government's function to take care of the needy	(7)	13.2
Against Democratic Administration*	(7)	13.2
Bureaucratic inefficiencies	(5)	9.4
Everybody does it	(5)	9.4
Distributes the loss	(4)	7.6
Total	(53)	100.0

* The data for this study were collected in 1951 and 1952 while the Democratic administration was in power.

All of the reasons for stealing listed in Table 5 involve the theme of lesser evil. Most of the 32 per cent who thought that government could best afford the loss felt also that what they might take would not hurt it to the extent that similar thefts would affect smaller organizations. This notion is subscribed to by an additional eight per cent who believed that stealing from GOV was the lesser evil, because the loss was well distributed. The choice was further justified on grounds that a great deal of money was collected in taxes; some of this taxation, it was hinted, was unnecessary. Many argued then, that GOV was big and wealthy and stated their preference in terms of the "Robin Hood" principle.

Bureaucracy, which was equated to size and disfunctioning, was an additional justification for the choice of GOV as the victim. Although this type of criticism was leveled against LB, it was more frequently applied to GOV. Such items as waste and red tape were not uncommon grounds for stealing preference. Only 9 per cent of this category proffered this as their primary reason, but many others mentioned bureaucratic inefficiencies as a secondary reason. That bigness and its corollaries played a part in determining this choice is seen in the following examples: "Government is the bigger concern; it wouldn't hurt government as bad as an individual or smaller concern." "They waste anyhow; they throw away more than I would take."

Though GOV is generally conceived of as larger than LB, the section of Table 4 dealing with GOV indicates the importance of factors other than size as a determinant of choice for some respondents. Concepts of loyalty, patriotism and fear of government swayed many individuals to select LB rather than GOV. Yet, size was still important for many of those who chose to steal from government.

The bigness of GOV, however, does not account for all who elected it as the victim. Lesser evil may be premised on factors other than bigness, and the 13 per cent who were against the Democratic administration grounded their judgment on this theme. Their feelings are reflected in such statements as: "I'm anti-socialist." "It's a God damned government anyway—if it were O.K., I'd take from big business."

Another category felt that stealing from GOV was the lesser evil because the respondents were part of the government and had contributed to its support. They reasoned that stealing from GOV would be stealing from themselves, and so less criminal. These individuals were among the most difficult to force into a decision involving their possible stealing. Their scores on the situational questions were among the most disapproving. They selected GOV reluctantly and only because they felt this choice was the least dishonest.

An additional 13 per cent whose scores on the situational questions were also very disapproving, thought that it was government's function to take care of the needy. These individuals intimated that if government failed in its duty, they were then more justified in stealing from it.

The following generalizations seem to be indicated: (1) While bigness and impersonality played a part in determining the preference for GOV as the victim, these elements do not seem as important for this category as they did for LB. (2) Other factors with strong emotional overtones—loyalty, patriotism, even anti-administration sentiment—appear to affect the decisions of some of the respondents. (3) Making decisions for this category seems easier than for those who chose LB, but not as easy as for those who selected SB. (4) Enough reasons pro and con were advanced so that the weighing process noted in the selection of LB was evident once again. (5) Some of the same reasons for preferring to steal from LB were again in evidence for those who selected GOV.

.

6

Social and Cultural Change

Neither culture nor social organization is ever really static. Change may occur more slowly during one era than another, and the rate of change varies from society to society, but the phrase "changeless culture" is an exaggeration for emphasis, not a scientific description.

Man is the only animal which not only adapts to his environment but also creates environment. Groups create culture patterns, and the problem of adjusting to the cultural environment is just as real as that of adjusting to the physical environment.

Seldom is change more abrupt and dramatic than when an invention alters long-established needs and expectations. By modifying patterns of behavior in such a basic institution as the economic order, technological innovation can have ramifications throughout the social structure. W. F. Cottrell's "Death by Dieselization" traces a case of the consequences of technological change in a one-industry town.

A quite different illustration of social change is provided by Sheldon L. Messinger's "Organizational Transformation." Here we see an organization being maintained for its own sake even at the cost of sacrificing work toward the goals which originally inspired its inception.

W. F. Cottrell

Death by Dieselization: A Case Study in the Reaction to Technological Change¹

In the following instance it is proposed that we examine a community confronted with radical change in its basic economic institution and to trace the effects of this change throughout the social structure. From these facts it may be possible in some degree to anticipate the resultant changing attitudes and values of the people in the community, particularly as they reveal whether or not there is a demand for modification of the social structure or a shift in function from one institution to another. Some of the implications of the facts discovered may be valuable in anticipating further social change.

The community chosen for examination has been disrupted by the dieselization of the railroads. Since the railroad is among the oldest of those industries organized around steam, and since therefore the social structure of railroad communities is a product of long-continued processes of adaptation to the technology of steam, the sharp contrast between the technological requirements of the steam engine and those of the diesel should clearly reveal the changes in social structure required. Any one of a great many railroad towns might have been chosen for examination. However, many railroad towns are only partly dependent upon the railroad for their existence. In them many of the effects which take place are blurred and not easily distinguishable by the observer. Thus, the "normal" railroad town may not be the best place to see the consequences of dieselization. For this reason a one-industry town was chosen for examination.

In a sense it is an "ideal type" railroad town, and hence not complicated by other extraneous economic factors. It lies in the desert and is here given the name "Caliente," which is the Spanish adjective for "hot." Caliente was built in a break in an eighty mile canyon traversing the desert. Its reason for existence was to service the steam locomotive. There are a few resources in the area to support

¹ *American Sociological Review*, 1951, 16:358-365. By permission.

it on any other basis, and such as they are they would contribute more to the growth and maintenance of other little settlements in the vicinity than to that of Caliente. So long as the steam locomotive was in use, Caliente was a necessity. With the adoption of the diesel it became obsolescent.

This stark fact was not, however, part of the expectations of the residents of Caliente. Based upon the "certainty" of the railroad's need for Caliente, men built their homes there, frequently of concrete and brick, at the cost, in many cases, of their life savings. The water system was laid in cast iron which will last for centuries. Business men erected substantial buildings which could be paid for only by profits gained through many years of business. Four churches evidence the faith of Caliente people in the future of their community. A twenty-seven bed hospital serves the town. Those who built it thought that their investment was as well warranted as the fact of birth, sickness, accident, and death. They believed in education. Their school buildings represent the investment of savings guaranteed by bonds and future taxes. There is a combined park and play field which, together with a recently modernized theatre, has been serving recreational needs. All these physical structures are material evidence of the expectations, morally and legally sanctioned and financially funded, of the people of Caliente. This is a normal and rational aspect of the culture of all "solid" and "sound" communities.

Similarly normal are the social organizations. These include Rotary, Chamber of Commerce, Masons, Odd Fellows, American Legion, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. There are the usual unions, churches, and myriad little clubs to which the women belong. In short, here is the average American community with normal social life, subscribing to normal American codes. Nothing its members had been taught would indicate that the whole pattern of this normal existence depended completely upon a few elements of technology which were themselves in flux. For them the continued use of the steam engine was as "natural" a phenomenon as any other element in their physical environment. Yet suddenly their life pattern was destroyed by the announcement that the railroad was moving its division point, and with it destroying the economic basis of Caliente's existence.

Turning from this specific community for a moment, let us examine the technical changes which took place and the reasons for the change. Division points on a railroad are established by the frequency with which the rolling stock must be serviced and the operating crews changed. At the turn of the century when this particular road was built, the engines produced wet steam at low temperatures. The steel in the boilers was of comparatively low tensile strength and could not withstand the high temperatures and pressures required for the efficient use of coal and water. At intervals of roughly a hundred miles the engine had to be disconnected from the train for service. At these points the cars also were inspected and if they were found to be defective they were either removed from the train or repaired while it was standing and the new engine being coupled on. Thus the location of Caliente, as far as the railroad was concerned, was a function of boiler temperature and pressure and the resultant service requirements of the locomotives.

Following World War II, the high tensile steels developed to create superior artillery and armor were used for locomotives. As a consequence it was possible to utilize steam at higher temperatures and pressure. Speed, power, and efficiency were increased and the distance between service intervals was increased.

The "ideal distance" between freight divisions became approximately 150 to 200 miles whereas it had formerly been 100 to 150. Wherever possible, freight divisions were increased in length to that formerly used by passenger trains, and

passenger divisions were lengthened from two old freight divisions to three. Thus towns located at 100 miles from a terminal became obsolescent, those at 200 became freight points only, and those at three hundred miles became passenger division points.

The increase in speed permitted the train crews to make the greater distance in the time previously required for the lesser trip, and roughly a third of the train and engine crews, car inspectors, boilermakers, and machinists and other service men were dropped. The towns thus abandoned were crossed off the social record of the nation in the adjustment to these technological changes in the use of the steam locomotive. Caliente, located midway between terminals about six hundred miles apart, survived. In fact it gained, since the less frequent stops caused an increase in the service required of the maintenance crews at these points where it took place. However, the introduction of the change to diesel engines projected a very different future.

In its demands for service the diesel engine differs almost completely from a steam locomotive. It requires infrequent, highly skilled service, carried on within very close limits, in contrast to the frequent, crude adjustments required by the steam locomotive. Diesels operate at about 35 per cent efficiency, in contrast to the approximately 4 per cent of the steam locomotives in use after World War II in the United States. Hence diesels require much less frequent stops for fuel and water. These facts reduce their operating costs sufficiently to compensate for their much higher initial cost.

In spite of these reductions in operating costs the introduction of diesels ordinarily would have taken a good deal of time. The change-over would have been slowed by the high capital costs of retooling the locomotive works, the long period required to recapture the costs of existing steam locomotives, and the effective resistance of the workers. World War II altered each of these factors. The locomotive works were required to make the change in order to provide marine engines, and the costs of the change were assumed by the government. Steam engines were used up by the tremendous demand placed upon the railroads by war traffic. The costs were recaptured by shipping charges. Labor shortages were such that labor resistance was less formidable and much less acceptable to the public than it would have been in peace time. Hence the shift to diesels was greatly facilitated by the war. In consequence, every third and sometimes every second division point suddenly became technologically obsolescent.

Caliente, like all other towns in similar plight, is supposed to accept its fate in the name of "progress." The general public, as shippers and consumers of shipped goods, reaps the harvest in better, faster service and eventually perhaps in lower charges. A few of the workers in Caliente will also share the gains, as they move to other division points, through higher wages. They will share in the higher pay, though whether this will be adequate to compensate for the costs of moving no one can say. Certain it is that their pay will not be adjusted to compensate for their specific losses. They will gain only as their seniority gives them the opportunity to work. These are those who gain. What are the losses, and who bears them?

The railroad company can figure its losses at Caliente fairly accurately. It owns 39 private dwellings, a modern clubhouse with 116 single rooms, and a twelve-room hotel with dining-room and lunch-counter facilities. These now become useless, as does much of the fixed physical equipment used for servicing trains. Some of the machinery can be used elsewhere. Some part of the round-

house can be used to store unused locomotives and standby equipment. The rest will be torn down to save taxes. All of these costs can be entered as capital losses on the statement which the company draws up for its stockholders and for the government. Presumably they will be recovered by the use of the more efficient engines.

What are the losses that may not be entered on the company books? The total tax assessment in Caliente was \$9,946.80 for the year 1948, of which \$6,103.39 represented taxes assessed on the railroad. Thus the railroad valuation was about three-fifths that of the town. This does not take into account tax-free property belonging to the churches, the schools, the hospital, or the municipality itself which included all the public utilities. Some ideas of the losses sustained by the railroad in comparison with the losses of others can be surmised by reflecting on these figures for real estate alone. The story is an old one and often repeated in the economic history of America. It represents the "loss" side of a profit and loss system of adjusting to technological change. Perhaps for sociological purposes we need an answer to the question "just who pays?"

Probably the greatest losses are suffered by the older "non-operating" employees. Seniority among these men extends only within the local shop and craft. A man with twenty-five years' seniority at Caliente has no claim on the job of a similar craftsman at another point who has only twenty-five days' seniority. Moreover, some of the skills formerly valuable are no longer needed. The boilermaker, for example, knows that jobs for his kind are disappearing and he must enter the ranks of the unskilled. The protection and status offered by the union while he was employed have become meaningless now that he is no longer needed. The cost of this is high both in loss of income and in personal demoralization.

Operating employees also pay. Their seniority extends over a division, which in this case includes three division points. The older members can move from Caliente, and claim another job at another point, but in many cases they move leaving a good portion of their life savings behind. The younger men must abandon their stake in railroad employment. The loss may mean a new apprenticeship in another occupation, at a time in life when apprenticeship wages are not adequate to meet the obligations of mature men with families. A steam engine hauled 2,000 tons up the hill out of Caliente with the aid of two helpers. The four-unit diesel in command of one crew handles a train of 5,000 tons alone. Thus, to handle the same amount of tonnage required only about a fourth the man-power it formerly took. Three out of four men must start out anew at something else.

The local merchants pay. The boarded windows, half-empty shelves, and abandoned store buildings bear mute evidence of these costs. The older merchants stay, and pay; the younger ones, and those with no stake in the community will move; but the value of their property will in both cases largely be gone.

The bondholders will pay. They can't foreclose on a dead town. If the town were wiped out altogether, that which would remain for salvage would be too little to satisfy their claims. Should the town continue there is little hope that taxes adequate to carry the overhead of bonds and day-to-day expenses could be secured by taxing the diminished number of property owners or employed persons.

The church will pay. The smaller congregations cannot support services as in the past. As the church men leave, the buildings will be abandoned.

Homeowners will pay. A hundred and thirty-five men owned homes in Caliente. They must accept the available means of support or rent to those who do. In either case the income available will be far less than that on which the houses

were built. The least desirable homes will stand unoccupied, their value completely lost. The others must be revalued at a figure far below that at which they were formerly held.

In a word, those pay who are, by traditional American standards, *most moral*. Those who have raised children see friendships broken and neighborhoods disintegrated. The childless more freely shake the dust of Caliente from their feet. Those who built their personalities into the structure of the community watch their work destroyed. Those too wise or too selfish to have entangled themselves in community affairs suffer no such qualms. The chain store can pull down its sign, move its equipment and charge the costs off against more profitable and better located units and against taxes. The local owner has no such alternatives. In short, "good citizens" who assumed family and community responsibility are the greatest losers. Nomads suffer least.

The people of Caliente are asked to accept as "normal" this strange inversion of their expectations. It is assumed that they will, without protest or change in sentiment, accept the dictum of the "law of supply and demand." Certainly they must comply in part with this dictum. While their behavior in part reflects this compliance, there are also other changes perhaps equally important in their attitudes and values.

Their first reaction took the form of an effort at community self-preservation. Caliente became visible to its inhabitants as a real entity, as meaningful as the individual personalities which they had hitherto been taught to see as atomistic or nomadic elements. Community survival was seen as prerequisite to many of the individual values that had been given precedence in the past. The organized community made a search for new industry, citing elements of community organization themselves as reasons why industry should move to Caliente. But the conditions that led the railroad to abandon the point made the place even less attractive to new industry than it had hitherto been. Yet the effort to keep the community a going concern persisted.

There was also a change in sentiment. In the past the glib assertion that progress spelled sacrifice could be offered when some distant group was a victim of technological change. There was no such reaction when the event struck home. The change can probably be as well revealed as in any other way by quoting from the *Caliente Herald*:

. . . [over the] years . . . [this] . . . railroad and its affiliates . . . became to this writer his ideal of a railroad empire. The [company] . . . appeared to take much more than the ordinary interest of big railroads in the development of areas adjacent to its lines, all the while doing a great deal for the communities large and small through which the lines passed.

Those were the days creative of [its] enviable reputation as one of the finest, most progressive—and most human—of American railroads, enjoying the confidence and respect of employees, investors, and communities alike!

One of the factors bringing about this confidence and respect was the consideration shown communities which otherwise would have suffered serious blows when division and other changes were effected. A notable example was [a town] . . . where the shock of division change was made almost unnoticed by installation of a rolling stock reclamation point, which gave [that town] an opportunity to hold its community intact until tourist traffic and other industries could get better established—with the result that [it] . . . is now on a firm foundation. And through this display of consideration for a community, the railroad gained friends—not only among the people of [that town] . . . who were

perhaps more vocal than others, but also among thousands of others throughout the country on whom this action made an indelible impression.

But things seem to have changed materially during the last few years, the [company] . . . seems to this writer to have gone all out for glamor and the dollars which glamorous people have to spend, sadly neglecting one of the principal factors which helped to make [it] . . . great: that fine consideration of communities and individuals, as well as employees, who have been happy in cooperating steadfastly with the railroad in times of stress as well as prosperity. The loyalty of these people and communities seems to count for little with the [company] . . . of this day, though other "Big Business" corporations do not hesitate to expend huge sums to encourage the loyalty of community and people which old friends of [company] . . . have been happy to give voluntarily.

Ever since the . . . railroad was constructed . . . Caliente has been a key town on the railroad. It is true, the town owed its inception to the railroad, but it has paid this back in becoming one of the most attractive communities on the system. With nice homes, streets, and parks, good school . . . good city government . . . Caliente offers advantages that most big corporations would be gratified to have for their employees—a homey spot where they could live their lives of contentment, happiness and security.

Caliente's strategic location, midway between some of the toughest road on the entire system has been a lifesaver for the road several times when floods have wrecked havoc on the railroad in the canyon above and below Caliente. This has been possible through storage in Caliente of large stocks of repair material and equipment—and not overlooking manpower—which has thus become available on short notice.

. . . But [the railroad] or at least one of its big officials appearing to be almost completely divorced from policies which made this railroad great, has ordered changes which are about as inconsiderate as anything of which "Big Business" has ever been accused! Employees who have given the best years of their lives to this railroad are cut off without anything to which they can turn, many of them with homes in which they have taken much pride; while others, similarly with nice homes, are told to move elsewhere and are given runs that only a few will be able to endure from a physical standpoint, according to common opinion.

Smart big corporations the country over encourage their employees to own their own homes—and loud are their boasts when the percentage of such employees is favorable! But in contrast, a high [company] official is reported to have said only recently that "a railroad man has no business owning a home!" Quite a departure from what has appeared to be [company] tradition.

It is difficult for the *Herald* to believe that this official however "big" he is, speaks for the [company] . . . when he enunciates a policy that, carried to the latter, would make tramps of [company] employees and their families!

No thinking person wants to stand in the way of progress, but true progress is not made when it is overshadowed by cold-blooded disregard for the loyalty of employees, their families, and the communities which have developed in the good American way through the decades of loyal service and good citizenship.

This editorial written by a member of all the service clubs, approved by Caliente business men, and quoted with approbation by the most conservative members of the community, is significant of changing sentiment.

The people of Caliente continually profess their belief in "The American Way," but like the editor of the *Herald* they criticize decisions made solely in pursuit of profit, even though these decisions grow out of a clear-cut case of technological "progress." They feel that the company should have based its decision upon consideration for loyalty, citizenship, and community morale. They assume that the company should regard the seniority rights of workers as important considerations, and that it should consider significant the effect of permanent unemployment upon

old and faithful employees. They look upon community integrity as an important community asset. Caught between the support of a "rational" system of "economic" forces and laws, and sentiments which they accept as significant values, they seek a solution to their dilemma which will at once permit them to retain their expected rewards for continued adherence to past norms and to defend the social system which they have been taught to revere but which now offers them a stone instead of bread.

.

Sheldon L. Messinger

Organizational Transformation: A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement¹

It is generally recognized that the organized arms of value-oriented social movements² may remain intact long after the movements themselves have lost general impetus. While it is to be expected that these structures will adapt to their changed circumstances, little attention has as yet been given to either the process or product of this adaptation. This paper reports a study of certain organizational consequences of the decline of the Townsend Movement.

THE TOWNSEND MISSION AND THE END OF RECRUITMENT

While the old age pension movement seems to be gaining impetus in the United States, the Townsend Movement has all but vanished. To understand this seeming paradox it is necessary to examine the Townsend mission. This has been, and continues to be, not simply national pensions for the aged, but national pensions for the aged *as a mechanism for alleviating or preventing economic dislocation*. The mission is a blending of issues born of the 1930s, and the continued identification of Townsendites with it aids in understanding the movement's decline and the nature of its remaining structure.

Two sorts of data support this characterization of the Townsend mission, as well as the continued identification of the Organization with it.

First, the Townsend Plan, major subject of most Townsend pronouncements, has maintained features directly linking pensions to economic reconstruction. Its provision requiring that the pension be spent within thirty days is intended to provide jobs by keeping money in circulation. Its stipulation that prospective recipients must cease work to become eligible is designed to combat "technological unemployment." These are the key to Townsend claims that theirs is not "just another pension plan." Further, leaders justify changes in other features of the Plan as occasioned by the aim of economic reconstruction. For example, the famous "200 dollars a month," from the first a legislative impediment, was formally discarded in all forms in 1943. Informally it is still mentioned as "essential to the Plan" in the sense that at least this much is requisite to "keep the economy going." Other changeable features, justified in all their forms as necessary to economic recon-

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1955, 20:3-10. By permission.

² "Value-oriented social movements" is a phrasing suggested to the writer by Ralph H. Turner. It refers to social movements fundamentally oriented toward rendering some change in the social structure and of sufficient force to develop organization.

struction, include the means of financing and designation of those to receive the pension.

Second, the Organization aside from the Plan has continued to link the pension and depression issues. In 1936, a year after passage of national social security legislation, the Organization changed its name from "Old Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd." to "Townsend National Recovery Plan, Inc.," emphasizing that its mission was far from complete. Not until 1948 did the less anachronous "Townsend Plan, Inc." become the organizational style. The *Townsend National Weekly*, official newspaper of the Organization, has become since 1941 a veritable compendium of "signs" pointing to "impending" economic disaster. Throughout World War II and the post-war boom, Townsendites continued to circulate tracts stressing that their Organization aimed at "a program to bring about full industrial production for the Nation . . . [and] make jobs for the jobless."

While such aims may again gain currency, it is suggested that under the changed conditions following the end of the depression the Townsend mission was deprived of relevance. Continued identification with this mission has constituted a serious block to Townsend membership maintenance and to the recruitment of new Townsendites. Combined with the short life-expectancies of old Townsendites, this has meant a rapid depletion of the Organization's ranks (see Table 1). In this situation, other "single-minded" old age groups, working to modify existing state aid legislation, have developed to absorb the membership which might earlier have gone to the Townsendites. It is in this context that the Townsend Organization has been transformed.

TABLE 1
NATIONAL AND CALIFORNIA TOWNSEND MEMBERSHIP DECLINE, 1936-1951*

	National Membership	Per Cent Drop	California Membership	Per Cent Drop
1936	2,250,000		330,000	
1951	56,656	97.5	6,839	97.9

* Sources: National and California membership figures for 1936 from U. S. House of Representatives, Select Committee Investigating Old Age Pension Organizations pursuant to H. Res. 443, *Hearings*, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, D. C.: 1936 (hereafter: *Hearings: H. Res. 443*), pp. 41-42, 208. National membership for 1951 from A. Holtzman, "The Townsend Movement: A Study in Old Age Pressure Politics," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1952. California membership figure for 1951 compiled from records in the Townsend Archives.

ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION

The Tendency to Deflection. Townsend leaders have attempted to cope with the challenge to their social base. In the process, they have been constrained to direct action in ways deflecting the Organization from its central mission.

The first indication of this tendency came in early 1940 when California Townsendites were urged to aid in qualifying an initiative readjusting state aid legislation. While the campaign was brief and the initiative was not qualified, the event is noteworthy since before this time national leaders had actively campaigned against any proposal at the state level. Further, they had always carefully disassociated themselves from state "aid" proposals. The "pension," on a national level and not involving indigence requirements, was the proper Townsend goal.

Leadership purposes in supporting this proposal are not far to seek. Urging his

lieutenants to support the measure, the California leader said: "Even if we should fail [to qualify it], it is believed we can secure enough publicity and good will to justify the effort. We think we can enlist many to join our ranks as a result of this campaign."

In 1943, California Townsendites entered a full-blown campaign for state old age pensions. The nature of this measure permitted it to be presented by both national and state leaders as a "first step" toward the national Townsend Plan. Thus, while only a state-wide proposal with a dollar demand geared to existing state aid legislation (60 dollars was asked), both the "compulsory spending" and "cease work" features of the national Plan were intact. Further, indigence requirements were absent, meaning effectively the end of a state "aid" program and the institution of "pensions" if the measure passed.

The initiative was qualified and placed before the voters in November 1944. It was defeated by over a million votes.

By 1947 membership was at a new low, recruitment at a dead halt, and George McLain's old age pressure-group successfully competing for the allegiance of the California aged. Aware of the challenge, the California leader proposed a new local effort to national headquarters by saying:

[Even] Dr. Townsend [who is generally opposed to local efforts] has consistently said that "we *must* put on an initiative in California . . . even if we know we will fail before we start. . . ." [This] for the reason that GM [George McLain] has announced that he, too, is going to sponsor a constitutional amendment proposing practically the same objectives. . . . If we fail to present . . . [a local] program, it is only natural that a large number of our own members will be inclined to support him in his efforts. . . . Many people have lost hope and interest in any national program becoming a reality in the near future.

By no stretch of the imagination could the new measure proposed by state leaders be identified as a "little Townsend Plan." First, unlike the 1943-1944 proposal, it was specifically drawn within the framework of existing state legislation for old age assistance and indigence requirements were present. Second, both the all-important "compulsory spending" and "cease work" provisions of the Plan were absent. Townsend propaganda could no longer claim that their measure would effect any significant change in the economic structure.

National leaders at first opposed making a new localized proposal on the grounds that another defeat would do the Movement's national position no good. In August 1947, conceding to California's pressures, they suggested that campaign funds should be raised *outside* the Organization. As late as October 1947, in the midst of efforts to raise money in California for the promotion of the initiative, national leaders carried out two mass meetings in the state to collect funds for national headquarters over the unanswered objections of the California leader.

By June 1948 it was clear that Townsendites had not qualified their initiative, but that McLain had qualified his. State leaders remained as silent as possible in the face of this proposal with "practically the same objectives" and tried to refocus membership attention on national issues.

The passage of McLain's constitutional amendment at the polls was quickly followed by a move for repeal. When the repeal initiative qualified, California Townsend leaders faced a serious dilemma. They could not support repeal, for the advantages brought to the aged by McLain's amendment were patent—e.g., a raise

in monthly grant, the end of "relative's responsibility." Nor could they fight repeal, lest an issue now entirely identified with McLain absorb all their membership's attention and funds. To meet the situation, California leaders tried to straddle the fence by proposing measures to the legislature to supplant McLain's. National leadership, on the other hand, insisted that the Townsend Organization stay clear of the battle, on the belated grounds that it was for national, not state, pensions. In July 1949, with a repeal measure on the ballot, the California leader wrote the following to national headquarters:

We [California leaders] thought that [some anti-repeal statement] was necessary as many of our members are supporting McLain financially and attending his meetings, to do what they can to hold the gains they have received. . . . [Now, in view of your position] . . . it seems all we can do is drift; let McLain get the money and our members and let things take their course and keep trying to focus attention on the Washington, D. C. work.

As late as 1953, the crisis continued. Too weak to promote state legislation directly, state leadership fluctuated between "preserving gains" made by others, "preventing setbacks," all within the framework of state aid legislation, and focusing attention on national issues. But now, for state leaders, the national issue, above all, is simply success. Late in 1952 the California leader wrote:

I realize that we have always felt that it was necessary to stick to our "full program," but if the Republicans will not now accept it "in full," it seems to me that we should try to take the lead with a bill *they will accept* and get something during the next session. . . . I feel that if we don't do something along this line, we can expect McLain to capitalize on the situation and we will lose more and more of our few supporters.

What we have seen here is a tendency to deflection from central aims on the part of Townsend leaders. At the national level, this tendency has been largely checked through a clearer appreciation of the "drift of things" by national leaders themselves. For this drift could only eventuate in the break-up of the national Organization. At the state level, leaders have tended to exchange identity for security in their search for a viable mission. But here, the pressure from national leadership, plus the successful capturing of vital issues by competing groups, have served to hold state leaders within the Organization and to the Townsend mission.

The Tendency to Salesmanship. Loss of mass support has brought increasing financial difficulty to the Townsend Organization. Adaptation to this circumstance has transformed Townsend leader-follower relations in such a way as to make recruit interest in the Townsend mission increasingly problematical.

Aside from advertising in the *Townsend National Weekly*, early Townsend income came largely from the small contributions of individual members. Propaganda materials were sold in large quantities, and royalties accrued from such items as Townsend auto-stickers, buttons, and license-plate holders. It is to be noted that all of these devices *assume commitment on the part of contributors* to the Townsend Organization and its mission.

By 1939, however, members were being urged to purchase *consumable* items bearing the Townsend name. This year saw a Townsend candy bar, then "Townsend Old Fashioned Horehound Drops." In 1940, a Townsend coffee was announced. A little later a "Townsend Club Toilet Soap" and a "Townsend Club Granulated Soap" appeared. In all of these enterprises the Organization merely lent its name; funds, if received, accrued from royalties. The change from auto-stickers, etc., was

small but significant because purchase of these new items did not assume commitment to the Organization or its Plan. Townsendites were urged to ask for these items at their usual shopping places, thus, to encourage store owners to stock them. The Organization had yet to become a distributor itself. This was to come.

Beginning in 1943, a series of health foods was offered to members. Of these, "Dr. Townsend's Vitamins and Minerals" soon became the major item. At first distributed only from national headquarters, by 1951 state offices had become distribution points, and Club members were selling pills on commission. In this year, the pills provided one-fifth of the total national income. Intra-organizational communications of all kinds reveal in this period a striking shift from programmatic matters to concern with promoting this product. Perhaps even more significant for the long run, advertising of the pills has come to leave the Organization and its Plan unmentioned. The most elaborate piece yet prepared (1953) is simply titled "Vitamins and Minerals by Francis E. Townsend, M.D." Its message is entirely one of "health" and "price." Headquarters for the pills is identified as "Dr. Townsend's Vitamins and Minerals" rather than the earlier "Townsend Plan, Inc." Besides this, national radio advertising has been considered, and discussions of this matter have placed promotion of the Plan aside.

This type of money-raising activity is to be clearly differentiated from that of earlier days. Townsend leaders have come to purvey items whose purchase assumes no commitment to the Townsend mission. The pills, especially, are amenable for presentation to others, *once to be seen as potential Townsendites*, without invoking any discussion of the Organization and its aims.

The transformation of leadership activities from the presentation of a program to the purveying of products can be traced in the present approach to recruitment as well. In May 1952, discussing a proposal to offer a 50 per cent commission to members who brought in new recruits, Dr. Townsend said:

We have innumerable people in our clubs who can be taught to sell. Let's push them into learning by making it necessary to do so if they wish to remain members of a club. After they have learned *what* to do, I believe they will continue to do—with a fifty per cent bait as inducement.

In October of the same year, national headquarters distributed a "training manual" designed to "double the readership of *Townsend National Weekly* and the membership of each Townsend club." The striking quality of this "manual" is that it makes clear that Townsend leaders *no longer even seek active support at large*. The issue has become simply support in itself. Members are told:

Many big business organizations give their salesmen sales manuals written from long experience in the technique of winning friends to a product. We've done the same for you. . . . Whether you're building a model boat or being a BUSY BEE, tools and technique are the secret of success.

How to extract the "cost" in manageable installments is outlined; little is said about the urgency or value of the mission at hand. The total impression received is that the best salesman is he who receives money with the least pain to the customer. And this is no doubt correct. For Townsend leaders no longer seek "converts" so much as "customers."

The Tendency to "Pure" Recreation. Membership activity at the level of the Clubs provides a final example of the transformation of the Townsend Organization.

Townsend Club "business meetings" are remarkably similar in both form and content. Similarity of form has been encouraged by the various *Townsend Club Manuals*, each containing a procedural outline, plus local leadership unpracticed in organizational ways. Whatever variation is found in content is largely accounted for by the make-up of the Club membership. Clubs with a preponderance of highly religious members substitute "sings" for card playing. Aside from formalities, Club meetings are given to discussion of plans for social activities such as are discussed below. The usual meeting is attended by less than fifteen persons, lasts a half an hour, and is adjourned. But no one leaves. More likely than not, five or ten more people enter. Card tables are set up, and what seems to the writer to be the "real" business of the evening begins: recreation. This latter may last for several hours.

This pattern may even be formalized. Examination of Club minutes often revealed that at some time in the past a motion had carried to limit the "business meeting" to an hour or less. Not all members agree that this is the proper order of things. Almost every Club has its "vocal Townsendite," a member always ready to take the floor and present the Organizational mission. Precisely toward these members such motions had been directed. The "vocal Townsendite," once perhaps a Club president, had become an outcast in his own Club. If in any executive role, he can ordinarily be found on the membership committee—a position nobody seemed to want, for obvious reasons. And even here he may remain under fire: many members feel that the membership committees misrepresent Club aims by "selling the Plan too hard," *i.e.*, presenting its realization as imminent ("even now").

Not only are membership social activities built right into Club meetings, but some Clubs have additional "pot-luck nights" or "weekly dances" specifically designed to attract non-members. These activities would seem to furnish ideal occasions for recruitment and the distribution of Townsend propaganda. The evidence in hand suggests that once they did, but no more. Several Club leaders informed the writer that propagandizing would only lower participation, thus reduce sorely needed funds. As public interest in the Plan has flagged, there has been a related change in the nature of Townsend social activities. They have become from the viewpoint of Townsend Club leaders purely fund-raising devices. In turn these activities have become, from the viewpoint of non-member participants, purely social.

The "vocal Townsendite" may object to this. In one Los Angeles Club a member insisted that the *Townsend National Weekly* be sold at social events and recruiting attempts made. This same member, then Club president, was the occasion of so much dissension in Club ranks that he was not re-elected—which is unusual in Club histories. The next (and 1953) president, while mildly unhappy that many who attend Club social functions "don't know what we stand for," seems more distressed by any falling-off of attendance at these affairs. Further, he regards social groups (*e.g.*, public park dance clubs) as his "most serious competition," not the McLain Organization.

This phenomenon is not far different from that of the Townsend pills. The object of these affairs, as with the pills, is to raise money. This is best done, now, on a "business" basis. The business at hand, in this instance is providing recreation. And to this business local Townsend leaders apply themselves.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: THE PROCESS AND PRODUCT OF ADAPTATION TO DECLINE

In the ascendant phases, when social forces press for reconstruction and changes are still in the offing, the concern of leaders and members of social movements alike is with those things that must be done to translate discontent into effective and concerted action. An evident condition of this orientation is discontent itself. In turn, this discontent must be supplied or renewed by social forces which, it must be believed, can be ameliorated by banding together. These provide the dynamic of value-oriented social movements, as well as the characteristic missions with which their organized arms become identified.

When the movements themselves lose impetus through a shift in the constellation of social forces, their organized arms are deprived of conditions necessary to sustain them in their original form. But organizations are not necessarily dissolved by the abatement of the forces initially conjoining to produce them. They may gain a certain degree of autonomy from their bases and continue to exist. We will expect, however, that the abatement of the particular constellation of social forces giving rise to the movement will have important consequences for the remaining structure. The most general of these is, perhaps, increasing lack of public concern for the organizational mission. This is reflected in the ending of public discussion of the issues which the organization represents or, perhaps better put, with these issues in the frame of reference that they are placed by organizational representatives. Within the organization, the abatement of social forces spells dropping membership and, more serious in the long run, the end of effective recruitment. This latter may be reinforced by the development of alternative organizational structures competing for the same potential membership. The end of recruitment is quickly transformed into financial difficulty. Where the organization has been geared to financial support from its own adherents, this last consequence will be especially crucial.

The organized arms of declining social movements will tend to adapt to these changed conditions in characteristic ways. We can broadly describe this adaptation by asserting that the dominating orientation of leaders and members shifts *from the implementation of the values the organization is taken to represent* (by leaders, members, and public alike), *to maintaining the organizational structure as such*, even at the loss of the organization's central mission. To this end, leaders will be constrained to direct action toward new issues or in new ways which will attenuate the organization's identification with the particular set of aims held to be central to it. In this process, the locus of issue-selection will tend to move outside the organization, to alternative leaderships who highlight the growing irrelevance to most of the traditional central mission. Presumably, a new mission may be found. Where this is not the case, leaders will be forced to search out new means of financing as the traditional mode of appeal and reap falls on fewer and deafer ears. In this process, members, and especially potential members, will cease to be regarded as "converts" and will come to be seen as "customers." Finally, membership activities, initiated in a context of declining public interest to support a faltering organization, will work to turn what were once the incidental rewards of participation to its only meaning. This last, by altering the basis for whatever recruitment may take place, would seem to insure that the organization, if it continues to exist, will be changed from a value-implementing agency to a recreation facility. In sum, the organizational character will stand transformed.

7

Socialization and Personality

The process of inducting the individual into the social and cultural world of his fellows is called *socialization*. The selections in this chapter illustrate two kinds of situations—out of many—which influence the nature and direction of personality development.

The paper by Walter C. Reckless, Simon Dinitz, and Ellen Murray brings out some of the differential factors in early training which served to “insulate” the boys in this sample against delinquency, even though they resided in a “high delinquency” neighborhood.

Melvin Seeman discusses the conflict which arises in a person who, because of congenial relations with fellow-members, is exposed to the pressure to avoid or decline roles of group leadership and to accept positions of “institutional leadership” as a reward for competence as viewed by higher authorities.

Walter C. Reckless, Simon Dinitz, and Ellen Murray

Self Concept as an Insulator Against Delinquency¹

This study is concerned with sixth-grade boys in the highest delinquency areas in Columbus, Ohio, who have not become delinquent and who are not expected to become delinquent. What insulates an early teen-age boy against delinquency? Is it possible to identify certain components that enable young adolescent boys to develop or maintain non-delinquent habits and patterns of behavior in the growing up process?

METHODOLOGY

In order to study the non-delinquent boy, all 30 sixth grade teachers in schools located in the highest white delinquency areas in Columbus were asked to nominate those white boys who would not, in their opinion, ever experience police or juvenile court contact. Treating each nominee separately, the teachers were then requested to indicate their reasons for the selection of a particular boy. Of the eligible students, 192, or just over half, were selected and evaluated by their teachers as being “insulated” against delinquency. A check of police and juvenile court records

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1956, 21:744-746. By permission.

revealed that 16 (8.3 per cent) of those nominated had some type of law enforcement record, and these boys were eliminated from further consideration. Repeated neighborhood visits failed to locate 51 others. In the remaining cases both the boy and his mother were interviewed.

The 125 "good" boys comprising the final sample were given a series of four self-administered scales to complete. These included, in somewhat modified form, (1) the delinquency proneness and (2) social responsibility scales of the Gough California Personality Inventory, (3) an occupational preference instrument, (4) and one measuring the boy's conception of self, his family and other interpersonal relations. At the same time, though not in the presence of the nominee, the mother or mother-surrogate was interviewed with an open-ended schedule to determine the boy's developmental history, his patterns of association, and the family situation. . . .

FINDINGS

An analysis of the scores made by these 125 nominees on the delinquency vulnerability (De) and social responsibility (Re) scales seemed to justify their selection as "good" boys. Out of a possible total (De) score of 54 scores ranged from a low of 4 to a high of 34 with a mean of 14.57 and a standard deviation of 6.4. This mean score was significantly lower than that of school behavior problem boys, young delinquents or reformatory inmates investigated in other studies. In fact, the De score of the sample subjects was below that obtained in all but one previous study using the same scale.

For a twelve year old group, the nominees scored remarkably high on the social responsibility scale. The mean Re score for the group was 28.86 with a standard deviation of 3.60 and a range of 12 to 40 out of possible 42 points. This mean score was appreciably higher than that achieved by school disciplinary cases, delinquents, and prisoners tested in other studies. The correlation between the two sets of scores was $-.605$, indicating a significant and negative relationship between delinquency vulnerability and social responsibility as measured by these instruments.

In response to self-evaluation items, the 125 boys portrayed themselves as law-abiding and obedient. Specifically, the vast majority defined themselves as being stricter about right and wrong than most people, indicated that they tried to conform to the expectations of their parents, teachers and others.² The nominees did not conceive of themselves as prospects for juvenile court action or detention,³ and they stated that their participation in such activities as stealing had been minimal and that their friends were either entirely or almost completely free of police and juvenile court contact. As part of their conformity pattern, the respondents rarely played "hookey" from school and almost without exception indicated a liking for school. Finally, the "good" boys visualized themselves as being about average in ability, activity level, and aggressiveness. When asked "What do you think keeps boys out of trouble?" the respondents listed parental direction (a good home), non-deviant companions, and work, as well as other conventional answers. It would

² Nearly 60 per cent of the boys thought they were stricter about right and wrong than most people; 85 per cent tried to escape trouble at all costs; 81 per cent stressed their obedience to their parents wishes, and 81 per cent were concerned with the reaction of friends and others to their behavior. These and other data were based on response to items in one or more of the four instruments used.

³ For example, 70 per cent of the boys in answering the questions on the Morlock scale seemed certain that they would never be brought before the juvenile court; only one respondent believed he would have future contact with the court. Two-thirds indicated certainty about never being taken to jail. Some 57 per cent did not rule out the possibility of becoming policemen.

therefore appear that the internalization of these non-deviant attitudes played a significant role in the "insulation" of these boys.

Nominee perceptions of family interaction also appeared to be highly favorable. . . . The 125 families were stable maritally, residentially, and economically. There appeared to be close parental supervision of the boys' activities and associates, an intense parental interest in the welfare of the children, and a desire to indoctrinate them with non-deviant attitudes and patterns. This parental supervision and interest seemed to be the outstanding characteristic of the family profiles. It extended over the entire range of their sons' activities—from friendship patterns, leisure activities, and after school employment to movie attendance and the performance of well-defined duties at home. Thus, as regards companions, for example, the mothers almost without exception stated that they knew the boys' friends, that these friends were good boys and that, in fact, the boys couldn't have chosen better companions. The mothers also knew the whereabouts of their sons at almost all times and many insisted on this knowledge.

Despite this intensive supervision, the boys did not feel themselves to be unduly restricted. In general, the nominees appeared satisfied with the amount of parental affection and attention and with the quality of discipline and punishment given them. They viewed their home life as pleasant and their parents as understanding.

Low and high scores on the delinquency proneness scale and their respective mothers did not differ significantly in their evaluation of these various aspects of family interaction. Of the 22 home background variables tested—ranging from the percentage of boys from broken homes to parental favoritism—none was found to be significantly related to the delinquency proneness scores. This finding was hardly surprising in view of the non-representative character of the sample group and the relatively small amount of variation in the family settings. It may also well be that in defining his interpersonal and family relationships favorably, the "good" boy, regardless of the degree of his "goodness" as measured by various scales, is in fact expressing the positive attitudes and perceptions that are important components in his "goodness."

While there was no appreciable variation in aspects of family interaction between the low and high scorers, the boys as a group and their mothers as a group did differ significantly in some of their evaluations. These differences were largely centered around the activity level of the boys, the definitions of fairness and severity of parental punishment, and the amount of bickering in the home. Mothers thought their sons to be more active, punishment to be less frequent and severe, and parental tranquility to be more pervasive than did the nominees. Most significantly, perhaps, the mothers expressed less satisfaction with the role played by the boys' fathers than did the boys. Briefly, the mother pictured their husbands as being relatively aloof and rigid in the affectional relationships with their sons. The nominees, however, could not differentiate between their parents in this regard.

These divergences in perceptions may largely reflect age, sex, and role differences in expectations of what constitutes satisfaction with family relationships. Consequently, predictive tables based on the parents' conception of the boy and his relationships would necessarily be different in many particulars from those based on the boys' conceptions.

CONCLUSION

"Insulation" against delinquency on the part of these boys may be viewed as an ongoing process reflecting an internalization of non-delinquent values and con-

formity to the expectations of significant others. Whether the subjects, now largely unreceptive to delinquent norms of conduct, will continue to remain "good" in the future remains problematic. The answer to this question, it is felt, will depend on their ability to maintain their present self-images in the face of mounting situational pressures.

While this pilot study points to the presence of a socially acceptable concept of self as the insulator against delinquency, the research does not indicate how the boy in the high delinquency area acquired his self image. It may have been acquired by social definition of role from significant figures in his milieu, such as a mother, a relative, a priest, a settlement house worker, a teacher, etc. It might have been a by-product of effective socialization of the child, which had the good fortune of not misfiring. On the other hand, it may have been an outgrowth of discovery in social experience that playing the part of the good boy and remaining a good boy bring maximum satisfactions (of acceptance) to the boy himself. Finally, there is a strong suspicion that a well-developed concept of self as a "good boy" is the component which keeps middle- and upper-class boys, who live in the better neighborhoods, out of delinquency. The point is that this component seems to be strong enough to "insulate" the adolescent against the delinquency in the unfavorable neighborhoods.

Melvin Seeman

Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership¹

There is a growing awareness that the study of leadership cannot be adequately conducted without reference to the cultural situation in which that leadership takes place. This trend is part of a general shift away from the traditional psychological "trait" approach, in favor of an approach which stresses situational variations in leadership. Robert Nisbet has commented along these lines that "there is a quickly reached limit to both the theoretical value and the practical utility of studies in human relations that lose sight of the historically given institutional realities of our time."² This emphasis on the importance of the "total cultural" situation is especially congenial to the sociologist; but one of the real problems is the implementation of this view in research. The purpose of this paper is to report on an empirical investigation which arose from such a total cultural view; namely, an investigation of the significance of role conflict in leadership.

Role conflict here refers to the exposure of the individual in a given position to incompatible behavioral expectations. Though an apparent incompatibility may be resolved, avoided, or minimized in various ways, the conflicting demands cannot be completely and realistically fulfilled. Ambivalence is the subjectively sensed aspect of this conflict, or, from the behavioral point of view, the validation in behavior of the fact that the actor experiences difficulty of choice in the performance of given behavior alternatives.

The gist of the argument which follows can be summarized in three propositions.

1. The empirical evidence supports the notion that institutional leadership positions are positions of high vulnerability, in the sense that our cultural imperatives impose

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1953, 18:373-380. By permission.

² "Leadership and Social Crisis," in A. Gouldner (ed.), *Studies in Leadership*, New York: Harpers, 1950, p. 708.

mutually contradictory demands with which the institutional leader must deal. At least four major bi-polarities, or choice points, of special importance for leadership can be isolated, these polarities being a significant part of those "institutional realities" of American culture which must be kept in mind as backgrounds for the understanding of leader behavior. There is no implication that these polarities are exclusive to American culture, though their order of importance and their specific manifestations are in all likelihood unique.

2. The specific role conflicts associated with these polarities can best be seen not simply as a single general category, but are analyzable into *types* of role conflict which have differential meaning for leaders.
3. There is evidence that these role conflicts, derived initially from the standpoint of the observer as *potential* sources of conflict, are in fact responded to as such by the actors in the situation. Our respondents reveal the self-contradiction and decision difficulties that a role conflict analysis of the situation would lead one to expect.³

DIMENSIONS AND TYPES OF ROLE CONFLICT

The writer has indicated that the concern with role conflict grew out of an appraisal of American culture. . . .

In the present case, the aim is to use an analysis of the "total cultural situation" as a guide to significant variables whose operation in leadership must be further examined, in the hope, of course, that such a procedure may yield findings which touch upon basic issues in American social life. A review of the available experimental literature on leadership suggests that such findings are not the typical product of the "isolationist" tradition—that tradition which takes the leader and his immediate group as the given for examination. Data were obtained bearing upon four major bi-polarities of value, or dimensions of role conflict. These dimensions are labeled and briefly described below.

Certainly one putative polar characteristic of American culture (and perhaps the most agreed upon) involves *the status dimension*. This refers to the conflict between the success ideology on the one hand, and the equality ideology on the other. These two ideologies, taken to be in some degree incompatible, lead some persons to honor individually achieved personal success and at the same time to deny the existence and significance of differences in status. There are presumably important ambivalences about leadership in America which are understandable in the light of this dual ideology about status; and, indeed, we see around us evidences of such ambivalence—the persistent halo that surrounds "leaders" and great men in America; the sneer directed at those in the army who were "bucking for promotion," and the like. In a variety of contexts, *The American Soldier* provides illustrations of this kind of ambivalence, or "leadership guilt." The volume notes, for example, that "there can be little doubt that attitudes toward officers represented a generalized attitude toward a system of special privilege alien to democratic civilian folkways";⁴ but criticism of the system existed side by side with a desire

³ The data on which this paper is based were gathered in a study of leaders in school systems (superintendents and principals), and the term "leader" throughout refers to individuals occupying such institutionalized positions of leadership. The study was conducted in 26 randomly selected communities in Ohio, the communities having been chosen from a parent population of middle-sized Ohio cities. "Middle-sized," in this instance, means large enough to have a full-time non-teaching superintendent, and small enough to have no official intermediate administrative staff (e.g., assistant superintendent, curriculum director). The communities range in population from 4,500 to 15,000.

⁴ S. A. Stouffer, et al., *The American Soldier*, Princeton University Press, 1949, Vol. 1, p. 382.

to achieve status within the system. And at one point, M. Brewster Smith, describing the experience of Officer Candidate School, says:

The new officer, somewhat insecure in his role and perhaps a little guilty at his favored status over his previous enlisted confreres, reactively asserts his status, and finds in the OCS ordeal a justification for his new prerogative; he *earned* them.⁵

A second area of role conflict involves *the authority dimension*. It is the conflict between the values of dependence and independence; and it is . . . [well] described in a theoretical way by Erich Fromm in terms of modern man's *Escape from Freedom*:

Freedom, though it has brought him independence and rationality, has made him isolated and, thereby, anxious and powerless. . . .⁶

There are disagreements, of course, about whether such a conflict exists and whether it exists in any differential degree for Americans as compared with others. If there is any merit, however, to the recent description of *The Authoritarian Personality*,⁷ the implication is plain that the problem of authority, of strength and weakness, is a source of considerable ambivalence for large segments of the American people. How such ambivalences, which are reflected in specific leader-follower relations is the task of empirical analysis, and such an analysis should throw much light, for example, on the operation of "non-directive" procedures in the context of group leadership.

The third conflict of special relevance for leadership, labeled for shorthand purposes as *the institutional dimension*, involves the choice between universalist as against particularist criteria for social action. . . .⁸ The official leader, holding in the usual case a key position affecting the distribution of reward and punishment is, hypothetically at least, highly likely to become involved in this kind of conflict precisely because of his combined power and office.

The final major area of conflict involves *the means-ends dimension*. It is the conflict between emphasis on getting the practical job done as against emphasis on the process of achievement. Almond comments on the presumably widespread belief in America in the compatibility of morality and expediency, and on the pendulum movements between emphasis on the two.⁹ . . .

What are the *types* of role conflict in which these four dimensions of conflict are manifested? The typing of role conflict is based upon the situation that obtains with regard to the criterion group or groups—i.e., those significant others who are the definers of the social role. One of these types of conflict is characterized by *agreement within the criterion group* on behaviors which are mutually difficult to achieve under the given institutional conditions.

An empirical illustration of this type of conflict comes from our study of school systems. Teachers were asked to describe the superintendent's leadership using pre-tested scales measuring, among other behaviors, the leader's degree of "separatism." The separatism score is essentially a membership or social distance measure, describing the extent to which there is informal interaction between the leader and

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

⁶ *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941, p. vii.

⁷ T. W. Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harpers, 1950.

⁸ [See] S. A. Stouffer and J. Toby, "Role Conflict and Personality," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1951, 56:395-406.

⁹ Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, pp. 51 ff. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950.

group members. In addition, a wide variety of objective data on financial trends in these same schools and communities was obtained.

For present purposes, one of the most striking results was the positive correlation of .40 (significant at the .05 level for an N of 26 communities) between the superintendents' "separatism" (as described by the teachers) and the amount of salary increase obtained for the teaching staff over a three year period. In short, where salaries went up there was high leader separatism.

If we assume, as our evidence on superintendent evaluation suggests, that the prevailing teacher code condemns superintendent separatism, and, of course, approves salary increases, we find apparently that the superintendent is placed in the unenviable position of being asked to engage in two behaviors which do not "go together." In order to achieve salary increases, he presumably must spend his time not with subordinates, but with those superiors and community influentials who wield power. As one superintendent succinctly put it: "You don't visit your classrooms regularly because you're writing publicity for the next levy that you can't have fail. It must pass. Therefore, you don't know what's going on in the classrooms too well."

Yet the normative code, it seems, asks him to do both, and though the trend is against it, some superintendents do succeed in achieving both salary increases and low separatism. It is interesting to speculate on the toll which such success exacts in mental health or in long run administrative efficiency. That there are such tolls of low separatism and salary increases, for the sense of tremendous pressure as a result of low separatism and salary increases, through many of the interviews with the superintendents.

The major problem for the superintendent is the substantial agreement within the community regarding the demands. And it is also, from the standpoint of the superintendent, a conflict, a situation in which economic ends and primary group solidarity and intimacy are both defined as goods in an institutional setting, makes both difficult to achieve.

A second type of role conflict involves significant disagreement within the criterion group regarding role definition. In the school study, for example, the teachers were asked ten forced-choice questions concerning the role of an "ideal superintendent." The alternatives for choice reflect the dimensions of role conflict described above. Two illustrations will perhaps indicate how the results exemplify this second type of conflict and document another dimension of conflict.

One question asked, "Should an ideal superintendent invite staff members to his home for social occasions?"; and a second, "Should an ideal superintendent feel free to discuss personal problems of his with the teachers?." Simple "yes" and "no" answers were the forced-choice alternatives provided. In both cases, the split in opinion among the teachers was close to a 60-40 division. Taking all of the teachers together, without regard to community differences (an N of 500 teachers in the 26 communities), 61 per cent said that the leader should invite teachers to his home for social occasions while 39 per cent felt that he should not; and, on the second question, 65 per cent responded that the superintendent should not discuss his personal problems with subordinate staff members.

We have here a reflection of the conflict between universalist and particularist role demands, with the conflict in this case being a within-criterion-group type. The answers reflect conflict in the institutional dimension since the disagreement centers around the question of whether or not the official leader will be drawn into "favorit-

to achieve status within the system. And at one point, M. Brewster Smith, describing the experience of Officer Candidate School, says:

The new officer, somewhat insecure in his role and perhaps a little guilty at his favored status over his previous enlisted confreres, reactively asserts his status, and finds in the OCS ordeal a justification for his new prerogative; he *earned* them.⁵

A second area of role conflict involves *the authority dimension*. It is the conflict between the values of dependence and independence; and it is . . . [well] described in a theoretical way by Erich Fromm in terms of modern man's *Escape from Freedom*:

Freedom, though it has brought him independence and rationality, has made him isolated and, thereby, anxious and powerless. . . .⁶

There are disagreements, of course, about whether such a conflict exists and whether it exists in any differential degree for Americans as compared with others. If there is any merit, however, to the recent description of *The Authoritarian Personality*,⁷ the implication is plain that the problem of authority, of strength and weakness, is a source of considerable ambivalence for large segments of the American people. How such ambivalences, if they exist, are reflected in specific leader-follower relations is the task of empirical analysis; and such an analysis should throw much light, for example, on the operation of "non-directive" procedures, in the clinic or in group leadership.

The third conflict of special relevance for leadership, labeled for shorthand purposes as *the institutional dimension*, involves the choice between universalist as against particularist criteria for social action. . . .⁸ The official leader, holding in the usual case a key position affecting the distribution of reward and punishment is, hypothetically at least, highly likely to become involved in this kind of conflict precisely because of his combined power and office.

The final major area of conflict involves *the means-ends dimension*. It is the conflict between emphasis on getting the practical job done as against emphasis on the process of achievement. Almond comments on the presumably widespread belief in America in the compatibility of morality and expediency, and on the pendulum movements between emphasis on the two.⁹ . . .

What are the *types* of role conflict in which these four dimensions of conflict are manifested? The typing of role conflict is based upon the situation that obtains with regard to the criterion group or groups—i.e., those significant others who are the definers of the social role. One of these types of conflict is characterized by *agreement within the criterion group* on behaviors which are mutually difficult to achieve under the given institutional conditions.

An empirical illustration of this type of conflict comes from our study of school systems. Teachers were asked to describe the superintendent's leadership using pre-tested scales measuring, among other behaviors, the leader's degree of "separatism." The separatism score is essentially a membership or social distance measure, describing the extent to which there is informal interaction between the leader and

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

⁶ *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941, p. vii.

⁷ T. W. Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harpers, 1950.

⁸ [See] S. A. Stouffer and J. Toby, "Role Conflict and Personality," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1951, 56:395-406.

⁹ Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, pp. 51 ff. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950.

group members. In addition, a wide variety of objective data on financial trends in these same schools and communities was obtained.

For present purposes, one of the most striking results was the positive correlation of .40 (significant at the .05 level for an N of 26 communities) between the superintendents' "separatism" (as described by the teachers) and the amount of salary increase obtained for the teaching staff over a three year period. In short, where salaries went up there was high leader separatism.

If we assume, as our evidence on superintendent evaluation suggests, that the prevailing teacher code condemns superintendent separatism, and, of course, approves salary increases, we find apparently that the superintendent is placed in the unenviable position of being asked to engage in two behaviors which do not "go together." In order to achieve salary increases, he presumably must spend his time not with subordinates, but with those superiors and community influentials who wield power. As one superintendent succinctly put it: "You don't visit your classrooms regularly because you're writing publicity for the next levy that you can't have fail. It must pass. Therefore, you don't know what's going on in the classrooms too well."

Yet the normative code, it seems, asks him to do both, and though the trend is against it, some superintendents do succeed in achieving both salary increases and low separatism. It is interesting to speculate on the toll which such success exacts in mental health or in long run administrative efficiency. That there are such tolls is not a matter of pure speculation, for the sense of tremendous pressure as a result of joint school and community demands runs through many of the interviews with these same superintendents.

The major point, however, is that here is a case of role conflict characterized by substantial agreement within the criterion group in imposing contradictory role demands. And it is also, from the standpoint of the discussion of dimensions of conflict, a situation in which economic *ends* and primary group *processes* of solidarity and intimacy are both defined as goods in an institutional setting which makes both difficult to achieve.

A second type of role conflict involves significant *disagreement within the criterion group* regarding role definition. In the school study, for example, the teachers were asked ten forced-choice questions concerning the role of an "ideal superintendent." The alternatives for choice reflect the dimensions of role conflict described above. Two illustrations will perhaps indicate how the results exemplify this second type of conflict and document another dimension of conflict.

One question asked, "Should an ideal superintendent invite staff members to his home for social occasions?"; and a second, "Should an ideal superintendent feel free to discuss personal problems of his with the teachers?". Simple "yes" and "no" answers were the forced-choice alternatives provided. In both cases, the split in opinion among the teachers was close to a 60-40 division. Taking all of the teachers together, without regard to community differences (an N of 500 teachers in the 26 communities), 61 per cent said that the leader should invite teachers to his home for social occasions while 39 per cent felt that he should not; and, on the second question, 65 per cent responded that the superintendent should not discuss his personal problems with subordinate staff members.

We have here a reflection of the conflict between universalist and particularist role demands, with the conflict in this case being a within-criterion-group type. The answers reflect conflict in the institutional dimension since the disagreement centers around the question of whether or not the official leader will be drawn into "favorit-

ism" and "personalistic" dealings if he engages in these behaviors which lie outside the official institutional definition of his role. Thus, the leader, in attempting to deal with this situation, is not simply faced with certain minor disagreements of policy represented in the manifest content of the items reported, but is coping with problems which have a wider cultural significance.

We should note at the same time that the within-group type of conflict reveals itself in the other conflict dimensions as well. On the status issue, for example, one question asked whether the superintendent should "generally act as chairman of group meetings (total staff, grade meetings, committees)." The split on this issue was 63 per cent answering "yes" and 37 per cent answering "no."

The recognition of all this may seem obvious to some, but it is certainly not obvious to those who are working in the situation. We asked these superintendents, in interviews conducted one year after the original data collection, what they thought the significance of these opinion discrepancies was and what should be done about them. For the most part, the answers constituted puzzled evasions—some literally avoided the issue by passing quickly on to other matters, some took refuge in a purely statistical definition of appropriate action ("just go along with the 60 per cent"), and some, expressing pleasure in the fact that such differences of opinion were democratically possible, insisted that nothing needed to be done and left it at that. In our own view, the training implications which stem from these results, seen in the conflict dimensions and conflict types perspective, go far beyond the "human relations skills" conception employed in the typical leadership training program.

A third type of role conflict involves *disagreement between criterion groups* regarding the nature of the given role. It is to situations of this type that the literature on "role conflict" typically points. One of the most important of such criterion group disagreements, in our data, arises out of the different definitions of leadership role by the subordinates as compared with the leader group themselves. The area of conflict involved is one we have labeled as the authority dimension.

Both the leaders and the teachers were asked the following questions:

1. Where a student's passing or failing is doubtful, do you think an ideal superintendent should:
 - a. leave the decision up to the teacher?
 - b. pretty much take responsibility for the final decision?
2. Should an ideal school leader work out school problems:
 - a. with a maximum of efficient personal leadership by him?
 - b. with a maximum of staff participation in the decisions that are made?
3. Should an ideal school leader:
 - a. fit his ideas into a group discussion in about the same way as other members of the group?
 - b. tell the group at the outset what his ideas on the given subject are?

In all three cases one of the choices offered defines the role of the school leader in a relatively directive, "true leadership" fashion. And in all three cases, significant differences were obtained between the choices of the leaders and the teachers. On the first item, only 40 per cent of the leader group chose the alternative "leave the decision to the teacher" as compared with 80 per cent of the teacher group; on the second item, 5 per cent of the leader group as against 17 per cent of the teacher group selected the "efficient personal leadership" choice; and on the third item, 7 per cent of the leaders but 20 per cent of the subordinates chose the "tell the group at the outset" alternative.

All of these items deal, in some form, with the question of the allocation of responsibility, that is, with the dependence-independence dimension. In this connection, three facts are especially worthy of note. There is, first, the fact that on some responsibility items the majority opinion of leaders and teachers is antithetical, with the teachers demanding more responsibility than the leaders are prepared to give. Second, even where there is majority agreement between the two groups, there is nevertheless a significantly greater minority of teachers who are in effect asking the superintendent to assert authority in situations where the leaders are denying that authority. Third, we should note that the superintendents frequently complained, in the recorded interviews, that their efforts toward democratic staff participation were blocked by the unwillingness of staff members to take the responsibility that goes along with decision-making power.

Though this latter complaint may be, in some part, simply a rationalization for inertia or personal power, these facts taken together nevertheless are indicative of the fact that the role conflict along the dependence-independence dimension has its reciprocal sides for leader and follower. The subordinate is caught in the dilemma of wanting not to be bossed, but at the same time wanting decision responsibilities to be borne by some other. The leader is, by the same token, caught between what we might call the authority imperative and the non-directive imperative.

THE PROBLEM OF AMBIVALENCE

In sum, we have been arguing that an analysis in terms of dimensions and types of role conflict places the problem of leadership styles in its more complete and realistic cultural context. Thus far, we have dealt only with role conflict from the standpoint of the observer viewing what, from the outside, appear to be dilemmas of action for leader and follower. Is there any evidence that these are more than logical contradictions, evidence that the actors themselves reveal the kind of ambivalence we would expect to flow from these contradictions? Interview and questionnaire data indicate that the language of the actor, so to speak, betrays and at times directly expresses the conflicts discussed above.

We have suggested, for example, that the office leader places himself in a uniquely vulnerable position, given the traditional American ambivalences about equality and hierarchy. One of our superintendents reflects this basic duality in his comment:

We shouldn't fear our superiors, and yet I do think that there should be respect. We shouldn't have contempt for a person just because he's a superior.

The juxtaposition of contempt and superiority is symptomatic of those status dimension difficulties to which we referred. A second superintendent reveals the status conflict in another way, namely by denial and assertion of its worth within the same interview. In the early section of an interview lasting more than an hour, he made the following comment about his position:

It carries a tremendous social prestige and professional prestige, and I'm sometimes annoyed—well, I have a Ph.D.—I'm sometimes annoyed because I never use the title myself, but they're always careful to. I don't know why. It's an annoyance to me because it's unimportant to me personally. Social lines are pretty well drawn in the community. I'm very much puzzled every once in a while by running into that experience where they (the teachers) would prefer to have me out in front, which I don't particularly want to be.

At a later point in the interview, when asked, "What are the positive things associated with your job?", his first remark was:

When I think about it, there's a lot of satisfaction because of the prestige the position

of superintendency carries in this community. I've been amazed at times how just a word here or there will carry tremendous weight. It will with factory management, for instance, and it will in business circles. I've had a lot of satisfaction from that. . . .

On the universalist-particularist dimension, there is again evidence in the interviews that this is a very real problem. One superintendent expressed the indecision in this way:

I don't think though—in my honest opinion—that an administrator should bring himself down to the level in all cases; of course I do think we're all teachers. But, at the same time, if you become one of them maybe you don't always accomplish. Yes, but maybe you do. I don't know. In fact, I have several (teachers with whom) my wife and I are very good friends.

At a later point, this same leader commented:

You can become too—maybe too—putting yourself on too much of an equal—to be too friendly. Now there has been some little thought that has come to my mind that maybe I have been a little too friendly

On the authority dimension, there are many evidences that retreat from responsibility, as noted earlier, is a problem. Two superintendents commented as follows:

I think it's your own group and your own people that seem to imply or seem to infer that you just carry on and take care of everything.

The limitation on democracy in school administration is this: there are a great many teachers who do not want that participation because of the responsibility that goes with it.

That the issue, however, is not as clearly one-sided as this is indicated by further remarks made by these same superintendents. One, in talking about the question of "staff participation" versus "efficient personal leadership," said:

You're not showing very much leadership if you follow. Your experiences should train you to have a strong point of view—and not be influenced by the group. Course, there is the other side of the picture. Two or three or four minds or opinions, if they're good minds, always strengthen a point, if it's reasoned properly. But here lately I'm having considerable difficulty in my thinking on that. . . . In other words, your staff seems to think that your leader should fall in line. . . . That's a weakness to my notion.

Finally, on the means-ends problem, one of the critical leader difficulties lies evidently in finding a clear path between their ends-in-view and the processes of staff participation, and frequently out of this difficulty comes a disturbingly clear Machiavellian view of the situation. Thus, one superintendent remarked:

I think you will find that you can lead them around to the place where they will see things as you want them. . . . You know, after all, you appoint your committee, and you have key individuals on your staff that you use as chairmen, and those chairmen feel pretty much as you do. At least you talk it over with them. And you control your committee action through your chairmen that you appoint.

Approaching the problem of ambivalence from a more statistical viewpoint, we asked our sample to indicate how difficult each forced-choice on ideal leadership was to decide upon. Degree of difficulty was rated on a four-point scale. The corrected split-half reliability of these ambivalence scores based on ten items was .87. The measure is admittedly a crude one and does not warrant detailed examina-

tion here, where we have been concerned largely with the development and description of a role conflict scheme, but it is adequate perhaps to indicate the profit of examining the leadership problem in these terms.

One finding of particular interest, for example, is presented in Table 1. The evidence clearly indicates that the leaders themselves achieve a consistently lower ambivalence score than the teachers, that is, superintendents describing the ideal superintendent role have a 2.92 ambivalence score as compared with teachers describing this same role who have a score of 3.35, and so on. The mean ambivalence score for all leaders is 2.68 and for all teachers 3.29, a difference which is significant at the .01 level.

TABLE 1
MEAN AMBIVALENCE SCORES OF SCHOOL LEADERS AND TEACHERS, BY POSITION DESCRIBED

	Superin- tendent	N	High School Principal	N	Elementary School Principal	N
Leaders	2.92	26	2.33	27	2.79	24
Teachers*	3.35	503	3.34	327	3.15	216

* Teachers holding different positions in the school system were asked to describe the "ideal leader" relevant to their position, e.g., the high school teacher describing a high school principal.

Though there are other entertainable hypotheses to account for these differences (e.g., the factor of experience in the role), one interpretation would suggest that these data point again to the high vulnerability of the leader role. What we do, in effect, is to place the leader in a position of built-in conflict, and then demand of him a greater clarity and decisiveness regarding that role than we ourselves command. This view regards the low scores of the leaders as responses to the pressure for such clarity—that is, the leaders respond as "real leaders should," namely with decision and conviction. Part of the evidence that this may be the case is found in the frequency with which, in the more intimate and informal interview situation, the leaders said that decisions previously rated "not very hard" were, in fact, difficult to make.

Whatever the validity of such an interpretation, it does highlight the possibility of, and need of moving toward, an analysis of the *consequences*, for person and institution, of the role conflict and ambivalence problem. Two kinds of consequences are immediately suggested by the example above: What difference does it make, in teacher morale, school efficiency, mental health and the like, if the leader is aware of these role pressures or adopts particular modes of adjustment and resolution; and secondly, what kinds of training, of leader and subordinate, would be required to effect optimal change in the system as now constituted? The scheme which this paper has presented is intended to make the asking of such questions about consequences more analytically possible, and to place these questions in the perspective of a particular cultural setting.

8

Social Structures and Functions

The way in which a group is put together is called its structure. An analysis of a social structure is a description of the relationship of its parts to one another. The consequences of a given pattern of interrelationship are called functions. Thus the functions of a given structure are the consequences of the way in which its parts are ordered.

In "A Comparative Study of the Role of Values in Social Action in Two Southwestern Communities," Evon Z. Vogt and Thomas F. O'Dea contrast the value systems of a Mormon community and a Texan community. Note that the differences between the two communities in patterns of behavior are to a large extent consequences of varying social organization, or functions of two different structures.

Eugene A. Weinstein's "Weights Assigned by Children to Criteria of Prestige" is a study of variations in judgment among a sample of school children in Chicago regarding the relative importance of several criteria of prestige. The child's grade level in school and the class status of his family are related to his evaluation of prestige factors. In other words, the child's values seem to be functions of his position in these social structures.

Evon Z. Vogt and Thomas F. O'Dea

A Comparative Study of the Role of Values in Social Action in Two Southwestern Communities¹

... The present article is an outgrowth of one phase of the field research carried out in western New Mexico. It presents the record of two communities, composed of people with similar cultural background and living in the same general ecological setting.

The responses of these two communities to similar problems were found to be quite different. Since the physical setting of the two villages is remarkably similar, the explanation for the differences was sought in the manner in which each group

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1953, 18:645-654. By permission.

viewed the situation and the kind of social relationships and legitimate expectations which each felt appropriate in meeting situational challenges. In this sphere of value-orientations a marked difference was found. Moreover, the differences in response to situation in the two cases were found to be related to the differences between the value-orientations central to these communities.

We do not deny the importance of situational factors. Nor do we intend to disparage the importance of historical convergence of value-orientations with concrete situations in explaining the centrality of some values as against others and in leading to the deep internalization of the values we discuss. But the importance of value-orientations as an element in understanding the situation of action is inescapably clear.

FOCUS OF THE INQUIRY

The inquiry is focused upon a comparison of the Mormon community of *Rimrock*² with the Texas community of *Homestead*, both having populations of approximately 250 and both located (forty miles apart) on the southern portion of the Colorado Plateau in western New Mexico. The natural environmental setting is virtually the same for the two villages: the prevailing elevations stand at 7,000 feet; the landscapes are characterized by mesa and canyon country; the flora and fauna are typical of the Upper Sonoran Life Zone with stands of pinyon, juniper, sagebrush, and blue gramma grass and some intrusions of Ponderosa pine, Douglas fir, Englemann spruce and Gambel oak from a higher life zone; the region has a steppe climate with an average annual precipitation of 14 inches (which varies greatly from year to year) and with killing frosts occurring late in the spring and early in the autumn. The single important environmental difference between the two communities is that Rimrock is located near the base of a mountain range which has elevations rising to 9,000 feet, and a storage reservoir (fed by melting snow packs from these higher elevations) has made irrigation agriculture possible in Rimrock, while in Homestead there is only dry-land farming. Today both villages have subsistence patterns based upon combinations of farming (mainly irrigated crops of alfalfa and wheat in Rimrock, and dry-land crops of pinto beans in Homestead) and livestock raising (mainly Hereford beef cattle in both villages).

Rimrock was settled by Mormon missionaries in the 1870's as part of a larger project to plant settlements in the area of northern Arizona. Rimrock itself, unlike the Arizona sites, was established as a missionary outpost and the intention of the settlers was the conversion of the Indians, a task conceived in terms of the *Book of Mormon*, which defines the American Indian as a "remnant of Israel."

The early settlers were "called" by the Church, that is, they were selected and sent out by the Church authorities. The early years were exceedingly difficult and only the discipline of the Church and the loyalty of the settlers to its gospel kept them at the task. Drought, crop diseases, and the breaking of the earth and rock dam which they had constructed for the storage of irrigation water added to their difficulties, as did the fact that they had merely squatted on the land and were forced to purchase it at an exorbitant price to avoid eviction. . . . The original settlers were largely from northern Utah although there were also some converts from the southern states who had been involved in unsuccessful Arizona settlements a few years earlier.

As the emphasis shifted from missionary activities to farming, Rimrock developed

² "Rimrock" and "Homestead" are pseudonyms used to protect the anonymity of our informants.

into a not unusual Mormon village, despite its peripheral position to the rest of Mormondom. Irrigation farming was supplemented by cattle raising on the open range. In the early 1930's the Mormons began to buy range land, and Rimrock's economy shifted to a focus on cattle raising. Today villagers own a total of 149 sections of range land and about four sections of irrigated or irrigable land devoted to gardens and some irrigated pastures in the immediate vicinity of the village. The family farm is still the basic economic unit, although partnerships formed upon a kinship basis and devoted to cattle raising have been important in raising the economic level of the village as a whole. . . .

The Church is the central core of the village and its complex hierarchical structure, including the auxiliary organizations which activate women, youth, and young children, involves a large portion of the villagers in active participation. The church structure is backed up and impenetrated by the kinship structure. Moreover, church organization and kinship not only unify Rimrock into a social unit, they also integrate it into the larger structure of the Mormon Church and relate it by affinity and consanguinity to the rest of Mormondom.

Rimrock has been less affected by secularization than most Mormon villages in Utah and is less assimilated into generalized American patterns. Its relative isolation has both kept such pressures from impinging upon it with full force and enhanced its formal and informal ties with the Church, preserving many of the characteristics of the Mormon village of a generation ago.

Homestead was settled by migrants from the South Plains area of western Texas and Oklahoma in the early 1930's. The migrants represented a small aspect of that vast movement of people westward to California which was popularized in Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* and which was the subject of investigation by many governmental agencies in the 1930's and 1940's. Instead of going on to California, these homesteaders settled in a number of semi-arid farming areas in northern and western New Mexico and proceeded to develop an economy centered around the production of pinto beans. . . . The land base controlled by the homesteaders comprises approximately 100 sections. Each farm unit is operated by a nuclear family; there are no partnerships. Farms now average two sections in size and are scattered as far as twenty miles from the crossroads center of the community which contains the two stores, the school, the post office, two garages, a filling station, a small restaurant, a bean warehouse, a small bar, and two church buildings. Through the years, farming technology has shifted almost completely from horse-drawn implements to mechanized equipment.

THE MORMON CASE

In broad perspective these two villages present local variations of generalized American culture. They share the common American value-orientations which emphasize the importance of achievement and success, progress and optimism, and rational mastery over nature. In the Mormon case, these were taken over from the 19th century American milieu in western New York where the Church was founded, and reinterpreted in terms of an elaborate theological conception of the universe as a dynamic process in which God and men are active collaborators in an eternal progression to greater power through increasing mastery. The present life was and is conceived as a single episode in an infinity of work and mastery. The result was the heightening for the Mormons of convictions shared with most other Americans. Moreover, this conception was closely related to the belief in reopening the divine

revelation through the agency first of Joseph Smith, the original Mormon prophet, and later through the institutionalized channels of the Mormon Church. The Mormons conceived of themselves as a covenant people especially chosen for a divine task. This task was the building of the kingdom of God on earth and in this project . . . much of the religious and secular socialism of the early 19th century found a profound reflection. The Mormon prophet proposed the "Law of Consecration" in an attempt to reconcile private initiative with cooperative endeavor. Contention led to its abandonment in 1838 after some five years of unsuccessful experiment. Yet this withdrawal did not limit, but indeed rather enhanced its future influence in Mormon settlement. The "Law of Consecration" was no longer interpreted as a blueprint prescribing social institutions of a definite sort, but its values lent a strong cooperative bias to much of later Mormon activity. In the context of the notion of peculiarity and reinforced by out-group antagonism and persecution, these values became deeply embedded in Mormon orientations. The reference for agriculture combined with an emphasis upon community and lay participation in church activities resulted in the formation of compact villages rather than isolated family farmsteads as the typical Mormon settlement pattern.

While Rimrock and Homestead share most of the central value-orientations of general American culture, they differ significantly in the values governing social relationships. Rimrock, with a stress upon community cooperation, an ethnocentrism resulting from the notion of their own peculiarity, and a village pattern of settlement, is more like the other Mormon village of the West than it is like Homestead.

The stress upon *community cooperation* in Rimrock contrasts markedly with the stress upon *individual independence* found in Homestead. This contrast is one of emphasis, for individual initiative is important in Rimrock, especially in family farming and cattle raising, whereas cooperative activity does occur in Homestead. In Rimrock, however, the expectations are such that one must show his fellows or at least convince himself that he has good cause for *not* committing his time and resources to community efforts while in Homestead cooperative action takes place *only* after certainty has been reached that the claims of other individuals upon one's time and resources are legitimate.

Rimrock was a cooperative venture from the start, and very early the irrigation company, a mutual non-profit corporation chartered under state law, emerged from the early water association informally developed around—and in a sense within—the Church. In all situations which transcend the capacities of individual families or family combinations, Rimrock Mormons have recourse to cooperative techniques. Let us examine four examples.

The "tight" land situation. Rimrock Mormons, feeling themselves "gathered," dislike having to migrate to non-Mormon areas. However, after World War II the 32 returned veterans faced a choice between poverty and under-employment or leaving the community. This situation became the concern of the Church and was discussed in its upper lay priesthood bodies in the village. It was decided to buy land to enable the veterans to remain. The possibilities of land purchase in the area were almost nonexistent and it appeared that nothing could be done, when unexpectedly the opportunity to buy some 38 sections presented itself. At the time, the village did not have the needed 10,000 dollars for the down payment so the sum was borrowed from the Cooperative Security Corporation, a Church Welfare Plan agency, and the land was purchased. The patterns revealed here—community concern over a community problem, and appeal to and reception of aid from the general authorities of the Church—are typically Mormon. However, Mormon cooperation

did not end here. Instead of breaking up the purchased land into plots to be individually owned and farmed, the parcel was kept as a unit, and a cooperative Rimrock Land and Cattle Company was formed. The company copied and adapted the form of the mutual irrigation company. Shares were sold in the village, each member being limited to two. A quota of cattle per share per year to be run on the land and a quota of bulls relative to cows were established. The cattle are privately owned, but the land is owned and managed cooperatively. The calves are the property of the owners of the cows. The project, which has not been limited to veterans, supplements other earnings sufficiently to keep most of the veterans in the village.

The graveling of the village streets. The streets of Rimrock were in bad repair in the fall of 1950. That summer a construction company had brought much large equipment into the area to build and gravel a section of state highway which runs through the village. Before this company left, taking its equipment with it, villagers, again acting through the Church organization, decided that the village should avail itself of the opportunity and have the town's streets graveled. This was discussed in the Sunday priesthood meeting and announced at the Sunday sacrament meeting. A meeting was called for Monday evening, and each household was asked to send a representative. The meeting was well attended, and although not every family had a member present, practically all were represented at least by proxy. There was considerable discussion, and it was finally decided to pay 800 dollars for the job which meant a 20 dollar donation from each family. The local trader paid a larger amount, and, within a few days after the meeting, the total amount was collected. Only one villager raised objections to the proceedings. Although he was a man of importance locally, he was soon silenced by a much poorer man who invoked Mormon values of progress and cooperation and pledged to give 25 dollars which was 5 dollars above the norm.

The construction of a high school gymnasium. In 1951 a plan for the construction of a high school gymnasium was presented to the Rimrock villagers. Funds for materials and for certain skilled labor would be provided from state school appropriations, providing that the local residents would contribute the labor for construction. The plan was discussed in a Sunday priesthood meeting in the church, and later meetings were held both in the church and in the schoolhouse. Under the leadership of the principal of the school (who is also a member of the higher priesthood), arrangements were made whereby each able-bodied man in the community would either contribute at least 50 hours of labor or 50 dollars (the latter to be used to hire outside laborers) toward the construction. The original blueprint was extended to include a row of classrooms for the high school around the large central gymnasium.

Work on the new building began in late 1951, continued through 1952, and is now (in 1953) nearing completion. . . .

The community dances. The Mormons have always considered dancing to be an important form of recreation—in fact a particularly Mormon form of recreation. Almost every Friday evening a dance is held in the village church house. These dances are family affairs and are opened and closed with prayer. They are part of the general Church recreation program and are paid for by what is called locally "the budget." The budget refers to the plan under which villagers pay 15 dollars per family per year to cover a large number of entertainments, all sponsored by the Church auxiliary organization for youth; the Young Men's Mutual Improve-

ment Association, and the Young Women's Mutual Improvement Association. The budget payment admits all members of the family to such entertainments.

Rimrock reveals itself responding to a group problem *as a group*. The economic ethic set forth by Joseph Smith in the Law of Consecration is seen in the dual commitment to provide individual initiative (family farms and family partnerships in business and agriculture) and to cooperative endeavor in larger communal problems (irrigation company, land and cattle company, graveling the streets, and construction of school gymnasium). For the Mormons, cooperation has become second nature. It has become part of the institutionalized structure of expectations, reinforced by religious conviction and social control.

THE HOMESTEADER CASE

The value-stress upon individual independence of action has deep roots in the history of the homesteader group. The homesteaders were part of the westward migration from the hill country of the Southern Appalachians to the Panhandle country of Texas and Oklahoma and from there to the Southwest and California. Throughout their historical experience there has been emphasis upon the rough and ready self-reliance and individualism, the Jacksonianism of the frontier West. The move to western New Mexico from the South Plains was made predominantly by isolated nuclear families and Homestead became a community of scattered, individually-owned farmsteads—a geographical situation and a settlement pattern which reinforced the stress upon individualism.

Let us now examine the influence of this individualistic value-orientation upon a series of situations comparable to those that were described for Rimrock.

The "tight" land situation. In 1934 the Federal Security Administration, working in conjunction with the Land Use Division of the Department of Agriculture, proposed a "unit re-organization plan." This plan would have enabled the homesteaders to acquire additional tracts of land and permit them to run more livestock and hence depend less upon the more hazardous economic pursuit of dry-land pinto bean farming. It called for the use of government funds to purchase large ranches near the Homestead area which would be managed cooperatively by a board of directors selected by the community. The scheme collapsed while it was still in the planning stages, because it was clear that each family expected to acquire its own private holdings on the range and that a cooperative would not work in Homestead.

The graveling of the village streets. During the winter of 1949-50 the construction company which was building the highway through Rimrock was also building a small section of highway north of Homestead. The construction company offered to gravel the streets of Homestead center if the residents who lived in the village would cooperatively contribute enough funds for the purpose. This community plan was rejected by the homesteaders, and an alternative plan was followed. Each of the operators of several of the service institutions—including the two stores, the bar, and the post office—independently hired the construction company truck drivers to haul a few loads of gravel to be placed in front of his own place of business, which still left the rest of the village streets a sea of mud in rainy weather.

The construction of a high school gymnasium. In 1950 the same plan of construction of a new gymnasium was presented to the homesteaders as was presented to the Mormon village of Rimrock. As noted above, this plan was accepted by the community of Rimrock, and the new building is now nearing completion. But the

plan was rejected by the residents of Homestead at a meeting in the summer of 1950, and there were long speeches to the effect that "I've got to look after my own farm and my own family first; I can't be up here in town building a gymnasium." Later in the summer additional funds were provided for labor; and with these funds adobe bricks were made, the foundation was dug, and construction was started—the homesteaders being willing to work on the gymnasium on a purely business basis at a dollar an hour. But as soon as the funds were exhausted, construction stopped. Today a partially completed gymnasium, and stacks of some 10,000 adobe bricks disintegrating slowly with the rains, stand as monuments to the individualism of the homesteaders.

The community dances. As in Rimrock, the village dances in Homestead are important focal points for community activity. These affairs take place several times a year in the schoolhouse and are always well-attended. But while the dances in Rimrock are well-coordinated activities which carry through the evening, the dances in Homestead often end when tensions between rival families result in fist-fights. And there is always the expectation in Homestead that a dance (or other cooperative activity such as a picnic or rodeo) may end at any moment and the level of activity reduced to the component of nuclear families which form the only solid core of social organization within the community.

The individualistic value-orientation of the homesteaders also has important functional relationships to the religious organization of the community. With the exception of two men who are professed atheists, all of the homesteaders define themselves as Christians. But denominationalism is rife, there being ten different denominations represented in the village: Baptist, Presbyterian, Methodist, Nazarene, Campbellite, Holiness, 7th Day Adventist, Mormon, Catholic, and Present Day Disciples.

In the most general terms, this religious differentiation in Homestead can be interpreted as a function of the individualistic and factionalizing tendencies in the social system. In a culture with a value-stress upon the independent individual action combined with a "freedom of religion" ideology, adhering to one's own denomination becomes an important means of expressing individualism and focusing factional disputes around a doctrine and a concrete institutional framework. In turn, the doctrinal differences promote additional factionalizing tendencies, with the result that competing churches become the battleground for a cumulative and circularly reinforcing struggle between rival small factions within the community.

To sum up, we may say that the strong commitment to an individualistic value-orientation has resulted in a social system in which inter-personal relations are strongly colored by a kind of factionalism and in which persons and groups become related to one another in a competitive, feuding relationship. The homesteaders do not live on their widely separated farms and ignore one another, as it might be possible to do. On the other hand, they do not cooperate in community affairs as closely as does a hive of bees. They interact, but a constant feuding tone permeates the economic, social and religious structure of the community.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES

Although there is some trading in livestock, feed, and other crops, the most important contacts between the two communities are not economic but are social and recreational. The village baseball teams have scheduled games with one another for the past two decades, and there is almost always joint participation in the community dances and in the summer rodeos in the two communities. Despite Mormon

objections to close association with "gentiles," there is also considerable inter-dating between the two communities among the teen-age groups, and three intermarriages have taken place.

In general, the homesteaders envy and admire the Mormons' economic organization, their irrigated land, and more promising prospects for good crops each year. On the other hand, they regard the Mormons as cliquish and unfriendly and fail completely to understand why anyone "wants to live all bunched up the way the Mormons do." They feel that the Mormons are inbred and think they should be glad to get "new blood" from intermarriages with homesteaders. They add, "That Mormon religion is something we can't understand at all." Finally, the homesteaders say that Mormons "used to have more than one wife, and some probably still do; they dance in the church, they're against liquor, coffee, and tobacco, and they always talk about Joseph Smith and the *Book of Mormon*."

The Mormons consider their own way of life distinctly superior to that of the homesteaders in every way. Some will admit that the homesteaders have the virtue of being more friendly and of "mixing more with others," and their efforts in the face of farming hazards are admired, but Homestead is generally regarded as a rough and in some ways immoral community, especially because of the drinking, smoking, and fighting (particularly at dances) that takes place. They also feel that Homestead is disorganized and that the churches are not doing what they should for the community. For the past few years they have been making regular missionary trips to Homestead, but to date they have made no conversions.

COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the case of Rimrock and Homestead, we are dealing with two communities which are comparable in population, in ecological setting; and which are variants of the same general culture. The two outstanding differences are: (a) irrigation versus dry-land farming and associated differences in settlement pattern, compact village versus isolated farmstead type; (b) a value stress upon cooperative community action versus a stress upon individual action. The important question here involves the relationship (if any) between these two sets of variables. Is the cooperation in Rimrock directly a function of an irrigation agriculture situation with a compact village settlement pattern, the rugged individualism in Homestead, a function of a dry-land farming situation with a scattered settlement pattern? Or did these value-orientations arise out of earlier historical experience in each case, influence the types of communities which were established in western New Mexico, and later persist in the face of changed economic situations? We shall attempt to demonstrate that the second proposition is more in accord with the historical facts as we now know them.

Nelson has recently shown that the general pattern of the Mormon village is neither a direct function (in its beginnings) of the requirements of irrigation agriculture, nor the need for protection against Indians on the frontier. Rather, the basic pattern was a social invention of the Mormons, motivated by a sense of urgent need to prepare a dwelling place for the "Savior" at "His Second Coming." The "Plat of the City of Zion" was invented by Joseph Smith, Sidney Rigdon, and Frederick G. Williams in 1833 and has formed the basis for the laying out of most Mormon villages, even those established in the Middle West before the Mormons migrated to Utah.

It is very clear that both the compact village pattern and the cooperative social arrangements centered around the church existed before the Mormons engaged in

irrigation agriculture and had a strong influence upon the development of community structure not only in Utah but in the Mormon settlements like Rimrock on the periphery of the Mormon culture area. There is no objective reason in the Rimrock ecological and cultural setting (the local Navahos and Zunis did not pose a threat to pioneer settlements in the 1880's) why the Mormons could not have set up a community which conformed more to the isolated farmstead type with a greater stress upon individualistic social relations. Once the Mormon community was established, it is clear that the cooperation required by irrigation agriculture of the Mormon type and the general organization of the church strongly reinforced the value stress upon communal social action.

It is of further significance that as the population expanded and the Rimrock Mormons shifted from irrigation agricultural pursuits to dry-land ranching in the region outside of the Rimrock valley, the earlier cooperative patterns modeled on the mutual irrigation company were applied to the solution of economic problems that are identical to those faced by the Homesteaders. Moreover, in midwestern and eastern cities to which Mormons have recently moved, church wards have purchased and cooperatively worked church welfare plan farms.

In Homestead, on the other hand, our evidence indicates that the first settlers were drawn from a westward-moving population which stressed a frontier-type of self-reliance and individualism. They were searching for a place where each man could "own his own farm and be his own boss." Each family settled on its isolated homestead claim, and there emerged from the beginning an isolated farmstead type of settlement pattern in which the nuclear family was the solidary unit. The service center which was built up later simply occupied lots that were sold to storekeepers, filling station operators, the bartenders, and others, by the four families who owned the four sections which joined at a crossroads. Only two of these four family homes were located near the service center at the crossroads. The other two families continued to maintain their homes in other quarters of their section and lived almost a mile from "town." In 1952 one of the former families built a new home located over a mile from the center of town, and commented that they had always looked forward to "getting out of town."

There is no objective reason in the Homestead ecological setting why there could not be more clustering of houses into a compact village and more community cooperation than actually exists. One would not expect those farmers whose farms are located 15 or 20 miles from the service center to live in "town" and travel out to work each day. But there is no reason why those families living within 2 or 3 miles of the village center could not live in town and work their fields from there. In typical Mormon villages a large percentage of the farms are located more than three miles from the farm homes. . . .

It is clear that the homesteaders were operating with a set of individualistic property arrangements (drawn, of course, from our generalized American culture) and that their strong stress upon individualism led to a quite different utilization of these property patterns (than was the case with the Mormons) and to the establishment of a highly scattered type of community. Once Homestead was established, the individualism permitted by the scattered dry-land farming pattern and encouraged by the emphasis upon the small nuclear family unit and upon multi-denominationalism in church affiliation reacted on and strongly reinforced the value stress upon individual independence. It is evident that the homesteaders continue to prefer this way of life, as shown by their remarks concerning the "hunched up" character

of a Mormon village and the fact that a number of families have recently moved "out of town" when they built new houses.

It is clear that the situational facts did not *determine* in any simple sense the contrasting community structures which emerged. Rather, the situations set certain limits, but within these limits contrasting value-orientations influenced the development of two quite different community types. It would appear that solutions to problems of community settlement pattern and the type of concrete social action which ensues are set within a value framework which importantly influences the selections made with the range of possibilities existing within an objective situation.

Eugene A. Weinstein

Weights Assigned by Children to Criteria of Prestige¹

This study is concerned with children's conceptions of a general stratification system based upon the prestige associated with occupational positions. Research on the patterns of adult evaluation has revealed considerable consensus as to the relative prestige of many occupations. It may be assumed that consensus in evaluation is the product of a common learning process. However, it is insufficient to point only to a common learning process as an explanatory factor. The content of this process must be examined if its relationship to evaluation is to be understood. By internalizing this content and learning to respond to the conception of a general hierarchy, the individual is learning a role: that of an ascriber of prestige. The purpose of this study is to investigate one aspect of the development of that role.

Prestige, as defined in this study, is multi-dimensional. Following Hatt's usage, some combination of all the rewards and prerequisites of a position constitutes its invidious value and hence its prestige. Thus these rewards and prerequisites serve as criteria of prestige and are of special interest here. From a survey of the literature on stratification, seven such criteria have been isolated. They are the income, education, working conditions, fame, community service, authority, and scarcity of personnel associated with a given occupation.

Two functions are performed by the ascriber in the evaluation of occupational prestige:

1. The ascriber must estimate the amount or increment of each of the criteria associated with a given occupation.
2. The ascriber must weight each criterion in accordance with its importance in his own value system.

Thus variation in prestige ratings can come about in two ways. First, there may be differences among ascribers as to the increment of any criterion associated with an occupation. For example, two ascribers could have quite different conceptions as to the amount of authority invested in a shop foreman. Second, the weights assigned to each criterion might not be the same for every group of ascribers. Income might have greater invidious value for persons of lower socio-economic status than for those of higher status. Therefore, within this conceptual framework, a general

¹ From *Sociometry*, 1956, 19:126-132. By permission.

prestige evaluation would consist of the weighted rather than simple sum of the rankings on each of seven criteria.

An attempt is made to determine the relative weights children assign to prestige criteria. Of the matrix of factors related to these weights, two have been selected for analysis in this study. (a) By systematically varying age, it is hoped that developmental patterns in the importance children accord specific criteria may be discovered. (b) . . . [Various] studies . . . have indicated that one's position in the stratification system has important consequences for the way that system is perceived. Similar studies have revealed striking differences between the value systems of social classes. By varying status level, it may be possible to determine the extent to which these differentials at the adult level are reflected in the responses of the children.

METHOD

Sample. The elementary school population of the Chicago Public School System constituted the universe from which the sample was drawn. Status level was systematically varied by stratifying schools, selecting schools most representative of the characteristics defining each stratum, and then randomly sampling within the selected schools. The status level of each school was defined in terms of the ecological characteristics of the area from which it draws its students. Using census tract data on income and education, an index was devised to measure the status level of each area.² The schools were then arrayed on the basis of this index, the range computed, and divided in three. The schools were selected as representative of the Upper, Upper-Middle, Lower-Middle and Lower status levels, respectively.

Six white male students were drawn from each of the fourth, sixth, and eighth grades within the selected schools. These grades correspond roughly to ages nine, eleven, and thirteen. White males were selected to avoid the effect of uncontrolled variation due to race and sex. Thus six students were selected from each of three grades at four schools making a total of seventy-two cases in all.

Interview. An interview schedule was designed to measure the relative weight a respondent assigns to each of the seven criteria. On each item, the respondent must rate the relative importance of two different prestige criteria. For example, "Which do you think is more important, a job which pays more or a job which takes more education?" Each criterion was compared with every other criterion once, making a total of twenty-one such paired comparisons. It was possible for any criterion to be rated higher than other criteria from zero to six times. By defining the relative weight of any criterion as the frequency of preference, a seven point scale was derived.

Method of Analysis. The results of the paired comparisons test were incorporated into analysis of variance designs; one for each prestige criterion. A check was made to insure that the techniques used in application met the assumptions of this method. The purpose of these designs was to test whether the variables of grade and status level were related to the importance assigned prestige criteria. A sample analysis for the criterion of income appears as Table 1.

RESULTS

The results of the seven analyses of variance appear as Table 2. Whenever the

² Median family income and median school years completed for population 25 years and older were used in constructing the index. They were combined by means of conversion to standard scores.

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF WEIGHTS ASSIGNED TO INCOME BY GRADE AND STATUS

Grade Level	Status Level				Total
	U	UM	LM	L	
8	1 0	2 0	2 4	5 5	66
	1 2	1 0	4 2	5 5	
	1 0	3 4	2 6	5 6	
6	0 0	2 3	3 2	5 3	63
	1 2	2 0	3 3	4 4	
	1 0	2 2	5 4	6 6	
4	0 0	3 3	2 2	5 4	57
	0 0	1 3	2 3	2 4	
	1 0	3 3	2 3	5 6	
Total	10	37	54	85	

Source of Variation	Analysis of Variance			
	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F Ratio
Total	241.5	71		
Subclasses	177.5	11		
Statuses	164.5	3	54.8	51.2
Grades	2.4	2	1.2	1.1
Interaction	10.7	6	1.8	1.8
Error	64.0	60	1.1	

magnitude of the *F* ratio indicated a significant relationship between one of the variables (status, grade, or the interaction between the two) and the weights assigned to a particular criterion, the direction of that relationship was explored by means of *t*-tests. Below are the results of these further analyses.

Income. Significant differences were found between the status groups in the importance they accorded income. As status level increased, the weights assigned to income decreased. The smallest difference, that between the two middle groups, was significant, indicating significance for the entire progression. . . . These patterns at the adult level, operating through the mechanisms of socialization, may be producing similar patterns of evaluation in children. Table 2 shows the other variables to be non-significant.

Education. Because of the necessity of education for mobility and/or status maintenance in the Upper and Upper-Middle groups, it might be expected that children from these groups would assign higher weight to this criterion. On the other hand, economic pressures militate against the availability of education as a mobility channel for members of the Lower status group. It would be less likely that their children would accord great importance to this factor. Education is desirable for but not necessary to status maintenance in the Lower-Middle group. It might be expected that children in this group would fall between the Lower and two Upper groups. As indicated by *t*-tests, this was the case.

Working Conditions. As in the case of most other criteria, the important contrast in the weights assigned to working conditions was between the two Upper and

two Lower groups. The difference between the combined means was significant. Factors such as dress, cleanliness of work, control over working time, may be of secondary importance in the probable future occupational roles of children in the Lower groups. This may be reflected in their low frequency of preference for this criterion. Conversely, working conditions are part of the definition of the occupational sub-culture in the Upper and Upper-Middle groups. It might be expected that their children would place higher value on the criterion.

Fame. Table 2 shows both status and grade to be related to the weights assigned to fame. There is a clearly defined progression in the importance assigned to fame at each grade level, ratings being highest in the fourth grade, lowest in the eighth. One way of interpreting this pattern would hold that fame's connotations of adventure and individual glory would have greater appeal for the egocentricity of younger children; as they grow older and there is a reduction in egocentric perspective, this appeal diminishes. The distribution of weights by status level was opposite to that found for working conditions, fame having significantly more appeal for Lower and Lower-Middle status children. The type of public adulation connoted by fame may not be given as much emphasis as recognition for professional achievement by those in the professions and similar occupations. On the other hand, becoming famous, with its implications for economic reward and personal grati-

TABLE 2
RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF WEIGHTS ASSIGNED TO PRESTIGE CRITERIA

Criterion	Variable	Degrees of Freedom	<i>F</i> Ratio
Income	Status	3	51.2
	Grade	2	1.1
	Interaction	6	1.8
Education	Status	3	9.1
	Grade	2	1.3
	Interaction	6	.1
Working Conditions	Status	3	28.8
	Grade	2	1.7
	Interaction	6	.3
Fame	Status	3	8.4
	Grade	2	17.4
	Interaction	6	1.0
Community Service	Status	3	1.4
	Grade	2	.3
	Interaction	6	1.0
Authority	Status	3	7.7
	Grade	2	3.8
	Interaction	6	.7
Scarcity	Status	3	3.0*
	Grade	2	2.9*
	Interaction	6	5.6

Note: With 60 degrees of freedom for the error mean square, all italicized values are significant at the .05 level.

* Interaction mean square used as denominator of *F* ratio.

fication may be equated with success by those in Lower status groups and hence evaluated more highly.

Community Service. The results for this criterion were all nonsignificant, scores being uniformly high for all groups. It is likely that helping to serve the community had considerable appeal on a moral basis. "Helping" is good, and as such it should be regarded as important.

Authority. Both grade and status level were related to the weights assigned to authority. Authority held significantly more appeal for students in the sixth and eighth grades than for those in the fourth grade. By the sixth grade, the meaning of authority changes from one implying purely power to one implying increased ability and personal responsibility. Having authority was given significantly more emphasis by Lower and Lower-Middle status children. It may not be power over others but control over one's own decisions that is emphasized in the two Upper groups. If this is the case, authority *per se* would not be of great importance to them. On the other hand, the parents of children in the Lower groups are often dependent upon persons in authority positions for their means of livelihood. The concept of being "boss" may be considerably more important in the lives of these children.

Scarcity. Analysis of variance showed that variation in the weights assigned to scarcity was due to the interaction of the factors of grade and status level. What appeared to be happening was that the interpretation placed on the criterion was related to grade; the evaluation related to status. Younger children tended to give romantic interpretations; older children saw implications of formal skills and limited opportunities. A *t*-test indicated that younger Lower and Lower-Middle and older Upper and Upper-Middle status students gave this criterion more weight than the remainder of the students in the sample.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings support the conclusion that patterns of occupational evaluation found in adult status level sub-cultures are reflected in the ways children perceive the status structure and function as ascribers of prestige. Generally, criteria implying material rewards are given more emphasis by children from Lower or Lower-Middle status backgrounds; criteria implying psychic rewards, extensive prerequisites, and personal ability are given greater weight by Upper and Upper-Middle status students. Developmental factors appear to be operating in the weights assigned to several of the criteria. In the case of authority and scarcity, these factors seemed to influence the way in which the child would interpret the criterion. In the case of fame, they appeared to reflect differentials in egocentricity.

Some consideration should be given to the limits of generalizability of these conclusions. The probability values for the various statistics used refer to a sample of Chicago Public School students. It is to this group that these conclusions are directly relevant. However, insofar as these data are consistent with the findings of many researchers in the area of social stratification, they may be in part independent of local idiosyncrasy. To this extent, it is hoped that they may be suggestive for further study of the development of ascription behavior in mass society.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to determine the relative weights children assign to various criteria of occupational prestige, and to assess the effect of their status

background and grade level upon these weights. Through the analysis of variance of children's responses to a paired comparisons test, the following relationships were found:

1. The child's status level was related to the weights assigned to income, education, working conditions, fame, and authority. For income, fame and authority, the weights assigned to the criteria increased as status level decreased. The direction of the relationship was opposite for education and working conditions.

2. The child's grade level was related to the weights assigned to fame and authority. As grade increased, the importance given fame diminished; that accorded to authority increased.

3. The interaction of the two variables was related to the weights assigned to scarcity. Older Upper and Upper-Middle, and younger Lower and Lower-Middle status students gave this criterion the greatest weight.

These directional patterns were generally congruent with those found in adult ascription behavior.

9

Social Processes

The idea of social structure^a implies a static situation. A description of a group as a social structure treats it at a point in time. Actually, of course, sociologists know that social organization and patterns of behavior are constantly being modified. A sociologist, then, must do more than describe the structure of a group; he must analyze its dynamics. This chapter illustrates some of the basic social processes.

Interaction is the most general social process. Interaction is reciprocal stimulation and response. Without interaction there would be no social life.

The papers in this chapter illustrate specific kinds of interaction. The process of acculturation is presented by Leonard Broom and John I. Kitsuse as a prerequisite to assimilation in "The Validation of Acculturation: A Condition of Ethnic Assimilation." Acculturation and assimilation are specific kinds of processes through which conflicts may be resolved.

Peter M. Blau, in "Cooperation and Competition in a Bureaucracy," discusses not only these social processes but also their consequences for productivity.

Leonard Broom and John I. Kitsuse

The Validation of Acculturation: A Condition to Ethnic Assimilation¹

The social significance of the acculturation of ethnic groups cannot be understood as a process of the accumulation of specific cultural elements. There comes a point in the acculturation of an ethnic group in an open society, such as America, when its members have acquired enough of the new cultural apparatus to behave efficiently within the adopted system. They then have the alternatives of maintaining a peripheral position in the social order or venturing the risks and rewards of validating their acculturation. Validation is the empirical test of the individual's achieved acculturation. It must occur in interethnic situations where the latent mobility of the individual, unprotected by his group or the immunities of cultural incompetence, is assessed.

The process of validation is not, however, an even one in the sense that acculturation is validated once-and-for-all, any more than acculturation is in the experience of a person a simple progression to a point of completion. Critical choices and traumatic experiences may figure importantly for one person, whereas for another the course may be a relatively steady one. An individual who is reared in a locality with a predominantly nonethnic population validates his acculturation continually in the spheres of activities appropriate to his age-sex status. As an adult, if he is to consolidate his earlier validations, he must validate his acculturation in other spheres, particularly the economic one.

A large part of the acculturational experience of the members of an ethnic group may be circumscribed by the ethnic community. Such experience does not validate acculturation and indeed may have the long-run effect of retarding the validation of acculturation and the eventual assimilation of many members of the group. The validation of acculturation must take place in the host society (not the ethnic community), and the individual must be divested of the immunities, as well as the impediments, which are properties of ethnicity.

When ethnic communities persist beyond the early immigrant stages, they contain a number of individuals with varying degrees of acculturation. The organizations and institutions of the ethnic community change, and some of them take on the essential characteristics of the institutional forms of the large society. These may be designated *parallel ethnic institutions*. Parallel ethnic institutions may be significant for the acculturational process in at least three respects:

1. They ameliorate the stresses of interethnic situations and provide contexts of acculturation under relatively permissive conditions. Ecological segregation and discriminatory restrictions upon social participation emphasize the functional importance of ethnic institutions. For those who are spatially isolated from the ethnic community and thus faced with greater exposure to the stresses of interethnic interaction, ethnic institutions provide avenues for withdrawal and retrenchment.
2. They provide criteria of acculturation for the less acculturated and more isolated

¹ From *American Anthropologist*, 1955, 57:44-48. By permission.

members of the ethnic group. These criteria almost always are selective of the dominant cultural forms. The selectivity is in part a reflection of the socially differentiated position of the group in the society. It is also conditioned by the cultural congruence of the two systems.

3. They legitimize the status system of the ethnic community in which we expect to find transplanted important aspects of the stratification criteria of the dominant society. Acculturation, when used for status differentiation within the ethnic community, tends toward the elaboration of formal culture. (Discussion of this interesting problem must be deferred to another time.) But acculturation acquired for intraethnic prestige value may obscure or impair the instrumental significance of acculturation for the adjustment of the ethnic group to the dominant society. The ethnic community is a relatively safe place in which acculturated forms may be tried out, and interaction with the dominant group may be rehearsed. But it is in *inter-ethnic* situations that acculturation is validated as an instrument of adjustment, the ethnic individual's level of acculturation is tested, and the distance he must yet travel to assimilation is measured.

To explore this problem further we shall take the case of the Japanese Americans. The rapid acculturation of the Japanese population in America and Hawaii and its adjustment to the dominant society has frequently been remarked upon. Considering the apparent gap between the American and Japanese cultures and the differences between the English and Japanese languages, the speed of this acculturation is doubly notable. It is not appropriate to review here the reasons for this adaptation—an achievement perhaps rarely equaled in the history of human migration. We should observe, however, that great differences in manifest cultural characteristics need not be accompanied by an equal difference in the less tangible aspects of culture and society—those aspects related to valuations, motivations, and the like. Indeed, it may be hypothesized that the American and Japanese cultures are quite similar in the emphasis placed upon societal instruments, e.g., formal education. The rapidity of Japanese acculturation has been aided by generally good access to formal education.

The speed of Japanese acculturation has produced within the population individuals varying widely in their degree of acculturation. Abrupt termination of immigration from Japan created the following situation: a native-born (*Nisei*) population with an intermediate to high level of acculturation standing beside an immigrant population (*Issei*) with low to intermediate acculturation. "The *Nisei* problem," the repeated concern of the Japanese community in the United States for the past thirty years, is an expression of this cultural cleavage. Part of this minority group has been brought with great rapidity to the very brink of assimilation. The extent to which the chasm will be bridged is dependent upon the ability of these highly acculturated individuals to validate their acculturation in the context of the large society. To what extent will they be able to surmount racial impediments, on the one hand, and the cohesive and isolating forces of ethnic separatism, on the other?

For any racially visible group, assimilation is impeded by the strong bars to racial crossing in the United States. Under these conditions full acculturation is not accompanied by the rewards of full acceptance by the society, at least not immediately. It is quite possible, indeed probable, that in a period of a few generations the small population of Japanese Americans will be absorbed into the white population. This does not enter into our discussion, however, and we need only note that the validation of acculturation is for this group impaired and retarded by the societal regulations of racial exclusion.

The validation of their acculturation before the war was largely limited to highly institutionalized settings and relations. The success of the *Nisei* in the public schools and in school clubs and teams is a manifestation of this. On the other hand, informal association with *hakujin* (Caucasians) was limited. The *Nisei* peer group elaborated their own institutions, which were sometimes adaptations of Japanese forms such as the Buddhist church, but more commonly were adaptations of American forms like the Japanese American Citizens League and numerous age-graded, sexually differentiated social clubs. Even in organizations such as the Buddhist church, which might naïvely be assumed to be agents of cultural conservatism, there rapidly emerged a set of forms and associations for *Nisei*, indistinguishable from their equivalents in the Protestant churches of middle-class white communities. Within these ethnically circumscribed associations the *Nisei* played acculturated roles, which in interethnic situations would have required more aggressive self-confidence than they were able to marshal. In the ethnic peer groups the *Nisei* found support for new standards and definitions of behavior, which were sources of intergenerational conflict in the family and community. We note in passing that the participation of *Nisei* females in interethnic groups demanded less acculturation and was less threatening to their position in the ethnic group as well as in the dominant society than was the case for the *Nisei* male. While females could participate passively, the male role demanded an aggressiveness which made him highly vulnerable. Consequently, interethnic participation among *Nisei* males required a degree of acculturation and security which few *Nisei* had achieved before the war.

In the processes of economic adjustment, the Japanese had concentrated their activities in a few occupations (small-scale business in ethnic enclaves, contract gardening, domestic service, fishing) and had achieved a most important role in the production and distribution of truck garden crops. However, many *Nisei* who graduated from high school in the early 1930's, encouraged by the high value given to education in the Japanese culture, chose college education as an alternative to entering ethnic-defined occupations. A college degree offered no guarantee of securing the white-collar jobs to which the *Nisei* as a group aspired, and the incongruity of college graduates taking employment in produce markets, gardening routes, and small shops, with scant prospects of advancement, led to a growing pessimism in the Japanese population. The flow of *Nisei* into ethnically defined occupations had important consequences for the group's adjustment to the society at large, for it affected the character of interethnic participation and reduced the volume of interaction in the important area of economic activity.

The political participation of the Japanese population was limited and immature because discriminatory legislation against the Japanese denied *Issei* the rights of citizenship. Consequently, it remained for the *Nisei* to assume political leadership in mediating the group's relations with the dominant society. The extreme vulnerability of the population in a historically anti-Japanese region defined an ethnic-centered, defensive political strategy, emphasizing selective group participation in the political institutions of the society. Opportunities for participation in dominant political organizations were consequently limited to the race leaders and then at the level of the ward worker.

The generally permissive orientation of the Japanese culture toward religion presented a favorable condition for the acceptance of and participation in the dominant religious institutions. The number of Christians in the Japanese population nearly equaled that of Buddhists. However, the dominant religious institutions provided few opportunities for the validation of acculturated religious forms. As

early as 1900 the Methodist Church, the denomination with the largest number of Japanese members, instituted a program which effectively segregated the activities of the Japanese. The occasional "interracial" meetings which were conducted between *Nisei* and Caucasian youth groups were designed for group rather than individual interaction and underscored the separation from Caucasian churches.

The Japanese family in America rarely participated as a unit in the larger society. We have already noted how the differential participation of its members in the dominant institutions created a wide range of acculturation in the population. Within the ethnic enclaves the family represented a major conservative influence, and in most families acculturation of the *Nisei* was accompanied by conflict. Community and institutional supports, so essential to the maintenance of the Japanese family system in Japan, became less effective as the *Nisei* carried their acculturative influences into the family. . . . The patriarchal family pattern was consequently attacked from within and without, and the traditional authority and dependency relationships were placed under stress.

Acculturation is viewed here as directed toward the ultimate assimilation of the ethnic individual in American society. Access to participation in the dominant institutions is a precondition for the validation of acculturation and consequently for assimilation. But access to the dominant society is limited by diverse factors which create stress in interethnic situations, provide for the prolonged survival of parallel ethnic institutions, and result in deferring the validation of acculturation.

Peter M. Blau

Co-operation and Competition in a Bureaucracy¹

This paper discusses performance and variations in competitiveness among twelve interviewers in two small sections of a public employment agency. The duties of the interviewers in both sections were essentially alike. They received requests for workers over the phone. The order forms on which job openings were described were filed in a common pool in each section. Most of the official's time was spent interviewing applicants for jobs. After ascertaining the client's qualifications, the interviewer searched the sectional files for suitable vacancies. If an acceptable job was found, he referred the client to it and later phoned the employer to determine whether the client had been hired.

"The statistics which show how many interviews and how many placements each person in the section did are passed around to all interviewers. Of course, you look at them and see how you compare with others. This creates a competitive spirit," said one of the interviewers, voicing the sentiments of most of his fellows. In a period of job shortages, competition took the form of trying to utilize job openings before anybody else did. Interviewers were so anxious to make placements that they even resorted to illicit methods. Said one:

When you take an order, instead of putting it in the box, you leave it on your desk. There was so much hiding of orders under the blotter that we used to ask, "Do you have anything under your rug?" when we looked for an order. You might leave an order you

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1954, 59:530-535. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

took on the desk, or you might leave it on the desk after you made no referral. . . . Or, you might take an order only partially; you write the firm's name, and a few things; the others you remember. And you leave it on the pad [of order blanks]. You keep on doing this, and all these orders are not in the box.

You can do some wrong filling out. For instance, for a rather low-salary job, you fill out "experience required." Nobody can make a placement on that except you, because you, alone, know that experience isn't required. Or, if there are several openings [on one order], you put the order into "referrals" [file category for *filled* job openings] after you make one placement. You're supposed to put it into "referrals" but stand it up, so that the others can see it. If you don't, you have a better chance of making the next placement than somebody else. And time and again you see four, five openings on one order filled by the same person. [In one case on file eight out of nine openings on one order had been filled by the same interviewer.]

The major opportunity for competitive monopolization of job openings occurred when they were received from employers. Since illicit practices were concealed from the observer, the extent of competition could not be determined through questioning or direct observation² but was betrayed by the record of official transactions. The extent to which an interviewer filled the vacancies he had received over the phone with his own clients in excess of chance expectations furnishes an index of competitiveness. . . .

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS AND COMPETITIVENESS

The members of Section A were more competitive than those of Section B. . . . The interviewer's competitiveness was related to his productivity in Section A (Pearsonian $r = +.92$), but this was not the case in Section B ($r = -.20$). In other words, hoarding of jobs was an effective way to improve an interviewer's placement record only in one of these two groups.

The members of Section B were more co-operative: they discouraged competitive practices by making them ineffective. When they learned about interesting vacancies, they often told one another, but an interviewer who manifested competitive tendencies was excluded from the network of reciprocal information and lost the respect of his co-workers. Any advantage of hoarding jobs was, at least, neutralized by such lack of co-operation, as is indicated by the absence of a relation between competitiveness and productivity in this group. Since competitive practices made an interviewer unpopular and failed to raise his productivity, they were infrequent.

These officials themselves attributed the greater competitiveness in Section A to the ambitiousness of several members: "There is usually one individual who starts it, who becomes a pace-setter. Once it has started, it is too late." The others, so interviewers claimed, have to follow suit. However, the most competitive member of Section A in recounting her reactions when production records were first introduced made it clear that this explanation of competition on the basis of personality characteristics is inadequate:

When they introduced statistics, I realized how fast I worked. I even wanted to drop lower. I didn't mind working fast as long as it didn't show, but when it showed up like that on the record, I wanted to work less. But you know what happened? Some of the

² This is clearly indicated by the comment of one of a group of special interviewers, who were expected to use the job openings of the regular interviewers but usually had great difficulty in doing so: "Oh, they hide everything from us. We got more orders when you [the observer] sat in the middle of that section than ever before. We laughed about it. Interviewers would hand us orders asking whether we could use them—when you were looking. That had never happened before."

others started to compete with each other and produced more than I did. Then I thought to myself, "Since I can do it, it's silly to let them get ahead of me." I'm only human. So I worked as fast as before.

When statistical records made the superior performance of this interviewer public knowledge, she decided to work less, possibly in response to pressures the others had brought to bear upon her. While complaining about her unfair standards, however, the other members of the section also improved their own performance. Consequently, this interviewer, just like the others, felt constrained by colleagues to compete for an outstanding record. One or two members of Section B, on the other hand, were also accused of competitive tendencies, but their colleagues successfully discouraged their expression in monopolistic practices. It is in this sense that the competitive practices of one group and the co-operative practices of the other were social factors, calling for explanation in sociological rather than psychological terms. . .

Differential conditions affected the development of these two groups. First, the supervisor in Section A relied heavily on performance records in evaluating interviewers: "And here, in the production figures, is the answer to the question: How good are you? Here you see exactly how good the work you did was." Interviewers often mentioned the pressure thus exerted: "[Especially] around rating time, you get this competition. You don't care whether the best person gets the job, but you try to make the placement yourself." In contrast, the new supervisor in Section B surprised his subordinates by rating them more leniently than they had expected, and not primarily on the basis of production records. Consequently, as one interviewer reported, "we became less anxious about statistics; another experience like that, and we might forget all about placement credit."

Second, a common professional orientation existed only in Section B. While the members of Section A had been assigned, and had received their training, at different times, the majority of those in Section B received their training together after World War II, at a time when intensive counseling had been stressed, since many returning veterans needed occupational advice. One official said of this period:

When I first came here, in May, 1946, we had a very nice bunch. It was like an all-day consultation; we discussed placements with each other all day long. At that time, the veterans came back, and there was a lot of emphasis on counseling. Nobody asked you how many placements you made, then. The emphasis was on quality, and we consulted with each other all day.

In this situation, the group developed a common professional code, which discouraged speedy placement as constituting defective employment service. In effect, this orientation transformed competitive practices from illegitimate means for desirable ends into illegitimate means for worthless ends. If such practices did occur, they were vigorously opposed on moral grounds as violating the interest of clients. Nevertheless, as will be shown presently, competition could not have been effectively curbed if the supervisor's evaluation practice had engendered acute anxiety over productivity. However, the existence of this code would have made it difficult for the supervisor to judge performance mainly by productivity, since doing so would have stamped him as ignorant of the essentials of good employment service.

No opportunity for the development of a *common* professional code had existed in Section A. Since competitiveness prevailed in this group, the individual whose personal professional standards made him reluctant to compete either became the

deviant whose productivity suffered or modified his standards and entered the race with the others.

Third, most members of Section A had been appointed to temporary civil service positions during World War II. They were on probation pending permanent appointments when production records were originally introduced and even afterward remained subject to layoffs due to reductions in staff. Their insecurity led them to strive to impress superiors with outstanding performance. In contrast, all but one of the members of Section B were veterans, whose employment could not be terminated except for cause. As one envious colleague put it, "They felt that nothing could happen to them, because they were veterans, and had super-seniority."

Differences in these three conditions—security of employment, opportunity for the development of a common professional orientation, and the evaluation practice of the supervisor—gave rise to two dissimilar social structures. Productivity was highly valued in Section A and became associated with the individual's standing in the group, while striving for sheer productivity was disparaged in Section B. Thus, whereas the most productive and most competitive member of Section A was considered the best interviewer by her co-workers and was most popular with them, the most productive member of Section B was least respected and least popular. As a result of these structural differences, co-operative norms prevailed only in Section B.

The interviewers in *both* sections disliked working in a competitive atmosphere. A member of Section A said: "If I see that an interviewer keeps orders on her desk, I take them and put them in the box. . . . Of course, you don't make friends that way." Since the majority in this section, including its most popular members, were highly competitive, to antagonize them was to threaten one's own standing in the group. This deterred interviewers from discouraging competitive practices. Antagonizing a deviant, however, does not endanger one's status. Consequently, since a striver was unpopular in Section B, its members could use sanctions freely to combat competitive practices and enforce co-operative norms.

SOCIAL COHESION AND PRODUCTIVITY

. . . The group most concerned with productivity was less productive than the other group. Fifty-nine per cent of the job openings received in Section A were filled, in contrast to 67 per cent in Section B. (The 8 per cent difference is significant on the .01 level.) Another implicit paradox is that competitiveness and productivity were directly related for individuals in Section A but inversely related for the two groups.

Anxious concern with productivity induced interviewers in Section A to concentrate blindly upon it at the expense of other considerations. In their eagerness to make many placements they often ignored their relationships with others as well as official rules. Competitiveness in this group weakened social cohesion, while co-operativeness in Section B strengthened it. This difference is further shown by the fact that usually none of the members of Section A spent their rest periods together, whereas all but one of those of Section B, a newcomer when this study was being made, did. Social cohesion enhanced operating efficiency by facilitating co-operation and by reducing status anxiety.

Although the members of both groups had occasion to assist one another, greater effort was required to elicit such co-operation in Section A. The social interaction that occurred in the office during the twenty-four busiest hours of one week was

recorded and classified as official and private contacts, that is, those directly concerned with a specific job or client, and all others. The frequency of an interviewer's official contacts with colleagues was related to his productivity in Section A (rank correlation = $+.98$) but not in Section B (rank correlation = $+.08$). This suggests that only interviewers who kept, as one put it, "hopping around all the time" to retrieve job orders that others kept on their desks were able to make many placements in the competitive section. In the cohesive group, on the other hand, the co-operation needed for making placements occurred as a matter of course, and not only in response to special requests. This effort was not required for high productivity.

To maximize his placements, the interviewer in Section A hoarded jobs and simultaneously tried to prevent others from doing so, thereby antagonizing his co-workers, whose co-operation he needed if he was to do well. The members of this section therefore attempted to conciliate colleagues whom their competitive practices had alienated. Often, shortly after having interfered with her operations, an interviewer paid another a compliment about her work or her apparel. The most competitive interviewer was in the habit of taking time out to joke with her co-workers and was proud of making more placements than anybody else, "nevertheless." Actually, this compensating friendliness, which made her popular despite her competitiveness, helped her to be productive.

In Section A, interviewers had to make special efforts at conciliation in order to make placements, but this was not necessary in Section B. At least, this impression is corroborated by the finding that frequency of private contacts with others was also related to productivity in Section A (rank correlation = $+.84$) but not in Section B (rank correlation = $+.13$). The members of the cohesive group, whose operating practices did not put colleagues at a disadvantage, did not have to devote time and energy to solicit and encourage co-operation, since it was not extended reluctantly. Their spontaneous co-operation improved operating efficiency.

Social cohesion also lessened the status anxiety generated by the evaluation system. Such anxiety is most acute in the individual who does not feel integrated in his work group and therefore seeks to derive social recognition from excelling at his task and from approval of superiors. Friendly relations with co-workers made the standing of the individual in the cohesive group independent of his productivity, particularly since fast work was disparaged as a sign of superficial service. The consequent reduction of anxiety in the antiproduktivity-oriented group actually raised its productivity.

Fluctuations in productivity illustrate the dysfunction of status anxiety. Section B had not always operated more efficiently than Section A. Its productivity had been lower during the two months preceding the last rating but had abruptly increased then, while that of Section A had declined. . .

The two groups found themselves in different situations before and after they were rated. The members of Section A were familiar with the rating standards of their supervisor, for she had rated them in previous years. Their anxiety led them to work especially hard immediately before the annual rating. The members of Section B, on the other hand, had never before been rated by their new supervisor. They were also concerned about their record but could not calm their anxiety by concentrating upon certain tasks, because they did not know what the supervisor would stress; the explanation he gave to his subordinates was too vague and adhered too strictly to official procedures to help them to foresee his actual practices. This unfocused anxiety was particularly detrimental to efficient performance.

Later, when the interviewers found out that they were not rated primarily on the basis of statistical records, their anxiety largely subsided and their productivity increased. In contrast, the experience of the members of Section A, whose rating was strongly influenced by their production records, intensified their status anxiety, but, when the rating was over, anxiety was no longer channeled into exceptionally hard work, with the result that their productivity declined below that of Section B.

Social cohesion is no guaranty against anxiety in a bureaucracy. Civil service status is too important to officials for them to remain immune to the threat of losing it. But when no such threat is felt, social cohesion reduces anxiety by divesting productivity of its significance as a symbol of status in the work group. Diminished anxiety as well as smoother co-operation then enables those in the cohesive group to perform their tasks more efficiently than the others.

In the absence of social cohesion, competitive striving for an outstanding performance record became a substitute means for relieving status anxiety in Section A. This psychological function of competition is illustrated by the following incident: The interviewers in this section became very irritable, and one of them even became physically ill, when a temporary supervisor, who tried to prevent competitive practices, interfered with their method of allaying anxiety. Status anxiety reduced operating efficiency. Even in the cohesive group, productivity was low when the unknown rating standards of a new supervisor produced acute and diffuse anxiety. Otherwise, however, the cohesive group was more productive, because social cohesion relieved status anxiety by making the individual's standing in the group independent of his productivity. The very competitive striving that undermined the group's cohesiveness also served to lessen the individual's status anxiety in a noncohesive situation. The hypothesis that the cohesiveness of the group and the competitiveness of the individual in the less cohesive group both reduce status anxiety explains the paradox that the *less competitive group* as well as the *more competitive individual* in the competitive group each was particularly productive.



PART III SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

10

Status and Role

Status is one's place or position in a given social structure. Role is the function or performance that goes with a given status. Every status carries with it some sort of evaluation. This we call prestige. The evaluation of a person's role behavior in a status which he occupies is termed esteem.

The papers in this chapter bear upon the interplay of status and role. For example, Ray Gold in "Janitors versus Tenants: A Status-Income Dilemma" exposes the ambiguity introduced by the fact of higher income of the janitors vis-à-vis the higher social status of the tenants.

In "Instabilities in Status: The Problem of Hierarchy in the Community Study of Status Arrangements," Gregory P. Stone and William H. Form discuss the relative instability of middle-class statuses in a small midwestern community. The basic difficulty is the lack of generally accepted definitions of role and status.

Ray Gold

Janitors Versus Tenants: A Status-Income Dilemma¹

.

There is some kind of status relationship between the worker and the person served in almost any occupation where the two meet and interact. For example, when the salesperson and the customer meet, each brings to bear on the other valuations by which the other's status category can be tentatively ascertained. This tentative status designation enables each to make a rough judgment as to how to act toward the other person and as to how he thinks the other person will act toward him. If their association is resumed, their initial judgments strongly influence the character of their subsequent interactions. If they are separated by wide barriers of social distance, they may carry on an almost formal salesperson-customer relationship for years. Or their respective status judgments may be such that the status barriers are gradually penetrated. In any case, the status relationship between them is always present, unless it is resolved into an absolute equalitarian relationship. Likewise, in the case of the physician and his patients, the plumber and his

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1952, 57:486-493. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

customers, the minister and his parishioners, and in others, there is a status relationship of which both parties are more or less aware and which influences the pattern of their interactions. Such being the case, the nature and form of these status relationships can and should be studied wherever they occur.

The present example, which concerns the apartment-building janitor and his tenants, is a case study in such status relationships. The form these relationships have taken is that of a marked dilemma of status and income.

STATUS AND INCOME

The status-income dilemma may be expected to occur in two situations. One is that in which an individual earns too little to pay for the goods and services generally associated with his other social characteristics. The other is that in which he earns enough to pay for goods and services generally associated not with *his* other social characteristics but with those of members of higher social classes. When an individual in the first dilemma meets and interacts almost daily on a rather personal level with one in the second as, respectively, in the case of the tenant² and the apartment-building janitor, they develop an association whose form and content are of sociological interest.

The data in this article are based entirely upon interviews with janitors. What results is a penetrating view of the janitor's conceptions of tenants and of his interpretations of their conceptions of him. Thus, we obtain an intimate understanding of the janitor's view of how he and tenants spar to resolve their respective dilemmas. Although many of the tenants may not be so sensitive as the janitor to this contest, it is safe to assume that, through his untiring efforts to play the game with his rules, the tenants are aware that he is agitating to change their traditional patterns of interaction.

In the early part of this century, before janitors in Chicago were unionized, they catered to virtually every whim of their employers and tenants in order to establish job security. Since they have become unionized, their duties have been greatly delimited, their wages increased, and their privileges extended to include a rent-free basement apartment in one of the larger buildings which they service. At present, they are required to fire the furnace to provide heat and hot water for the tenants, to remove the tenants' garbage regularly, to make minor emergency repairs, and to keep the building and grounds clean.

Having a history, the janitor also has a reputation. The tenant-public seems to look upon him as an ignorant, lazy, and dirty occupational misfit. There has developed a general belief that, if a man cannot do anything else successfully, he can always become a janitor. This stereotype has been perpetuated by the public because of a number of beliefs, principally the following: (1) many janitors are foreign-born and therefore strange and suspicious; (2) the janitor is always seen wearing dirty clothes, so the tenants seem to feel that he habitually disregards cleanliness; (3) the janitor lives in the basement, which symbolizes his low status; and (4) the janitor removes the tenants' garbage, a duty which subserves him to them. It is because the public has singled out these features in their view of the janitor that his ascribed status has been lowly. In the public's view it seems that the janitor merely is a very low-class person doing menial work for the tenants.

It is true that the performance of janitorial duties requires neither lengthy training nor a high order of mechanical or technical skills. However, the nature of the

² The term "tenant" herein refers to the housewife, as the janitor seldom comes in contact with the man of the house.

janitor's situation has led him to play roles and incorporate self-conceptions which frequently overshadow those which others expect of a combination caretaker and handy man. Because he does not work under direct supervision and can plan his work to suit himself, he feels that he is his own boss: he, alone, is in charge of the building and responsible for the safety of the tenants. After becoming proficient at making repairs for tenants, he magnifies his handy-man role into that of a master mechanic. Combining these two roles, he then sees himself as an entrepreneur who runs a cash business of attending to the tenants' service needs.

These roles, together with others which stem from the work situation, contradict the public's stereotyped view of the janitor. Being sensitive to these social conceptions, the janitor strives to gain the tenants' acceptance as a person who has risen above the disreputable fellow these conceptions describe. Toward this end he not only plays the role of a respectable, dignified human being but of one who has a very substantial income. . . . In this setting it is evident that the janitor's social relationships with the tenants are of crucial importance to him. These relationships are pervaded by his persistent disowning of his unhappy occupational heritage and the justification of his claim to middle-class status.

So important are social relationships with the tenants that the janitor defines success in terms of them. As many janitors have pointed out:

The most important thing about a janitor's work is that you have to know how to deal with people. Then, when you show the tenants that you have a clean character and are respectable, you can train them to be good tenants, that's what's really important in being a success.

Because the janitor attempts to realize his self when interacting with his tenants, his efforts to train them are actually channeled toward the establishment of relationships which support, rather than oppose, his self-conceptions. The "good" tenants support his self-conceptions; the "bad" tenants oppose them.

It will be well now to examine the nature of these social relationships to determine how they give rise to the personal and social dilemmas which comprise the central theme of this discussion.

The janitor believes that, in general, tenants hold him in low esteem. Even the most friendly tenants maintain some social distance between the janitor and themselves. Tenants, generally, overlook his qualifications as an individual and see him only as a member of a low-status group. In their view he is merely an occupational type. The most militant proponents of this view are the "bad" tenants.

There are two characteristics of a special group of "bad" tenants which are apposite to this presentation. These characteristics, jealousy and resentment, are descriptive of only those tenants who are embittered by the janitor's economic prowess. They are people whose incomes are usually below, but sometimes slightly above, the janitor's income. The janitor often refers to these tenants as "four-flushers." They live on the brink of bankruptcy, and he knows it.³ Status symbols are very important to them. Unlike the janitor, they apparently strain their budgets to improve the appearance of their persons and their apartments. When they see

³ In the boiler-room the janitor sorts out the noncombustible garbage from the combustible garbage, the former to be removed by a scavenger and the latter to be burned by him in the furnace. In the course of these sorting and burning operations he wittingly or unwittingly comes across letters and other things which serve to identify the different bundles or other forms of garbage accumulation. Thus, each of the tenants is readily identified by her garbage. What the garbage reveals about the tenant over a period of time enables the janitor to make intimate judgments about her.

the janitor's new car or television aerial, their idea of high-status symbols, it is almost more than they can bear. It violates their sense of social justice. In consequence of his high income, the janitor can acquire things which these tenants may interpret as a threat to the established social order.

The janitor's new car, parked conspicuously in front of the building, serves constantly to remind tenants of his pecuniary power. It draws the most criticism from the jealous tenants. Commenting on the tensions thereby engendered, Janitor No. 35 remarked:

There is a certain amount of jealousy when janitors try to better themselves. A whole lot are jealous because the janitor makes more than they do. But they don't consider the time a janitor puts in. When I got my Dodge two years ago somebody said, "Hub, look at that fellow. He must be making the money or he wouldn't be buying a new car." I know one party, they think a janitor should be in working clothes all the time. Just because a janitor likes to go out in an auto and they don't have any, there is that feeling between janitor and the tenant, that's for sure.

Some of these fourflushers do own an automobile. But if the janitor's car is bigger and newer than theirs, they are extremely mortified. Janitor No. 33 experienced the wrath of such people:

About a third of the tenants are very pleasant about it when they see my car, but the rest say, "Holy cripe, the janitor got a new car!" The same majority is the ones you are in trouble with all the time. They say, "How is the 'nigger' with the big car?" meaning I am a "nigger" because I got a Buick and my car is bigger than theirs.

The janitor finds that the jealous tenants are impossible to accommodate. They do not want to be accommodated by him. "No matter what you do," protested Janitor No. 14, "they squawk." Their animosity seems to know no bounds. They deliberately attempt to create trouble for the janitor by complaining about him to his employer.

Besides complaining about him, these tenants reveal their resentment of the janitor's mobility efforts by making nasty remarks to him. This was shown very clearly in a conversation with Janitor No. 12 and his wife:

JANITOR: When we got our 10 per cent raise a short time ago, the tenants didn't like it. You see how nice this [first-floor] apartment looks. Well, there ain't another apartment in the building that's decorated as nice as this. I had all those cabinets in the kitchen tore out and got new ones put in. That brick glass and ventilator in the transom opening—I had it done. Tenants didn't like to see me do all that. They resent it.

INTERVIEWER: How do they show their resentment?

WIFE: Mostly by making snotty remarks. One woman told us that we shouldn't live in such a nice apartment on the first floor, that we should live in a hole [basement apartment] like other janitors. Then they are sarcastic in a lot of other ways. They just don't like to see us have a nice apartment and a new car. I guess they'd rather see us live like rats.

The basement apartment is symbolic of the janitor's subservient status. If he can arrange with his employer to obtain a first-floor apartment, there is nothing that the jealous tenants can do to stop him. They can only try to make life miserable for him.

Jealous tenants disdainfully address him as "Janitor," rather than using his given name. It is bad enough, from his standpoint, that all other tenants address him by his given name, thereby indicating his historically servile status. But these

resentful tenants go further. They call him by his occupational name. Symbolically, their use of this "dirty" name means that they want their relationships with him to be as impersonal as possible. They want the janitor to be aware of the great social distance which he would dare to bridge. Janitor No. 14 commented on this form of address:

JANITOR: The bad ones squawk as long as they live. No matter what you do they squawk. They're the ones that don't call you by your name. They're a lower class of people, but they try to make you feel even lower than them.

INTERVIEWER: Why do they call you "Janitor"?

JANITOR: It's either out of stupidity or to make you think you are a slave to them—an underdog. Janitors get the same crap all over the city, I know.

These fourflushers who address him as "Janitor" are unalterably opposed to his efforts to better himself. The longer they live in the building, the worse their relationships with him become. This point was brought out by Janitor No. 4:

Boy, I'll tell you about one thing that happened to me last Christmas morning. This woman rings my bell when I'm out and gives an envelope to my wife to give to me. I passed by the back windows here a little while later and looked in like I always do to wave at the kid, and my wife called me in because she thought there must be a present in the envelope. So I went in and opened it up and there was a note inside that said, "I'll be home today so please keep the heat up." I was so mad I coulda booted her ass right over the fence if she was there. That's how the tenants get when they been living here too long. Most of them think they own the building, and you should do just what they want.

As Janitor No. 4 insisted, the fourflushers' unthinking demands for personal service, their utter disregard for the janitor's integrity and authority, and their possessiveness toward the building increase with their length of residence. The building becomes more and more like "home" to them, the longer they live there. "They can't afford to have a home and servants of their own," observed Janitor No. 18, "so they try to treat the janitor as their servant." They like to think of him as a mobile part of the building, always at their beck and call. Still, the deep-seated animosities between these tenants and the janitor preclude any mutually satisfactory adjustment of their respective roles. Through the years they continue to be jealous and resentful of him. Meanwhile, he continues to resent their uncooperativeness and disrespect. The building becomes as much "home" to him as it does to them. But there is something about "home" that can never be remedied. From the standpoint of these fourflushers, that something is the janitor. From the janitor's point of view, that something is the fourflushers.

Turning now from janitors whose tenants have incomes that are marginal to theirs to janitors whose tenants are plainly well-to-do, it is evident that there is a remarkable contrast in janitor-tenant relationships. The following conversation with Janitor No. 26 will serve as an introduction to this contrast:

INTERVIEWER: Some fellows have told me that many of their tenants resent their getting a new car or a television set. Have you ever come up against that?

JANITOR: That class of people don't live here, of course. The class of people you're talking about are making two hundred a month, don't have a car, and are lucky they're living. Yeah, I've met up with them. . . . People here aren't jealous if you got a new car. People here feel you have to have a car, like bread and butter.

Tenants whose incomes are clearly higher than the janitor's have no cause to be

jealous of him. They do not compete with him for symbols of pecuniary power. There is more prestige attached to having an engineer in the building than to having a janitor, so they call him "the engineer." These people obviously do not have the status-income problems of the fourflushers who contemptuously address him as "Janitor." Clearly, then, tenants who are well-to-do have no need to make demands. As Janitor No. 17, many of whose tenants have incomes marginal to his, so penetratingly observed:

The people that don't have anything put up the biggest front and squawk a lot. The people who got it don't need any attention. I'd rather work for rich tenants. The ones we got here are middle ones. Those tenants that sing don't have a right to. . . . Some few tenants just got here from the Negro district. They were stuck there until they could find a place to move to. Man, they're real glad to be here. They don't give me no trouble at all.

Demonstrating remarkable insight, Janitor No. 17 pointed out that the "rich" tenants do not feel that they need attention from the janitor; that the "refugee" (like the poor) tenants feel that they are in no position to make demands; and that the fourflushers or "middle" (probably lower-middle) tenants are the most troublesome.

When a janitor works for many years in a building occupied by well-to-do tenants, it is not unusual that a genuinely warm relationship develops between him and these tenants. They probably come to see him as an old family employee, while he believes that he has been accepted for himself. As Janitor No. 26 asserted, "They feel they're no better than me—I'm no better than them, and they always invite me in for coffee or something like that." There is no problem in sharing identification of "home." The building is undisputedly "home" to both the janitor and the "rich" tenants, because they most probably view their relationship with him as a status accommodation, which he interprets as an equalitarian relationship.

In the next section the status-income dilemma is illustrated in terms of the janitor's professional behavior and outlook, which are in marked contrast with the tenants' lack of respect for him.

PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDES

It is likely that in every low-status occupation, where the worker associates with the customer, the workers meet with certain customer-oriented situations in which they typically behave in accordance with standards that people have traditionally called "professional." These low-status workers certainly do not label themselves "professionals," nor do others so label them. Yet, there is ample evidence that some of their behavior is ethically comparable to the behavior exhibited by members of the so-called "professions."

While it is true that the janitor's self-conceptions are instrumental in forming the superstructure of his professional behavior, the foundation of such conduct is formed primarily out of situational requisites. This being the case, his status-income dilemma is intensified, because he is frequently called upon to act in a professional manner toward the disrespectful tenants. Thus, whether mainly out of choice (expression of self-conceptions) or out of necessity (fulfilment of situational requisites), the relationship between janitor and tenant sometimes assumes the character of that between professional and client.

The nature of the janitor's work leads him to find out a great deal about the personal lives of his tenants. He meets with many situations which force him to decide how much and to whom he should tell what he knows about them. Generally, he exercises scrupulous care in the handling of this intimate knowledge, as he considers himself to be intrusted with it in confidence.

The janitor gets some of his information from sources other than the tenants themselves. When he acts as an informant (e.g., for insurance checkers), he finds out a great deal about their personal affairs. One tenant tells him about another. The garbage reveals much about them. From these sources he acquires information of a very confidential nature.

The janitor also gets information directly from the tenants. They confide in him not only about illnesses but also about personal problems. As Janitor No. 20 remarked, "Some of them stop you and think they have to tell you if they got a toothache."

Like the bartender and the barber, whose ascribed occupational status beclouds the fact that they frequently share their customers' personal secrets, the janitor is placed in problematical situations requiring some kind of ethical rules. When it is understood that occupational problems which accrue from the same kinds of situations are basically the same without respect to status, then the similar receipt of confidences by the janitor, the lawyer, or the bartender becomes clear. These workers are, in this instance, in the kind of situation which requires them to protect the customer's personal secrets. Whether the disposition of these secrets involves as little as remaining silent or as much as stretching the truth, the workers protect their relationship with the customer by protecting his confidences. Likewise, in other given kinds of work situations which require the solution of ethical problems, the worker-customer relationship becomes overly complicated unless the worker makes and observes appropriate rules. Such ethical rules are not simply a matter of honorable self-conceptions or formalized professional codes. They are fundamentally a matter of situational requirements, irrespective of personal and occupational status.

Another area in which professional behavior is found concerns the janitor's relationships with overamorous tenants. Janitor No. 12 described what he considers to be the proper procedure for easing gracefully out of such a delicate predicament:

Another thing about janitors—lots of women try to get you up, in apartment just "to talk" or for some phony excuse. When you walk in they are on couch, ask you to sit down, and that means only one thing. When that happens to me and I begin to sweat, I know I better leave. Thing is not to refuse them so they get embarrassed, so I act dumb. I excuse myself and say I forgot about water running some place which I must shut off right away. It's hard to do, but it's best.

One can easily imagine hearing the bishop advise the young minister or the elderly doctor instruct the young doctor in a similar vein. The minister and the doctor must be prepared to meet such situations in a like fashion. The janitor instructs tenants to call him for repairs only during daylight hours, except for what he considers to be genuine emergencies.

Yet another cluster of work situations wherein the janitor exhibits professional

behavior concerns those occasions when he is called upon to do mechanical work for the tenants. The most clear-cut evidence of professional behavior in this area was submitted by Janitor No. 11.

Some of the repair work the tenant is responsible for and I'm supposed to charge for it. Well, if I replace some glass that costs me three and a half dollars, I may charge the tenant a half dollar or two dollars more for my labor, depending on how much she can afford. If it's a little thing and the tenant isn't well off, I won't charge her anything for it if she's supposed to pay.

The janitor's practice of charging for repairs on the basis of the customer's ability to pay is a high standard of service—quite in the tradition of the medical profession—and he knows it.

THE DILEMMA

The janitor's professional behavior, together with his substantial income, contradicts what he believes are his tenants' conceptions of him. His struggle to gain their respect is a struggle for status. His high standards of conduct constitute a way of favorably influencing their estimation of his worth. Still, he finds that tenants regard him as hardly more than a *janitor*. He strongly resents their failure properly to recognize him, particularly in the case of the fourflushers. As Janitor No. 18 bitterly remarked:

They're the kind that are very important. They think you're a fireman—should drop everything and run to them. They adopt a superior attitude: "I'm the tenant and you're the janitor." Like the East and the West in that saying. Confidentially, a lot of us janitors could buy out most tenants. They put on airs and try to be bossy.

The janitor has a higher income than many of the tenants; yet, the latter "adopt a superior attitude." So he does considerable soul-searching to seek a satisfactory explanation of his relatively low status. The conversation which we had with Janitor No. 28 is in point.

INTERVIEWER: What things are janitors touchy about?

JANITOR: A lot of tenants figure he's just a goddamn janitor, a servant. Here [with "rich" tenants] it's not so bad. You say something to them and they [the "bad" tenants] say, "Hell, you're nothing but a janitor." Or when you're talking to even a working man and you tell him you're a janitor, he smiles—you know, people think there's nothing lower than a janitor. You get that feeling that they're looking down on you, because you're working for them. I know I feel that way sometimes. During the depression I was making better than most, so what the hell. It's good earned money.

INTERVIEWER: Well, why do you say you get that feeling that they are looking down on you? Why do you feel so sensitive?

JANITOR: In different places you hear people talk janitor this and janitor that, and they say they'd never be a goddamn janitor. So you think people here must say and think the same, but not to you. It makes you feel funny sometimes.

It is noteworthy that Janitor No. 28 does not reject his idea of the tenants' definition of a janitor. For that matter, virtually no other janitor does so either. To explain this, it is necessary to understand how the janitor relates himself to other janitors in terms of the occupational title.

The individual janitor strongly identifies himself with the name "janitor," despite his belief that tenants look down on janitors. Their view does not annoy

him very much because he, too, looks down on *other* janitors. He feels that he is different from and better than other janitors. So, when tenants (nonjanitors) speak disparagingly of janitors, he does not resent it because of the group solidarity in the occupation, for, in reality, there is little such solidarity. Rather he resents it because his self-conceptions are so involved in the name "janitor" and because the tenants fail to recognize his individual worth. Thus, when a janitor (No. 8) proudly states, "Tenants never treated *me* like a janitor," there is no doubt that he agrees with their definition of janitor but that he, by virtue of being singularly superior to other janitors, has been treated in accordance with his conception of himself.

This attitude of "different and better" may be characteristic of the members of any occupation (or other group) whose public reputation is one of censorious stereotypes. This attitude implies that the individual member agrees that most of his colleagues do have the characteristics attributed to them by the public. The interesting question is: Why does the member agree with the public? The study of janitors suggests that the answer is likely to be in terms of (1) the nature of the member's association with his colleagues (he probably knows only a few of the "better" ones) and (2) the status relationship between the member and the portion of the public he associates with in his work.

Although the individual janitor capably defends himself from the public's conceptions of janitors, he still must perform tasks which preclude advance to a higher occupational, hence social, status. The janitorial reputation refers to the members' personal characteristics and work habits. Closely related to, but distinguishable from, these alleged personal traits, are readily verified features of janitoring which involve dirty work (e.g., shoveling coal and removing garbage). Work is dirty when society defines it as such, that is, when society defines it as being necessary but undesirable or even repugnant. Middle-class people seem consciously to avoid such tasks. They apparently realize that the kind of work one does is often more important than one's income when it comes to getting established as a member of the middle class. Yet, in a materialistic society certain costly things, like a new automobile and a television set, become symbolic of high status, even to them. This accounts for the dilemma of the fourflushers.

Janitor No. 35, in summarizing the status-income dilemma, is painfully aware that tenants look down on the janitor. Their trash, the garbage, is undoubtedly the biggest single element in the janitor's continued low status. The removal of garbage is dirty work, incompatible with middle-class status. It causes the janitor to subserve the tenants, all of his individual attributes notwithstanding. The garbage symbolizes the dilemmas of the janitor-tenant relationship.

CONCLUSION

This account of the status-income dilemma suggests that, since high-prestige and high-income occupations are frequently distinguishable from one another, the *kind* of work a person does is a crucially qualifying factor in so far as his status possibilities are concerned. Viewed another way, the trend toward professionalization of occupations becomes an effort either to bring status recognition into line with high income or to bring income into line with high-status recognition. The janitor-tenant relationship has been graphically presented to call attention to a dilemma which is so prevalent that it is apt to be overlooked.

Gregory P. Stone and William H. Form

Instabilities in Status: The Problem of Hierarchy in the Community Study of Status Arrangements¹

During the last decade, many objections have been raised against existing conceptions of social stratification. . . .

Specifically, this paper questions: (1) the adequacy of conceiving status *groups* as comprising the basic units of the social order; (2) the fruitfulness of conceiving status groupings as hierarchically arranged in the structural analysis of status stratification; and (3) the appropriateness of a hierarchical conception of *status arrangement* for facilitating the study of social process.

This is not to say that the long and, at times, heated discussion has gone for naught, because it has served to isolate the principal areas of methodological confusion confronting sociological investigation into problems of social stratification. These have been summarized and commented upon elsewhere, but three of them need to be spelled out here, for they designate areas within which the methodological decisions circumscribing the applicability of the observation that follow have been made.

(1) *Levels of analysis.* . . . It becomes clear that the study of social stratification may proceed upon any of four levels of analysis: that of the larger society, the community, institutions, or the interpersonal level. This inquiry is primarily focused upon the level of community organization, although, from time to time, comments will be made concerning the implications of social status both for the larger social organization and special institutions. It would seem, too, that our discussion is particularly appropriate for the study of status arrangements in modern urban communities. Hopefully our observations will have ultimate bearing on the larger sociological problem of urban life, *viz.*, how consensus and communication are achieved in situations which foster social heterogeneity.

(2) *Dimensions of analysis.* Although some researchers in the area of social stratification still regard that phenomenon as a pervasive, integrating, and inclusive structure with respect to community organization, there seems to be a growing agreement among sociologists that social stratifications may be apprehended as co-existing in community organization along the lines suggested by Max Weber's proposed social, economic, and political orders. Such a multi-dimensional view of social stratification is especially appropriate for the study of social structure in urban communities. This view is accepted here. In addition, the discussion is limited to considerations of the social order, *i.e.*, *social status*.

(3) *Conceptions of social stratification.* Many sociologists who have turned their attention to the study of social stratification have distinguished between its subjective and objective conceptualization. . . . Both objective and subjective aspects of social status are explored in this paper.

In short, this paper is primarily concerned with the study of social status in its subjective and objective aspects on the level of community organization.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

By status, we refer to social honor as its signs and symbols are differentially

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1953, 18:149-162. By permission.

distributed among the social groups and aggregates which constitute the social organization of a community. According to this view, then, there are both *status groups* and *status aggregates* (and the former term is not satisfactory for depicting all of the social units of status order). A status group is an exclusive unit composed of a number of individuals enjoying approximately the same amount and kind of honor (as indicated by symbols, the deference patterns of others, and a reflected sense of dignity or personal worth) on the basis of their social position in a community. Such groups are communal in nature, and, consequently, their members are in relatively frequent social contact with one another. A status aggregate is an inclusive category referring to a number of individuals enjoying approximately the same honor in a community, but who are in potential, capricious, occasional, or sporadic social contact. Probably, the smaller the community, the greater the proportion of its members included in status groups; the larger the community, the greater the proportion of its members included in status aggregates.

Four considerations that have been employed previously in the discussion of status groups are useful for distinguishing the characteristics of such groups from status aggregates.

(1) *Social closure or exclusiveness.* Only status groups are characterized by their intrinsic tendency toward social closure particularly as manifested in conubial and commensal exclusiveness. Such exclusiveness may be largely understood as a response on the part of groups of relatively high status to the emulation directed toward them by members of groups enjoying relatively lower social status. Exclusion and emulation are primary modes of relationship among coordinated status groupings in most status arrangements. Whereas social closure is intrinsically generated by status groups, status aggregates can achieve only a limited degree of closure in this manner. . . .

(2) *Monopolization of appropriate symbols.* By diligent application, one can "pass himself off" as a member of a status aggregate to which he does not objectively belong, but seldom as a member of another status group. This is because there is a characteristic difference in the control over status symbols exercised by each grouping. Status groups may exercise a virtual monopoly over many symbols of their status through the application or the objective presence of various restrictions. Status aggregates may be (often imprecisely) recognized by the appropriate symbols, but their members are limited in the means available to them for their use. As a result, status symbols are more often adequate "tests of status" for status groups than for status aggregates where, on the contrary, status symbols are seldom adequate "tests of status."

(3) *Life-style.* The life styles of these groupings differ greatly in the matter of specificity. In the case of status groups, the relevant life styles are rather closely circumscribed by elaborated moral codes. Too, the status group restricts knowledge of its characteristic life style to its membership by virtue of an intricate and secretive educational process. As over and against this, knowledge of the life style shared by the members of a status aggregate is often public. Frequently the members of status aggregates are educated into their life style by the mass media of communication. As a result, the relevant nuances of living become diffused and lacking in specificity.

(4) *Solidarity and dignity.* The members of both status groups and aggregates derive a certain solidarity-producing sense of dignity from the way in which they respond to either their positive or negative honor in a community or to the status arrangement as a whole. However, the specific sense of dignity that mem-

bership in a status group entails is reserved to the membership: not so in the case of membership in a status aggregate. The dignity of a particular status aggregate may be "borrowed" in anonymous situations by persons of objectively different status.

... This paper proposes that status groups are variously arranged with reference to one another in different communities, and that status arrangements are often characterized by *typical* instabilities that cannot be conceptualized adequately by the application of the "hierarchy-construct." Instabilities in status may, in fact, be the rule in urban communities rather than the exception. Status arrangements may approach closure as in the case of structural systems, they may coexist, or they may not exist as *structural* systems at all. Status groups may be ranked or unranked in community status structures. Some members of communities may be accorded social honor and yet not belong to status *groups* at all. These seeming "anomalies" in the socially structured distribution of status were suggested by persistent obstacles which faced the research team in a community study.

STATUS ARRANGEMENT IN A SMALL MICHIGAN CITY

Research into the social aspects of clothing has been carried on at this institution [Michigan State University] since the summer of 1950. The locale of the study is a small city of approximately 10,000 residents which we shall call Vansburg. A central postulate of the research asserted that clothing functions in social life as a symbol of social status. Since the study was carried on in a community context, schedules were constructed on the expectation that the residents of Vansburg had arranged themselves with respect to differences in social status along the lines suggested by the Warner studies. These schedules were pre-tested in a small city of the same size as Vansburg and were found to be adequate, i.e., the responses "made sense" in terms of Warner's schema. When, however, the schedules were applied to Vansburg, the responses elicited were often incongruous and elusive of ready explanation in the conventional status terminology. This was eventually traced to the fact that our conception of status groups as arranged hierarchically in the organization of community life was erroneous. Status arrangement in Vansburg could be described as a unidimensional "system of rank." Many conditions were responsible for this, but four will be singled out here, since similar conditions may apply in other cities of the same size.

(1) *Status arrangement not clearly reflected in community ecology.* The topography of Vansburg is unusually regular and devoid of those "natural barriers" and irregularities of terrain which, as has been observed so frequently in the literature, shape the spatial arrangement of social groupings. One area of town was not *especially* "more desirable" than another. The juxtaposition of "good" and "bad" housing seemed to be the dominant pattern of the town. Although the houses of the "old families" had, at one time, clustered along the outer reaches of the main street, with the conversion of that street into a principal east-west highway, many residences had been abandoned and converted into tourist homes. The spatial response of the "old families" who had been displaced in the process had been accomplished without any clear pattern. As a result, the status arrangements of the community were not clearly reflected in its ecological composition. Probably, this had the further effect of rendering status arrangements less visible to residents.

(2) *Lack of adequate "status reputation" for a sizeable segment of the community.* Vansburg had a relatively high proportion of truckers in its male popu-

lation. Since truckers spent much of their time out of town, there was a considerable number of families, the heads of whose households were more often away than at home. Consequently, the "status reputations" of these families were vaguely conceived by the other members of the community.

(3) *Consensus on status extremes and disagreement in the middle range.* In our effort to adjust occupational rating so that Warner's Index of Status Characteristics could be used to stratify our sample of the Vansburg population, we selected ten long-term residents of the city from different social levels to rate on a seven point scale the eighty-eight occupations in which the males in the sample were engaged. Assuming that the rating of these judges did, in fact, represent a community estimate of the social honor accorded the occupations in question, there was some evidence to suggest that more agreement existed in the matter of rating the very high and very low occupations, while less agreement characterized the ratings of the occupations in the middle range. The evidence is best presented by illustration. The physician, for example, was an occupation accorded the highest rank by all of the judges. Similarly, the county judge was placed in the highest category by nine of the ten raters. Although agreement on such negatively esteemed occupations as street cleaner, foundry laborer, and truck loader was somewhat less than that for highly esteemed occupation, it was still considerable. All of these occupations were placed in either the sixth or seventh rank by the judges. The disagreement on the matter of occupations receiving a medium average rating stands in sharp contrast. For example, the foundry foreman was assigned ranks two to six. This lack of consensus on occupations in the middle range of status may partly account for the lack of any clear line of demarcation between the so-called "lower-middle" and "upper-lower" status groupings in the city.

(4) *Invasion of the "cosmopolites."* Certain national manufacturers had singled out Vansburg—a source of low-cost labor—as a site for the location of decentralized assembly plants and warehouses. Managerial personnel employed by these concerns and by various state departments and agencies which had located their district offices in Vansburg, the county seat, had taken up residence in the city. Thus, managerial personnel in significant numbers had been recruited into the community. They came principally from outlying metropolitan and other large urban centers. Other persons had also come into the community from larger cities. For example, a wealthy urbanite had purchased the local newspaper and established his residence in town. These people did not accept either the conventional symbols or the conventional norms of status held by the members of the community prior to their arrival.

It is this invasion of the "cosmopolites," together with the lack of community consensus about the ascription of social honor, that commands the major focus of our interest. The "cosmopolites" were oriented in their life style primarily to the sophisticated, blasé, and busy life of the metropolis. Immediately these people joined together and made status claims that called into question the status of the "old families" of the community. Rather than attempting to achieve social honor by emulating the life style of the entrenched "upper classes," the members of this group imposed their own symbols upon the social life of Vansburg and established themselves as a separate status group. They appeared publicly in casual sport clothes, exploited images of "bigness" in their conversations with established local businessmen, retired late, and slept late. With all the aspects of a *coup* they "took over" the clubs and associations of the "old families." The Country Club, for example, has undergone a complete alteration of character. Once the scene of

relatively staid dinners, polite drinking, and occasional dignified balls, the Country Club is now the setting for the "businessman's lunch," intimate drinking, and frequent parties where the former standards of moral propriety are often somewhat relaxed for the evening. Most "old families" have let their memberships in the club lapse. Moreover, in the attempt to consolidate their appropriated status, a group of the "cosmopolite set" has purchased a large section of land just outside the city and reserved it for restricted housing.

The result of this *status contest* has been a cleavage in the status structure of Vansburg which extends from the top of the social order down to what Warner would term the "upper-lower class." The cleavage has been conceptualized by many members of the community as a difference between "drinkers" and "non-drinkers." Frequently, when our interviewers inquired of the residents of Vansburg whether or not there were any different "social classes" in town, replies would be prefaced with reference to the "drinking" and the "non-drinking" groups. It was only after several interviews had been taken that the terms were found to refer to a vertical cleavage in the status arrangement and not to different horizontal strata. The difference between the two opposed groups, it should be added, were age-graded, with the young adult group more likely to dedicate its status allegiances to the "cosmopolites" and the older adult group more likely to extend its fealty to the "old families."

Such a vertical cleavage in the status structure of a community may be viewed as an instance of *unstable* status arrangement which may have structural counterparts in many communities throughout the nation. There were also certain consequences for status arrangement, to be discussed later, which derived from the lack of agreement among the residents of the community about the ascription of social honor to occupational symbols in the middle range. These, together with the vertical cleavage we have described, stand in need of at least preliminary conceptualization.

MODES OF STATUS INSTABILITY

It is not the purpose of this section to present a logically derived typology of structured instabilities in status. Instead, three concrete modes of unstable status arrangement on the level of community organization are considered. It is quite likely that these modes may characterize the relationship of status groupings to one another in many other American communities. Before considering them, it should be observed that, in our view, status arrangements may be said to "range" from amorphous highly unstable aggregation of status groups, related to one another, if at all, by their physical propinquity, to a purely hierarchical stable system of ranked groupings. We choose not to be concerned with either of these limiting cases in this paper. Instead, it is proposed to consider some intermediate common modes of unstable status arrangement.

(1) *Arrangement of status opposition.* The first type of status arrangement is the case in which two or more status groupings are engaged in an indecisive contest for status and consequently exist in a horizontal or oblique relationship to each other rather than in the more frequently observed hierarchical relationship. This type was suggested by the Vansburg study. As we have pointed out, a number of local managers who had been sent to the town by large metropolitan business and government agencies retained their own status symbols and engaged the indigenous high status groups in a contest for status. This situation set the stage for other members of the community to mobilize themselves around alternative sets

of symbols, with the result that their status loyalties were divided between the "old families" and the contesting group of "cosmopolites." The impact of this contest extended downward through the middle status groupings which also became divided in their allegiances. In this case the opposition of status groups occurred at a relatively high level in the community structure and extended downward.

It may well be that such opposition and cleavage also occurs at lower status levels of community organization.

The case of Vansburg affords concrete evidence of the horizontal and oblique opposition of status groups at either extreme of the social order. Whether there is evidence of clearly dichotomized opposition in the middle ranges of status in community organization, however, remains an open question for further research. Yet this possibility may be evident in the opposition of the "new" and "old" middle-classes on the level of the larger society.

Another dimension to this struggle is suggested by the phenomenon of occupational mobility. One of the more potent factors making for the increase in the number and heterogeneity of the American "middle-class" is the relative success of organized labor in the power arena. Among the consequences of this new power definition of labor unions has been the guarantee of status mobility as well as economic gains to its membership. . . . Perhaps the opposition of status arrangements in the middle range does not manifest itself as a clear total opposition of two competing status groups but as a highly atomized series of status contests among diverse social and economic groups vying for social honor. If this is the case, a different model of status relations may result which we have called "vertical polarization." This is a point to which we shall return.

It would seem that the opposition of relatively equivalent status groups in community settings, as described above, may represent a phase of status accommodation to at least two coexisting social forces, *viz.*, immigration from other communities of distinctly different moral characters; and economic instability reflected, for one thing, in the emergence, disappearance, and mobility of occupations. With reference to migration, events referred to here should, ideally, be distinguished from those that accompany the acculturation of ethnic groups. In the latter case, the newly arrived ethnic group is set apart from the status arrangement of the "host" community in the sense that it commands no status allegiance from the native residents. In pure instances of status opposition, the allegiances of the community itself become divided. There is a point, however, at which the influence of ethnicity upon the character of community status arrangements is difficult to isolate. Whether the southern hill-billy may be best regarded as a status or ethnic group is most difficult to decide. . . .

(2) *Arrangement of vertical polarization.* One of the logical and methodological difficulties in locating genuine instances of horizontal opposition among the middle status groups of a community derives from the fact that where such cases are found they verge over into another mode of status arrangement: that of vertical polarization. Vertical polarization of status arrangements in local communities may exist when status groups have been precipitated out at the extremes and have become separated by a somewhat amorphous aggregation of persons or atomized social circles sometimes referred to as the "middle-class." Consensus on the boundaries of status at the extremes of the social order and disagreement upon

the status limits in the middle reaches of that order are not unique to Vansburg.

It is of course the so-called "middle-class" and those who aspire to membership in it, or who identify with it, that have given students of social stratification the greatest difficulty as far as theoretically adequate conceptualization is concerned. Although the life style and social character of the "old" and the "new" middle-class may stand in sharp contrast to each other, yet both are "middle-class"—the nominal bailiwick of the lawyer and the filing clerk, the manager and the machinist, the school teacher and the typist. The "middle-class" represents a veritable medley of social positions certainly not characterized by easily specified shared symbols or by consensually integrated roles, and certainly not by tight social closure. Yet the "middle-class" is symbolically distinguishable by both the laymen and the sociologist, and a source of self-esteem and dignity to many. If it has no other attribute, it serves as a locus of status achievement and contest which makes the extremes more stable and visible.

Whatever the "middle-class" is, it cannot in most American communities be called a status group. It is, rather, a status aggregate. Membership in it is accessible to many within a single generation of effort. Moreover, there is practically no general agreement on the "tests of status" which unambiguously designate a person's identification with it. Instead, an individual may be identified as "middle-class" because he is not something else, or because he is like everybody else, or because he is like "me."

To complicate the problem further, institutions have emerged in relatively large urban centers specifically dedicated to the task of making it possible for individuals to affect membership in the "middle-class" without actually belonging to status groupings which are recognized as such. Thus, in communities large enough to guarantee relative anonymity to their members in the city center, the cocktail lounge offers a stage *par excellence* where the actors may play roles which, in their estimate, connote a higher social status than their family, occupation, or education warrant. Department stores and other service establishments perform a similar function. The "middle-class" may in fact be regarded as a large heterogeneous mass. In this respect, certainly one of the chief functions of fashion in our society is to facilitate among large segments of the population a *subjective* sense of upward mobility which is independent of *objective* mobility.

(3) *Unranked Status Groups.* The arrangements of status opposition and vertical polarization are complicated by the existence of what may be designated as "unranked status groups." Unranked status groups owe their distinctive character to the fact that they are not an integral part of the community status structure, whatever that type happens to be. Yet their presence is vital to explain some of the mechanisms of change which occur in the status structure of the community. The unranked status group is always a group, but is unique because its members have rejected in greater or lesser degree the values, symbols, and norms of the larger social order, supplanting them with values, symbols, and norms of their own. Moreover, there is no consensus on the part of all segments of the community on the status location of such groups. Members of unranked status groups may be recruited from any status level of the community and there remains a vast discrepancy between community evaluation of such groups and their self evaluation. Social types which often identify unranked status groups are intellectuals, artists, revolutionists, Bohemians, and such "isolated" occupational groups as career women, politicians, and others. Such groups abound in the metropolis, and to include

their members in the recognized strata of the larger community (e.g., by placing the intellectual in the "middle-class") is not only to obscure their function in the larger status order but also to neglect an important source of social change.

In this sense unranked status groups are at once in and out of the larger social order, but they need not arise only in response to the *negative* social honor they are accorded in the community. In fact, as Hughes has pointed out, protesting groups may arise in response to any status dilemma—to any situation of crucial marginality where dignity is at stake.

Hence, wherever there is the objective opportunity for incompatibilities in social position, or, subjectively, pervasive moral dilemmas which threaten personal dignity, unranked status groups may be expected to emerge. We may cite, for example, the disparity that often arises between economic *interests* and status *sentiments*. The "enlightened middle-class" college student, becoming imbued with the interests of the working class and noting their irreconcilability with the sentiments of the status grouping from which he originates, will often seek membership in "Bohemian" and arty campus groups. And is not the disparity between his wealth and social status in a sense responsible for the separate social world of the racketeer? Thus, isolation and alienation are other characteristics of the unranked status groups.

These examples are enough to underscore the difficulty involved in detecting and isolating unranked status groups by means of the usual criteria of community deference patterns. At best, the deference received by members of unranked status groups is of a highly segmentalized nature. Thus, *avant-garde* writers are respected by their peculiar audiences which, incidentally, are not included in similar status categories. Such respect is seldom appreciated. For example, the jazz musician is accorded the tireless and for him tiresome respect of his audience. Rather, the crucial criterion for detecting the unranked status group would seem to be the fact that the solidarity and dignity of the membership is independent of the deference paid it by the out-group. In the unranked status group, solidarity and dignity is self-contained and, consequently, the group is characterized by an extremely high degree of social closure.

Closure here is most effectively guaranteed by the monopolization of a body of distinctive symbols. The mechanisms by which this monopoly is assured need at least passing comment. Unlike the case of status groupings in the larger "established" social order, the members of unranked status groups seek out symbols that do not necessarily excite the envy of outsiders. Whereas the status of persons caught up in the conventional "social whirl" is in large part dependent upon their ability to display symbols sufficiently *exoteric* to be understood by large segments of the community, the status of persons in the unranked groups hinges in large part upon their ability to employ symbols sufficiently *esoteric* to be understood only by the members of their own social circle. One guarantee of the esotericism rests in the fact that such symbols have, in the past, failed to "catch on" in the larger society or have largely been discarded by conventional status groupings. This is one way in which the works of obscure poets or musical forms that have "run their course" find their way into the symbolic repertoire of the unranked status group. Another reason that the group adopts such obscure objects arises from the fact that its members place greater stress on the intrinsic value of expressive symbols. When the "masterwork" is too scarce or too expensive for

them to acquire, they may seek out less known, less expensive, but, for themselves, comparably valuable objects. In such a way "taste" is cultivated to a high degree among the members of many unranked status groups. The cultivation of taste acts as another guarantee of symbolic exclusiveness depending upon the ability of members of unranked status groups to maintain an artistic taste somewhat "in advance" of the taste of the larger community.

In a certain sense, this latter guarantee is a stimulus to the creativity so often characteristic of the unranked status group. For the "democratization of taste" continually robs the group of its distinctive symbols. This fact also affords an important insight into the function of many unranked status groups in contemporary society. They provide the symbols which conventional status groupings utilize to maintain their (relatively high) social positions or which competing groups use to wage their status contests. Thus, they are often related to the larger social order by patronage. Moreover, those unranked groups that function to provide others with symbols of social honor are placed in a peculiarly vulnerable position during such periods of great social instability as revolution. Struggling power groupings coerce the artist and enlist his support to symbolize their particular ideologies. Nor is his role to be viewed merely as that of the propaganda technician. It is much more. The artist by representing, for example, an ascendant power group to the society as a whole helps it to secure its newly won position by the embellishments of social honor.

These types do not, of course, exhaust all of the possibilities and are not mutually exclusive. Each may be found to exist with one or both of the others. Probably the status arrangements found in the metropolis will manifest something of every pattern that has been discussed here. . . . This presentation of three modes of status arrangement which have been observed to exist in diverse communities provides a tentative formulation of variations in status arrangements.

CONCLUSIONS

Although Max Weber's theory of social stratification is admittedly fragmentary and incomplete, students of stratification have often proceeded on the assumption that the concept of "status group" adequately and exhaustively apprehends the units of the social order. Status groups are communal in nature, but there appear to be other status groupings in modern urban communities which are not characterized by communality. It is suggested that there are stratification aspects to all types of social categories. Specifically, the term "status aggregate" can facilitate the comprehension of urban status problems. It is proposed that status groupings, especially in the middle ranges of social honor, have a *mass* aspect that must be taken into account in the stratification literature.

One of the reasons for the gaps in status theory may be traced to the theoretical constrictions intrinsic to the concept of stratification. The conception of status groupings as hierarchically arranged limits the application of general sociological theory in this area. This paper proposes that the notion of status, class, and power arrangements be substituted for analogous hierarchical conceptions. Several empirical and hypothetical models of status arrangements have been suggested as an aid for understanding the structure and process of status phenomena in the urban community. These models have been subsumed under the category *instabilities in status*. Consequently, their application in research demands that the investigator attend to the social processes they promote or engender.

The implications of the above theory and research are manifold. Theoretical

models of status arrangements on the community, institutional, and societal levels must be carefully constructed. Empirical research dedicated to explore conditions under which such models are approached must be carefully designed. By analyzing the interplay between the theoretical types and the empirical realities of status arrangement, the investigator will be able to formulate new propositions to explain the processes by which such status arrangements emerge and change.

The study of the social processes inherent in stratification phenomena constitutes at the same time a serious lag and a great opportunity for the development of sociological theory. Such a development must of necessity bring into focus certain aspects of the social structure heretofore considered to be of only tangential relevance for stratification theory. Studies of change within the context of social stratification have usually been limited to the matter of whether class lines have become more or less sharply defined over a given period of time. To pose this question is to obscure more than its answer can possibly reveal, for the significant problem may concern the nature of the "class lines" themselves or the modes of arrangement of stratification groupings. Besides, the structural origins of such changes cannot be adequately discerned by studying such a problem. The necessity of bringing our knowledge of collective behavior to bear on the study of social stratification is patent.

Although this article has limited itself to the study of status arrangements on the community level, its implications have bearing upon other orders of stratification. Certainly sociological theory is circumscribed by hierarchical conceptions of the economic and political orders. The analysis arrangement in these spheres promises even a more fertile field of inquiry. After a preliminary theory of class, status, and power arrangements has been derived which embraces some of the considerations discussed in this paper, the discipline will be ready to attack the major problem of the relationship among stratification arrangements on the community and societal levels.

11

Social Class and Its Consequences

In a few rudimentary societies, people eke out a meager living at the margin of subsistence and bother with only the simplest elements of social organization. In all other societies, people classify each other into groups and categories on some criteria of preference. This process of ranking is called

social stratification, and the groups and categories ranked are referred to as social classes.

A class structure has a number of functions. It provides the channels of distribution for life chances. The position of relative advantage or disadvantage which one occupies in the stratification structure affects the likelihood of one's surviving infancy, being warm in cold weather, being exposed to fine art, attending college, and having access to many other opportunities. These experiences, which are consequences of one's class status, in turn determine one's style of life: attitudes, interests, values, and patterns of behavior, or class subculture.

One of the advantages of relatively high status in American society is the opportunity to be judged in court by one's peers, by people who share in and understand one's class subculture. In "Bias, Probability, and Trial by Jury," W. S. Robinson shows us that people from the lower strata in American society are not judged by a jury of their peers.

For centuries, men have dreamed of a classless society. Eva Rosenfeld reports on a contemporary effort to create a social structure without classes in "Social Stratification in a 'Classless' Society." Note that the variable in such a social experiment is not the existence of classes but the criteria by which people are ranked.

W. S. Robinson

Bias, Probability, and Trial by Jury¹

There has recently been developing in United States Supreme Court decisions a new attitude toward trial by jury, an idea that trial juries and grand juries alike ought to be bodies truly representative of the community, in the sense of being cross-sections or representative samples from the community.

It is the purpose of this paper (I) to trace the development of this concept in Supreme Court opinions from its inception in 1940 to the present, and (II) to point out the social and economic biases in present methods of jury selection which gave rise to the principle of the representative jury and which that principle will wipe out if it is enforced.

I

Trial by jury is guaranteed as a fundamental right by the Constitution of the United States and by the constitution of each state. Since it was first recognized in the Magna Carta, however, the concept of trial by jury has undergone progressive modification. Blackstone was careful to point out that in the English law it was a privilege and not a right. Our Constitution made the privilege into a right for criminal proceedings in United States courts.

Most recent modifications of the idea of jury trial have come about through changes in the notion of what constitutes a proper jury, so that today the idea of trial by jury and the idea of what constitutes a proper jury are inextricably intertwined. The original Constitution provided only that "The trial of all crimes,

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1950, 15:73-78. By permission.

except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury . . ." [Article III, Section 2], and the concept of jury trial was then modified in the Sixth Amendment by defining a proper jury as an impartial one.

A new series of fundamental modifications of the concept of jury trial is now under way in the United States. It began with a decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Smith v. Texas* in November, 1940, and the revolution it is working in the concept of jury trial is being made through modification of the idea of what constitutes a proper jury.

The case of *Smith v. Texas* [311 U.S. 128]² concerns a Texas Negro who was indicted and convicted of rape. The conviction was appealed on the ground that it was based on an indictment which violated that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment which guarantees that "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Smith contended that equal protection had been denied him because in the county in which he was indicted Negroes had intentionally and systematically been excluded from grand jury service solely on account of their race and color. It has long been settled that a conviction based upon an indictment returned by a jury so selected is a denial of equal protection [e.g., *Pierre v. Louisiana*, 306 U.S. 354], and this was not challenged by the state. But both the trial court and the Texas Court of Appeals held that the evidence failed to uphold the charge of racial discrimination.

The opinion of the Supreme Court, written by Justice Black, provided the two essentials for the present modification of the concept of jury trial:

(1) It stated definitively, apparently for the first time, the principle of the representative jury: "It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community." [311 U.S. 130]

(2) It provided a probability basis for assessing the representativeness of the jury. It was established that in Harris County, Texas, where Smith had been indicted and convicted, Negroes constituted over 20 per cent of the population and over 10 per cent of those paying poll taxes. Therefore between 10 and 20 per cent of those eligible for grand jury duty in the county were Negroes. Yet the court clerk testifying from court records covering the years from 1931 through 1938 showed that of 512 persons summoned for grand jury duty only 18 were Negroes, and that of 384 grand jurors actually serving only 5 were Negroes.

The difficulty of the petitioner in trying to establish his case was to prove that the deficit of Negroes in the grand jury was the result of intentional and systematic exclusion, and here the Supreme Court ruled that he need not do so and introduced a basically statistical argument. "Chance and accident alone," it said, "could hardly have brought about the listing for grand jury service of so few Negroes from among the thousands shown by undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifications for jury service. . . . The state argues that the testimony of the commissioners themselves shows that there was no arbitrary or systematic exclusion. And it is true that two of the three commissioners who drew the September, 1938, panel testified to that effect. . . . But even if their testimony were given the greatest possible effect, and their situation considered typical of that of the 94 commissioners who did not testify, we would still feel compelled to reverse the decision below. . . . If there has been discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand." [311 U.S. 131, 132]

² All citations of this form are to *United States Reports*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., the first number referring to the volume and the second to the page.

In other words, a grand jury may be interpreted as a representative sample from a population consisting of persons eligible for grand jury duty, and if the grand jury can be shown to be unrepresentative in a probability sense, then it has been shown to be an improper grand jury. Moreover, so far as qualifications are concerned, the same principles apply to trial jurors and grand jurors alike. Let us apply a test of significance here, to see what probability theory has to say about the representativeness of the 1931-1938 Harris County grand juries. Out of 512 persons summoned for grand jury duty, 18, or 3.5 per cent, were Negroes. If we assume that only 10 per cent of the population eligible for grand jury service was Negro, we find that the chance of getting 18 or fewer Negroes out of 512 persons randomly drawn from the population of eligibles is very much less than .001.

In the case of *Smith v. Texas* the ruling involved racial discrimination and was based upon a very clear constitutional point involving the Fourteenth Amendment. Other Supreme Court opinions, however, continued to apply the principle of the representative jury and further to extend the list of characteristics in terms of which a jury must be representative.

The case of *Glasser v. United States* [315 U.S. 60], January, 1942, provided the next important extensions of the notion of what constitutes a proper jury. Glasser contended that he had been denied an impartial trial because of the exclusion from the petit jury panel of all women not members of the Illinois League of Women Voters. He swore that all the names of women placed in the box from which the panel was drawn were taken from a list given the court by the Illinois League of Women Voters, and prepared exclusively from its membership, and contended that women not members of the League but otherwise qualified were systematically excluded from the panel.

The Supreme Court opinion in the Glasser case, delivered by Justice Murphy, further modified the principle of the representative jury in two ways:

(3) It laid down that selection of jurors should be at large from the community, and not from the membership of particular private organizations or a special group or class. The exercise of the duty of selection "must always accord with the fact that the proper functioning of the jury system requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the community,' and not the organ of any special group or class. . . . The deliberate selection of jurors from the membership of particular private organizations definitely does not conform to the traditional requirements of jury trial." [315 U.S. 85, 86]

(4) It specifically recognized the existence and probable effects of unconscious class bias, something which had of course been known to social scientists for decades but which was revolutionary in legal circles in which bias is defined as conscious bias. "The deliberate selection of jurors from the membership of particular private organizations definitely does not conform to the traditional requirements of jury trial. No matter how high-principled and imbued with a desire to inculcate public virtue such organizations may be, the dangers inherent in such a method of selection are the more real when the members of those organizations, from training or otherwise, acquire a bias in favor of the prosecution. The jury selected from the membership of such an organization is then not only the organ of a special class, but, in addition, it is also openly partisan." [315 U.S. 86]

It was in the Supreme Court opinion in the case of *Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.* [328 U.S. 217], delivered by Justice Murphy in May, 1946, that the most sweeping and obvious extensions of the principle of the representative jury were made. Thiel

brought suit in a California state court against the Southern Pacific Co. for damages for alleged negligence in its treatment of him while a passenger. He requested a jury trial, and then moved to strike the entire jury panel on the grounds that "mostly business executives or those having the employer's viewpoint are purposely selected on said panel, thus giving a majority representation to one class of occupation and discriminating against other occupations and classes, particularly the employees and those in the poorer classes who constitute, by far, the great majority of citizens eligible for jury service. . . ." [328 U.S. 219] The issue was now wide open before the Supreme Court, as to whether the existence of unconscious economic bias was to be recognized by the Court and admitted as grounds for striking an economically unrepresentative jury as improperly constituted.

In the opinion, delivered again by Justice Murphy—

(5) The principle of representativeness was extended specifically to include *economic* representativeness of the jury. "The undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates a failure to abide by the proper rules and principles of jury selection. Both the clerk of the court and the jury commissioner testified that they deliberately and intentionally excluded from the jury lists all persons who work for a daily wage. . . . Wage earners, including those who are paid by the day, constitute a very substantial portion of the community, a portion that cannot be intentionally and systematically excluded in whole or in part without doing violence to the democratic nature of the jury system. Were we to sanction an exclusion of this nature we would encourage whatever desires those responsible for the selection of jury panels may have to discriminate against persons of low economic and social status. We would breathe life into any latent tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of the economically and socially privileged. That we refuse to do." [328 U.S. 221, 223, 224]

(6) The principle of representativeness was extended by a list of "background" or controlling factors with respect to which juries ought to be representative (a list not unlike the list of controlling background factors for a stratified representative sample), and by an implicit reiteration of the probability basis for assessing the representativeness of a jury. "The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury." [328 U.S. 220]

(7) Finally, in the case of *Ballard v. United States*, the representative principle was explicitly extended to include sex as well. In the Supreme Court opinion, delivered by Justice Douglas in December, 1946, the statement runs thus: "The systematic and intentional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a racial group, or an economic or social class, deprives the jury system of the broad base it was designed by Congress to have in our democratic society." [329 U.S. 195]

II

The principle of the representative jury was developed presumably to wipe out an existing evil of economic and social bias operating in grand juries and trial juries throughout the nation. The extent of that evil, however, can be assessed only by determining how much bias juries selected by present methods actually exhibit. The pragmatic importance of the principle of the representative jury, in other words, depends upon the changes which it will introduce if actually put into operation in the selection of jurors and grand jurors. These changes can be assessed only by determining how unrepresentative juries are at present. This paper now provides such an assessment of the economic bias of persons nominated for grand jury service in the United States Criminal Court, Southern District of California, County of Los Angeles, for the years 1935 to 1947 inclusive.

During these 13 years, 1,563 persons were nominated for grand jury duty, though not all of them served. Since those who actually served were chosen by lot from the nominees, however, a consideration of the list of nominees provides a fair indication of the nature of persons chosen for and actually serving as federal grand jurors in this area.

Each person nominated for grand jury duty swears to certain facts concerning himself, and among these facts is his occupation. It is possible, therefore, to get an idea of the economic status of grand jury nominees by classifying them by occupation.

Columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 of Table 1 show the results of classifying by occupation the 1,176 nominees who returned their occupation on the official form which nominees are required to fill out. The occupational groups are those of the 1940 U. S. Census, except that some of the census groups have been combined for convenience. The original forms, filled out and sworn to by the nominees themselves, were used, and the standard census index was used in the assignment of occupations to classes.

Column 1 in Table 1 shows the occupational distribution of persons who were actually employed when nominated. Column 3 classifies housewives by their husbands' occupations, on the assumption that husband's and wife's economic attitudes will tend to be alike and to reflect the husband's occupational level. Column 4 gives the distribution of retired nominees by their last occupation. Column 5 gives the total of Columns 1, 3, and 4.

TABLE 1
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS NOMINATED FOR GRAND JURY DUTY IN THE
UNITED STATES CRIMINAL COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 1935 TO 1947

	Employed (1)	(2)	House- wives (3)	Re- tired (4)	Total (5)	Labor Force (6)	Differ- ence (7)
Professional and semiprofessional workers	203	(104.0)	69	15	287	(129.4)	157.6
Farmers and farm managers	34	(8.8)	2	—	36	(11.0)	25.0
Proprietors, managers, and officials	495	(113.3)	84	28	607	(141.0)	466.0
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	181	(225.0)	23	2	206	(279.9)	— 73.9
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	24	(134.3)	2	—	26	(167.2)	—141.2
Operatives, and kindred workers	1	(158.9)	1	—	2	(197.7)	—195.7
Domestic and protective service workers	3	(39.7)	1	4	8	(49.5)	— 41.5
Other service workers	4	(98.4)	—	—	4	(122.4)	—118.4
Laborers, farm and other	—	(62.6)	—	—	—	(77.9)	— 77.9
Total	945	(945.0)	182	49	1176	(1176.0)	

We now need an indication of the occupational distribution of all persons who were at this time eligible for federal grand jury duty in the County of Los Angeles. Under California law a juror to be competent must be a citizen of the United States over the age of 21, a resident of the state and county for one year preceding nomination, possessed of his natural faculties, of ordinary intelligence and not decrepit, and possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language. [California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 198] We have no occupational distribution for a group so precisely defined, but we do have in the 1940 Census an occupational distribution for a group closely approximating the desired one and eminently a cross-section of the community, viz., those persons in the labor force who were over 21 years of age.

Column 2 in Table 1 shows what the occupational distribution of the 945 employed grand jury nominees would have been had their occupational distribution been that of persons over 21 years old in the labor force. Column 6 shows a similar distribution, but based on all 1,176 nominees for which occupational data were available. Column 7 shows the discrepancy between Columns 5 and 6.

Let us now apply the probability basis for assessing the representativeness of these grand jury nominees which the Supreme Court itself inaugurated in the case of *Smith v. Texas*. Column 5 in Table 1 shows the actual distribution of 1935-1947 grand jury nominees by occupation, while Column 6 shows the distribution which would have resulted had the nominees represented a true cross-section of the community. We have a column of actual numbers and another column of expected numbers, to which we can apply the chi-square test of goodness of fit. In comparing Columns 5 and 6 we find $\chi^2 = 2349.4$ for eight degrees of freedom, which indicates that the probability that the actual distribution was got as a sample from the community at large is exceedingly remote. The .001 point for χ^2 for eight degrees of freedom is but 26.125. If the reader objects to the classification of housewives by their husbands' occupations, he can make a similar test based only upon the column for employed nominees in Table 1, and he will find in this case that $\chi^2 = 1889.6$, again for eight degrees of freedom.

A comparison of Columns 5 and 6 in Table 1 reveals the economic bias in the occupational distribution of these federal grand jury nominees. There are 287 professional and semiprofessional workers, an excess of 158 over the number which should have been nominated on the principle of the representative jury. The excess is even more marked for proprietors, managers, and officials, the actual number being 607, over four times as great as the representative number of 141.

Deficits on the lower economic levels are just as pronounced as excesses in the higher. Only 26 craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers were nominated in 13 years, whereas 167 should have been. Only two operatives were nominated in the 13 years, whereas nearly 200 should have been. An even dozen service workers were nominated, whereas for representativeness 172 should have appeared in the list, and not a single laborer, farm or otherwise, appears in the list at all.

It needs to be pointed out that the bias shown by Table 1 is a bias in the selection of persons who *might* serve on the grand jury. Not all persons nominated actually serve; for some are excused and some are not needed. But no one not nominated *can* serve, and therefore Table 1 shows without the slightest doubt that the lower occupational and economic classes are systematically and with remarkable efficiency excluded from the federal grand jury in this court.

In view of the well-known correlations between socio-economic status and political and economic attitudes, there is a strong presumption that the occupational bias shown in Table 1 resulted in political and economic bias as well. For the sake of

illustration, however, let us investigate with the meager material available the probable distribution of labor *v.* management attitudes in the list of grand jury nominees, and contrast it with the probable distribution in the list of nominees which would have resulted from the principle of the representative jury.

In January, 1946, the Fortune Poll gave a distribution of answers to the following question, based on a nationwide sample: "Suppose you had been acting as a referee in labor-management disputes during the past three months, do you think your decisions would probably have been more often in favor of labor's side, or more often in favor of management's side?" The distribution of answers was as follows:³

	Total	Executives	Farmers	Workers
Favor labor	25.7%	18.2%	24.3%	38.9%
Favor management	44.7%	62.2%	50.2%	30.8%
Don't know	29.6%	19.6%	25.5%	30.3%

We see from these answers that the proportion of workers who would have favored labor is over twice as large as the proportion of executives who would have done so. Conversely, the proportion of executives who would have favored management is over twice the proportion of workers who would have done so.

To get a more precise idea of the extent of the bias shown by Table 1, let us apply the percentages given by the Fortune Poll to the actual and the representative distributions of Table 1. Let us assume that by executives Roper means proprietors, managers, and officials, and let us for the sake of argument even assume that professional and semiprofessional workers are to be classed with Roper's "workers." If the actual list of nominees then reflected national sentiment as of January, 1946, there would be among the 1,176 nominees 327 who would have favored labor and 560 who would have favored management, or a ratio of 5 to 3 in favor of management. Had the nominees been chosen on the principle of the representative jury, however, they would have exhibited a slight pro-labor majority, for there would have been among them 427 persons who would have favored labor and 409 who would have favored management. This bias, moreover, has not operated in a vacuum, for this group of nominees voted indictments in scores of cases involving a labor *v.* management issue.

³ Reported in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, X, 121, Spring, 1946.

Eva Rosenfeld

Social Stratification in a "Classless" Society¹

Before proceeding to the analysis of social stratification in the Israeli collectives, some general information is in order. The first collective (or "Kibutz") was established in 1910. At present, over thirty thousand adult members and another thirty thousand children, old parents and transient groups live in more than two hundred collective agricultural settlements; this comprises about six per cent of the settled Jewish population in Israel and over one-third of its settled rural population. The collectives average about 200 members . . . ; there are several large ones with more than 1,500 population. With the exception of a dozen or so religious collectives, all the rest belong to either one of the three large federations of collectives and

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1951, 16:766-774. By permission.

through them to the socialist and anti-clerical General Federation of Trade Unions (the Histadrut).

With one exception, all collectives are based on farming but, increasingly, industrial branches are being developed. All property, not only the means of production, belongs to the commune, and members who leave have no claim on any part of it. There is no exchange market nor labor market within the collectives, although there is business as usual with the outside world. Members are assigned to work by an elected Work Committee. All administrative officers and branch managers are elected—by the General Meeting or by the workers in the given branch, respectively—for a period of one to two years and, although their nomination may be extended several times, there is a principle of turnover in managerial positions and of rotation of disliked tasks. The manager of the communal factory may be—and is—assigned to kitchen duty in slack season or on holidays.

Furthermore, the members' position in the administrative hierarchy is not related to their life chances for material gratifications: the basic norm is "from everyone according to ability—to everyone according to need." In principle, and in practice as well, it may happen that the manager of an important branch of the collective enterprise lives in a smaller room, has more primitive furniture, worse clothes, and eats less well than some of the unskilled workers who happen to be sickly and need special food and housing. All commodities are distributed centrally and in kind; food is eaten in the communal dining hall. Children are brought up, from birth, in communal children's homes.

Political institutions are democratic and equalitarian. All decisions of general interest are taken by a simple majority vote in the General Meeting, every member having one vote. Minor decisions are made by the Management Committee and other special committees elected by all members for one-year terms.

Thus, the social structure of the kibutz prevents the emergence of economic differentiation. Yet, differential social status exists in the kibutz society. Members with high and low status regard each other with a set of stereotype attitudes, and in their relations the awareness of being a distinct social type is clearly expressed. The high and low strata play distinct roles in the process of institutional change and the difference in their Weltanschauungs is well known.

Several questions demand answering:

1. How did the distinct strata emerge out of the equalitarian group of early settlers?
2. What are the criteria for locating members in one of the strata?
3. What are the characteristics of each stratum?
4. What are the relations between them and their attitudes to each other?
5. What special roles do they play in the process of institutional change?
6. What self-perpetuating processes can be observed?

To simplify matters, the following analysis is limited to first-generation full members; transient and marginal groups are excluded; the special problems of the position of the woman in the collective will also be omitted.

As to methodology, the uniformities reported in this paper were first discovered through participant observation in three of the oldest collectives over a period of a year and a half. These uniformities were subsequently checked by (1) short visits to a selected group of the oldest communes with a systematic observation and interview guide; (2) intensive interviews with the leaders of the two important factions in the current struggle for institutional change: the "conservatives" and the

"innovators"; and (3) participation in nationwide meetings of the collective movement, called to discuss the pressure for change in the institutional structure.

The Emergence of Social Strata. Managerial positions of vital importance to the group are quite naturally entrusted to those members whom the group deems most capable and trustworthy. Yet, the association of a high status rank with managerial positions was not a simple process. . . . In fact, it would seem that in the Israeli collectives this order of priority was reversed: managerial positions gained high prestige because of the initially high prestige of the persons who became elected to fill them.

Two structural characteristics of the kibbutz society must be kept in mind: the glorification of manual "productive" work and the fierce insistence on complete equality, which made all authority unacceptable. The glorification of manual labor grew out of the general scarcity of workers and farmers among the immigrant Jews and their strategic importance in the task of building the nation anew in the deserted land. Since there was a surplus of intellectuals and white-collar workers among the Jews, the "clean" and "brainy" type of work was looked down on and the manual worker became the hero of the day. Such attitudes, particularly strong in the early years of settlement, imbued managerial tasks with deep ambiguity. On the one hand the group itself insisted on a turnover in all managerial and administrative positions—even though efficiency might suffer. On the other hand, the members elected to managerial positions felt impelled to insist on going back to "real work" after the end of their first term—even though they might have enjoyed their task. But in this secular society the pressure of the need for efficiency in time won over the cultural considerations.

In a new settlement there is much movement from bottom to top; new branches are being opened, skill and initiative are at a premium and the small group quickly recognizes ability and good judgment. While, at the outset, there is usually only one skilled worker in every branch and he is naturally put in charge of the less skilled, years of work and experience often produce several self-taught capable workers in every branch. Then a system of turnover of managers may be adopted for some years. But again, as years pass, one worker usually becomes recognized as the best among the good workers and the tendency then is to re-elect him as manager for many years. Such men are usually successful in several fields. The collectives, as any pioneering society, suffer from a lack rather than abundance of men and women with talent, initiative and integrity: their scarcity puts them at a premium and gains them general recognition and high esteem. Thus there emerges a group of members whose personal status is so high that their re-election to important managerial positions is a matter of course, the benefit to the group in making best use of them being obvious to all. In the early years of settlement in Palestine, the formalities were observed more than now: managers would insist upon returning to "real, productive work" after a term in the office; but these periods of "productive work" grew shorter and shorter and the principle of turnover nowadays means, in reality, turnover within a given range of managerial positions. Simultaneously, the exigencies of managing a big enterprise and the scarcity of good managers made for a general shift in valuation from manual to "brainy" work.

In time, these correlates of personal attribute—managerial positions—became fixed in the popular mind and are used, instead of the original criterion of status, to denote the high standing of these members in the community. The substitution of status criteria became complete with the arrival of newcomers to the kibbutz, who are faced with the existence of an already stable group of highly respected leaders—

managers whose personal background and attributes are hidden by time and social distance. However, within the core of oldtimers, personal attributes remain the true criterion of the esteem they bestow.

As the community grows older and the original group of pioneers becomes ever smaller in the influx of newcomers, seniority also becomes a source of prestige. The oldtimers ("vatikim") are the aristocracy of the kibutz. They are accorded a certain amount of esteem for the attribute of seniority alone. One might call this "the charisma of the pioneering personality." And since, in most cases, the leaders, managers, and "responsible workers" are recruited from among the oldtimers (newcomers are not as generously appraised as the oldtimers and they are not given as much opportunity for showing their best abilities) the attribute of seniority comes to denote not only a personal distinction of idealism and pioneering spirit, but also the correlate: the managerial position; and the managerial positions gain in prestige through the charisma of the oldtimers who hold them.

Locating Members in One of the Social Strata. The objective attributes of status are used explicitly whenever a kibutz member is asked to describe or give information about some other member. The highest rank attribute is mentioned first; other, additional and qualifying attributes may then follow.

The highest rank is associated with a designation of "an important personality" (Yish hashoov) which, on closer questioning reveals, one of the top leaders in the kibutz movement or a person highly skilled and specializing in some activity of general importance in the kibutz movement. A qualification: "an important personality in his kibutz," means a local leader or branch manager who is credited for contributing to the success of the communal enterprise or to the high morale of the community. All "important personalities" are oldtimers and no mention of seniority is made, unless the member is one of the very first pioneers, the father of the kibutz movement. The "important personalities" are the living myths of the collective ideology—they exemplify the devotion, the faith, the accomplishment which show that the system really "works."

Second in rank is simple, "one of the first members" (ahad mihavatikim); this attribute is then followed by a designation of the special work the oldtimer is doing. In many cases, the oldtimers have a managerial position in one of the branches of the farm or specialize in some administrative tasks. If the work position is not managerial, the special branch in which the oldtimer works as a steady and "responsible" worker is stressed: "He is one of the *chief* field workers," or "She is one of the *oldest* workers in the poultry yard" or, "She is the *head* nurse of infants."

If a member is not an oldtimer and yet not a recent arrival, the length of his stay in the community is not mentioned, only his position at work. Here, again, we find members in managerial and administrative positions who have successfully merged with the oldtimers; members who are simply "good, reliable workers" in a specific branch; and members who simply "work" in a given branch.

"Just an unskilled, moveable worker" (stam pkak) is the lowest designation. In this category one finds newcomers who are still unknown in the community and those of the older members who are not considered responsible or who are sickly, lazy, unpleasant to work with and shunned by all work groups—and who are, therefore, assigned every day to various menial jobs in whatever branch the need may be—usually the vegetable garden, orchards, services and factory (if there is any).

The concept of rank is thus based on objectively defined attributes of seniority and managerial position in work or administration. The informal leaders of the kibutz movement and within the collectives are always members who belong to this

upper stratum of oldtimers-managers. The rank and file (*amho*) are composed of the middle stratum of "responsible workers" (both oldtimers and middlecomers) and of the lowest stratum of "*pkaks*."

Within the rank and file, the ratio of steady to moveable workers varies greatly from one community to another and, within every collective, over the span of time. But the significant distinction in terms of differential life attitudes, opinions and social role played in the process of change, obtains between the upper, managerial stratum on the one hand, and the whole rank and file on the other. The numerical ratio of the lower to the middle substrata affects the relations between the upper stratum and the rank and file (see section on relations between the two strata).

The Characteristics of the Two Social Strata. Two special life conditions characterize the upper stratum of leaders-managers; one is the immunity from frustrating and humiliating experiences in dealing with the central distributive and administrative kibutz institutions, and the second is the greater life chance for emotional gratifications derived from the special, ego-expanding experiences associated with their position of seniority, responsibility and leadership. These two special life conditions revolve around important areas of communal life.

One of the serious problems in collective life is the dependency of the individual, in the satisfaction of his material needs, upon the elected officers who are supposed to distribute commodities centrally, in kind and according to a general (and rather vaguely defined) concept of "need." For several reasons (into which it would be impossible to enter here) the relations between the members and their distributive officers very often place the members in humiliating and frustrating situations. The kibutz "aristocracy" is spontaneously treated with more respect and deference and, therefore, very unlikely to encounter these humiliating situations. Furthermore, a sense of one's importance in the affairs of the community and the feeling of security it generates, make their behavior in dealing with the distributive officers more poised and self-confident and this, in turn, affects the attitude of the officers so that it is very unlikely that they will release against the upper stratum members whatever irritation or hostility they may feel.

Another serious problem in the kibutz is generated by the fact that the individual does not see directly the results of his work-effort. His energy is pooled together with that of others in the communal enterprise and the fruits of his labor are pooled with those of the others; so is the recognition. The sense of personal creation and an opportunity to realize one's sense of workmanship as well as the claim to the group's recognition for one's efforts, all these are lost to most members among the rank and file. Seemingly, in the kibutz, this loss is serious; especially is the recognition by the group important to the individual.

A woman working in the kibutz dairy complained to me one day that her supervisor snapped at her "What did you do today, anyway?" and she felt very hurt and upset. I asked her, why should such a thing bother her; after all she is an experienced, responsible worker and if her conscience is at rest, she should not mind the supervisor's remarks. She answered: "Outside, you get your money for your work and that is the main thing and the work relation ends there. Here you get no reward at all. Look at me, after 13 years of hard work in the dairy, what have I got? But we work, because we know that is the right thing to do. The only thing we want is '*yahas*'—recognition."

The managers of the branches, who identify themselves with the branch and direct its policy, see the harvest as the product of their own labor. The administrative officers and the oldtimers in general, who direct the policy of the whole com-

munity, see the communal enterprise as a whole, can grasp it as a whole and identify with it; they watch the growth and development of the farm and village with pride and interest and receive therefrom emotional gratifications. Since seniority is so highly correlated with managerial and leadership positions, many members of the upper stratum have several sources of opportunities for ego-expanding experiences, while some of the rank and file have none. Furthermore, managers and administrators often have a chance to leave the settlement and go to town on some errand; they enjoy a degree of freedom of movement and the pleasure of some petty cash which they can spend to see a show or go to a cafe—pleasures which the rank and file are deprived of. On errands in town, the managers again experience the ego-expanding gratifications, as they represent their whole community in the dealings with banks, merchants, and government agencies.

These special life conditions tend to create a special "managerial Weltanschauung" among the upper stratum. They experience less of the strain and dependency and more of the pleasures of collective living. "What is all this talk of 'dependency' I hear?" exclaimed one of the top leaders. "Why, we in the kibutz are the only people who are truly free: free from the worry and anxiety of competitive existence. I feel more free than all your Rockefellers. I do what I *really* want!"

The rank and file, on the other hand, see collective life from the disadvantageous point of daily routine, difficult and subordinate work, tensions, and conflicts in many institutional relations.

The importance of emotional gratifications in the kibutz society can not be overstressed. The kibutz ideology is that of avant-guard pioneering, and the motivation is essentially that of self-denial. Material rewards for individual effort are non-existent. The whole motivational system is based on the assumption that the members derive emotional gratifications in the course of communal life. This assumption is in turn based on the existence of identification of the members with their work, the village, the group, the communal future. If the society does not provide any basis for identification, or if the members are not prepared to identify with the community, no emotional gratifications are forthcoming and the whole motivational system collapses.

Relations between the Managerial Stratum and the Rank and File. Social relations among all members are completely informal. Among the older members no overt signs of deference exist. A certain degree of social distance is, however, introduced by newcomers through their spontaneously deferential attitude towards the managerial stratum. One may observe a newcomer stepping aside to let the "big leader" pass through the door; in addressing the "important personalities" the newcomers speak more politely and quietly than with other newcomers. This deferential attitude on their part springs from the fact that they actually are strangers to the oldtimers and are incapable of ever achieving the degree of familiarity obtaining among the oldtimers; their deferential attitude towards the managers is brought from the outside world. The newcomer is faced with a fixed correlate of personal status—managerial position—and he often does not sense the initial criterion of status—personal attributes—which, historically and logically, stands behind these occupational correlates. This attitude of restraint and deference on the part of the newcomers tends to increase the gulf between the upper stratum and the rank and file and interferes with the proper functioning of communication and with mutual understanding of each stratum's viewpoints and problems.

In a summer rest-home maintained by the kibutz, a girl newcomer became

friendly with one of the oldtimers. "How I enjoy being able to talk with you," she exclaimed once. "Back home, I would never dare to speak to you—you always seemed so formidable and distant." The oldtimer was bewildered at her feeling of distance. He felt that he was always open to approach by anyone in the kibutz.

In reality the two strata regard each other with a set of stereotype attitudes. The manager-leaders are respected for their contribution to the communal enterprise as leaders, organizers, managers of farm and shops, but they are not loved. (On the part of some insufficiently motivated newcomers, the respect is not even genuine.) The special character of their life conditions is recognized and they are privately—and sometimes publicly—accused of not really knowing "what kibutz life tastes like." "These people don't lead our lives," say the rank and file. The managers and leaders, on the other hand, feel slightly contemptuous of and discouraged with the rank and file for their inadequate enthusiasm, their lack of interest and participation in group life, their demands for a higher standard of living and less self-denial. It seems clear that the managers-leaders do not grasp the difference in the life conditions of the rank and file and the impact it must make on their image of and attitude toward the collective society. An incident in which the author participated will illustrate the nature of the differences between the two strata and the relations between them:

I was chatting with an oldtimer in the tiny switchboard-post office-armory room where his job was to answer telephone calls and take care of the mail. "Tell me," he said, "you've been around long enough to know what the score is. You know what is bad in our system and I know it too, so let's not talk about that. But tell me, what, in your mind, are the good things in kibutz life?" I started hesitantly but then warmed up and talked about the deep emotional gratifications many people seem to receive from identifying themselves with a big, expanding, to them meaningful enterprise. As I talked, the manager of the local factory stuck his head through the window and listened. His face warmed up with a smile and when I finished he exclaimed: "Let me shake your hand! It is all true, very true, what you have just said!" But the first man flared up: "Oh, that's him again," he cried, dismissing the other with an impatient gesture (though not an unfriendly one; they were both oldtimers). "I know your song—and it is not the whole song, my friend. True, people in central positions, who can influence life around them, do feel all that. But most of the people do the dirty work and they feel nothing of the sort. To the contrary, they ask themselves: 'What the hell am I breaking my neck for? What do I get out of this?'"

The Distinctive Roles of the Two Strata in the Dynamics of Institutional Change. The managerial stratum, strongly identified with the communal enterprise and immune from many tensions, acts as a whip for inducing greater effort in work and maintaining the austerity in consumption. The rank and file, on the other hand, press for the elimination of the discomfort and dependency inherent in some of the institutional structures, and for a higher standard of living. The pressure of the rank and file towards readjustments in the institutional structure is strongly opposed by the leadership, who use several means in their effort to restrain the "innovators." Among the means used by them is, first, intimidation through ridicule at General Meetings; secondly, administrative obstacles put in the way of an initiator who insists on placing an issue on the agenda for a public discussion or wants to publish an article in the kibutz newspaper or periodical (secretaries and editors are members of the "upper" stratum); thirdly, the invitation of top leaders—men who have a charismatic appeal and are experienced "whipper-uppers" for a pep talk; more

generally, a systematic attempt is being made at strengthening the ideological motivation through special seminars, literature, lectures, etc.

The different roles played by the two strata are clearly visible at the General Meetings where leaders and managers call for every greater effort and self-sacrifice and the rank and file resist more or less passively. During the informal gathering which always follows after the official meeting is closed, the resentment of the rank and file members is openly voiced; the leader-stratum is labelled "fanatics," "saints" and "conservatives." The only means used by the rank and file are passive resistance in the form of general apathy, loss of interest and refusal to participate in meetings, committee work and other communal activities. It is only when the passive resistance of the rank and file seriously threatens group morale that the leaders reluctantly give in to the pressure from below. Even then, the central secretariat of the kibutz federation may exert its constraining pressure and threaten the "deviating" settlement with expulsion. The innovations are felt to be a retreat from the pure collective system and are feared eventually to lead to a destruction of the very foundations on which this system rests.

Thus the differences in life conditions and the resulting differences in each stratum's image of and attitude toward the collective society create two types of vested interests with regard to the question of institutional change: those more directly exposed to the dysfunctional consequences of the collective system have a stake in the pressure for change, while those experiencing more directly the functional aspects and less exposed to the tensions and strain fight to preserve the system in its entirety; they identify themselves with and act as the guardians of the system as a whole and of the status quo. Thus in these times of "sturm und drang" the leadership is not best qualified to lead in the search for solutions—its function is mainly conservative.

The question arises as to the *self-perpetuating forces in the existing social stratification*. It is too early yet to make definite statements in this respect. The oldest of the sons and daughters of the first generation are still in their twenties and all of them are children of the early pioneers—the kibutz aristocracy. Few have become active in communal affairs. Two tendencies may, however, be observed: (1) to sons and daughters of the top leaders and managers their parents' intelligence and abilities (and often also personal integrity and a very high standard of values) are often transmitted, whether through heredity or through personal contact and influence. Since special training and higher education are offered by the community on the basis of intellectual promise, special ability and loyalty to kibutz values, these sons and daughters of the upper stratum have a better chance to be given additional training and to be placed in positions of trust and responsibility. In some cases two and three children of an "important personality" show great promise and special talent, and all are given special educational opportunities. (2) In addition, some of the "halo effect" of the parents does fall on their children. The sons and daughters of "big shots" in the kibutz movement are regarded as the aristocracy among the growing crop of second-generation youths. There is a vague aura of prestige clinging to the "big name." They are very desirable as marriage partners and a marriage of children of "big shots" is a popular event in the kibutz society, while marriages of others pass unnoticed. Still, the community applies the initial criteria of status—intelligence, ability, devotion to collective values and good work performance—to the second-generation members, just as it originally did in the small group of pioneers with respect to each other.

Conclusions. The very special type of social stratification in the Israeli col-

lectives is distinguished by the following features which may now be related to the several theoretical questions raised at the beginning of this paper:

1. A distinct relation between the prestige of personality attributes and the prestige of social position. Scarcity puts a premium on capable and trustworthy members with initiative and leadership ability. Functional necessity forces the group to keep these highly valuable and esteemed members within a narrow range of important, managerial positions. Prestige becomes associated with these positions which are, then, used as an index of high social status.

2. A divorce between material and non-material rewards. High status positions do not bring economic rewards. Members in managerial positions enjoy extensive (long range) emotional rewards (some due to their personalities; particularly an ability to identify with larger entities and with the future of the group; and some due to the tasks they perform) and these rewards make them more satisfied with their lot than the rank and file. The latter, deprived of these emotional gratifications, demand immediate (short range) material gratifications and reduction in institutional strain.

3. A conflict of interests obtains with regard to institutional change, which is not related to economic exploitation or inequality, but to what might be termed "spiritual exploitation" or an unequal distribution of seemingly crucial, emotional gratifications. The managerial stratum upholds the collective ideology and the status quo. Their special life conditions and resulting managerial Weltanschauung interfere with effective communication between the strata; they are accused of not knowing what collective life "really" is. Their efforts at grappling with the growing demands of the rank and file take the form of "ideological education" which, they hope, will increase the people's emotional gratifications.

These features of social gratification in the kibutz explain the seeming paradox of "class struggle" in a "classless" society.

12

Minorities in the Stratification System

Every society has a category of people who are able to enforce the norms which they prefer. In some societies, all the people are in this dominant category. In other societies, there are categories of people who look different from and act differently than the people who are dominant. The members of such categories are unable to enforce their norms when those norms conflict with

the ways of the dominant culture. Because they are different, they are excluded from full participation in the culture.

Such people who are accorded differential treatment (or discriminated against) because they are believed to be inherently different from the dominant people are called a minority. They need not be a numerical minority; the point is that they are on the short end of the power distribution. Minorities, in other words, are specifically defined cases of unprivileged categories in the stratification structure.

Not only dominant people but minority people as well expect certain behaviors from members of minorities. Because of the tendency for people to see what they expect to see, minority people are particularly noticeable when they are displaying undesirable traits which dominant people expect from them. William M. Kephart's "Negro Visibility" details a case of such perception.

Minority status sometimes impedes the development of leadership and can deter minority members from organizing to improve their position. Leonard Broom's "The Social Differentiation of Jamaica" is a general description of a stratification system. It is interesting to compare and contrast a structure which is in some ways similar to our own, but which employs some different categories and badges of rank.

William M. Kephart

Negro Visibility¹

In the Fall of 1952 a research project dealing with racial factors and law enforcement was begun under the auspices of the Greenfield Center for Human Relations, University of Pennsylvania. An attempt was made to discover the extent to which Negroes were being integrated into urban police forces, and to this end employment data were collected from our 20 largest cities. Another phase of the project dealt with an investigation of the relationship between race of offender and race of arresting officer. Still another area involved assignment policies and efficiency patterns as they pertained to the interrelation of Negro and white police; for example, the extent to which Negroes and whites were being assigned as partners to the same patrol car and the interaction between white patrolmen and Negro commanders. The latter two phases were conducted in the City of Philadelphia and entailed the gathering of district arrest figures by race, as well as an extensive interviewing program with police commanders, Negro policemen, Negro community leaders, and editors of the Negro press. In addition a printed questionnaire was distributed to the 2,101 white policemen assigned to district (Precinct) duty; that is, those engaged in foot-beat or patrol car work. The present paper deals with some of the inter-item analyses of this questionnaire, and while space precludes the publication of the latter in its entirety some indication of its content is necessary.

The questionnaire was designed primarily to reveal something of the opinions held by white policemen regarding their occupational relationships with Negro

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1954, 19:462-467. By permission.

policemen. Questionnaire items (in addition to the usual background factors) included single-answer, multiple-choice, and open-end questions, and were constructed largely on the basis of a preliminary series of interviews with both Negro and white policemen of all ranks. Included in the questionnaire were items inquiring whether the respondent objected to riding in a patrol car with a Negro partner, whether there was any objection to taking orders from Negro sergeants or captains, whether the respondent was satisfied with his present duty assignment, whether he would prefer to work in a white, Negro, or mixed neighborhood, whether he believed a white community objects to having a Negro policeman assigned to that area, whether he felt that Negro policemen should be assigned to Negro neighborhoods, and the like.

Preliminary interviews had disclosed a wide variation in response when the subject of Negro numbers was raised. Consequently two such items (non-contiguous) were included in the questionnaire: (a) About what percentage of arrests in your district involve Negro law violators? (b) About how many Negroes do you think there are on the police force? The inclusion of these two "visibility items" resulted in some rather pointed findings, and these in turn led to the formulation and testing of certain hypotheses relating to the perception or visibility of Negroes. For our purposes, visibility is defined as the extent to which Negroes are numerically overestimated, and in this sense will comprise the content-emphases of the present paper.

The Philadelphia phase of the project was undertaken with the approval of the Commissioner of Police. Questionnaire distribution was carried out with the cooperation of the division inspectors and the help of the district captains. Of the 2,101 questionnaires given out to Philadelphia policemen, 1,081 (51.5%) were returned.

ACTUAL NEGRO ARRESTS

Examination of city-wide arrest figures indicated that some police districts show a high rate of Negro arrests and others a low rate.² It was decided, therefore, to test the relationship between the actual Negro arrest rate in a district and certain racial opinions held by the white policemen assigned to that district. Theoretically, of course, it is quite possible that white policemen assigned to a district with a high rate of Negro arrests would be more likely to resent working in a Negro area, riding with a Negro partner, taking orders from a Negro sergeant or captain, etc., than those policemen who are assigned to a district with a low Negro arrest rate. The districts were also arranged in rank order based on their *percentage of positive responses* to relevant items on the questionnaire; e.g., the district with the largest percentage of respondents who signified that they objected to riding with a Negro policeman was placed on top, the district with the smallest percentage at the bottom, and so on. A rank-order correlation (ρ) was then computed for each of the relevant questionnaire items.

Arbitrarily selecting correlations of .60 and higher as having some significance, the following profile emerges: The higher the Negro arrest rate in a district the more the white policemen in that district would "like another type of assignment, such as Traffic, Highway, Detectives, etc." (.60); the more they "believe a Negro policeman should be assigned to a Negro neighborhood" (.71); and the less they "would prefer not to have any Negroes assigned" to their district (— .67).

While the rate of Negro arrests in a given district seems to relate to some of the responses of the white policemen assigned to that district—apparently those relating

² "Negro arrest rate" refers throughout to the number of Negro arrests per 100 total arrests.

to the matter of assignment—for the most part the correlations with questionnaire items are of a low order (21 out of 26 below .50). The opinions of white patrolmen on most of the itemized racial topics appear to be associated only slightly with the Negro arrest factor.

ESTIMATED NEGRO ARRESTS

In terms of the visibility factor the relationship to be tested is that between racial opinions of white policemen and their *estimate* of Negro arrest rates, rather than the *actual* arrest figures. Inspection of the data indicated, however, that before turning to the relationship between the racial opinions of white policemen and their estimation of Negro arrests, it would be advisable to analyze (a) the general accuracy of the estimates, and (b) the variation in estimates among the several districts.

ACCURACY OF THE ESTIMATES

As has been mentioned, the information pertaining to estimated Negro arrests was derived from the question, "About what percentage of arrests in your district involve Negro law violators?" Since the actual percentages had been obtained from Police Headquarters it was possible to compare the respondent's estimate for his district with the actual district figure. The results are as follows ($N = 915$):³

Overestimated the percentage of Negro arrests	75.0 per cent
Estimated correctly or underestimated	11.2 per cent
No opinion	13.8 per cent

If the "No opinion" category is excluded, the results are:

Overestimated	86.9 per cent
Correct or under	13.1 per cent

It is clear that most of the white policemen tend to believe the percentage of Negro arrests in their own districts is higher than it actually is; as a matter of fact, they overestimate to a considerable degree, as the following figures indicate:

District	Actual Percentage of Negro Arrests	Median Estimated Percentage of Negro Arrests
A	66.4	90
B	65.1	90
C	39.9	85
D	31.1	75
E	23.8	60
F	26.6	53
G	57.9	85
H	22.2	50
I	70.1	95
J	11.9	10
K	9.2	10
L	51.9	85
M	26.8	53
N	61.9	85
O	65.3	85
P	27.9	60
Q	14.8	20
R	31.7	30

³ Although the returned questionnaires numbered 1,081, which figure comprised the working N for the bulk of the statistical computations, one divisional clerk failed to separate the returns for the districts in his division. The 166 questionnaires collected from that division could not be used in the tabulations pertaining to district percentages, hence the N of 915 used in this set of data.

DISTRICT VARIATION

While 86.9 per cent of these respondents overestimated the percentage of Negro arrest, and although this overestimation was manifest in all but two of the districts, the . . . table reveals that the degree of overestimation varies a good deal from district to district. In an attempt to account for the district variation, inspection of the individual district estimates led to the following hypothesis: *The higher the actual Negro arrest rate in a district, the greater the overestimation of that rate. . . .*

It must be realized that districts with a high Negro arrest rate have a potentially smaller margin for overestimation as compared to districts with a relatively low rate of Negro arrests. . . .

The fact that this hypothesis is supported by the data may have implications beyond the bounds of the present study. While it is hazardous to generalize on the basis of specialized groups (white policemen and Negro offenders) it is possible that the same progressive or possibly geometric form of increase in visibility would apply to more general groups (Negro-white ratios in schools, factories, or even cities). It may be that *as Negro numbers increase arithmetically, their visibility—perhaps up to a certain point—increases exponentially*. From our own data, plotted by a variety of graphical methods, it is not possible to demonstrate what this point is or whether, in fact, visibility is exponential. Nevertheless, a general hypothesis of this type, empirically tested within broader social or ecological groupings, might provide a contributory link in a generic theory of inter-group tensions.

ESTIMATES OF NEGRO POLICEMEN

The second facet of visibility explored in the present study is that relating to estimated numbers of Negro *policemen*. Unlike the percentage of Negro arrests, the proportion of Negro policemen assigned to the various districts showed little variation. One reason for this was the small number of Negroes on the force. According to personnel lists supplied by commanding officers, there were, at the time of the survey, 149 Negro personnel on the force, and some two-thirds of the districts had no more than three Negro policemen assigned. Since it was not feasible to work with *district* figures the item referring to estimated number of Negro policemen was phrased, "About how many Negroes do you think there are on the police force?"

The following table shows the frequency distribution of the estimated numbers (N = 1,081):

Estimated Number of Negroes on the Force	Per Cent Responding
0-149	
159-249	5.6
250-349	15.1
350-449	17.0
450-and over	8.3
No opinion	16.6
	37.4

Excluding the "No opinion" category, the over-all percentages are:

Overestimated the number of Negroes on the force	91.0
Estimated correctly or underestimated	9.0

There is a marked tendency among the respondents to overestimate the number of Negro policemen on the force, just as there was in the case of Negro arrests. In both instances, estimates of Negro arrests and estimates of Negro policemen, the percentage of white policemen who overestimated was roughly the same—90 per

cent. It would appear that to these respondents Negro visibility, at least in two areas, is high.

With regard to the visibility of Negro policemen, it can be seen from the above figures that the estimates are much higher among some respondents than others. Since a wide individual variation of this kind was also found in the estimates of Negro arrests, the possibility was strong that a concordance existed between the two sets of variations. The hypothesis to be tested was as follows: *A relationship exists between the white policeman's estimate of the Negro arrest rate and his estimate of the number of Negro policemen on the force.*

... The results lend no support to the hypothesis.

A number of other statistical relationships were explored, using the estimated number of Negro policemen as a variable, but results were negative.

The very fact of negative results, in this instance, is believed to be of importance, since the question that poses itself is, "Why is the visibility of the Negro offender a significant item (i.e. why does it relate to unfavorable opinions) whereas visibility of the Negro policeman is a non-related item? The answer might hinge on the fact that in the estimates of Negro police the "no opinion" percentage was quite large (37.4 as against a corresponding 13.8 per cent in the case of estimated Negro arrests). Or the answer might depend on the obvious difference between the two groups of Negroes—fellow workers on the one hand and law violators on the other.

The writer's explanation would take into account the fact that the percentage of Negro policemen is low while the percentage of Negro arrests is high. It has been suggested that as Negro numbers increase arithmetically their visibility increases exponentially. Since the number of Negro policemen in Philadelphia is not only small but (up to the time of the present study) has been *decreasing* in recent years, it may follow that their estimated numbers would not be expected to evidence any relationship to unfavorable opinions on the part of white policemen. Such a relationship might be expected only if the ratio of Negro policemen were large or increasing.

This interpretation, if true, would be applicable to groups other than policemen, and would lend itself, in terms of study design, to further testing. Attitudes toward Negroes could be compared with their estimated numbers in schools, businesses, or factories where the Negro ratio was small, as against the same comparison in similar organizations where the Negro proportion was large.

If inter-racial tensions are in any way a function of number, and if the manifestation of this function is demonstrably exponential in nature, the element of visibility emerges as a conceptually useful implement.

Leonard Broom

The Social Differentiation of Jamaica¹

Jamaica has long attracted the interest of American sociologists. Here a British colony, close to our shores, experienced color slavery and arrived at a kind of "race relations" different from that developed in the United States. Jamaica, passing

¹ *American Sociological Review*, 1954, 19:115-125. By permission.

through a brief state termed "Apprenticeship," achieved emancipation of her slaves a third of a century earlier than did the United States, and without civil war. Her whites constitute a small minority.

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

The basic racial pattern of Jamaica was laid down in the eighteenth century. At the end of the seventeenth century there were an estimated ten thousand whites and forty thousand slaves, principally blacks. Less than a century later the whites numbered about eighteen thousand, but there were a quarter of a million slaves—an increase of over two hundred thousand. An additional increment of whites in the first quarter of the nineteenth century was followed by a decline after the Apprenticeship period. By 1844 there were less than sixteen thousand whites in the Island, and their number has since fluctuated little. The census of 1943 reported 13,400, hardly more than the white population of 1775. Meanwhile the colored (mixed bloods) increased from 68,500 in 1844 to 216,000 in 1943, and the black population increased from 293,000 in 1844 to nearly a million in 1943. The whites, barely maintaining their numbers, have steadily declined in proportion from about 4 per cent of the population in 1844 to 1 per cent a century later. . . .

Historians of the British Caribbean have amply documented the drain of white population out of the area.² The high sugar prices in the latter half of the eighteenth century accelerated the movement, for the planters could live luxuriously in England on the returns from their holdings. According to Ragatz, "When the permanent decline in revenues from tropical American holdings . . . set in, overseas owners as a class failed to return, take personal possession and salvage what they might, but instead, after exhausting credit, they transferred their estates to holders of their paper, while planters actually in the West Indies, becoming hopelessly entangled in debt . . . forsook the colonies."³ The practice of sending the planters' children to England for their education, whence they often failed to return or returned miseducated for colonial life, reinforced this tendency. The consequence was a heavy drain of the trained talent out of the Island and an abdication of insular responsibilities to multiple office holders, agents, and mortgagees. In their turn the agents often departed. "Social stability was . . . far to seek; how far must be clear to anyone who cares to search among the names of the chief men in Jamaica in the eighteen-thirties . . . for the names of men who held . . . offices a hundred years before."⁴ The reasons for this discontinuity are to be found in vital as well as migratory causes. The sex ratio was heavily masculine, the life expectancy of the poorer immigrants, the clerks and overseers was exceedingly low, and the practice of concubinage reduced legitimate fertility.

Throughout Jamaican history the whites were thus drained off as fast as they arrived, and a vacuum was created in positions of intermediate responsibility. One segment of the population, the manumitted or free born colored, was always present to enter the vacuum. Many of these were children of the planters and their concubines. Some had European education, and even those less trained compared favorably enough with the impoverished, forgotten men of the plantation, the English clerks and indentured whites. *The precondition for the differentiation of the black and colored populations was then established, just as it was in South*

² For example see: W. L. Burn, *Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West Indies*, 1937; W. J. Gardner, *A History of Jamaica*, 2nd ed., 1909; L. J. Ragatz, *The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833*, 1928.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁴ Burn, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

Africa, Brazil, and the United States. But in Jamaica the lack of an adequate population of qualified whites, or indeed of unqualified whites, afforded the colored a greater opportunity to differentiate themselves from the blacks.

Spanish definitions of color long persisted in Jamaica, and in the eighteenth century the recognized gradations were black, mulatto, *terceroon*, *quadroon*, *mustee*, *musteefino*, and white. The child of a white and a *mustee* (or *mustee*, or *quadroon*, according to various writers) was called "English, free of taint."⁵ Thus Edwards at the end of the eighteenth century wrote: "The children of a White and Quinteron consider themselves as free from all taint of the Negro race. Every person is so jealous of the order of their tribe or cast, that if, thru inadvertence, you call them by a degree lower than what they actually are, they are highly offended."⁶

Lightness, valued as a promise of higher status, became valued for itself, and status became equated with lightness. The early literature often refers to colored free men but black slaves. Certainly the differential statuses, which are all too apparent in the 1943 census, are reinforced by the selective perception of census takers. For example, a phenotypically black civil servant of the upper categories is most likely to be classified as colored. A dark colored peasant is most likely to be classified black.

Differential manumission operated so that, according to Gardner, "the greatest portion of those fairer than the mulattoes were free"⁷ at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the "creole distinction of brown lady, black woman was . . . strictly observed; and except in the smaller towns, different shades of color did not readily mingle."⁸ John Stewart reported in 1823 that 95 per cent of the white males had colored mistresses and that into the hands of their male children "much of the property of the country [was] fast falling," certainly an overstatement of the case. Polite society ruled by white women might admit a few highly educated and well-to-do colored men, but colored women were much more rigidly excluded. The distinction between the society of men and of women presumably was a by-product of concubinage, and its effects persist to this day.

If colored persons had little or no entree to high society, some were accumulating the necessary equipment for substantial middle class status as early as the 18th century. An Assembly inquiry in 1763 showed that property valued at 250,000 pounds sterling had been left to colored children. The list included four sugar estates and thirteen cattle pens. The legislature then passed a statute invalidating bequests by whites to non-whites in excess of 1,200 pounds. Subsequently by individual acts the Assembly from time to time permitted what it had expressly forbidden. Inheritance of property by colored persons from colored persons was unrestricted, so that the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the colored was only retarded.

The colored population made most general progress in the urban areas where they entered the professions, administrative jobs and trades. Even before Apprenticeship they comprised the majority of the voters in Kingston and in three of the parishes. Had they voted *en bloc*, they could have elected at least nine of the forty-five members of the Assembly, but prior to 1837, there were only three colored members. In 1837 eight were elected.

Here is a rough approximation of the status ladder as it appeared in the Island in the first quarter of the 19th century, before Apprenticeship and Emancipation:

⁵ Cf. M. W. Beckwith, *Black Roadways*, 1929, p. 5 and Ragatz, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁶ Bryan Edwards, *The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies*, 1793, Vol. II, p. 16.

⁷ Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

⁸ Gardner, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

- (1) The invisible man, the absentee landlord; the executive; the resident creole planters and the top representatives of overseas companies—all whites
- (2) Estate attorneys and agents and well-to-do Scottish and Jewish merchants; some professionals—all whites
- (3) Other merchants and urban specialists, including some colored; a few colored planters and professionals
- (4) Colored artisans, tradesmen, and semi-professionals
- (5) Brown slaves not in field labor
- (6) Black slaves working in the fields

The first two categories, were, of course, very small in numbers. The indicated correlation of color and status was not perfect. For example, blacks could be found in the levels immediately above field slavery, and there were some colored at the very bottom. An additional, I trust unnecessary, caution should be kept in mind: no interval values can be assigned to the several positions.

The avenues of vertical mobility and their categorical limitations have been indicated in the foregoing discussion. Colored slaves were manumitted more often than blacks; colored slaves were more often than blacks employed in domestic, urban, and entrepreneurial activities (e.g. as peddlers) where they could acquire the pre-requisite skills for further mobility. For the first few steps up the ladder some training was more important than some land. At higher levels, although literacy and training in themselves had status value, the validation of high status rested on land ownership or, at least, its control.

After "the fall of the planter class" the merchants increased in relative importance and, as urban influences grew, the roles of Jews (see below) and the colored expanded. Some of those, e.g. Scots and Jews, who had achieved higher status in urban functions penetrated the planter group or emigrated to England, but the colored elements consolidated and developed their intermediate positions. This was done by further education, the acquisition of real estate especially in urban areas, intermarriage, and an expansion in trades and professions. All of these processes were retarded by the persistently low level of the Jamaican economy. Planter interests maintained their strong representation in the Assembly, and colored men who never comprised more than a third of its membership up to its dissolution in 1865, generally opposed the Country party, dominated by the English planters. The black and colored peasantry increased, and overseas companies tended to replace individual absentee landlords.

The varieties of colored employment are worth detailing. John Bigelow, proprietor and editor of the *New York Evening Post*, who visited Jamaica in 1850, reported that the pilot in Kingston harbor was a mulatto, that the revenue officers were mostly colored, that most of the eight hundred man police force were colored. In a visit to court he found two lawyers, all but one of the officers of the court, and most of the jurors colored. At this time Edward Jordan, a colored man, was public printer, editor of the *Kingston Morning Journal*, and leader of the Administration party. His is said to be the first portrait of a colored man to appear in the history gallery of the Institute of Jamaica.

Americans have been impressed with the permissiveness of Jamaican race relations for more than a century. Bigelow summarized the case as well as we could ask:

... one accustomed to the proscribed condition of the free black in the United States, will certainly be startled at the diminished importance attached here to the matter of complexion. Intermarriages are constantly occurring between the white and colored people, their families associate together within the ranks to which by wealth and color they

respectively belong, and public opinion does not recognize any social distinctions based exclusively on color. Of course, cultivated or fashionable people will not receive colored persons of inferior culture and worldly resources, but the rule of discrimination is scarcely more rigorous against those than against whites. They are received at the "King's House" . . . and they are invited to [the governor's] table with fastidious courtesy. The wife of the present mayor of Kingston is a "brown" woman . . . so also is the wife of the Receiver General himself, an English gentleman, and one of the most exalted public functionaries upon the island. . . . One unacquainted with the extent to which the amalgamation of races has gone here, is constantly liable to drop remarks in the presence of white persons, which, in consequence of the mixture of blood that may take place in some branch of their families, are likely to be very offensive. I was only protected from frequent *contretemps* of this kind, by the timely caution of a lady, who in explaining its propriety, said that unless one knows the whole collateral kindred of a family in Jamaica, he is not safe in assuming that they have not some colored connections.⁹

THE STATUS CLEAVAGE

Social stratification in Jamaica cannot be understood as an uninterrupted continuum of status positions. No matter what empirical criteria are employed, gross discontinuities are to be found. Given the historical forces briefly reviewed, this fact should cause no surprise, but the extreme character of this status cleavage affects all facets of Jamaican society.

As elsewhere in the Western World, literacy and education are preconditions to vertical mobility. . . . A little over one per cent of the blacks have more than an elementary schooling and fully 28 per cent are illiterate. Only the East Indians show a higher rate of illiteracy. The colored and Chinese groups occupy an intermediate position but both have substantial populations with more than elementary schooling. The whites and Syrians¹⁰ are far better off. Stated crudely, 96 per cent of the Jamaican population is an undifferentiated mass in regard to education, with elementary schooling or none. Combining illiterates with those having only elementary schooling, we find the groups have the following percentages of illiteracy: Blacks, 98.6; East Indians, 97.7; Colored, 88.9; Chinese, 87.5; Syrians, 51.7; Whites, 38.8. These figures are for the population seven years of age and older. The residual population of illiterates and those with limited education is subject to reduction for all groups, but disproportionately so for Syrians and whites.

The same relationships exist in the distribution of secondary schooling. The whites are five times better off than the colored, the colored ten times better off than the blacks. In this respect the Syrians approximate the other whites, the Chinese resemble the colored, and the East Indians again resemble the blacks. One qualification must be made to the statistical generalization about the educationally depressed characteristics of the Chinese. Their limited formal schooling is ameliorated by extensive *informal* practical training in small commercial enterprises. . . . Effectively they are better educated than the census records suggest.

The data on professional and pre-professional schooling are presented in the next section. Suffice it to say that the educational prerequisites for even modest vertical mobility are available for only a small part of the colored and for a very small proportion of blacks and East Indians:

⁹ John Bigelow, *Jamaica in 1850, 1851*, pp. 20-22.

¹⁰ The separate designation of Syrians here and of Jews later is no attempt to develop a private somatology but simply follows Jamaican custom and census policy. Educational figures for Jews are unavailable. Unless otherwise indicated, in referring to Syrians, East Indians, and Chinese, the colored products of amalgamation are included with these groups, as the census usually does. No separate educational classifications are available.

Table 1 approaches the phenomenon of status cleavage with different data. About half the black and East Indian and about a third of the colored wage earners got ten shillings a week or less, an exchange value in 1943 of about two dollars in U.S. currency. This does not take into account a high rate of unemployment, which

TABLE 1
WAGE EARNINGS BY COLOR AND ETHNIC IDENTITY, JAMAICA, 1943*

	Black	Colored	White	Chinese and Colored Chinese	East Indian and E.I. Colored	Syrian and Syrian Colored	Jewish	Total
Total wage earners	151,101	33,630	2,990	1,526	4,770	163	233	194,458(1)
Per cent earning:								
More than 100s/wk.(2)	3	5.6	41.5	5.0	.5	17.8	33.5	1.9
Less than 10s/wk.	58.4	32.1	2.1	6.1	49.8	2.5	1.7	52.2

* Computed from *Eighth Census of Jamaica*, 1943, Table 125, p. 220.

1. Includes "Not otherwise specified."

2. The shilling was then valued at about 20 cents U.S.

operates selectively against the low wage earners and reduces their mean earnings disproportionately. The heavy concentration of blacks and East Indians in agricultural labor largely contributes to their disadvantageous position. The better wage status of the colored is, on the other hand, probably related to their higher incidence of urban employment. The other color and ethnic groups had very small numbers in the lowest wage category.

Jamaica has a predominantly agricultural economy. The size of farms operated may, therefore, be taken as another measure of the degree of differentiation of the several elements of its population. Table 2 shows that once again the blacks, East Indians, and colored are found in an inferior position. In this case the Chinese

TABLE 2
FARM LAND TENURE BY COLOR AND ETHNIC IDENTITY, JAMAICA, 1943*

	Black	Colored	White	Chinese and Colored Chinese	East Indian and E.I. Colored	Syrian and Syrian Colored	Jewish	Total
Total farm operators	51,763	12,398	950	81	922	18	19	66,173(1)
Per cent operating:								
More than 100 acres	.7	4.9	43.3	3.7	2.2	5.5	52.6	2.1
Less than 10 acres	78.4	61.6	23.8	65.4	72.2	77.8	10.5	74.3

* Computed from *Eighth Census of Jamaica*, 1943, Table 200, p. 306.

1. Includes "Not otherwise specified."

and Syrians resemble the undifferentiated groups, but their involvement in agriculture is small, and their poor agricultural status is, therefore, of little importance. The Census data do not permit us to treat separately the colored segments of the Chinese and Syrians, but we may guess that these elements constitute most of the small operators, grouped in their respective ethnic categories.

Three sets of data have thus been used to suggest the gross characteristics of Jamaican stratification. Each criterion—education, wage earnings, and farm land tenure—showed the blacks and the East Indians in a very disadvantageous position and the colored population only somewhat better off.

Further comment on the depressed elements of these populations should bear on the channels of mobility open to them rather than on additional stratification details. The available data will permit us only to suggest the broad outlines of such an analysis. Very large proportions of blacks and East Indians, and to a lesser extent the colored, are agricultural laborers or small peasants who lack the minimal educational skills. An expansion of the agricultural economy might incidentally improve their status by providing steadier employment at somewhat higher rates of pay or, in the case of peasants, by yielding better returns on crops. In other words, assuming continued agricultural functions, changes in their life chances lie in changes in the whole economy (except, of course, in the cases of the movement of unusually lucky or able individuals). In any event, the relative position of these groups in the economy would not be significantly altered. Given their lack of education and experience, urban employment can only offer unskilled work or the opportunity to acquire limited skills in such jobs as domestic service.

The depressed urban workers move in a more fluid and differentiated labor market in which some opportunities for upgrading are possible. Furthermore, insofar as they can combine a small capital accumulation with commercial or manual skills, they can make a shaky upward step as independent entrepreneurs. As we shall see, below, however, these chances are severely limited. Lacking some dramatic expansion of the economy, the character of the status cleavage of Jamaica does not seem subject to drastic change.

THE ETHNICS AND THE ELITES

Just as the status cleavage and mobility are the chief topics for studying the undifferentiated elements of the population, the proper study of the highly differentiated elements is function. . . . In this population, predominantly African in origin, several groups are visible by racial characteristics, cultural characteristics, or simply social identity. This is important because, as we shall see, the more or less visible groups, although quite small, are the very ones which perform distinctive functions in the society.

○ In the retail trade category the most striking fact is that the Chinese have a larger share than any other group except the blacks. Moreover, their occupational visibility is not merely statistical, for they are predominant in the retail grocery trade throughout the Island and are very important in the related food processing industry. The opportunity to develop a retail grocery trade lay fallow in the hands of the colored population until the latter 19th century when it was taken over by the Chinese with their greater entrepreneurial experience. It would be very difficult now, short of political interference, for the black or colored population to make much headway in this business. As a consequence of their semi-monopoly over the most conspicuous of businesses, the Chinese have come to occupy a difficult position. In scores of towns they stand as strangers who possess the goods most desired by the peasantry and small wage earners. They tend to be ethnically exclusive in their associations, perform few elite functions, and are fairly isolated from the blacks, colored, and the other ethnics. Their conspicuousness could easily be translated into vulnerability. This is suggested in an editorial in a Jamaican periodical:

If the Chinese in Jamaica don't do a *volte face* soon they are going to plunge the whole island into serious racial trouble. As one whose goodwill towards them is no secret, I feel

duty-bound to give this note of warning—or these few words of advice. Jamaica's race relations record is too good to be spoilt. So I must warn now before it is too late.

I remember how bitterly they complained to the Moyne Commission of '38 that everybody was against them though they offended no one by merely minding their own business. I remember what wise old Lord Moyne told them. He said in effect: You people are not pulling your weight in the community. You build a wall around yourselves and live within it. People don't like walls, particularly if they get to thinking that what's within is inimical to them. Remove your wall. Integrate with the community, and stop giving the impression that you are only interested in grabbing and scraping all you can out of the island to take back to China. Forget about China. You are Jamaicans. Be Jamaicans—like the Jews, Syrians, Negroes and others whose ancestors also came from alien lands.

That was sound advice. But the Chinese haven't taken it. Instead, they have built a thicker and higher wall. Those who venture out and identify themselves with the rest of the Jamaican people are so few they are lost in the crowd.

The rest of Jamaicans are beginning to look at the Chinese wall. And it is not a friendly look; it is a look that bodes ill, a threat to the continuance of internal peace. If the Chinese keep piling up wealth and hate behind that wall giving back nothing to the community, they may find it expedient to go back "home" sooner than they hope—if China is still home for any large numbers of Jamaican Chinese. . . .

They hate Negroes more than all ("Nigger" is their favourite word for anything black), though they have bred more half-Negro children than any other group during the past 50 years. They ostracise any of their group who accept employment with Negro firms. There is the case of a Chinese girl who married a Negro some time ago. Her folks haven't spoken to her since. . . .

. . . The Chinese take full advantage of all the facilities the community offers, yet such facilities as they have as a group are reserved for Chinese only. Examples: only Chinese are employed in Chinese businesses; only Chinese kids are accepted in the Chinese public school; only Chinese are admitted to membership in the Chinese Athletic Club.

Few Chinese even bother to vote. Every public subscription list shows the same few names. . . .

Political control of Jamaica will ever remain in the hands of Negroes. Since it is too late to bar all Chinese—as some other Caribbean countries have done—it is not too late to enact the kind of legislation which will force the Chinese out from behind the wall. . . .¹¹

In contrast, the Jews, Syrians, and other whites who also perform important commercial functions are involved in varied enterprises, chiefly concentrated in the urban areas. In their exchange functions they have less direct contact with the general public. Like the Chinese, the Syrians are concentrated in commercial activity. Unlike the Chinese, at the turn of the century they entered into competition with the relatively well established dry goods and wholesale firms run by creole whites and colored. In large part through the skill of a single family, the Syrians have become a major economic force, tightly integrated and with close ties to the Syrian community in North America and throughout the Caribbean.

Although a detailed discussion is impossible here, a word must be said about the Jews of Jamaica who have never exceeded a few hundred. They were originally of Spanish and Portuguese origin and were important in the entrepot trade with the Spanish Caribbean. Along with the Scots, they dealt in plantation stores, a large scale business in which sales were made in bulk. In the 17th and early 18th centuries Jews suffered from discriminatory taxation and civil disabilities. The special taxes were rescinded first, and then, early in the 19th century they were

¹¹ "Occidental Chinese Wall," *Spotlight* (October, 1952), pp. 4 and 7.

relieved of the remaining impediments. As the colored population became urbanized and achieved some vertical mobility, intermarriage and concubinage with Jews as well as with other whites took place. It is not clear to what extent Jews left the Island for England, but they undoubtedly shared in this migration.

As has been indicated, Jews are widely distributed through the urban occupations. Of approximately 200 listed in the *Jamaica Who's Who* (1946), a very inclusive roster, nearly half are in business activities of one sort or another, and most of the remainder are in the free professions or the civil service.

There is not space to report here on current Jewish intermarriage and related problems. It would be safe to assert, however, that despite the observance of religious holidays by Jewish firms and the maintenance of a congregation, the group is the most fully integrated of all the ethnic minorities into Jamaican society. Like the colored, many of their number perform elite functions.

The other whites, especially the English and Jamaica creoles, control most of the largest estates, the finance and the shipping activities. Polite society is dominated by these whites, or more accurately, by the white wives of these men. There are also a number of cliques of high status centering on the colored professionals, but the town clubs, yacht club, and the country clubs are not racially exclusive. Their memberships, of course, are disproportionately white and light colored as a consequence of the distribution of money, education, and occupation. Perhaps in the country parishes one or two clubs composed exclusively of creole whites might be found, but these are rural survivals of an earlier period.

The Chinese would not have gained control of the grocery trade so quickly if the educated colored had not become committed to the professions and the civil service as status-bearing occupations. It is ironic that British colonialism, which historically has been so heavily influenced by commercial interests, should have implanted a disdain of commerce among many colonial peoples. This may be in part because a colonial may seek recognition in two places, in the colony and in the metropolitan "home." The dual striving is apparently achieved without conflict of ends most readily in the public service and, of course, some immediate status is acquired by the very identification with official functions.

... As the power-shift becomes consolidated, the whites and the ethnically differentiated groups must seek indirect access to power. The Jamaican House in 1951 included in its number men who by training and experience were highly qualified to perform elite responsibilities in a representative government. The cadres of trained personnel, as we have seen, were most numerous in the white, colored, and ethnic elements of the population. Jamaica today has two difficult tasks. First, to continue to utilize its resource of personnel with elite qualifications. Second, to train and recruit to the elite a far larger number of blacks. The extent to which these tasks may be accomplished will depend on the appreciation of elite functions by a black electorate with limited schooling.

13

Social Mobility

The term *social mobility* refers to a change in the status of an individual, a group, or a category. By social mobility, then, we mean movement within the social structure.

Sociologists study social mobility in order to assess the degree of "openness" of a social structure—the relative ease with which persons or groups can alter their position in the class structure and hence can gain access to different life chances and styles of life.

It has been traditional in the United States to emphasize the extent to which mobility is possible and desirable. Our cultural values and social norms encourage us to strive for a higher position in the stratification structure.

What happens when people are taught that they can and should better themselves, and then find their ambitions frustrated? Ely Chinoy offers one answer in "The Tradition of Opportunity and the Aspirations of Automobile Workers."

"The Protestant ethic" has been used as a phrase descriptive of the cultural norm which urges us to strive for higher status. In "The Protestant Ethic, Level of Aspiration, and Social Mobility," Raymond W. Mack, Raymond J. Murphy, and Seymour Yellin report an investigation into whether or not there is any relationship between being Protestant in the religious sense and participating in the Protestant ethic.

Ely Chinoy

The Tradition of Opportunity and the Aspirations
of Automobile Workers¹

The United States is widely pictured as the "land of promise," where golden opportunities beckon to everyone without regard to his original station in life. . . . School children learn early of humble Americans whose careers fulfilled the promise,

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1952, 57:453-459. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

and the occasional new arrival at the top of the success ladder is publicly acclaimed as a fresh illustration that opportunity is open to all.

Based on some concrete facts plus a substantial admixture of myth and optimism, the tradition of opportunity which has been a sprawled folk gospel deeply imbedded in the American character has now also become a consciously manipulated dream only partially related to the changing conditions of American life. Large corporations, rendered defensive by the events of the post-1929 decades, and the conservative press have tried to bolster their version of free enterprise by energetically fostering the belief that, to quote one newspaper advertisement, "There are more opportunities in this country than ever before."

The American experience has indeed been distinctive in the opportunities it offered to able and ambitious men. The expansion across a rich unpeopled continent of a population that roughly doubled every twenty-five years between 1790 and 1914 enabled farm boys, bookkeepers, prospectors, peddlers, clerks, and mechanics to rise significantly in the world. to become in some cases captains of industry and titans of finance.

But, with the closing of the frontier, the leveling of the rate of population growth, and the concentration of industry, upward mobility by men starting at the bottom has become more difficult. In this era of big business, with its heavy capital requirements for independent enterprise and its demands for specialized managerial and technical skills in industry, factory workers, with whom we are centrally concerned, are severely handicapped. "It is widely recognized," declared the authors of a report prepared for the Temporary National Economic Committee in 1940, "that substantial opportunity does not exist for a large proportion of workers in either small or large corporations. . . . Most of them, therefore, must look forward to remaining more or less at the same levels, despite the havoc this might visit upon the tradition of 'getting ahead.'"²

Industrial workers, therefore, face in their occupational lives a palpable disparity between the exhortations of the tradition and the realities of their own experience. On the one hand, they are encouraged to pursue ambitious goals by the assurance that anyone with ability and determination can, by his own efforts, "get ahead in the world"; on the other hand, only limited opportunities are open to them.

This paper, which is a partial summary of a larger investigation, is an attempt to explore what opportunity looks like to a group of automobile workers in a middle-sized midwestern city. What are the goals of men who are caught between the promises of the culture and the exigencies of their workaday world? What, if anything, does "getting ahead" mean to them?

Automobile workers were chosen for this investigation because they work in an industry which poses sharply the problems related to opportunity. Automobile manufacturing is a glamorous, relatively new industry whose spectacular growth dramatized and gave new substance to the American success story but whose present characteristics—giant plants, an extremely high degree of mechanization, and specialized corporate bureaucracies—make it difficult for the men who operate its machines to rise from the industrial ranks.

The research for the study was done over a period of fourteen months, from August, 1946, to July, 1947, plus the summer months of 1948. The bulk of the data was secured in seventy-eight prolonged interviews with sixty-two men employed

² M. Dimock and H. K. Hyde, *Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations* ("Temporary National Economic Committee Monographs," No. 11 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940]), p. 55.

in one large automobile plant. Since the problem of aspirations takes a somewhat different form among Negroes and, perhaps, among immigrants and second-generation Americans, interviews were confined to white workers who, with few exceptions, were at least third-generation citizens. All but six were married. In age they ranged from twenty to sixty-three, with no marked concentration at any age level and a mean age of thirty-eight. Thirty-five men had been employed in the plant prior to the outbreak of the war, fifteen had been hired during the war, and the rest were postwar employees. The group included fifteen skilled workers, ten machine operators, nine assembly-line tenders, and twenty-eight others who held various semiskilled jobs. Most types of work in the plant were represented. The data drawn from interviews were supplemented by several weeks of work in the factory by the investigator, by reports from informants, and by innumerable hours of casual conversation and informal social participation with men from the plant.

The aspirations of the automobile workers who were thus studied represent a constant balancing of hope and desire against the objective circumstances in which they find themselves. Recent research has tended to picture industrial workers as creatures of feeling and sentiment whose "social logic" contrasts sharply with the "rational logic" of managers and engineers. But, as our data clearly show, the aspirations of these men are controlled by a reasonably objective appraisal of the opportunities available to them. Given the unreliable picture presented by the culture, they are remarkably rational in their selection of goals. By and large they confine their aims to those limited alternatives which seem possible for men with their skills and resources.

With few exceptions, they see little chance of ever rising into salaried positions in the large corporation in which they work. To them the admonition to "think of the corporation as a pyramid of opportunities from the bottom toward the top with thousands of chances for advancement" has little meaning. They are clearly aware that engineering and management have become so highly selective as to exclude them almost completely. Not one of these workers ever suggested the possibility of moving into the top-salaried ranks. Only foremanship, which itself rarely leads to better managerial posts, remains as an obvious escape hatch from wage labor on the factory floor. And even this seemed to hold little promise for most of the workers who were interviewed.

In normal times only eight or ten openings on the supervisory level occur each year in this plant of almost six thousand workers. To many of them, therefore, it seems as though, in the words of one disillusioned toolmaker with fifteen years' seniority: "They'll have to die off in my department before anybody could get to be a foreman." Since forty of the sixty-two men interviewed had not completed high school, their chances of gaining promotion were further contracted, as they can readily see, by management's increasing preference for men with substantial educational qualifications.

Even in these circumstances, however, a few workers with only limited education still manage to become foremen, and their example might provoke a good deal of hope and effort, were it not for uncertainties in the selection process. Since new foremen are chosen on the basis of recommendations by foremen, the crucial question for workers seeking advancement is: What qualities and actions will bring us to the favorable attention of our supervisors? According to management, only merit and ability are taken into account when considering men for promotion. But, because the criteria used to define merit and ability remain unspecified, workers

tend to stress "pull," "connections," and various personal techniques for gaining favor—"buddying up to the foreman," "running around squealing on everybody," sending the foreman a Christmas card, or getting one's name in the union paper. The rich variety of invidious terms applied to many of these techniques, however—"bootlicking," "brown-nosing," "sucking around"—indicates how workers feel about them. And in any case there was no consensus as to which methods were effective, no guide lines to direct men's efforts.

It is not surprising, therefore, that only five of the sixty-two men interviewed expressed any real hope of ever becoming foremen. While seven others had given up the hopes they had once had, fifty said that they would not want to be foremen or that they had never thought of the possibility. Given the obstacles to advancement into supervision, it is easy to imagine the build-up of verbal objections to foremanship as a rationalization against the likely disappointment of any hopes men might secretly entertain. Or, alternatively, men may protect themselves against the prospect of failure by disclaiming any interest in the goal.

Yet it is not unlikely that the disparagement of foremanship and the lack of interest are in many cases genuine. There are those who, for various reasons, are unwilling to assume responsibility. And the difficulties in the foreman's position which have been documented by numerous academic investigators are clearly evident to the men in the shop.

It is interesting to note that the five men who had hopes of becoming foremen were all still relatively young and that they had done fairly well for themselves in the plant. One was thirty-five, the others between twenty-nine and thirty-two. Three were skilled workers, two of whom had moved up from semiskilled labor during the war. One was a former line tender who had become an inspector, a more pleasant if not a better-paying job; one was a group leader in the shipping department, who had started there as an unskilled laborer. The seven men who had given up hope were, on the average, older and had not moved ahead in the shop. Only two were under thirty-five, while the others were thirty-eight or older. Only one had gained any personal advancement, a toolmaker who had finally become a group leader—after thirteen years in the plant. Two had been moved down after the war from skilled to semiskilled work, and the others were all on about the same level on which they had begun in the plant anywhere from five to sixteen years earlier. These facts suggest the possibility that, unless industrial workers gain some evidence while still young that advancement is possible, they are likely to confine their aspirations to modest objectives.

But the advancement which might encourage hope for foremanship or other substantial objectives is hard for these men to secure. Constant mechanization of automobile production has left most automobile workers as semiskilled operatives who can be moved about easily from one job to another. There were relatively few unskilled workers in the work force of almost 6,000, while only 300 were skilled craftsmen.

For the semiskilled workers who constitute the great majority in the plant, the obvious line of advancement would be into the few remaining skilled jobs, which represent the top of the wage hierarchy. But the leveling of skill makes it impossible for the plant to provide any sequence of progressively more demanding tasks which might lead toward the skilled occupations.

In the years before recognition of the union it was sometimes possible to learn enough as a helper to be able to pass one's self off as skilled. Now that the union insists that men work only within their job classifications, this possibility has been

virtually eliminated; a helper cannot try to do the work of a journeyman, even under the latter's guidance. With this informal route closed—at least in this plant—apprentice training has become the only way to acquire a trade. Admission to apprentice training, however, is limited to high-school graduates not over twenty-one years old, stipulations which exclude most of the workers studied. Only during the war, when there was an acute shortage of skilled labor, were semiskilled men—"upgraders," as they were called—trained by journeymen to do at least part of a skilled job.

Thus to practically all the semiskilled workers interviewed entry to the skilled trades seemed to be completely closed. Only two veterans whose war service exempted them from the age limitation on apprentice training were planning to enter the trade through this route. And one former upgrader who had been returned to semiskilled work after the war still had hopes that he might some day be recalled to a skilled job.

With both foremanship and skilled work out of reach, the best that most workers can see for themselves in the factory is a series of isolated small gains—transfer to a job that pays a few cents more per hour or to one that is easier, steadier, or more interesting. Substantial wage increases for individual workers are almost out of the question, however, since wage rates for semiskilled jobs are highly compressed. In 1947, in the production, inspection, and material-handling divisions of the plant, for example, maximum wage rates for 240 of 280 job classifications fell within a 9-cent range, from \$1.41 to \$1.50 per hour, while only seven classifications brought as much as \$1.64 per hour.

The achievement of even those small monetary gains which are possible has been taken out of the hands of individual workers by the impersonal seniority rule which provides that promotion to better-paying jobs should go to the men with the longest service. For the most part, therefore, higher wages and other economic benefits are now achieved through gaining and holding standardized agreements, a collective effort in which the union rather than the individual plays the central role.

As a result, the factory is not a place where men can do much as individuals to gain personal advancement. If they have worked in the plant long enough to "know the ropes," they may be able to secure a transfer to an easier, steadier, or more interesting job; otherwise they are exposed to the chance job shifts occasioned by constant changes in technology. The traditional imperatives for success—hard work and inventiveness—play an insignificant role in the context of carefully timed jobs and organized scientific research. Nor are "character" and "personality"—the other important traditional requisites for advancement—of much value to men who work with things rather than with people.

Despite the fact that they saw few opportunities for advancement in the factory, most of the workers studied could see no other future for themselves. Although forty-eight of the sixty-two answered "Yes" to the question: "Have you ever thought of getting out of the shop?" only eight had gone past wishful thinking or escapist dreams. Five of these were planning to buy a small farm or to go into some kind of small business. One had applied for a position on the local police force. And the other two—one a twenty-year-old single man, the other a twenty-nine-year-old veteran who could receive governmental assistance—were planning to go to college. The other forty who answered "Yes" quickly qualified their desire to leave with reasons why they could not do so or confessed that they had only vague, unfocused desires. Much as many of these men would like to gain :-

and to escape from the factory, they soon recognize that they have neither the financial resources nor, in some cases, the educational and personal qualifications that are needed.

Nevertheless, the possibility of leaving the shop forms a staple topic of conversation on the job. A dozen men spontaneously observed that "everybody" or "almost everybody" talks about getting out of the shop. This endless discussion, though unrelated in most cases to feasible plans or substantial hopes, serves an important psychological function. As one assembly-line tender put it: "It makes the time go quicker and easier if I keep thinking about that turkey farm I'd like to buy." A few minutes later he admitted that he could never hope to save enough money to buy the farm. Even though hopes shrivel when put to the test of reality, however, the talk and daydreams they generate soften the harsh reality of the moment.

To summarize our findings thus far: Of the sixty-two men interviewed, only eight felt that they had a promising future outside the factory. Within the factory, five men had real hope that they might some day become foremen, while only three semiskilled workers felt that it might be possible to move into the ranks of skilled labor. The remaining forty-six, both skilled and nonskilled, could see little room for personal advancement and hence restricted their ambitions to small goals.

Despite their limited aspirations and their pessimism regarding opportunity for themselves, these men have not given up the success values of American society. "Everybody wants to get ahead," said a machine operator, and none of his fellows would contradict him. But if they accept the success values and yet see little opportunity for themselves, how do they explain their failure to move up in the economic order? How do they reconcile their limited aspirations with the cultural admonition to aim high and to persevere relentlessly?

The tradition of opportunity itself provides a ready-made explanation for failure which is accepted by some of these workers. Responsibility is placed squarely upon each individual. Failure cannot result from lack of opportunity but only from lack of ambition or ability, from unwillingness to make the necessary sacrifices, or from defects in one's character and personality. "I guess I'm just not smart enough," said one worker. "It's my own fault," said another. "Sometimes," he went on, "I look at myself in the mirror and I say to myself, 'Pat, you dumb so-and-so, you could have been somebody if you'd only set your mind to it.'" By thus focusing criticism upon the individual rather than upon its institutions, society protects itself against the reactions of those who fail.

But the self-blame thus engendered is obviously painful, and men therefore seek other ways of reconciling their small ambitions with their acceptance of success values. This they do primarily by redefining the meaning of advancement in terms closer to the realities of their own experience, and to a lesser degree by fostering ambitious hopes for their children and by verbally retaining the illusion of out-of-the-shop ambitions.

By labeling the small goals they pursue in the shop as "getting ahead," these workers maintain for themselves the appearance of sustained effort and ambition. Then, if they manage to secure a job that pays 5 cents an hour more or one that is less exacting or more interesting, they seem to be advancing. "I'll be getting ahead all right," said a discontented line tender, "if I can just get off the line." But, as men reach the low ceiling imposed on this kind of advancement or as they come to the conclusion that they are in dead-end jobs, they must turn to other meanings if they are to avoid admission of failure.

Since there are few opportunities for occupational advancement, they shift their

attention toward security, on the one hand, and toward the acquisition of material possessions, on the other, identifying both as "getting ahead." Security, which has always been a crucial concern for automobile workers because of the erratic employment pattern in the industry, is now equated with advancement. Questions which tried to elicit from these workers the relative importance assigned to security as over against opportunities for advancement proved to be virtually meaningless. They could see no difference between the two. "If you're secure, then you're getting ahead," explained one worker with many years of seniority.

As with wages, security has taken on a collective character. Protection against arbitrary layoffs and assurance of recall after a shutdown are provided by the seniority rule incorporated in the union contract. In 1950 pensions were gained via collective bargaining, and the union has now set its sights on a guaranteed annual wage. Only in the accumulation of personal savings, which is itself defined as advancement, does security retain an individual character. "If you can put away a couple of hundred dollars, then you're getting ahead," said a worker struggling to make ends meet. If one can pay one's bills and meet the instalments on the house, the car, or a new refrigerator and still save a little money, then one is moving forward.

The visible evidence of advancement in this world of anonymous jobs and standardized wage rates, however, is the acquisition of material possessions. With their wants constantly stimulated by high-powered advertising, they measure their success by what they are able to buy. A new car standing in front of one's own home—this is the prevailing symbol of advancement, with a new washing machine, living-room furniture, and now probably a television set as further confirmation that one is "getting ahead." This shift in the context of advancement from the occupational to the consumption sphere is justified whenever possible by stressing the potential economic returns from a large purchase, particularly in the case of a home and a car.

Even if men can see little hope for personal advancement in the present, they may still maintain their identification with the tradition of opportunity by focusing their aspirations upon their children's future, a practice strongly encouraged by the culture. "What sustains us as a nation . . .," wrote Eleanor Roosevelt in one of her daily columns, "[is] the feeling that if you are poor . . . you still see visions of your children having the opportunities you missed." "I never had much of a chance," said a semiskilled laborer whose entire working life had been spent in this one large plant, "but I want my kid to go to college and do something better than work in a factory." All of the twenty-six men with sons not yet old enough to work felt that their children could do better than factory work; none of them wanted their sons to go into the factory, except perhaps as skilled workers. But, with their limited income and lack of knowledge, these fathers can provide little financial assistance or occupational guidance. Yet they all felt that, if their sons would exert the necessary effort and make the requisite sacrifices, they could move up in the economic order. By thus placing responsibility upon their sons, however, they protect themselves against the disappointment they are likely to experience.

Finally, men seek to maintain the illusion that they themselves are still striving by constantly talking about their intention to leave the shop, even though, as we have seen, they admit when pressed that they would probably never do so. Stimulated both by the still lively small-business tradition and by their urgent desire to escape from factory jobs, many of these workers continue to believe that at least modest success as a small entrepreneur is possible for the hardworking,

personable man with ideas and initiative. They therefore verbally entertain, in usually disorderly succession, various business ambitions which are critically scrutinized and rejected as impractical or are mulled over, dreamed about, vaguely examined, and eventually permitted to fade away because there is little likelihood of their immediate realization.

From our analysis it seems evident that these automobile workers have to a large extent retained the form but lost the substance of the American tradition of opportunity. It is, of course, difficult to gauge how often and under what conditions these men see through their fabric of rationalization and self-justification to the fact that they are confined to their working-class status despite the promises of the culture. But as long as they can "get ahead," even on their own terms, they are unlikely to question seriously the validity of the tradition of opportunity.

Raymond W. Mack, Raymond J. Murphy,
and Seymour Yellin

The Protestant Ethic, Level of Aspiration, and Social Mobility: An Empirical Test¹

Few debate Weber's theory that rationalized capitalism and spiritual Protestantism are ideologically compatible.² The thesis lends itself to the historical method, whereby one can see Protestantism as the precursor of the rise of capitalism, or to comparative analysis, wherein one cites the correlation between the capitalistic character of a society's economic order and that society's acceptance in its religious institutions of the tenets of the Protestant Reformation. Weber asserted that the emancipating and rationalizing effect of the Protestant Reformation made possible the rise of rational capitalism. The Catholic ethic propounded a culturally established emphasis upon other-worldliness; the rationale for the performance of earthly tasks was other-worldly: reparation for sins and purification through humility. Luther and Calvin sanctified work; they made virtues of industry, thrift, and self-denial. Wesley preached that the fruits of labor were the signs of salvation. The culmination of the Protestant Reformation, then, was to give divine sanction to the drive to excel.

We can accept the evidence of a historical relationship between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism, but we cannot assume the existence of any relationship between the Protestant and Catholic ethics and role performance in contemporary American society. Sebastian de Grazia has subsumed the extremes of these two belief systems under the labels "Activist Directive" and "Quietist Directive," positing them as two poles of an ideal-type continuum.³ He uses the term "directive" to denote mores which have been internalized in early childhood and thus exert unusually powerful influences upon behavior. The theoretical question which remains unanswered because of a lack of data is whether the Catholic and Protestant faiths in contemporary American society exert a potent enough in-

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1956, 21:295-300. By permission.

² Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* [translated by Talcott Parsons], New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930.

³ Sebastian de Grazia, *The Political Community*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 59.

fluence on behavior to be accurately designated "directives." . . . Intuitively a good argument can be made for the idea that the "American Dream," the mobility ethic, is so strong in our culture that it will override in influence sub-cultural religious dogma. That is, a child socialized in contemporary American society will be less conditioned by either the Catholic other-worldly salvation, "quietist directive" or the Protestant salvation through works, "activist directive" as such than by the positive value which our society places upon upward mobility striving.

This we propose to test empirically in the form of the null hypothesis: No significant differences will be found either in social mobility patterns or in aspiration level between samples of Protestant and Catholic Americans in several occupations. The mobility patterns will provide data on role performance; the expressed level of aspiration will supplement these with evidence of intent, thus offsetting a possible difference between the two categories in life chances.

METHODOLOGY

The data analyzed here were gathered as part of a larger study of occupational role behavior and patterns of social mobility in three white-collar occupations. The sample in this larger study consists of 2,205 white males in three occupational statuses: salesmen, engineers, and bank officials and clerks. The sample is confined to white males so that analysis will not be confounded by variations accounted for by differences in race and sex. Two main considerations entered into the selection of these particular occupations: (1) They are all white-collar jobs, thus holding constant the manual-non-manual dimension, and (2) they are widely distributed on a hypothesized determinate-indeterminate continuum of occupational roles.

The theory of role determinateness which these data were gathered to test postulates statuses ranged along a continuum according to how well-defined are the rights and duties of the status and how rigid the expectations of the role. One polar type we call the determinate occupational status which has elaborately prescribed requirements for entry. The rights as well as the duties of the person occupying the status are firmly established and well known to both the actor and those with whom he interacts in his occupational role. The expectations of role behavior in such a status are narrow in range and relatively definite. An indeterminate occupational status is the opposite ideal type, characterized by less stringent requirements for entry into the occupation and shifting with both time and locale. Neither the rights nor the duties of the person occupying the status are firmly established, and the expectations of role behavior are wide in range and relatively indefinite. Engineers were selected for this research as determinate, salesmen as indeterminate, and bankers as occupying an intermediate position on the continuum.

The total salesman sub-sample consists of 1,389 persons, either employed as salesmen, or applying for the position of salesman (if the applicant has had previous sales experience among his last three jobs). These individuals are distributed in a cluster sample of twenty-six companies in eleven industries. The industries correspond to the following Census Bureau classifications: *Manufacturing*: furniture and fixtures, machinery, except electrical, meat products, other food industries, paper and allied products, printing, publishing, and allied industries, petroleum and coal products; *Wholesale and Retail Trade*: wholesale trade, motor vehicles and accessories retailing; *Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate*; *Business and Repair Services*. Salesmen are defined as persons who are outside salesmen or company representatives, thus excluding persons categorized under a broader

definition of sales work, such as store clerks, door-to-door canvassers, and newsboys.

The sub-sample of engineers consists of 515 individuals of eleven engineering specialties (aeronautical, agricultural, ceramic, chemical, civil, electrical, hydraulic, industrial, mechanical, mining, and metallurgical) in fifty-nine companies. The criteria for inclusion were: (1) presently holding an engineering position, or (2) of those applying for engineering positions, either having an engineering degree or having filled an engineering position among the last three jobs.

The total for the third sub-sample, bankers, consists of 301 middle-management officials and clerks from twelve banks. Again, the criteria for inclusion were: (1) current employment in this occupational status, or (2) of those applying for a banking position, banking experience among the last three jobs.

Each person in the sample has filled out a personal history of the variety often required of employees and applicants by employers for company files. The personal history is a four-page printed form used as a projective technique by a firm of consultants to industry. The questionnaire was administered at work, either by an associate of the consultant firm (a Ph.D. in Psychology) or by the personnel manager after he had completed the firm's course in administration of the personal history. It was always given to individuals, never group administered. The form contains such information as the subject's age, marital status, number of dependents, education, membership in voluntary associations, level of aspiration, the occupation of his father, and an employment history. The employment history includes types of occupations held, length of employment period at each, type of company and industry in which employed, and income. Since the total sample was not selected randomly, the degree to which it is representative of its universe in the national labor force can be estimated by inference only. First, in relation to gross size, the three occupational subsamples are proportionate to their corresponding categories in the labor force (see Table 1). Secondly, despite the lack

TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF SAMPLE WITH UNIVERSE

Occupation	Census	Sample	Percentage Which Sample Is of Census
Salesman	1,214,094	1,389	.1144
Engineers	446,954	515	.1152
Bankers	265,123	301	.1135

Source: Bureau of the Census, *U. S. Census of Population: 1950, Vol. II, Characteristics of the Population, Part I, U. S. Summary*, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1953, Chapter C.

of random selection procedures, there does not appear to be any impelling reason to suspect the presence of systematic bias. Economically, the companies contributing to the sub-samples of salesmen and engineers represent a wide variety of production and distribution lines. Geographically, the firms in all three sub-samples are distributed throughout the country. Not only are all regions represented, but the companies themselves range in size from three-person firms to some of the largest corporations in the industries sampled, and are located in cities with populations varying from a few thousand to several million. Finally, no selective factors were operative within the companies with regard to employees filling out the questionnaire.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

The sample in each of the three occupations for the present analysis is about one-half the size of the total N for that occupation in the larger study. Religious affiliation information is available only for a sharply reduced portion of the total sample for two reasons: (1) A number of individuals did not fill in this response item, and (2) FEPC legislation resulted in the removal of the religious item from the questionnaire in 1951. The possible bias arising out of a potential selectivity of respondents in favor of those with strong religious convictions is, of course, unknown. The direction of the bias is in favor of those having relatively strong feelings about their religion, the more indifferent being excluded from the analysis. The effect of the bias, therefore, would be to stack the deck against the null hypothesis; significant behavioral differences should appear more readily among those with firm religious convictions than among the disinterested. The religious affiliation of respondents who filled out the form after the question had been deleted has been inferred wherever possible from voluntary association memberships which were reported in response to other items; e.g., Masons were coded as Protestants, Knights of Columbus as Catholics. Since the number of Jews was too small to permit tests of statistical significance, they were excluded from the analysis.

Four measures of social mobility were utilized: (1) change from father to son in stratum as defined in the Census occupational category of subject; (2) change during employment history in stratum as defined in the Census occupational category of subject; (3) change from father to son in status as defined in the Warner occupational category;⁴ and (4) change during employment history in status as defined in the Warner occupational category. The four mobility measures will be referred to hereafter as father-son stratum, career stratum, father-son status, and career status, respectively.

The data allow, in the case of stratum mobility, for a fifteen point scale ranging from seven strata downwardly mobile (from professional to unskilled labor) to seven strata upwardly mobile with non-mobile as a midpoint. A thirteen point scale can be constructed for status mobility. For the present analysis, however, the N becomes far too small for such an elaborate treatment if any controls are implemented. Our research to date indicates that both age and occupation are significantly related to mobility; it seemed, therefore, far more desirable to control for these two variables than to run religious affiliation against a multi-point mobility scale. Mobility, then, like religious affiliation, was dichotomized. Bifurcation of either the stratum or status mobility scales poses a question: do the non-mobile persons belong with the upwardly or the downwardly mobile? From the point of view of the Protestant ethic, one might frame an argument for either alternative, depending upon whether he chose a Calvinist or a Wesleyan emphasis. We decided that it made better sense in the present context to combine non-mobile persons with the downwardly mobile and to contrast this category with the upwardly mobile. Occupational success and achievement represent cultural imperatives in American society. The extent of the rise above the social level of the parents or above the point of entry into the labor force is often taken as a measure of the individual's adherence to the dominant value system with its emphasis upon competitive effort. It therefore seemed appropriate (particularly in view of the white

⁴ W. Lloyd Warner, Marchia Meeker, and Kenneth Eells, *Social Class in America*, Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949, pp. 140-141.

collar, middle-class character of the sample) to separate the upwardly mobile from those who have not been so.

The hypothesis that no significant differences in social mobility patterns would be found between Protestants and Catholics was tested by four cell Chi-square analysis. For each of the four mobility types, Chi-squares were computed within occupational sub-samples, and each occupational sub-sample was divided into those under 35 years of age and those 35 and over. These age categories are called the "Trial Work Period" and the "Stable Work Period" by Miller and Form: they comprise two distinct segments in the career patterns of the respondents, according to these researchers.

The first computation, then, was run on the relationship between religious affiliation and father-son stratum mobility for salesmen under 35, the next for salesmen 35 and over, the next for bankers under 35, and so on until we moved to the next mobility type, career stratum. When this analysis was completed for two age groups within each of three occupations within each of four mobility types, 24 Chi-squares had been computed to test the association between social mobility and religious affiliation. As can be seen in Table 2, only three of these reached even the .05 level of significance, and one of those disappeared when Yates' correction

TABLE 2
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY,[†]
WITHIN OCCUPATION BY AGE CATEGORY

Mobility Measure	Occupation	Age	N	Sum Chi-square	P
Father-son stratum	Salesmen	—35	387	2.13	.20
	Salesmen	35+	182	3.05	.10
	Bankers	—35	72	3.01*	.10
	Bankers	35+	80	4.00*	.05
	Engineers	—35	91	1.35	.30
	Engineers	35+	113	0.07	.80
Career stratum	Salesmen	—35	355	1.14	.30
	Salesmen	35+	206	0.97	.80
	Bankers	—35	44	0.05	.90
	Bankers	35+	63	0.93	.50
	Engineers	—35	90	2.27	.20
	Engineers	35+	94	0.01	.95
Father-son status	Salesmen	—35	414	1.22	.30
	Salesmen	35+	189	3.92*	.05
	Bankers	—35	82	2.88	.10
	Bankers	35+	71	3.46	.10
	Engineers	—35	121	2.16	.20
	Engineers	35+	92	0.58	.90
Career status	Salesmen	—35	379	2.52	.20
	Salesmen	35+	214	0.08	.80
	Bankers	—35	47	1.39	.30
	Bankers	35+	64	0.02	.90
	Engineers	—35	98	3.25	.10
	Engineers	35+	97	0.20	.70

[†] All Chi-squares in this table are with one degree of freedom: Religious Affiliation has been dichotomized as "Protestant" and "Catholic"; Mobility as "Upward" and "Non and Downward."

* Yates correction has been applied.

was applied. A pattern of significance can hardly be suggested by two Chi-squares in a set of twenty-four, and these two are not even for the same mobility measure or the same occupation.

Among the men in these three white-collar occupations there is apparently no relationship between being Catholic or Protestant and being upwardly or downwardly mobile either from the occupational status or stratum of one's father or from one's own previous status or stratum in the labor force.

ASPIRATION AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

It is conceivable that the Protestant ethic might be operative as a value system without producing statistically significant results in performance. For instance, differences in life chances between the social categories being analyzed might obscure its results. Thus at first blush, we should expect an exaggeration rather than a disappearance of mobility differences between Protestants and Catholics in contemporary United States, since it is generally conceded that Protestants have higher status and suffer less discrimination in the job market. However, it must be remembered that the mathematics of the situation could trick us here: a man born into the top stratum of the Census occupational categories has seven occupational strata available for the downward father-son stratum mobility, but he cannot possibly be upwardly mobile by this measure. Similarly, a person who enters the labor force in a job ranked seventh on the Warner scale has six categories into which he can move up, but none into which he can move down.

Secondly, if we accept the dicta of those who tell us that the American class structure is becoming more rigid, we must admit that the subcultures of Protestantism and Catholicism might engender different value systems without producing different rates of mobility, simply because mobility was not available to the striver. To guard against the possible error of concluding that Catholic and Protestant Americans share a value system, where actually they might only share a social structure which does not allow them to implement the differences in their beliefs, we turned to an analysis of data on aspiration.

TABLE 3
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND OCCUPATIONAL ASPIRATION,[†]
WITHIN OCCUPATION BY AGE CATEGORY

Aspiration Measure	Occupation	Age	N	Sum Chi-square	P
Income goal	Salesmen	-35	.412	1.34	.30
	Salesmen	35+	205	0.34	.70
	Bankers	-35	77	0.05	.90
	Bankers	35+	73	0.32	.70
	Engineers	-35	127	0.02	.90
	Engineers	35+	88	2.79	.10
Job orientation	Salesmen	-35	704	0.004	.95
	Salesmen	35+	324	0.54	.50
	Bankers	-35	134	0.35	.70
	Bankers	35+	109	0.56	.50
	Engineers	-35	264	0.27	.70
	Engineers	35+	155	0.44	.70

[†] All Chi-squares in this table are with one degree of freedom: Religious Affiliation has been dichotomized as "Protestant" and "Catholic", Aspiration as "Under \$10,000" and "\$10,000 and over" in the case of Income Goal, "Occupational Mobility" and "Other" in the case of Job Orientation.

Chi-squares were calculated on the relationship between religious affiliation and two other variables: income goal and job orientation. The former was coded from a questionnaire item which asked the respondent, "Regardless of your present salary, what income do you need to enable you to live as you would *like* to live? (This relates to type of housing and general living conditions you may desire ultimately; and your response will not be construed as dissatisfaction with your present salary.)" Answers were dichotomized as "Under \$10,000" and "\$10,000 and over." The job orientation variable was taken from the final item on the personal history, an open-ended question which asked, "What are your plans for the future?" These were classified for the present analysis either as "Occupational Mobility" ("I want to become Sales Manager," "To work my way up in the company," "A more responsible position," and so on) or as "Non Occupation Oriented" ("Buy a place in the country and retire," "Have two more children," "See more of the United States," and so on). As in the mobility computations, both occupational and age controls were instituted.

The results of these twelve Chi-square calculations are presented in Table 3. Not one reaches the .05 level of significance. No relationship is indicated between religious affiliation and either income goal or work-oriented plans for the future.

CONCLUSIONS

We are unable to reject our null hypothesis. This analysis seems to indicate that whatever influence these two religious subcultures have upon their adherents in our society, so far as the Weberian thesis is concerned, is overridden by the general ethos.

This interpretation, however, should be accompanied by one major reservation springing from the nature of the sample. All three occupations investigated are white collar in character and of relatively high status. This should make no difference if we adopt the position that there is a culturally defined success drive shared by persons at all levels of our social structure. Such a position implies the existence of a mobility ethic external to specific occupations. However, Hyman finds inferential evidence that the desire for upward mobility varies with social class level and occupational category. Stress toward upward movement may, then, represent an internal component of some occupational roles. If motivation toward upward mobility is partly a function of occupational role expectations, persons in different occupations will show different attitudes toward mobility which are derived from an internalization of their work roles.

Since all three of the occupations in this sample are middle-class categories, we must entertain the idea that the Catholics in those occupations may be thought of as internalizing the mobility ethic in their occupational roles—in other words, as already participating in the Protestant ethic.

A test of the above reservation must await research on a sample which cuts across stratum lines. Meanwhile, we must conclude that there is no evidence in these data that the Protestant ethic is participated in any less by Catholics than by Protestants in contemporary United States.

14

Population and Resources

Since the days of Malthus, students of population have been concerned not only with the problems of population pressure on resources but also with the differential impact of age, sex, class, occupation, place of residence, and church affiliation on demographic phenomena.

Rupert B. Vance's "Is Theory for Demographers?" points out an urgent need for contemporary students of population to give serious thought to theory-building. Sound demographic theory must be appropriately integrated with the broader theory of general or systematic sociology. All too often research in the field of population has been of the bits-and-pieces variety, with little or no consideration of its relation to more general theory.

In "Population Policies in Communist China," Irene B. Taeuber interprets the demographic and other implications of some present-day population policies and practices. (This paper neatly supplements that in Chapter 20 by Sripati Chandrasekhar dealing with Mao's attack on the traditional Chinese family.)

Rupert B. Vance

Is Theory for Demographers?

Population studies hold high prestige in scientific circles. Each decade multitudes of facts, equivalent in cost to a completely equipped battleship, are gathered at public expense and poured into our waiting calculating machines. Among the social sciences demography has developed some of the most advanced techniques. Our analyses are of the greatest practical use and are eagerly awaited by municipalities, planning boards, and administrators. Empirically and technically, population has gone a long way. And this is no icy perfection. Population has its human interest angle and its materials are much sought after by publicists.

Demography, on the whole, is doing very well these days. We have facts, we have the techniques and we are neatly polishing up our concepts. But there is one area where demography is getting rather poverty-stricken and frayed at the edges. In the realm of high theory we have been living off our capital and borrowing

¹ From *Social Forces*, 1952, 31:9-13. By permission.

from our associates. It seems some time since we have made any investment of our own in basic theory. As demography comes of age it comes to a point of necessity—the necessity of a closer working relationship between its research operations and basic theory. In theory demography remains relatively unstructured. It lacks, shall we say, a binder for its diverse findings. Moreover some findings which have passed for population research among the laity barely reach the level of description. The actual work, it is apparent, was done by the Census Bureau. It is with this in mind that a leading sociologist once told me that the Decennial Census was the worst thing which had happened to sociology in this country. . . . There is such a thing as an excess diet of raw data. Undigested, it is very bad for the development of the theoretical muscles. I am reminded of a boner from a student who was oversold on objectivity. Trying to answer the question: Is sociology scientific? he wrote:

The facts gathered are of value and even though they may not prove a point, it must be remembered that the object is to gather the material and not to prove the point.

I

There exist today striking differences between demography as a field of knowledge and those disciplines with which it is most closely related. These differences are so great that, for good or ill, they are likely to color the future development of our specialty. The development of theoretical systems at a high level of integration is now apparent in fields which touch on population. In economics, in sociology, in social psychology, in the contribution which psychoanalysis and psychiatry are making to the study of human behavior one has the choice of complex thought systems, sophisticated, rationally articulated, and of the highest importance in the tactics and strategy of science. As the validity of these theories is increasingly subjected to test, hypothesis by hypothesis, assumption by assumption, this body of knowledge assumes increasing importance.

In law there is the *Corpus Juris*—the body of the law. In population the nearest we have to a body of theory is several population texts written for the undergraduate student—admittedly not a high level at which to perform the operations of synthesis and integration demanded for theory. In two texts today I find the implication that it is not the task of the demographer to develop high level theory.

Among high level theorists we have Malthus to our fathers. He dates from the early Nineteenth Century and falls among the classical English economists for whom Lord Keynes rendered a superb verdict in one sentence: "The characteristics of the special case assumed by the classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society in which we actually live with the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of experience." Undoubtedly in the beginning Malthus intended to analyze the poverty of nations after the fashion of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Admittedly the theory now falls far short of explaining poverty in the western world for which it was first written in 1800.

We realize that systematic theory is on the wane. High-level theorists admittedly are lone wolves. In the strategy of science we need one generalissimo of basic theory each generation, whether he is forthcoming or not. Certainly these great theories have not proved cumulative; they are competing and conflicting. After systematic theory what next? The consensus of the future to which we demographers look forward will more likely in Robert Merton's phrase come out of

theories of the middle range—"theories intermediate to the minor working hypotheses evolved in abundance during the day by day routines of research, and the all-inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual scheme from which it is hoped to derive a very large number of empirically observed uniformities of social behavior." It is no secret to tell you that hopes exist that, when all the hypotheses of the Indianapolis Study are finally fused, population will have a healthy young theory of the middle range.

We can not let this occasion pass without some attention to the development of concepts in social demography. Admittedly fertility, mortality, and migration are not concepts in any true sense; they are simply topics we investigate. Further evidence of theoretical weakness in our field is demography's failure, in President Conant's phrase, to use the tactics and strategy adequate to develop new and significant concepts. When we realize, for example, the revolutionary impact of the concept of culture on social science we are tempted to ask to what recent concepts of value can we point? Frankly we have neglected to do the rigorous work required to either establish or disprove some of our seminal ideas. I can think of two concepts now suspended halfway between heaven and earth, the concept of optimum population and the theory of intervening opportunities in migration. Both of these examples remind us that since the establishment of any hypothesis is extremely difficult, the scientist's first duty is to so frame his hypothesis that it is also capable of disproof. Only in this way can we rid the field, piece by piece, of doubtful lumber which otherwise will remain to clutter it up forever. Neither of these valuable hypotheses, I submit, is capable of disproof as now framed. Intervening opportunities can hardly be defined except as potentially different for each migrant, and no equation with that many unknowns can be solved. Similarly in optimum population many students accept the economic optimum as only one of many optima. This will leave the concept forever stillborn. And in the economic optimum one factor, the standard of living, has approximately all the variables of intervening opportunities. Since it is not capable of disproof, neither can it be proved.

Systematic theory, middle range concepts and hypotheses, we will not build [in] demography until we learn, like the physical scientists, to repeat and repeat. Our smaller studies, those below the middle range, must be focused more and more on specific hypotheses already set up and embodied in these systematic formulations. Like science everywhere, demographic analysis must be made cumulative. Once we get a good hypothesis let us repeat and repeat until we determine whether it stands or falls.

In many of our allied fields alternative theories compete for the support of scientists and we are allowed the hope that research by research these theories of the middle range will either approach the closure characteristic of a complete thought system or else be found invalid and discarded. Aye, there is the rub. When a thought system is invalidated and discarded, a dozen reputations may perish with it. Who wants to take that risk?

II

If there is room in demography for the timid souls, is there also room for the bold and audacious? In science as in poker, we realize we can play it one of two ways. We can play it close to the vest, that is, maximize description and minimize synthesis, or we can play it for maximum gains of human knowledge. In other words, as Roger Nett says, the working scientist can be either a tight system

builder or a loose system builder. A tight system has high validity and low generality. A line which twists and turns to touch a hundred points in a distribution is worth no more than the hundred points. A line which touches ten points and comes within hailing distance of 90 is usually worth more than the hundred points. It may give the scientist a curve of distribution or an equation of probability for his colleagues to test in a sequence of 100 analyses. "There exists a known tendency for all thought systems to be vulnerable." Accordingly the closer one sticks to his data, the less vulnerable are his generalizations and oftentimes the less important. A loose thought system sacrifices accuracy for the sake of generalization.

In science when one plays for double or nothing, he runs the risk of evolving a system of high generalizations and low validity. Obviously this represents high vulnerability and we are all cautious enough to dread the results. But we should remember there are two forms of maximum error: The first is a system that misses contact with the known facts at every point of observation. The second is no system at all. This is maximum error, for it equates with total ignorance. As a matter of fact, I am willing to make the claim that he who develops a theory capable of being proved invalid makes a contribution. In statistics the disproof of any hypothesis is accepted as a way station on the road to knowledge. Demographers should become brave enough to so state their hypotheses that they are capable of disproof.

Thus far I have been talking about the demographer as a personality, willing or unwilling to take the risks of his profession. As a collectivity, demography should set about organizing its strategy to support shock troops who take calculated risks for theory. In a manuscript which I have been permitted to read in advance of publication, J. J. Spengler demonstrates the extent to which the study of population remains relatively unstructured as to theory and uncircumscribed as to scope. "A variety of scientists," he writes, "have contributed to the development of what currently passes for population theory and their separate contributions have not yet been transfused into an integrated whole."

There is great need for the development of integrated theory of a high order to serve as a "binder" for demography's diverse and particularized findings. Such theory should meet three criteria, says Professor Spengler: (1) It must be dynamic rather than static, (2) it must take account of demographic interrelations as between countries and groups within nations, and (3) it requires a multi-science approach.

I am happy to say I believe the framework for one such theory is now emerging. In concise statement, the transition from high-level deaths and births to the new equilibrium at a low level of vital rates furnishes the population dynamics of the last 300 years in the Western world. The line of succession runs from Dr. Walter Willcox whose studies of world population growth opened up this whole field to Dr. Frank Notestein who has done so much to clinch the analysis. This Demographic Revolution unfolds and diffuses in a manner reminiscent of the Industrial Revolution. Different countries reach different stages of this transition in terms of (1) a time sequence in the West and (2) in terms of culture contacts and time stages as regards non-Western countries. Population status, age, and even sex composition, can then be viewed as stages in this long sequence. Our own low crude death rates and low proportions of natural dependents can be seen as a transitional stage in age distribution which may later level off.

The swarming of Europe is seen as due to the demographic gap which emerged as fertility remained high for 100 years and more after deaths took a sharp decline.

Differential fertility emerged in the initial stage of the great decline in birth rates. Outside the West no countries now appear to have the demographic slack which new continents and untapped industrial markets once offered Europe. Demographic movements in succeeding countries, however, are to be judged by economic stages and cultural diffusion as well as the resistance to change within each culture. Such an over-all view can give meaning to the many descriptive population studies now made country by country. If this transition proceeds in orderly sequence it will be the function of demographic studies to classify populations by stage and sequence. But since populations and countries vary, demographers have a choice. They can either explain these variations in the scheme or demolish the basic theory by a critical analysis of succeeding population movements.

It is agreed, I take it, that the function of theory is not to give answers to all the questions which may rise; rather it is to see that in the unfolding of science the "right" questions get asked in the "right" context. Such theories of the middle range in Merton's phrase also serve to set known facts in meaningful context. Demographic fluctuations anywhere can then be tested as short-run movements against the background of this long-run demographic transition. Beginning and ending phases of this great transition, however, will remain unclear: the first because our beginnings run back to inadequate data, the second because closing phases will always remain in the future. An incidental contribution of this scheme is to place the work of Malthus in the perspective of history.

That demography must attend more sharply to its basic theory is indicated in this very field of dynamics. What are long-run and what are short-run phenomena in demography? What is trend and what is a fluctuation? And how long can a fluctuation last before it becomes a trend? Are there reversals in trends?

In fertility analysis it is this problem which caught demographers unprepared. Texts in the hands of our students continued to proclaim decline while the figures showed an amazing upsurge. It is this phenomenon which led Dr. Frank Notestein to the wry comment that to some, demographers now appear as "double distilled false prophets"—prophets who, proven wrong, persist in staying wrong.

Demography can put controversy in its place only as it develops basic theory. Other disciplines have faced this problem and come up with answers based on theoretical models complex enough to encompass alternatives. Techniques in this field can still be used to test broadly stated theoretical systems. Empirical operations without basic theory, no matter how carefully safeguarded, are now proved dangerous. Finally, it is my feeling that these controversies hasten the development of systematic theory.

Such theory—now in process of being filled in—satisfies two of Professor Spengler's requirements: (1) it is dynamic and (2) it takes account of interrelations between countries and classes. It raises, however, the question of a multi-science approach to theory. Interesting to note, the theory of the demographic transition has been the contribution of population specialists developed largely from the consideration of historic changes in the field of vital rates. It did not come out of the theoretical matrix of either biology, sociology or economics. In certain ways the multi-science orientation of demography has operated to delay the development of population theory. Eclecticism is not conducive to the development of unified theory. Biological explanations of changing vital rates have proved immature and completely inadequate; sociologists have not yet developed an adequate theory of social change; economists have often felt obliged to limit their work to direct economic causation. With a theoretical scheme of its own, com-

parable to its techniques, population study has been able to attain a certain unity of attack.

But as we heard Professor W. F. Ogburn argue so eloquently before the Population Association last year, population study must make its further advances by establishing interrelations and correlations as yet unknown. The dynamics of population need to be integrated with some basic theory of social change. There is no escaping the complexity of the problem of interrelation which demography faces. Population study must seek in the dynamics of culture, the economy, and changing society itself the primary conditions of its own dynamics. And then population change itself operates as a starter. As new demographic conditions emerge—mature age composition, new family size, increasing and then decreasing class differentials, lowered rates of natural dependents—social scientists have the task of seeing how such factors initiate change in the society and in the economy. Truly the work of analysis and theory has just begun if we accept the task of tracing major change through nations and classes from Occident to Orient.

But I forget myself. This is but one theory of many, and I am not attempting here to write the prescription for our theory. I do believe, however, that the best spring tonic demographers can take is a good stiff dosage of theory, adequately compounded. There is a level of complexity to which all our scientific disciplines must aspire or resign their task—namely the creation of valid and significant theory. There is, I take it, work for all. Let us then be about our business.

Irene B. Taeuber

Population Policies in Communist China¹

On November 1, 1954, the State Statistics Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of China announced the results of a census—registration taken in major part as of midnight on June 30, 1953. The total population was reported as 602 million. Deleting the 7.6 million Chinese accepted as the population of Taiwan and the 11.7 million other Chinese outside the Mainland left the population of the Mainland as 583 million. . . . There was also an official statement that a survey of more than 30 million people showed a birth rate of 37 per 1,000 total population, a death rate of 17, and hence a rate of natural increase of 20. If these results are valid, a rate of natural increase of two per cent per year is producing annual increases amounting to more than 12 million.

The initial public reaction to the fact—or belief—that the numbers of the Chinese exceeded 600 million was one of jubilation. There was the ancient identification of numbers with the power of the state, the anticipation of greater power as numbers became greater, pride in China and the Chinese as the most populated of the world's lands and the most numerous of its peoples, derision of the skeptics who believed China weakened by its numbers. Pai Chien-hua of the Census Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs acclaimed the 600 million as the "great force for Socialist reconstruction . . . the most precious of all the categories of capital," and ridiculed "the bourgeois economists who cling to bankrupt Malthusian theories of population." China, he said, was a country with vast amounts of virgin

¹ From *Population Index*, 1956, 22:261-274. By permission.

land and unexplored natural resources where rates of growth in production far exceeded rates of population increase.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSITION

The propaganda against Neo-Malthusian imperialists and the omnipresent promises of a forthcoming millennium under the Communist order have been new and verbal aspects of the post-revolutionary period. . . .

One can only speculate as to what happened when the bureaucracy in Peking became immersed in the arithmetic of an overall five-year plan, a twelve-year plan for the development of agriculture, and plans of unspecified durations to educate all children and to extend the beneficent facilities of the state to all mothers. If the rate of growth were really two per cent per year and the count of 583 million for the Mainland population as of June 30, 1953, were accurate, the population would have increased to about 625 million by the end of 1956. There may be considerable debate concerning the population capacity of China under conditions of maximum utilization of modern scientific knowledge. There can be little doubt that rates of natural increase of two to three per cent per year would retard the speed of any concurrent drives for industrialization, for advancing consumption levels, and for raising educational standards.

The population problem faced by Mainland China was similar to that in other Asian countries except that the magnitude was greater and the sense of urgency was stronger. Modernization that included economic development and health activities brought decreases in death rates but left birth rates relatively unaffected. Increasing rates of population growth brought social and economic problems that seemed to have no direct solutions. There was no way whereby birth rates could be reduced quickly and easily to correspond to the lowered death rates. The elimination of growth through deliberate raising of death rates was neither culturally nor politically feasible. The desires of the people for health and life were tremendous; reductions in the crusades to swat flies, kill mosquitoes, eliminate filth, and secure insecticides and antibiotics could not even be considered.

The problem of increasing population had no easy solution, but it was one that could not be evaded. All the sons of the peasants could not be absorbed efficiently in agriculture. Internal developments could provide opportunities for some of them, but continuing absorption of a natural increase such as that to be anticipated in a modernizing China would involve serious difficulties. . . . The accumulation of people in the villages was not a feasible solution to the problem, for the country needed surplus food from the rural areas to feed the proliferating urban and industrial populations. Moreover, food and agricultural commodities were needed for export in exchange for the materials and products essential to economic development.

. . . Actions taken between the fall of 1954 and the present indicate substantial movement toward a decision to use the propaganda facilities and the administrative organization of the government to encourage urban and village dwellers alike to practice family limitation. Description and evaluation of the events that have already occurred and of the prospects for future pronouncements and activities are difficult. . . . The correspondence between directives from Peking and events in the peasant society can be judged only on the basis of the statements of journalists. . . .

The processes whereby the need for family limitation was accepted in theory and adopted as government policy should be noted in summary form prior to a

somewhat more detailed consideration of the arguments in the propaganda, the question of means, and the procedures of implementation.

The hazardous transition from the orthodox Marxian position against "over-population" to concern over the burdens of bearing and rearing children was made without jeopardy to the central party organization or the publicized personalities of the regime. The main spokesman on the subject of birth control seems to have been Shao Li-tzu, a deputy to the National People's Congress but a late convert from the old regime. He spoke first to the People's Congress on September 18, 1954. Speculation as to the significance of his cautious statement was ended early in 1955 when people of unquestioned stature in the Party wrote in the official publications of various organizations. For instance, an article on the approach to the problem of birth control appeared in *Hsin Chung-kuo fu-nü* [New China's Woman], the journal of the All China Federation of Democratic Women. Chou Ngo-feng, a gynecologist, described the techniques of contraception in *Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien* [China Youth], the organ of the Communist Youth League. Major theorists defined the problem and divorced the concept of birth control from that of Neo-Malthusianism. A legal basis was prepared that permitted not only contraception but also abortion and sterilization. . . . An intensive campaign to extend knowledge and practice was ordered by the Minister of Health in early August of this year.

It is difficult to summarize the steps whereby the government of Mainland China accepted the extension of planned parenthood as one of its legitimate functions. There was no population commission, and there is no statement of government policy as such. The movement toward action has been cautious and circuitous. The first public statement, already noted, that of Deputy Shao Li-tzu to the National People's Congress on September 18, 1954, was much in the tradition of the past: China had great areas but there were calamities of a localized nature. Needs for development were great and the people were backward. An over-large population presented many problems. The difficulty stressed was that of building schools rapidly enough to keep up with the increasing numbers of children reaching school age each year. There were references to the sufferings of mothers with too many children; and denials of Neo-Malthusianism were coupled with references to Lenin. However, the argument proceeded from the national ills to the prescription of birth limitation for families.

The statement of a position that was pure from the standpoint of the Party had to resolve substantial ideological conflicts. The ancient problems of the rice lands presented few difficulties, for the survival of these man-land maladjustments under a socialist organization could be blamed on the iniquities of the old exploitative order. The new problems of the relations between economic development, public health, and rapid population increase were more difficult, for each of these individually was a vaunted goal of the new regime. The solution lay in repudiating Neo-Malthusianism and the economic arguments as to the retarding effects of high rates of growth but accepting birth limitation for personal, family, and party reasons.

The broad position that retains Marx, repudiates Malthus, hurls invectives at Neo-Malthusians, and advocates the limitation of births was presented by Yang Ssu-ying in *Hsüeh-hsi* [Study] on October 2, 1955. Here, in the party's major journal for ideological studies, there has been no overt ideological compromise. Indeed, "the Malthusian theory of population is the most reactionary among the theories of the social sciences in capitalist society." There is no absolute over-

population and there are no general demographic-economic laws. Instead, resting on page 796 of Vol. 1 of Marx's *Capital* as issued by the People's Publishing Press in 1953, Yang Ssu-ying states that "each special form of productive society has a special set of laws applicable to it." The relative population surpluses of the capitalist system were due to the operation of the principle of wealth accumulation in the capitalist society. Under capitalism, there is "a continual increase in the ranks of the proletariat . . . the supply of labor power surpassing the average needs for labor power on the part of the capitalist." Under the law of socialism, there is a "continuous and rapid increase in population accompanied, however, by a relatively higher standard of material well-being of the populace and by diminishing sickness and mortality rates with simultaneously a full and more rational utilization of employment of people possessing labor power."

Then the theoretical hurdle from anti-Malthusianism to birth control is taken with a jibe:

There are some people who having come across articles on methods of birth control in newspapers and magazines in our country are inclined gleefully to say, "Look! The Communists too need Malthus no less than they need Marx."

The crux of the arguments with reference to family limitation merits quotation:

In giving publicity to notes on methods of birth control our newspapers and magazines had not been inspired by the belief that we were overpopulated. On the contrary, they did so having in mind that our country had been at one time a colonial or semi-colonial country and one that was semi-feudalistic and under imperialist rule so that economically, socially, culturally, and in regard to general welfare facilities we have been rather backward. . . . Viewed from the standpoint of individual families, the fact that there are too many children in a family unduly increases the burden of the parents and affects adversely their work, their study of political doctrines, and their general livelihood. Similarly the children's education may be profoundly affected. In view of the above, in order to lessen the difficulties currently facing us, to protect the health of maternity womanhood and finally to ensure that the next generation may be brought up better, we are not at all opposed to birth control. At the same time the publicity given by certain newspapers and magazines to methods of birth control is also necessary as well as proper. This has no point in common with Malthus' theory at all. . . .

The conclusion reverts to the campaign against Neo-Malthusianism. Since, it is argued, the circulation of the theory only serves the forces of reaction, ". . . we should, with firm resolve, refute and continue unceasingly to expose the deceptive nature of this reactionary and fallacious doctrine."

There is substantial evidence that the unbounded optimism of old and the undiluted orthodoxy of the Marxian thesis survive alongside the new duality in demographic argument. Chen Po-ta, one of the theorists of the Party, stated this position in a report submitted to the February 2, 1956, session of the Second Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference:

There are still some people in China who believe the preposterous "theory of overpopulation" of Malthus. The collapse of the so-called law of diminishing returns of the fertility of soil is . . . a proof of the nonsense of the Malthusian population theory. . . . There is no sign of overpopulation in China. The truth is that China's agricultural productive power was seriously damaged by the reactionary rule of foreign imperialists, feudal landlords, and the Kuomintang before China was liberated. . . . Of course we do not deny the importance of the food question to our work of Socialist construction. The way to solve this question is to change agriculture from the system of individual economy to the system of cooperation. . . .

The proof of the nonexistence of a real population problem is held to lie in the target for grain production required by the National Program for Agriculture. The plan requires a doubling of grain output in twelve years. Thus, according to Chen Po-ta, "China can provide room for at least another 600 million people. Twelve years later, there will certainly be still greater developments in agriculture."

THE ARGUMENT OF THE PROPAGANDA

Marxian orthodoxy with its refusal to admit overpopulation, surplus population, the pressure of population on resources, or demographic deterrents to capital formation bars many of the arguments for birth control that have been prevalent in the West and in Japan. No appeals for consideration of the fate of the national economy are permissible. There are other differences. In a socialist state where agriculturalists are being moved into cooperatives, fears for old age and desires for children as social security cannot be regarded as forces buoying an overabundant fertility. Health and other family and personal reasons for family limitation remain, together with the duty of the individual to serve the society and the responsibilities of parents for the development of children.

The most concise statement of the basic motif in the birth control propaganda of Mainland China was given in the introduction of the subject to the All China Federation of Democratic Women:

Birth control is to regulate the spacing of childbirth by means of contraceptive methods. It is aimed to protect the health of the mothers and children, so that women can be bodily strong to better serve the cause of Socialist construction and to give full attention and good education to the new generation.

The elaboration of the relationship of maternity to health considers a variety of factors that are similar to the listings of the woes of the poor in the early social surveys of Western countries. In the advice to Communist youth, it is stated that:

... production cannot be brought to a high level at one stroke, and the life of the people cannot be improved speedily on a large scale. During the course of the past several years, the State has paid great attention to the founding of undertakings to look after the welfare of the children and to take care of the health of the women and infants. But this has not completely solved the difficulties encountered by the parents. In some cases the children are not properly developed in embryo due to the ill-health of their mothers, and are born unhealthy or dead. In some cases, because of the bad financial condition and lack of energy of their parents, some children are not nurtured properly. It is particularly true with the young couples who are still in the course of growing up. They need time to learn and their financial capacity is far from sound. To them, the birth of too many children would mean great hardship.

Positive elements predominate in the health arguments, despite the use of tales of over-frequent childbearing, fatigued mothers, stillborn infants, and sickly children. Health is not for its own sake but to permit the mothers to continue their studies or to work for the realization of the new order.

In the statements on birth control in the party journals, major emphasis is placed on the individual nature of the decision concerning limitation practices. It is the duty of the state, and particularly the medical doctors and the health services, to give information, advice, and guidance to those seeking it. In the writing of the leaders and the theorists, people should be educated concerning the nature and availability of limitation practices, but there should be no coercion.

There are other but less frequent motifs in the fragments of literature that are available. The happiness of married couples is mentioned occasionally. The advocacy of late marriage as a means of limiting fertility is regarded as a trick of the Malthusians; its pernicious effects are said to be obvious. A wide knowledge of birth control, it is held, would permit student marriages, continued study, and progressively greater contributions of individuals to their society.

There are also answers to the common fears of people concerning birth control. Education for contraception will prevent the tragic consequence of the resort to nonmedical abortions. It is recognized that some "demoralized and decadent survivors" of the old regime may use contraceptives in a life of laxity. This, it appears, is neither a problem for the doctors nor a blot on the banners of limited but planned parenthood. . . .

THE QUESTION OF MEANS

The reduction of fertility can proceed through a variety of means. Institutions or adjustments that keep major classes of a population celibate obviously reduce the proportionate childbearing of the total population. Late age at marriage and deterrents to, or taboos on, remarriage reduce the years of childbearing and so reduce total fertility. Severe malnutrition, debilitating disease, and other factors may lessen rates of conception and decrease the proportion of conceptions carried through to the delivery of a viable infant. Planned actions of individuals may permit coitus without conception, eliminate the foetus prior to independent viability, or destroy the newly born. Many of the factors in the cultural milieu, the social institutions, and the levels of physiological functioning are subject to governmental manipulation and hence may be parts of population policies; but they are not included in the practices referred to as "birth control." That term is limited to the deliberate actions of individuals, those actions having as a consequence the reduction in the numbers of births.

The term "birth control" itself has no internationally accepted meaning other than that implicit in the words themselves. In many cultures it is a generic term that includes contraception (the prevention of conception) and abortion (the elimination of the product of conception). It may or may not include that gamut of practices whose consequence is the death of the infant at or soon after birth. These practices include direct infanticide; exposure, desertion, or other action where death is probable but not inevitable; gross neglect in the period soon after birth; and a generally lessened level of care so that survival becomes less probable.

In Mainland China the problems of terminology and propriety are alike great. Again and again the reference phrase is "birth control and contraception" rather than either used alone. The Chinese language permits a distinction between birth control as a generic term including contraception, abortion, and sterilization, and contraception as the prevention of conception. As in Japan, however, the distinctions tend to be ones of means without sharp ethical or religious connotations. And, again as in Japan, common usage is likely to involve a generic and quite non-specific interpretation.

The discussions of birth control in the party journals and the press are so written that the uninitiated reader is likely to make a facile identification of birth control with contraception. The discussions of birth control as a contribution of modern science refer specifically to contraception. The advice to Communist youth on birth control includes all the standard techniques of modern contraception.

Abortion is cited as a harmful practice, a carry-over from the old regime, an evil that will be eradicated as medical doctors with their knowledge of scientific means of contraception replace the untrained and uneducated operators in the field. There is little consideration of infanticide or infant neglect.

The regulations of the Ministry of Health with reference to abortion are cast in medical and health terms, though with references to the requirements of work and study. As early as 1954 abortion was permitted "... where continued pregnancy is considered medically undesirable, where the spacing of children is already too close, and where a mother with her baby only four months old has become pregnant again and experiences difficulties in breast feeding." At this time, the performance of the operation required the joint application of husband and wife, medical certification, and the approval of the party organization to which the couple belonged. The removal of these latter provisions for certification of need would make the legal situation in Mainland China quite comparable to that in Japan after the spring of 1952 when a similar requirement for certification was removed from the law. It is highly significant, therefore, that when Vice-Minister of Health Fu Lien-chang was questioned by a *China Youth* correspondent, he stated that it was necessary to ease the restrictions on induced abortions and expressed the hope that "health agencies and medical personnel in all areas will consider the requests and the difficulties of those who apply, and appropriately ease the restrictions when deliberating approval for induced abortions." The Vice-Minister added that his remarks should not be construed as approval of abortion under all circumstances, and that contraception was "the best way of birth control."

The interplay of the familial values of the old society and the economic imperatives of the new emerge in clear focus in the discussions of sterilization and its role in the reduction of family size. Initially sterilization was repudiated as inconsistent with the culture of China; it was argued that Chinese with their love of children and their veneration of family continuity would never accept the permanent elimination of the possibility of having children. Then sterilization began to be mentioned as a means of contraception whose unique advantage was its permanence. Finally there was advocacy of sterilization as the most feasible means of limiting fertility. Sterilization of the male requires a single simple operation. It thus eliminates the continuing burdens on medical personnel implicit in a widespread resort to abortions. Moreover, it solves the serious problem of a use of sparse imported materials for other than industrial purposes which is implicit in a nationwide use of contraceptives. It is also held that sterilizations performed by modern techniques would lessen the pressures placed on hospitals and health services by the high rates of childbearing that now exist.

The limitations placed on sterilization operations by the Ministry of Health are being reduced gradually, although they remain substantial. Sterilization was restricted initially to those having more than six children, then to those having four or more. Regardless of the number of children, though, the operation is limited to families in which the woman is over 30 years of age, in bad health, economically poor, and actively engaged in study.

IMPLEMENTATION

The preparations of theoretical positions and the issuance of laws and regulations are intellectual activities that can be pursued at a distance from the realities

of life and death throughout the vast areas of the country. As has been noted earlier, the verbal basis for population policy in Communist China achieved a rather high level of sophistication. The discussions of the acceptability of family limitation and of the means of achieving it, however, are so naive as to suggest that those demographers and public health doctors who were concerned with the problem in the last quarter century of the Nationalist regime are not influential in the councils of the Communists. In the spring of 1955 deputies of the National People's Congress who made inspection trips to the villages discovered that rural women did not know of contraception but did think that they had too many children. The conclusion from this was simple; all that was needed to produce major reductions in fertility was the spread of knowledge on modern contraception and the provision of supplies.

The problem of means is receiving serious attention; the Minister of Health is reported to be collecting the sacred formulae of the herbalists as a part of research on formulae for contraceptives. The reports and the discussions are curious combinations of modern science and ancient lore. The following formula of advanced herbalist Yeh Hsi-chun, Deputy of the National People's Congress, was presented seriously:

Fresh tadpoles coming out in the spring should be washed clean in cold well water, and swallowed whole three or four days after menstruation. If a woman swallows fourteen live tadpoles on the first day and ten more on the following day, she will not conceive for five years. If contraception is still required after that, she can repeat the formula twice, and be forever sterile. . . . This formula is good in that it is effective, safe, and not expensive. The defect is that it can be used only in the spring.

The action program of the government has lagged considerably behind its stated position. In July of 1954 the Minister of Health submitted regulations concerning birth control to the Government Administrative Council for approval, but reports in the following months indicate that there were delays in action programs. In 1955 the National People's Congress forwarded a proposal for intensive effort to the Minister of Health. In June, 1956, it was announced that a report on birth control had been issued. Then on June 19, Li Te-ch'uan, the Minister of Health, reported directly on her delinquencies to the National People's Congress:

We have failed to adequately popularize birth control which may be beneficial to the health of mothers and children, to the education program for children, and to the prosperity of our nation. From now on, we must develop our work concerning publicity and education and strengthen our work of providing technical leaders.

Various activities seem to have been undertaken in the period from 1954 to early 1956, however inadequate they may have been. It was reported that contraceptive supplies were on sale at the stores of the government-managed China Medical Company. Educational activities were reported as beginning, the party groups and the cooperative organizations being the channels of communication.

Suspicion that the magnitude of the campaign was limited was implicit in Li Te-ch'uan's statement to the National People's Congress on June 19. On August 14, a Radio Peking broadcast carried the announcement that on August 6 the Minister of Health had directed all health offices to push a campaign to spread information about birth control techniques. The campaign will involve the use of publicity posters, special provisions for a wide distribution of supplies; and an

educational campaign that will move from doctors through women's organizations, labor groups, and associations of teachers.

THE BROADER FRAMEWORK

Viewed in the broader perspective of total population policy, the crusade for family limitation appears peripheral to the main goals of the Communists. Industrialization is regarded as the major solution to problems of population and poverty, but the extension of land cultivation and food production is an essential part of the economic developments now in process or contemplated. . . . The eastern central provinces have very high densities; the northern and western peripheral areas are sparsely settled. The obvious policy implications have been drawn. The densely settled provinces should be sources for the manpower needed to develop the economy and insure the strategic security of the border areas. The Economic Planning Commission has been assigned the task of moving millions of people to resettlement projects that extend from Sinkiang around to the far north.

There are also tremendous drives behind some of the social campaigns. The Marriage Law of 1950 and the subsequent activities designed to eliminate the feudal aspects of family relations are direct assaults on the family system and the ancient role of women. In so far as they penetrate the populations in the rural areas they will transform the bases for family life and reproduction from unquestioned acceptance of the traditional ways to rational striving for individual survival and advancement in the service of the state and its ideals.

It remains to be seen whether the assault on high fertility will achieve a momentum comparable to that of the development and reform programs whose ideological positions are centered firmly in Communist thinking and Chinese national aspirations. It should be noted, furthermore, that genuinely intensive drives for the reduction of births would involve critical choices in the use of sparse personnel and resources. Doctors, other health personnel, and health facilities are too few for the health programs now in process. Work in family planning would have to compete with work in the control of tuberculosis, malaria, and the infectious diseases. If the difficulties involved in population increase were less great, there would have to be considerable skepticism as to whether the Communist leaders would choose to slow the speed of their industrialization and to lessen the intensity of their health campaigns in order to achieve substantial reductions in fertility. Given the present situation, and the realization on the part of the central government of that situation, rational considerations would indicate that priority be given to the reduction of fertility. . . .

The emphasis in the previous discussions has been placed on the question as to whether or not Communist China would wage a really intensive and adequately supported campaign to reduce fertility through all classes of the population, and particularly in the rural areas. If such a campaign should be waged, there is the further question of its effectiveness. There is no historical precedent for the answer to this question, for no country has waged such a campaign at the beginning of its drive for economic and social transformation. The influence of the legalization of abortions in the Soviet Union at an earlier period was largely an urban phenomenon; Japan's precipitant drop in fertility came after a century of forced economic development, and it came after national fertility had been declining slowly for perhaps three-quarters of a century.

If an intensive campaign for family limitation had come within the context of

the traditional rural society, all the experience of China itself and of other countries in and outside Asia would have indicated a high degree of skepticism as to the possibility either of swift changes in family values or of a rapid acceptance of rational planning of family size. The situation today is not so predictable. Mainland China has a society in revolution. The new order combines the police state and the terror with a driving ideology that is at once political, economic, and social. Vast physical dislocations are occurring alongside changes in the organization of agriculture, redefinitions of the role of women, and major assaults on the Confucian relationships. For some eight years now youth have been subjected to the activities, the indoctrinations, and the controls of a Communist regime. The party organization and its correlated group associations provide channels for contact and influence at the family level even in the remote villages. If the drive to reduce fertility should be intensive and conformity to a small family pattern should be made an objective manifestation of party orthodoxy, there could be powerful pressures on women to avoid additional pregnancies or, if they occurred, to terminate them in abortion.

The future course of the population of Mainland China has become even more of an enigma than its present size and rates of growth. It is possible to discuss the limits within which the future course of that population must lie if one accepts the initial assumption that the Communist state maintains its political control and succeeds in achieving a rate of economic advance somewhat more rapid than its rate of population growth. Given the continuation of health activities in the modern setting, it is not conceivable to the student of population that birth rates could be dropped to the relatively lower levels of the death rates except over a considerable period of time. There are high probabilities that health campaigns to reduce deaths will achieve far greater initial success than campaigns to reduce births, and hence that rates of population growth will increase. This conclusion would remain, whatever the intensity of the present campaigns or of those that may be initiated in the near future. In other words, in the absence of economic collapse, the population will grow much larger than it is at present. The question concerns the amount of the growth, not the fact of growth. If economic development continues as assumed, birth rates will begin to decline in the industrializing areas and among the more educated groups of the population, but that decline will be slow. In the modern world, an increase of one to two per cent per year is not a high rate of population growth. The actual rate may go above three per cent in Mainland China, as it has in less populous countries elsewhere. A many-fold increase in total population is implicit in the Chinese economic-demographic situation—if the economy can support the population that it generates.

.

15

Population Differentials

Many and varied influences play upon birth and death rates and upon the conditions of health of any population. These include age, sex, class status, and other factors. The present chapter presents two papers on specific aspects of such differential effects.

The first, William F. Ogburn's "Population, Private Ownership, Technology, and Standard of Living," defends the thesis that the level and extent of technology are the most significant elements in the interplay of these factors. The second, by Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and Evelyn M. Kitagawa, discusses the "Demographic Characteristics and Job Mobility of Migrants in Six Cities" of the United States—three relatively stable, the others subject to rapid change.

William Fielding Ogburn

Population, Private Ownership, Technology and the
Standard of Living¹

The wealth of nations has been the subject of much distinguished writing. Nowadays we speak of "income" rather than "wealth." And, more recently, in an age of the "welfare" state, much reference is made to the "standard of living"—a less exact term—which usually refers to an economic plane of living in actual existence and not to a moral or spiritual standard.

In this paper four factors that affect differences in the standard of living of peoples will be considered: population, natural resources, organization, and technology. Actually, these factors are interrelated and not independent.

The term "population" refers to quantity, which has meaning only as it is related to the size of an area. The theory is that, if all other factors are constant, generally the greater the population, the lower the standard of living, particularly in agricultural areas; though it is probably true that in some sparsely settled countries an increasing population for a time would have meant an increasing standard of living if other factors had remained the same.

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1951, 56:314-319. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

Natural resources vary in quality of soil and variety and extent of minerals as well as in sun, moisture, and temperature. A people with meager natural resources will have a lower standard of living than a people with the same technology and more abundant natural resources.

"Organization" in this context refers to economic organization, though it is tied in with political and social organization. The concept of economic organization is separate from the concept of technology, though actually they are very closely related.

The economic organization of a state may be one in which productive industry belongs to private owners or is owned by government or owned by both in various combinations. It is customary to contrast today these types under the names "communism" and "capitalism." From the organizational point of view, communism and socialism are much alike. "Private capitalism" is not a very satisfactory term, for it implies not only private ownership but also capital goods which are the subject matter of technology. So private capitalism is really a combination of technology and private ownership. These types of organizations, even with the same technology, may affect the standard of living of the people. The economic organization in other cultures than our modern ones, as of hunting peoples, of herders, or of those with a hoe culture, have varying standards of living in the order named, but in these cases the technology differs. It is difficult to separate organization from technology.

By "technology" we mean the knowledge of the production of material goods, and by extension it includes applied physical science. The standard of living is obviously related to the tools of production, that is, technology. For instance, the standard of living of the Stone Age American Indian, two hundred years ago at the foot of Lake Michigan, was lower than that of the present-day Chicagoan, with his advanced machines.

Probably all will admit the validity of the claims for the influence of these variables on the standard of living. But what we should like to know is the degree of influence of each. This question has arisen particularly in a comparison of the effects of communism and of private ownership or free enterprise on the standard of living. In the discussion of this topic it seems to be assumed that communism and private ownership are the main determinants of the standard of living. For instance, in *Time* magazine in an article showing that for seven items of consumption about ten times as many hours of labor were required to earn enough money to purchase them in the Soviet Union as in the United States, the following comment is made: "They . . . prove . . . that 30 years after the Revolution, Russia was still giving its workers 10 per cent of what an 'exploited' worker under

TABLE 1
MINUTES OF LABOR REQUIRED TO EARN MONEY TO PURCHASE ARTICLES
IN U.S.S.R. AND IN THE UNITED STATES

Item	In U.S.S.R.	In United States
Rye bread, pound	31	7
Wheat bread, pound	70	7.5
Veal, pound	315	34.5
Butter, pound	642	48.5
Beer, bottle	171	6.25
Cotton dress	1,911	142
Woolen suit	34,815	1,684

capitalism got for his labor." (See Table 1.) Similar figures have been quoted in newspapers and by speakers, with the suggestion or implication that the reason a Russian worker can buy so much less for an hour's labor than a worker in the United States can is somehow due to a difference between communism and private ownership. Thus a leaflet distributed by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company at the Chicago Fair of 1950 contains the following statement:

America has only 1/16 of the world's population, and about the same proportion of land and natural resources. But America has more than 1/2 of the world's telephone, telegraph, radio networks; more than 1/3 of the railways, and about 3/4 of the automobiles and almost 1/2 of the radios. Just what is it that has given Americans the highest income, the most goods, the best quality, and the lowest prices on earth? It is free enterprise.

A little reflection of course, reminds one that there are other things besides organization in the standard of living.

Further consideration suggests that the hours of labor as an index of values might be used to indicate the degree of importance of the four factors just described—population, organization, natural resources, and density—on the comparative wealth of peoples. Accordingly, we chose for comparison five countries: China, India, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

China before the war had private ownership of production, with a low technology, abundant natural resources, and a dense population. India's status was much like China's in these respects, but with a somewhat more advanced technology, though one not highly developed. The United Kingdom has about 80 per cent private ownership and is the most densely populated of the five countries, with a highly developed technology, though not so extensive or so efficient as that of the United States, and with rather good natural resources. The U.S.S.R. has extensive socialism, is not a very densely populated country, has excellent natural resources, with a technology somewhat more developed than that of China and India but not so advanced as that of the United Kingdom and the United States. The latter is favored by a small population for the size of its territory, a very advanced technology, abundant natural resources, and private ownership.

Let us see how much an hour's labor will buy of a common list of articles in each of these countries with varied technology, population, density, and politico-economic organization, as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2
MINUTES OF LABOR REQUIRED TO EARN ENOUGH MONEY TO BUY
ARTICLES OF CONSUMPTION

Article	United States	United Kingdom	U.S.S.R.	India	China
Cotton cloth, yard	23	45	(276) (1)	96	180
Bread, pound	6	5	30
Flour, pound	4	5	..	26	(144)
Fish, pound	19	23	170	216	300
Peas, pound	7	17	212	156	170
Sugar, pound	4	9	(140)	(190)	(204)
Rice, pound	8	17	..	84	58
Beef, pound	29	26	(254)	(240)	(280)
Eggs, dozen	27	55	(382)	(348)	(360)
Tea, pound	56	72	(1,506)	(408)	(370)

(1) [Parentheses indicate little use of the item in that particular country.]

The low prices in the United States can hardly be due to private ownership of productive industry, since India and China (1937) have private ownership, and their prices are quite high. The industry of India is not highly developed; yet in the cities theirs is a commercial economy, with private ownership and a free-enterprise system. Perhaps the influence of private ownership on prices in India and China may be offset by the large populations of these countries. But it should be remembered that the density of population is greater in Britain than in India or China, and Britain has low prices as compared with India and China, though the people of the United Kingdom draw more of their food from an area outside their national boundaries than do the other nations here discussed. Therefore, the concept of density should be qualified for Britain. That these differences in price levels are not caused by population density is further indicated by Russia, which has a low figure for population density, yet rather high prices. Russia's density figures rest in part upon a cold, barren land in the north, and her prices are probably unduly high because of her war-preparation effort, which diverts much income from better to cannon. Still, the Soviet Union, not densely populated like Britain, India, and China, has prices somewhat comparable to those of China and India. Indeed, the density of the Soviet Union is not greatly different from that of the United States, yet her prices are so much higher that it is hard to explain the difference in terms of war effort. If population density were the determining factor, then the prices in the United States and the U.S.S.R. should be more nearly the same.

Since Russia has low population density and high prices, it might be thought that the high prices are due to the politico-economic organization of the Soviet Union. There are no other countries with a long experience in communism or socialism with which to check. Britain has had some socialism for five years, but only about 20 per cent of her industries are governmentally owned. Even so, the prices in Britain are quite low relative to Russia's. But, before drawing conclusions about the influence of state-owned industry in the U.S.S.R. as being a cause of her high prices, we should examine the factor of technology, which is much less developed in the Soviet Union than in the United States and in Britain but somewhat more developed than in India and in China. So the low state of technology in the U.S.S.R. may explain her high cost of living.

The analysis so far fails to indicate that population density is a large factor in explaining the low standard of living; for Britain has a high density and a high standard of living, while Russia and the United States have a low density of population, with Russia having a low standard of living and the United States a high one.

Also organization does not appear to explain the divergencies in the table. For the U.S.S.R. and India, one with communism and the other with private ownership of productive property, have standards of living that are not widely divergent, and the private ownership in the United States and in China has produced very unequal standards of living. So the variation in organization from government ownership to private ownership does not vary concomitantly with the standard of living and hardly appears as a controlling factor.

The natural resources are large in all the countries in the table and hence are a constant, approximately.

There remains the factor of technology. When it is found highly advanced with a monetary economy, the products of technology become the capital goods of capitalism. The two countries with advanced technology, the United States and Britain, have high standards of living, even though population pressure and organization differ. And in the three countries where technology is not very advanced—the

U.S.S.R., China, and India—there are low standards of living even though population pressure and organization vary.

This analysis which has been somewhat winding may be seen in summary in Table 3, which presents numerical measures of the cost of living in these five countries and also measures of two of the factors—population density and technological development. The figures for the cost of living are the sums of the minutes of labor required to buy a pound of bread, flour, or rice, a pound of fish, and a pound of peas. Density is the total population divided by the total area in square miles, and the technological development is the per capita annual consumption of energy of all kinds in hundreds of kilowatt hours. We see from Table 3 that the first and second lines of data, namely, cost of living and density, do not synchronize in the case of Britain and the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the first and third lines—cost of living and technological development—move up and down together, but in reverse.

TABLE 3
COST OF LIVING, POPULATION DENSITY, AND TECHNOLOGY

	United States	United Kingdom	U.S.S.R.	India	China
Cost of living	32	45	412	398	428
Population density	47	521	25	200	209
Technological development	130	71	22	4	2

The foregoing analysis, then, of the data of prices in terms of labor for five countries indicates that technology is much the most important of the four factors in explaining the variations in the standard of living, though no doubt population density and organization are also factors. Five countries are a small sample, though the extreme variations make them more significant than might be thought from the small number. However, the sample is too small to hold two variables constant while measuring the influence of the third on the dependent variable. That the data indicate the greater influence of technology is probably due to its real importance as a factor. If all three variables had been nearly equal, the small number of countries—only five—would not have indicated such a result.

It is possible to get a larger sample of countries with differing prices, but it is not possible to get a larger sample with a communistic organization in existence for a long time. The *Monthly Labor Review* for December, 1949, publishes for eighteen countries the amount of a list of some forty-one food commodities that could be bought for an hour's labor. The prices of a substantial number of these commodities were found for each of eighteen countries in terms of what an hour of labor of the average factory worker would buy. These countries were the United States, Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.S.S.R. The data were for 1948-49. For these same countries it is possible to get an index of the degree of development of technology that seems to be reasonably satisfactory. The ones selected were annual per capita use of energy as measured or translated into kilowatt hours of electricity. This energy may be that used for productive purposes or for all purposes. The data are for 1946. They show that the countries with the greatest use of energy and hence of machines have the highest standard of living, that is, lowest prices as measured in terms of labor.

The coefficient of correlation between the per capita use of energy and the high standard of living, as measured in what an hour of labor will buy, is $+ .7$ for the eighteen states. For comparison, the correlation of the high standard of living with population density (for the total areas) is $-.3$. These data indicate for a different group of countries that technological development, as measured by use of energy, is a more important factor than density of population.

The comparisons will be better with each of the factors if we hold the other constant. When the data are arranged in a correlation table, the partial correlation coefficient between standard of living and technology, with density held constant, is found to be lowered a little but still about $+ .7$. The correlation between standard of living and density, with the influence of technological variation removed, becomes $-.2$. The table shows a few far outlying cases, but the coefficients derived from the same data, grouped into only two categories, are approximately the same.

The two sets of data discussed in this paper indicate the great bearing of technology, as compared with population density, on the wealth of the peoples, natural resources being approximately constant.

This conclusion of the relatively great importance of technology for the standard of living and hence for the wealth of nations should not be surprising, for productivity may be greatly increased by machines. It would take an American Indian a long time to dig the foundations for a building with his Stone Age tools. Our forefathers with a pick, shovel, and wheelbarrow could dig it much more quickly. But with a steam shovel and a truck, a twentieth-century man could dig it even faster. We have a way of failing to uncover the impersonal technological factor. Thus we often speak of the increased productivity of labor, which is, however, due not to the fact that a laborer works any harder but that he has better tools to work with. The productivity of the American Indian is much less than that of a modern construction worker. Such is the implication of some figures presented by Mills, where he shows that the total annual income in the United States for the forty-seven years from 1899 to 1945 in 1929 dollars was \$3,151 billion. But the labor input for each year operating at the 1889-98 level in productivity in 1929 dollars would have created a total of only \$1,669 billion, a little more than half. The workers hardly worked any longer or any harder, though the organization may have improved.

While little credit has been given by social science analysts to technological change as a cause of the rise in the standard of living, much has been said about population density as a factor, owing to the remarkable and well-known claims of Malthus.

Then lately we have been attributing much virtue in explaining production, which is the basis of the standard of living, to capitalism and much evil to communism. But capitalism is not wholly private ownership and free enterprise; it means also capital goods, which means technology. Furthermore, communism uses capital goods as well as private capitalism. Again, the technology factor is obscured in favor of human achievement and morals, which are usually quite adequately appreciated.

It is obvious that natural resources are a necessity for a high standard of living, but the question concerns their variability from country to country, not their existence as a factor. Furthermore, technology is needed to use natural resources. Organization is also closely related to technology. One wonders, indeed, how much difference in economic organization there can be with the same technology, given a sufficiently long time to make adjustments and remove cultural lags.

Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Evelyn M. Kitagawa

Demographic Characteristics and Job Mobility of Migrants in Six Cities¹

This paper reports the characteristics of the migrant population and compares them with those of non-migrants in six cities: Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, San Francisco, St. Paul, and New Haven. The data on migrants and non-migrants are based on a sample survey of some 4,000 to 5,000 persons 14 years and older in each of the six cities in January 1951. For the most part these persons were located in about 1,900 households in each city which were enumerated in the 1950 Census of Population and Housing. The estimates of total males and females 14 years and older are based on a combination of data from the survey and the 1950 Census. All other estimates were obtained by inflating weighted sample results to the estimates of total males and females 14 years and older.

The six cities for which findings are reported differ considerably in their occupational and industrial structure. Characteristically, Chicago and Philadelphia are referred to as mature metropolitan centers with a relatively stable population and as industrial centers with a diversified economic base where employment in manufacturing is predominant (but less than 50 per cent of all employed), while employment in wholesale and retail trade, though second in importance, is substantially below that in manufacturing. New Haven has a similar economic base, though it is much smaller in size. By comparison, San Francisco and Los Angeles are relatively young metropolitan cities with a diversified economic base where employment in wholesale and retail trade is more or less equal to employment in manufacturing and together these industries employ about one-half of all workers. St. Paul, though an older and smaller city, has a similar economic base. These differences in major economic activity are reflected in the occupational structure of the cities. Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Haven, where employment in manufacturing predominates, show a greater concentration of blue collar workers, while Los Angeles, San Francisco and St. Paul, where employment in retail trade is about equal to that in manufacturing, show a greater concentration of white collar workers. The same patterns in occupational structure hold for both men and women. However, superimposed on this pattern is the expected pattern of substantially higher proportions of white collar workers among women than among men. These structural differences among the cities help to explain certain of the migrant differentials which follow.

The rapid growth of urban centers in the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was made possible by immigration, a high birth rate, and internal migration. Since the changes in immigration policy during the 1920's, cities have increasingly relied upon internal migration and natural increase for their growth. Students of urban life have therefore turned their attention to a study of the selectivity of migration and its contribution to urban growth.

While metropolitan centers usually require some migrants in order to maintain their size, migration is greatest for rapidly growing cities where the industrial base is undergoing considerable expansion. Opportunities for such expansion occur not only under conditions of general economic growth but under specialized conditions

¹ From *Social Forces*, 1953, 32:70-75. By permission.

such as wartime or emergency mobilization of the economy. The size and composition of the migrant population of cities, therefore, may be expected to vary, depending upon the size and kind of economic base, the relative age and rate of growth of the cities, the age and sex structure of their populations, and the relative mobility prevailing in their occupational and industrial structures. . . .

STABILITY OF POPULATION

We observe considerable variation in the residential stability of persons in the six cities. The proportion of migrants—i.e., persons who have resided in the Standard Metropolitan Area of a city less than 12 years—in the total population 14 and older varies from a high of 46 per cent in Los Angeles to a low of 13 per cent in Philadelphia.² There is, moreover, *a marked stability of residence for persons in the older industrial cities*, Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Haven. Over two-thirds of the persons 14 and older in these cities have resided in the Standard Metropolitan Area of the city 21 years or more. St. Paul also shows rather marked stability of residence as 59 per cent of the persons 14 and older are long-time area residents. The rapidly growing metropolitan cities of the West Coast show the least residential stability. This is more marked in Los Angeles where only 33 per cent of all persons 14 and older have resided in the S.M.A. 21 years or more than in San Francisco where 45 per cent are long-time residents. There were no significant differences in duration of residence for men and women in each city, except in San Francisco and St. Paul where there seem to be a significantly higher per cent of women than men who are migrants.

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS

Studies of migrations to metropolitan cities have generally emphasized that migrants possess those characteristics generally assumed to be associated with mobility. In particular they find that (1) a larger proportion of the migrants than non-migrants are in the younger age groups; (2) a larger proportion of migrants than non-migrants are in the labor force; (3) migrants more often than non-migrants tend to belong to families or households whose size indicates a relative freedom from family controls or responsibilities. Furthermore, it is usually found that cityward migration is selective of women, i.e., a lower sex ratio for migrants than non-migrants, and that the sex ratio of cityward migrants is lowest in the young adult age groups. These findings generally hold for migrants in each of the six cities.

The participation of migrants in the work force of a city is both an indication of the factor of economic opportunity in impelling migration and the adjustment of migrants to the requirements of a labor market as well as an index of their availability for recruitment into a work force. It should be remembered that migrant persons compete against non-migrants who have various claims to employment preference (e.g., seniority, experience in a local labor market, status requirements, etc.). Therefore, we would not necessarily expect high participation of migrants in the labor force relative to comparable non-migrant groups.

² In this study, persons who had resided in the Standard Metropolitan Area (S.M.A.) of a city less than 12 years, i.e., persons who arrived after the middle of 1939, were classified as migrants. All persons who had resided in the S.M.A. 21 years or more are called long-time residents. Although length of residence in the S.M.A. of a city was used to define migrants status, survey coverage was limited to the city boundaries so that migrants refer to 1951 city residents who moved into the S.M.A. less than 12 years previously, while non-migrants refer to 1951 city residents who moved into the S.M.A. (though not necessarily the city itself) 12 or more years previously.

Examination of work status differentials of migrants and non-migrants in the six cities shows that among both men and women, migrants were more often at work than were non-migrants. . . . However, *among men the higher work participation rates for all migrants than all non-migrants were almost entirely due to the more "favorable" age distribution of migrants insofar as providing workers was concerned.* The major reason, therefore, for the relatively higher participation of migrant men in the work force as compared with that of non-migrant men is that male migrants were more heavily concentrated in age groups where work participation rates were high. The fact that differences in the age distribution of migrants and non-migrants explain these differences can be seen in a comparison of age-specific work-rates for male migrants and non-migrants. . . . The age-specific work-rates for male migrants are significantly higher in only one age group. In general, in all six cities, male migrants 14-24 years old were more often at work than male non-migrants of this age. This suggests that young male migrants as compared with non-migrants include a relatively larger proportion of persons who seek jobs rather than attend school. Of course, male migrants 14-24 usually include a lower proportion of 14-17 year olds who would be attending high school than do male non-migrants 14-24 years old. It is also possible that, in cities, a larger proportion of non-migrant men than migrant men 18-24 years old lead a "marginal existence" for which employment in the work force is not a requisite.

However, the higher work rates for migrant women were not entirely due to their "favorable" age distribution. Examination of the age-specific work-rates of women supports the conclusion that *migrant women in each age group were more often at work than non-migrant women of the same age.* This probably explains why in each city the work participation rate for all migrant women 14 and older exceeds that of all non-migrant women 14 and older by more than the work participation rate of all migrant men 14 and older exceeds that of all non-migrant men 14 and older. The marital status and family responsibilities of non-migrant women as compared with those of migrant women probably account for this somewhat higher participation in the work force of migrant women.

While migrants apparently are attracted to cities by economic opportunities, these opportunities seem to be disproportionately those offered by private employment rather than those afforded by self-employment or employment in government. In all six cities we found that private employment has the largest proportion of migrants and "own business" in general the lowest. This is probably so for a number of reasons. Migrants are somewhat younger in age and often may not possess the requisite capital to establish a private business or engage in private practice (self-employment); also, they less frequently may be aware of such opportunities as compared with local residents. Furthermore, male migrants are on the average less skilled than are male non-migrants. The findings were less clear for women.

During the 1940-49 decade there was considerable variation in job mobility of workers in the six cities and of workers in various age and migration status subgroups.³ The crude mobility rates for workers in Los Angeles and San Francisco—where workers averaged about three jobs per person during the 1940-49 decade—were higher than the crude rates in the other four cities, where workers averaged about 2.5 jobs per person. . . .

³ Job mobility for this paper is defined as the mean number of jobs held by persons in a given subgroup during the 1940-49 decade. A job is defined as a continuous period of work for one employer. . . .

Also the average number of jobs held between 1940 and 1949 was considerably higher for migrants than non-migrants and considerably higher for young persons than for older persons. These age and migrant status differentials in mobility remain clearly defined even when age-migrant status-specific mobility rates are computed. That is, rates for migrants are higher than those for non-migrants even when age is held constant, and rates for young persons are higher than those for older persons even when migrant status is held constant, except for male migrants in Los Angeles, St. Paul, and New Haven where mobility varies very little by age.

Thus, it is clear that age and migrant status are independently important factors influencing the average number of jobs held during the 1940-49 decade by workers in the six cities. Since this is the case and since the proportion of migrants in the work history samples of the six cities varied considerably—for example, from highs of 47 and 35 per cent for men in Los Angeles and San Francisco respectively to lows of 15 and 13 per cent for men in Chicago and Philadelphia respectively—at least part of the differences in the crude mobility rates among the six cities may well be accounted for by differences in the migrant composition of the work history samples in the six cities. Since there are also some variations in the age composition of migrants and non-migrants in the cities, it is desirable to take the influence of age composition into account at the same time.

An "expected cases" analysis of the extent to which the largest city differences in

TABLE 1

PER CENT COMPONENTS (BY AGE AND MIGRANT STATUS) OF CITY DIFFERENCES IN MOBILITY, BY SEX: CHICAGO AND LOS ANGELES, CHICAGO AND SAN FRANCISCO, PHILADELPHIA AND LOS ANGELES, PHILADELPHIA AND SAN FRANCISCO

Percent Components of Mobility^a

Pairs of Cities	Difference in Crude Rates (1)	Combined Influence Age and Migrant Composition (2)	Gross Influence Migrant Status (3)	Gross Influence Age (4)
Men				
Chicago & Los Angeles	24	65		
Chicago & San Francisco	18	41	65	12
Philadelphia & Los Angeles	32	44	53	-3
Philadelphia & San Francisco	26	14	38	2
			30	-11
Women				
Chicago & Los Angeles	21	50	63	-7
Chicago & San Francisco	12	51	91	-30
Philadelphia & Los Angeles	38	40	42	1-
Philadelphia & San Francisco	28	42	54	-6

^a The percent components have the following interpretation: Column (1): percent by which the crude mobility rate for the second city of the pair exceeds the crude mobility rate of the first city. Column (2): percent of difference between crude mobility rates for the two cities of each pair which can be accounted for by the difference in their age and migrant status composition; migrant status-age-specific rates of Chicago (or Philadelphia) used as weights in computing this component. Column (3): percent of difference between crude mobility rates for the two cities of each pair which can be accounted for by the difference in proportion of migrants in the two cities. Column (4): percent of difference between crude mobility rates for the two cities of each pair which can be accounted for by the difference in their age composition.

crude mobility rates may be accounted for by differences in their age and migrant composition has been made for selected pairs of cities—namely, Chicago and Los Angeles, Chicago and San Francisco, Philadelphia and Los Angeles, and Philadelphia and San Francisco. The chief reason for selecting these four pairs of cities for the present analysis was that each pair includes two extremes with respect to crude mobility rates and also with respect to the importance of migrants in the population. That is, Chicago and Philadelphia are cities with relatively low mobility and fewer migrants, while Los Angeles and San Francisco are cities with relatively high mobility and much higher proportions of migrants.

The expected cases analysis shows that *about half of the differences in 1940-49 crude mobility rates between cities with the lowest crude rates and cities with the highest crude rates can be accounted for by differences in their age and migrant composition combined* (see Table 1). Among men, the per cent of the difference in crude mobility rates accounted for by age and migrant status combined varies between 41 and 65 per cent for three of the four pairs of cities included in this report—that is, 65 per cent of the difference between Chicago and Los Angeles crude mobility rates, 41 per cent of the difference between Chicago and San Francisco crude rates, and 44 per cent of the difference between Philadelphia and Los Angeles crude rates can be accounted for by differences in their age and migrant composition.

Among women, the proportion of the difference in crude mobility rates accounted for by age and migrant status combined varies from 40 per cent of the difference between Philadelphia and Los Angeles crude rates to 51 per cent of the difference between Chicago and San Francisco crude rates.

It should also be noted that it is the higher proportion of migrants in the high mobility cities which is the more important factor in accounting for differences in crude mobility rates of high and low mobility cities. Migrant status alone accounts for a substantial part of the differences in crude mobility rates—see column (3) of Table 1. However, differences in age composition alone (without holding migrant status constant), instead of being partly responsible for differences in crude rates, tend to act in the opposite direction. In six out of eight pairs of cities, the difference in mobility is slightly increased when age composition is held constant—this is the interpretation of the negative components in column (4) of Table 1.

These findings, therefore, suggest that about half of the differences between crude mobility rates of the high and low mobility cities included in the Occupational Mobility Survey can be accounted for by their age and migrant composition. That is to say, if the high and low mobility cities had the same proportions of migrants and the same age composition, then their differences in over-all mobility rates would be cut about in half. Of course, this still leaves the West Coast cities, Los Angeles and San Francisco, with higher mobility rates than Chicago and Philadelphia, though to be sure the size of the difference is considerably reduced under this assumption.

It is possible that differences in the occupational and industrial composition of these cities might account for part of these remaining differences. However, it is not unlikely that other factors are more important in this respect. For example, it may well be that the much greater relative increase in population and expansion of employment in the two West Coast cities during the 1940-49 decade as a result of the war industries located there (particularly shipbuilding industries in San Francisco and aircraft industries in Los Angeles) generally facilitated job changes and also necessitated relatively more post-war conversion in these two cities than in

Chicago and Philadelphia. In this case, we would expect higher job mobility rates in these cities (since mobility for this study was defined as mean number of jobs held 1940-49) even after the influence of other population and labor force characteristics is taken into account.

16

Folk and Urban Communities

In the long course of both prehistory and history man has resided, for the most part, in small or folk communities. The basic features of such communities are close-knit family life, a strong sense of solidarity, and informal means of social control. During the past 150 years, however, the industrialized city, with its high density of numbers, its high mobility, and its extreme division of labor (specialization of roles), has become increasingly dominant in various regions of the world—first in Europe, then in the Americas, and more recently in Asia and Africa. The contemporary urban world is sometimes designated as “mass society.”

Kingsley Davis traces out the origin and growth of urbanization and fills in various gaps in data with estimates of the size of cities the world over, both historically and at the present time. He further indicates the neat economic balance between the productivity of the agricultural hinterland and the rise and survival of urban centers.

In “Individual Participation in Mass Society,” Scott Greer discusses important patterns of individual yet segmental participation, both informally and formally, in present-day mass society. In this connection he raises some pertinent questions regarding the meaning of such participation for the further growth of personal choice and individual freedom.

Kingsley Davis

The Origin and Growth of Urbanization in the World¹

Urban phenomena attract sociological attention primarily for four reasons. First, such phenomena are relatively recent in human history. Compared to most other

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1955, 60:429-437. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

aspects of society—e.g., language, religion, stratification, or the family—cities appeared only yesterday, and urbanization, meaning that a sizable proportion of the population lives in cities, has developed only in the last few moments of man's existence. Second, urbanism represents a revolutionary change in the whole pattern of social life. Itself a product of basic economic and technological developments, it tends in turn, once it comes into being, to affect every aspect of existence. It exercises its pervasive influence not only within the urban milieu strictly defined but also in the rural hinterland. The third source of sociological interest in cities is the fact that, once established, they tend to be centers of power and influence throughout the whole society, no matter how agricultural and rural it may be. Finally, the process of urbanization is still occurring; many of the problems associated with it are unsolved; and, consequently, its future direction and potentialities are still a matter of uncertainty. This paper examines the first and last points: the origin, growth, and present rate of progress of urbanization in the world. Since good statistics on urban concentration do not exist even today for substantial parts of the world, and hardly exist for any part during most of the time since cities have been in existence, we are forced to rely on whatever credible evidence can be found and so can reach only broad conclusions concerning early periods and only approximations for recent times. . . .

THE RISE OF EARLY URBAN CENTERS

Because the archeological evidence is fragmentary, the role of cities in antiquity has often been exaggerated. Archeologists in particular are inclined to call any settlement a "city" which had a few streets and a public building or two. Yet there is surely some point in not mistaking a town for a city. Moreover, what is important is not only the appearance of a few towns or cities but also their place in the total society of which they were a part. Thus, even though in particular regions around the Mediterranean and in southern and western Asia many towns and a few cities arose prior to the Christian Era, there were severe limitations both on the size that such cities could reach and on the proportion of the total population that could live in them.

Speaking generally, one can agree with the dominant view that the diverse technological innovations constituting Neolithic culture were necessary for the existence of settled communities. Yet one should not infer that these innovations, which began some 3,000-10,000 years ago, were sufficient to give rise to towns as distinct from villages. Even though the Neolithic population was more densely settled than the purely hunting or food-gathering peoples, it was nevertheless chiefly engaged in an occupation—agriculture—which requires a large amount of land per person. The Neolithic population density was therefore not a matter of town concentration but rather a matter of tiny villages scattered over the land.

What had to be added to the Neolithic complex to make possible the first towns? Between 6000 and 4000 B.C. certain inventions—such as the ox-drawn plow and wheeled cart, the sailboat, metallurgy, irrigation, and the domestication of new plants—facilitated, when taken together, a more intensive and more productive use of the Neolithic elements themselves. When this enriched technology was utilized in certain unusual regions where climate, soil, water, and topography were most favorable (broad river valleys with alluvial soil not exhausted by successive cropping, with a dry climate that minimized soil leaching, with plenty of sunshine, and with sediment-containing water for irrigation from the river itself), the result was a sufficiently productive economy to make possible the *sine qua non* of urban exist-

ence, the concentration in one place of people who do not grow their own food.

But a productive economy, though necessary, was not sufficient: high productivity per acre does not necessarily mean high per capita productivity. Instead of producing a surplus for town dwellers, the cultivators can, theoretically at least, multiply on the land until they end up producing just enough to sustain themselves. The rise of towns and cities therefore required, in addition to highly favorable agricultural conditions, a form of social organization in which certain strata could appropriate for themselves part of the produce grown by the cultivators. Such strata—religious and governing officials, traders, and artisans—could live in towns, because their power over goods did not depend on their presence on the land as such. They could thus realize the advantages of town living, which gave them additional power over the cultivators.

The first cities, doubtless small and hard to distinguish from towns, seem to have appeared in the most favorable places sometime between 6000 and 5000 B.C. From that time on, it can be assumed that some of the inventions which made larger settlements possible were due to towns and cities themselves—viz., writing and accountancy, bronze, the beginnings of science, a solar calendar, bureaucracy. By 3000 B.C., when these innovations were all exercising an influence in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India, there were in existence what may be called "true" cities. After that there appears to have been, for some 2,000 years, a lull during which the most important innovations, toward the end of the period, were alphabetic writing and the smelting of iron. Curiously, the cities in the regions where city life had originated eventually went into eclipse, and it was not until Greco-Roman times that new principles made possible, in new regions, a marked gain in city existence. The fact that the greatest subsequent cultural developments did not occur primarily in the regions where the first cities arose suggests that cities are not always and everywhere a stimulant of economic and social advance. . . .

Why was there so little urbanization in ancient times, and why did it proceed so slowly from that point? The sites of the earliest "cities" themselves show that they were small affairs. The walls of ancient Babylon, for example, embraced an area of very roughly 3.2 square miles, and "Ur, with its canals, harbors, and temples, occupied some 220 acres; the walls of Erech encompass an area of just on two square miles." This suggests that the famous Ur could hardly have boasted more than 5,000 inhabitants and Erech hardly more than 25,000. . . .

To the questions why even the largest cities prior to 1000 B.C. were small by modern standards, why even the small ones were relatively few, and why the degree of urbanization even in the most advanced regions was very slight, the answer seems as follows: Agriculture was so cumbersome, static, and labor-intensive that it took many cultivators to support one man in the city. The ox-drawn plow, the wooden plowshare, inundation irrigation, stone hoes, sickles, and axes were instruments of production, to be sure, but clumsy ones. Not until iron came into use in Asia Minor about 1300 B.C. could general improvement in agriculture be achieved. The static character of agriculture and of the economy generally was fostered perhaps by the insulation of the religio-political officials from the practical arts and the reduction of the peasant to virtually the status of a beast of burden. The technology of transport was as labor-intensive as that of agriculture. The only means of conveying bulky goods for mass consumption was by boat, and, though sails had been invented, the sailboat was so inefficient that rowing was still necessary. The oxcart, with its solid wheels and rigidly attached axle, the pack animal, and the human burden-bearer were all short-distance means of transport, the only excep-

tion being the camel caravan. Long-distance transport was reserved largely for goods which had high value and small bulk—i.e., 'goods for the elite—which could not maintain a large urban population. The size of the early cities was therefore limited by the amount of food, fibers, and other bulky materials that could be obtained from the immediate hinterland by labor-intensive methods, a severe limitation which the Greek cities of a later period, small as they remained, nevertheless had to escape before they could attain their full size.

There were political limitations as well. The difficulty of communication and transport and the existence of multifarious local tribal cultures made the formation of large national units virtually impossible. The first urban-centered units were city-states, and when so-called "empires" were formed, as in Egypt, in the Sumerian region, and later in Assyria, much local autonomy was left to the subordinated areas, and the constant danger of revolt prevented the extension of the hinterlands of the cities very far or very effectively. It is symptomatic of the weakness of the early cities that they were constantly threatened and frequently conquered not only by neighboring towns but also by nonurban barbarians. Each wave of barbarians tended to rebuild the urban centers and to become agricultural and sedentary, only to be eventually overwhelmed in turn by new invaders. Other limiting factors were the lack of scientific medicine (which made urban living deadly), the fixity of the peasant on the land (which minimized rural-urban migration), the absence of large-scale manufacturing (which would have derived more advantage from urban concentration than did handicraft), the bureaucratic control of the peasantry (which stifled free trade in the hinterland), and the traditionalism and religiosity of all classes (which hampered technological and economic advance).

The limitations explain why we find, when the sites furnish adequate evidence, that the earliest cities were small affairs, usually no more than towns. Whether in the new or in the old world, even the biggest places could scarcely have exceeded 200,000 inhabitants, and the proportion of the total population living in them must have been not more than 1 or 2 per cent. From 50 to 90 farmers must have been required to support one man in a city.

SUBSEQUENT CITY DEVELOPMENT

If urbanization was to escape its early limitations, it had to do so in a new region, a region more open to innovation and new conceptions. As it turned out, the region that saw a later and greater urban development was farther north, the Greco-Roman world of Europe, flourishing approximately during the period from 600 B.C. to 400 A.D. Iron tools and weapons, alphabetic writing, improved sailboats, cheap coinage, more democratic institutions, systematic colonization—all tended to increase production, stimulate trade, and expand the effective political unit. Towns and cities became more numerous, the degree of urbanization greater. A few cities reached a substantial size. Athens, at its peak in the fifth century B.C., achieved a population of between 120,000 and 180,000. Syracuse and Carthage were perhaps larger.

The full potentialities of the ancient world to support a large city were realized only with the Romans. Through their ability to conquer, organize, and govern an empire, to put the immediate Italian hinterland to fruitful cultivation, to use both force and trade to bring slaves, goods, food, and culture to the imperial capital, they were able to create in Rome (with the possible exception of Constantinople some centuries later) the largest city that was to be known in the world until the rise of London in the nineteenth century. Yet, despite the fact that Rome and Constantinople came to hold populations of several hundred thousand, they were not able to

resist conquest by far less urbanized outsiders. The eclipse of cities in Europe was striking. Commerce declined to the barest minimum; each locale became isolated and virtually self-sufficient; the social system congealed into a hereditary system. When finally towns and cities began to revive, they were small, as the following estimates suggest: Florence (1338), 90,000; Venice (1422), 190,000; Antwerp (sixteenth century), 200,000; London (1377), 30,000; Nuremberg (1450), 20,165; Frankfort (1440), 8,719.

Yet it was precisely in western Europe, where cities and urbanization had reached a nadir during the Dark Ages, that the limitations that had characterized the ancient world were finally to be overcome. The cities of Mesopotamia, India, and Egypt, of Persia, Greece, and Rome, had all been tied to an economy that was primarily agricultural, where handicraft played at best a secondary role and where the city was still attempting to supplement its economic weakness with military strength, to command its sustenance rather than to buy it honestly. In western Europe, starting at the zero point, the development of cities not only reached the stage that the ancient world had achieved but kept going after that. It kept going on the basis of improvements in agriculture and transport, the opening of new lands and new trade routes, and, above all, the rise in productive activity, first in highly organized handicraft and eventually in a revolutionary new form of production—the factory run by machinery and fossil fuel. The transformation thus achieved in the nineteenth century was the true urban revolution, for it meant not only the rise of a few scattered towns and cities but the appearance of genuine urbanization, in the sense that a substantial portion of the population lived in towns and cities.

THE WORLD TREND FROM 1800 TO 1950

Urbanization has, in fact, gone ahead much faster and reached proportions far greater during the last century and a half than at any previous time in world history. The tremendous growth in world trade during this period has enabled the urban population to draw its sustenance from an ever wider area. Indeed, it can truly be said that the hinterland of today's cities is the entire world. Contemporary Britain, Holland, and Japan, for example, could not maintain their urban population solely from their own territory. The number of rural inhabitants required to maintain one urban inhabitant is still great—greater than one would imagine from the rural-urban ratio *within* each of the highly urbanized countries. The reason is that much of agriculture around the world is still technologically and economically backward. Yet there can be no doubt that, whether for particular countries or for the entire globe, the ratio of urban dwellers to those who grow their food has risen remarkably. This is shown by the fact that the proportion of people living in cities in 1950 is higher than that found in any particular country prior to modern times and many times higher than that formerly characterizing the earth as a whole.

The rapidity of urbanization in recent times can be seen by looking at the most urbanized country, England. In 1801, although London had already reached nearly the million mark (865,000), England and Wales had less than 10 per cent of their population in cities of 100,000 or more. By 1901 no less than 35 per cent of the population of England and Wales was living in cities of 100,000 or more, and 58 per cent was living in cities of 20,000 or more. By 1951 these two proportions had risen to 38.4 and 69.3 per cent, respectively.

Britain was in the van of urban development. A degree of urbanization equal to that she had attained in 1801 was not achieved by any other country until after

1850. Thereafter the British rate of urbanization began slowly to decline, whereas that of most other countries continued at a high level. By assembling available data and preparing estimates where data were lacking, we have arrived at figures on urbanization in the world as a whole, beginning with 1800, the earliest date for which anything like a reasonable estimate can be obtained. The percentage of the world's population found living in cities is as shown in Table 1. It can be seen that

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF WORLD'S POPULATION LIVING IN CITIES

	Cities of 20,000 or More	Cities of 100,000 or More
1800	2.4	1.7
1850	4.3	2.3
1900	9.2	5.5
1950	20.9	13.1

the proportion has tended to do a bit better than double itself each half-century and that by 1950 the world as a whole was considerably more urbanized than Britain was in 1800. As everyone knows, the earth's total population has grown at an extremely rapid rate since 1800, reaching 2.4 billion by 1950. But the urban population has grown much faster. In 1800 there were about 15.6 million people living in cities of 100,000 or more. By 1950 it was 313.7 million, more than twenty times the earlier figure. Much of this increase has obviously come from rural-urban migration, clearly the most massive migration in modern times.

In 1800 there were apparently less than 50 cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants. This was less than the number in the million class today and less than the number of 100,000-plus cities currently found in many single countries. By 1950 there were close to 900 cities of 100,000 or more people, which is more than the number of towns and cities of 5,000 or more in 1800.

As yet there is no indication of a slackening of the rate of urbanization in the world as a whole. If the present rate should continue, more than a fourth of the earth's people will be living in cities of 100,000 or more in the year 2000, and more than half in the year 2050. For places of 20,000 or more, the proportions at the two dates would be something like 45 per cent and 90 per cent. Whether such figures prove too low or too high, they nevertheless suggest that the human species is moving rapidly in the direction of an almost exclusively urban existence. . . .

When . . . more than a third of the population of a country lives in cities of the 100,000 class (38.4 per cent in England and Wales in 1951), the country can be described as almost completely urbanized (81 per cent being designated as "urban" in the English case in 1951). We thus have today what can be called "urbanized societies," nations in which the great majority of inhabitants live in cities. The prospect is that, as times goes on, a greater and greater proportion of humanity will be members of such societies.

The question may be raised as to how such an extreme degree of world urbanization will prove possible. Who will grow the food and fibers necessary for the enormous urban population? The answer is that agriculture may prove to be an archaic mode of production. Already, one of the great factors giving rise to urbanization is the rather late and as yet very incomplete industrialization of agriculture. As farming becomes increasingly mechanized and rationalized, fewer people are needed on the land. On the average, the more urbanized a country, the lower is its rural density. If, in addition to industrialized agriculture, food and fiber come to be

increasingly produced by manufacturing processes using materials that utilize the sun's energy more efficiently than plants do, there is no technological reason why nearly all of mankind could not live in conurbations of large size.

THE REGIONAL PATTERN OF URBANIZATION

The highest levels of urbanization are found today in northwestern Europe and in those new regions where northwest Europeans have settled and extended their industrial civilization. The figures are as shown in Table 2. Oceania is the most urbanized of the world's major regions, because Australia and New Zealand are its principal components. North America is next, if it is defined as including only Canada and the United States. The regions least urbanized are those least affected by northwest European culture, namely, Asia and Africa.

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF WORLD'S POPULATION LIVING IN CITIES, BY REGIONS

	In Cities of 20,000 Plus	In Cities of 100,000 Plus
World	21	13
Oceania	47	41
North America (Canada and U.S.A.)	42	29
Europe (except U.S.S.R.)	35	21
U.S.S.R.	31	18
South America	26	18
Middle America and Caribbean	21	12
Asia (except U.S.S.R.)	13	8
Africa	9	5

The figures for world regions are less valuable for purposes of analysis than are those for individual countries. The latter show clearly that urbanization has tended to reach its highest point wherever economic productivity has been greatest—that is, where the economy is industrialized and rationalized. This explains why urbanization is so closely associated with northwest Europeans and their culture, since they were mainly responsible for the industrial revolution. Of the fifteen most urbanized countries in the world, all but one, Japan, are European in culture, and all but four derive that culture from the northwest or central part of Europe.

The rate of urbanization in the older industrial countries, however, is slowing down. During the twenty years from 1870 to 1890 Germany's proportion in large cities more than doubled; it nearly doubled again from 1890 to 1910; but from 1910 to 1940 the increase was only 36 per cent. In Sweden the gain slowed down noticeably after 1920. In England and Wales the most rapid urbanization occurred between 1811 and 1851. Contrary to popular belief, the fastest rate in the United States occurred between 1861 and 1891. Since, as we noted earlier, there has been no slowing-down of urbanization in the world as a whole, it must be that, as the more established industrial countries have slackened, the less-developed countries have exhibited a faster rate. In fact, such historical evidence as we have for underdeveloped areas seems to show that their rates of urbanization have been rising in recent decades. This has been the case in Egypt, where the rate is higher after 1920 than before; in India, where the fastest urbanization has occurred since 1941; in Mexico, where the speed-up began in 1921; and in Greece, where the fastest period ran from 1900 to 1930. Asia, for example, had only 22 per cent of the world's city population in 1900 but 34 per cent of it in 1950, and Africa had 1.5 per cent in 1900 but 3.2 per cent at the later date.

With respect to urbanization, then, the gap between the industrial and the pre-industrial nations is beginning to diminish. . . . As the degree of urbanization rises, it of course becomes impossible for the rate of gain to continue. The growth in the urban proportion is made possible by the movement of people from rural areas to the cities. As the rural population becomes a progressively smaller percentage of the total, the cities no longer can draw on a noncity population of any size. Yet in no country can it be said that the process of urbanization is yet finished . . .

THE TENDENCY TOWARD METROPOLITAN EXPANSION

The continuance of urbanization in the world does not mean the persistence of something that remains the same in detail. A city of a million inhabitants today is not the sort of place that a city of the same number was in 1900 or in 1850. Moreover, with the emergence of giant cities of five to fifteen million, something new has been added. Such cities are creatures of the twentieth century. Their sheer quantitative difference means a qualitative change as well.

One of the most noticeable developments is the ever stronger tendency of cities to expand outward—a development already observed in the nineteenth century. Since 1861, the first date when the comparison can be made, the Outer Ring of Greater London has been growing more rapidly than London itself. . . . There is no doubt, however, that the process of metropolitan dispersion has increased with time. This fact is shown for the United States by comparing the percentage gains in population made by the central cities with those made by their satellite areas in forty-four metropolitan districts for which Thompson could get comparable data going back to 1900. The gains are as shown in Table 3.² The difference increases,

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN POPULATION IN 44 METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1940

	Central Cities	Rest of Districts
1900-1910	33.6	38.2
1910-20	23.4	31.3
1920-30	20.5	48.7
1930-40	4.2	13.0

until in 1930-40 the population outside the central city is growing more than three times as fast as that inside the central city. Furthermore, Thompson has shown that *within the metropolitan area outside the central cities* it was the "rural" parts which gained faster than the urban parts, as the percentage increases per decade shown in Table 4, indicate. Clearly, the metropolitan districts were increasingly dependent on the areas outside the central cities, and especially upon the sparsely settled parts at the periphery of these areas, for their continued growth. Thompson showed that, the greater the distance from the center of the city, the faster the rate of growth.³

The same forces which have made extreme urbanization possible have also made metropolitan dispersion possible, and the dispersion itself has contributed to further urbanization by making large conurbations more efficient and more endurable.

² Warren S. Thompson, *The Growth of Metropolitan Districts in the United States, 1900-1940*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 5. The picture is much the same for the rest of the metropolitan districts for decades in which comparability could be established.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

The outward movement of urban residences, of urban services and commercial establishments, and of light industry—all facilitated by improvements in motor transport and communications—has made it possible for huge agglomerations to keep on growing without the inconveniences of proportionate increases in density. In many ways the metropolis of three million today is an easier place to live and work in than the city of five hundred thousand yesterday. Granted that the eco-

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE POPULATION INCREASE OUTSIDE CENTRAL CITIES
IN 44 METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS

	Urban Parts	Rural Parts
1900-1910	35.9	43.2
1910-20	30.2	34.5
1920-30	40.6	68.1
1930-40	7.3	28.1

nomie advantages of urban concentration still continue and still push populations in the direction of urbanization, the effect of metropolitan dispersion is thus to minimize the disadvantages of this continued urban growth.

The new type of metropolitan expansion occurring in the highly industrial countries is not without its repercussions in less-developed lands as well. Most of the rapid urbanization now occurring in Africa and Asia, for example, is affected by direct contact with industrial nations and by a concomitant rise in consumption standards. Although private automobiles may not be available to the urban masses, bicycles and busses generally are. Hence Brazzaville and Abidjan, Takoradi and Nairobi, Jamshedpur and New Delhi, Ankara and Colombo, are not evolving in the same manner as did the cities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their ecological pattern, their technological base, their economic activity, all reflect the twentieth century, no matter how primitive or backward their hinterlands may be. Thus the fact that their main growth is occurring in the present century is not without significance for the kind of cities they are turning out to be.

FUTURE TRENDS IN WORLD URBANIZATION

Speculation concerning the future of urbanization is as hazardous as that concerning any other aspect of human society. Following the direction of modern trends, however, one may conclude that, with the industrial revolution, for the first time in history urbanization began to reach a stage from which there was no return. . . . Today virtually every part of the world is more urbanized than any region was in antiquity. Urbanization is so widespread, so much a part of industrial civilization, and gaining so rapidly, that any return to rurality, even with major catastrophes, appears unlikely. On the contrary, since every city is obsolescent to some degree—more obsolescent the older it is—the massive destruction of many would probably add eventually to the impetus of urban growth.

The fact that the rate of world urbanization has shown no slackening since 1800 suggests that we are far from the end of this process, perhaps not yet at the peak. Although the industrial countries have shown a decline in their rates, these countries, because they embrace only about a fourth of the world's population, have not dampened the world trend. The three-fourths of humanity who live in underdeveloped countries are still in the early stages of an urbanization that promises

to be more rapid than that which occurred earlier in the areas of northwest European culture.

How urbanized the world will eventually become is an unanswerable question. As stated earlier, there is no apparent reason why it should not become as urbanized as the most urban countries today—with perhaps 85-90 per cent of the population living in cities and towns of 5,000 or more and practicing urban occupations. Our present degree of urbanization in advanced countries is still so new that we have no clear idea of how such complete world urbanization would affect human society; but the chances are that the effects would be profound.

In visualizing the nature and effects of complete urbanization in the future, however one must guard against assuming that cities will retain their present form. The tendency to form huge metropolitan aggregates which are increasingly decentralized will undoubtedly continue but probably will not go so far as to eliminate the central business district altogether, though it may greatly weaken it. At the periphery, it may well be that the metropolis and the countryside, as the one expands and the other shrinks, will merge together, until the boundaries of one sprawling conurbation will touch those of another, with no intervening pure countryside at all. The world's population doubles itself twice in a century, becoming at the same time highly urbanized, and as new sources of energy are tapped, the possibility of centrifugal metropolitan growth is enormously enhanced. . . . Almost any technological advance from now on is likely to contribute more to the centrifugal than to the centripetal tendency. It may turn out that urbanization in the sense of emptying the countryside and concentrating huge numbers in little space will reverse itself—not, however, in the direction of returning people to the farm but rather in that of spreading them more evenly over the land for purposes of residence and industrial work. "Rurality" would have disappeared, leaving only a new kind of urban existence.

Scott Greer

Individual Participation in Mass Society¹

The participation of the individual in his community is of importance on two grounds. Theoretically, an understanding of such behavior aids in the clarification and extension of our picture of modern society as a system. And, from a normative point of view, the nature and degree of such participation sets the limits and indicates the possibilities of social control in a nonhierarchical society. The dissolution of traditional orders, reflected in our fluid class structure and the uncertain basis for legitimacy, presents a major problem for modern society. Further, if we assume that the solvents destroying these older forms of order emanate from the process of rational transformation and increase in scale in the society, we may be confident that the problems experienced in America and the West are potentially universal problems.

The general ideology identifying the problem and indicating its solution is for Westerners some variation of the democratic dogma. We assume that for the hierarchical order of the past we may substitute an order based on individual

¹ From Roland Young, ed., *Approaches to the Study of Politics*, pp. 329-342. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958. By permission.

option, control through the consent of the governed. In making such normative decisions, however, we are also making certain empirical assumptions about the nature of modern society. We assume the existence, at some level, of subcommittees, in which the individual has interest, influence, and concerning which he has some realistic information. Such subcommittees are the necessary condition for individual participation in the vast totality of society (though they are not sufficient conditions), and whoever says "democracy" is, in effect, positing such groups.

However, the western societies in which modern democratic political systems were first devised have changed radically since their democratic birth. America, approximately five per cent urban at the time of the Revolution, is today over sixty per cent urban and this predominantly urban, centralized society differs radically from the nation assumed by the framers of the democratic constitutions. While the rural population and the smaller cities still have their importance, the social structure of the large urban complex is crucial for the study of social participation and democratic process in contemporary society. It is upon individual participation in very large cities that this paper is focused.

Many current interpretations of the large city sharply contradict the empirical assumptions implied in the democratic dogma. The analyses of Louis Wirth and Georg Simmel emphasize these aspects of the city: (a) its heterogeneity, (b) its impersonality, (c) its anonymity, and (d) the consequent social fragmentation of the individuals who make up the urban world. Such views are congruent with the long-run trends envisaged by Durkheim, Tonnies, Park, and others—trends from a simple homogeneous society possessing an automatic *consensus universalis* and resulting solidarity, towards a complex, heterogeneous society, in which order results from functional interdependence of differentiated groups, and solidarity within groups leads to dynamic relations between them. In this view . . . the primary-group structure of society is in a process of rapid dissolution. Kinship groups, neighborhood groups, the church, and the local community are losing their importance. Their strength in controlling individual behavior is shifted to formal, secondary groups, which organize work, religion and politics. Even play is controlled by the large commercial organization.

From such a position, the theorist who wishes to emphasize the viability of democratic structure and process must . . . accept the formal organization as the effective subcommunity—one which is capable of performing the function of organizing individuals in meaningful wholes which may then participate in the control of the larger society. The "Associational Society" is seen as the alternative to the hierarchical society of the past, based upon primary communities and hereditary strata.

These formulations concerning urban social structure are largely the result of keen observation and analysis, rather than large scale empirical studies. Their influence is largely due to two facts: (a) they are based upon observations available at random in any large city, and (b) they fill, neatly, a gap in the theoretical system of sociology. However, in the past decade, and even more in the last few years, a substantial body of work has been accumulated dealing with the specific area of participation in the urban community. It is possible, on the basis of this work, to sketch a tentative description of the modes of participation which occur among urbanites—a snapshot of the organizational topography of the modern city. Such a description serves as a test of earlier assumptions and the basis for new interpretation.

THE DISENCHANTMENT OF THE CITY: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The studies to be summarized are focused upon participation in formal organizations. . . . The urban complexes included are: New York (Komarovsky), Chicago (Janowitz), Los Angeles (Greer), San Francisco (Bell), Detroit (Axelrod) and Rochester (Foley). The net is thus spread wide, and the results are remarkably consistent—so much so that the discussion of findings will emphasize common trends rather than variations. The following loci of participation will be discussed: kinship, the neighborhood, the local area, formal organizations, friends, work associates, and the mass media.

Some Empirical Findings. (A) Kinship. One of the most striking results of this research is the extreme importance of kin relations for the urban residents. The results, in Detroit, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, all indicate the same fact: kin relations, as measured by visiting patterns, are the most important social relations for all types of urban populations. Half of the urbanites visit their kin at least once a week, and large majorities visit them at least once a month. Even the extended family is important; one-third of the Los Angeles sample visited uncles, cousins, and the like at least monthly. The conjugal family is of basic importance; the urbanite, in any local area, is apt to spend most of his evenings in the bosom of his family; this is true even in Hollywood, and extremely so in the suburbs.

(B) The neighborhood. There is much more differentiation here—the range is from a substantial number of people who are intense neighbors to a substantial number who hardly neighbor at all. The degree of neighboring varies by local area, and within the city there is a wide range, but the average urban resident has some informal neighboring relationships.

(C) The local area. Much like their neighboring behavior, urban residents indicate wide variation in their degree of “local community” identification and participation. Janowitz found a majority of his Chicago samples to be identified with their local area as their “true home,” and in Los Angeles this was true of some areas, but varied considerably between areas.

(D) Formal organizations. Although a majority of urban residents belong to churches, a minority which varies around forty per cent attend as frequently as once a month. Aside from church participation, most urban individuals belong to one organization or none. Low socio-economic rank individuals, and middle-rank individuals, usually belong to one organization at most, and it is usually work-connected for men, child- and church-connected for women. Only in the upper socio-economic levels is the “joiner” to be found with any frequency. When attendance at organizations is studied, some twenty per cent of the memberships are usually “paper” memberships.

(E) Friendship. Informal participation in friendship relations, with individual friends or friendship circles, is an extremely frequent occurrence. Friendship, outside any organizational context, is a near-universal in the city. The urbanite is seldom isolated from this type of primary group.

(F) Work associates as friends. Here one of the important hypotheses of urban theory is in question. As the primary community and neighborhood decline, friendship was expected to be more closely related to work organization. However, studies by Axelrod, Bell, and Greer all indicate that work associates are a minor proportion of the individual's primary relations when he is away from the job. Only in the upper socio-economic levels (where friendship is frequently instrumental for

economic ends) is there a change. Work relations are usually insulated from free primary-group participation of the urban-dweller.

(G) Mass entertainment. Cultural participation in organized entertainment is relatively unimportant for urban adults. Most of the Los Angeles samples attended fewer than three events a month. One-third attended no event, one-third one or two, and a few attended as many as ten or more. Most attendance was at movies, but the real importance of the mass entertainment media was in the home—television and radio are extremely important, but it is in the context of family participation.

In summary, the urbanite's individual "path" through social structure crosses these six areas of possible involvement and participation. According to one theory of urban society, his involvement should be increasingly intense with respect to formal organizations, work associates as his friends, and mass entertainment; it should be correspondingly weak with respect to kin, neighbors, the local community, and primary groups other than these. The studies cited indicate no such clear-cut development. Instead, the individual's involvement in formal organizations and work-based friendship is weak; the mass media are most important in a family context; participation with kin and friendship circles is powerful, and with neighbors and the local community's groups it varies immensely by area.

The picture that emerges is of a society in which the conjugal family is extremely powerful among all types of population. This small, primary group structure is the basic area of involvement; at the other pole is work, a massive absorber of time, but an activity which is rarely related to the family through "outside" friendship with on-the-job associates. Instead, the family-friendship group is relatively free-floating, within the world of large scale secondary associations. The family is usually identified, although weakly, with the local community; it "neighbors," but strictly "within bounds." By and large, the conjugal family group keeps itself to itself; outside is the world—formal organizations, work, and the communities.

A Typology of Urban Populations. Such findings as these are important in two respects: first, in their sharp departures from what would be considered the conventional picture of metropolitan life; and, second, in their consistency. The agreement between the various American studies . . . leads us to suspect that such participation patterns are a result of powerful trends in modern Western society. In explaining the average, and variations from it, it is useful to base a description upon social trends.

The Shevky-Bell typology of urban subpopulations is one such method of describing and accounting for the varieties of urban areas. Based upon Colin Clark's studies of economic history, and on analysis of the long-term changes in the nature of production, the organization of work, and the composition of the total society, the typology posits three dimensions along which urban subpopulations vary. These are: social rank (economic and occupational status), segregation (the proportion of segregated ethnic populations in a community), and urbanization. The latter refers to variations in life-styles; it ranges from the family-centered, home-centered life at the low-urbanization pole to an opposite pole where one finds many single individuals and couples without children. In this kind of subarea, among the highly urbanized populations, many women work outside the home, most people live in multiple dwelling units, and the market is of great importance as a center of cultural life.

Studies have indicated that the urbanization of an area is closely associated with the importance of the local area as a "social fact," as a community. And this, in turn, is associated with political participation.

The results of the Los Angeles study of four census-tract populations at middle social rank, without segregated populations, but varying from very highly urban to very low-urban areas, were summarized as follows:

In general, our findings indicate a growing importance of the local area as a social fact, as we go from the highly urbanized areas . . . to the low-urban areas. Neighboring, organizational location in the area, the residences of the members of organizations in the area, the location and composition of church congregations, all vary with urbanization and increase as urbanization decreases. Readership of the local community press also increases, as does the ability to name local leaders and intention to remain in the area indefinitely.

Thus the studies of the small community, with its local organizational structure and stratification system, may apply in the low-urban areas; they are not likely to fit in the highly urban area. . . .

A comparison was made between the political attitudes and behavior of the very highly urbanized population and the very low-urban population studied in Los Angeles. The latter were more involved in their local community (they could name more local leaders), had a more consistent voting record, were more certain of the social class position of their "community" (middle-class) and of their political preferences.

The picture of participation in the metropolis must be qualified in these ways: the highly urbanized populations are atypical—they are an extreme of a continuum. Their behavior deviates from the stereotype of the atomistic man in their great involvement in the family and their intensive participation in primary groups. However, the majority of the population in a great urban complex does not lie in the highly urbanized segments; instead, it is of middle to low urbanization, and middle social rank. At the extremely low-urban pole, the local area becomes a definite community—it is a social fact, as well as a geographical fact.

The galaxy of local residential areas which make up a great city may be seen as differing in their level of living (social rank) and their style of living (urbanization). At each level of social rank there are vast differences between areas of high and low urbanization. In general, the highly urban areas lie within the central city, and the low-urban areas lie towards the suburbs. One may keep in mind the image of the urban apartment house districts, on the one hand, and the tract developments and suburbs on the other. As one moves towards the latter, community participation in the local area increases, and political behavior in general changes.

However, even as few urban subareas approach the anonymity and fragmentation of the stereotype, fewer still approach the kind of subcommunity envisaged in the democratic ideology. Although more respondents can name local leaders in the suburbs than in the highly urbanized areas, less than forty per cent can do so anywhere. And the percentage who cannot even name one city-wide leader is considerable. With this qualification in mind, the differences between the polar extremes are sharp and suggestive. What is the meaning of this great variation in "normal life style"—what accounts for it, and what are its consequences?

COMMUNITY—AND MODERN URBAN SOCIETY

The word *community* is an ambiguous one, with many theoretical meanings and varying empirical referents. Two core meanings, however, stand out in the theoretical and empirical uses of the term. In one, community connotes certain modes of relationship, in which the individual shares values, is understood and identifies with the aggregate. In the other meaning community indicates a spatially defined social unit having functional significance, reflecting the interdependence of individuals and groups. In the first sense, the modern metropolis is not a community; in the second, it must be by definition.

Rather than choose one meaning, it is preferable to indicate the empirical interrelation of the two aspects. For it is likely that, when we refer to community, we have in the back of our mind the picture of the *primary community*—preliterate society, feudal holding, or peasant village. Such communities fulfilled both definitions: they were extremely significant functionally, providing all or most of the conditions for individual and group life, and they had a high degree of consensus and communion. Such is manifestly not the case with the urban community today, and the reasons lie deep in the nature of modern society.

The chief difference between societies based upon primary communities and urban societies is one of scale—modern urban society is the result of a vast increase in scale. Wilson and Wilson² have studied this process in Central Africa, tracing its nature and its effects upon three small village cultures. They noted the autonomy of the societies at the early stage—each small group had its own means of subsistence and order, and each was independent of the other. The process of increase in scale was one of increasing commitments to widespread social groups and dwindling dependence upon immediate associates. The wealthy Central African farmer, for example, became free of local economic coercion by the village head man at the same time he became dependent upon the international ground-nuts market. Thus, if one conceives of social organization as a network of mutually sustaining activities, based upon necessary functions, one may say that the radius of this network was short in the primary community of village society; with the increase of scale, there is a lengthening of these radii of functional interdependence.

Such extension of interdependence is not necessarily the result of rational undertaking, nor are the results all functional. However, once such interdependence exists, the human need for predictability (and the demand for predictability in ongoing organized groups) tends to result in a flow of communication and a mutual ordering of behavior. . . .

The process may be traced in the development of modern industry. . . . The need for a predictable market results in monopoly, oligopoly, and cartels; the need for predictable work-flow results in bureaucracy, and indirectly in some form of labor organization. The organization of one function acts as a catalyst producing further organization; thus industrial cartels produce national labor unions, and unions in turn force the further integration of management groups.

Returning now to the concept of the primary community, we note that in such communities the radii of many functional interdependencies were short, coinciding with the same aggregate of persons. The result was, for the individual, a complete dependence upon this community leaving him few choices; for the community, it was autonomy from outside groups. There was a coincidence of many organizational

² Godfrey Wilson and Monica Wilson, *The Analysis of Social Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945.

networks, based upon functional interdependence for various social products in the same small aggregate. The result was an extreme density of interaction. When such density of interaction occurs, a secondary function results: the social process. This may be defined as communication as an end in itself; it is identical with many meanings of *communion*, and it is the basis for that aspect of association which we call the primary group.

Interdependence based upon the need for the various social products (protection, economic production and consumption, etc.) and upon the need for the social process, or communion, thus creates an extremely strong social group coterminous with the spatially defined collective. Such a group satisfies both the meanings of community advanced earlier: it is both a mode of relationships and a spatially defined social unit having functional significance. In such a society the village is, to a large degree, one primary group. . . .

The process of increase in scale, however, results in both the lengthening of the radii of interdependence (spatially and socially) and the disjunction of the different radii, representing the organizations fulfilling different functions. Not only is the small local area no longer autonomous—the boundaries of the organizations upon which it is dependent no longer coincide. Work, government, education, religion—each is a congeries of organizations which include parts of the local area's population in their various spans, while this area is thrown with many others into various society-wide networks.

In this sense of the word, America has never been to any large degree a society based upon primary community, for Western society was already large in scale and rapidly expanding when America became a colony; the very nature of colonialism insured dependence upon the imperial and international markets. There are, however, degrees and it is likely that, until the twentieth century, community existed in a widespread fashion in open-country neighborhoods, villages, and the country town. Such community, less complete than in the peasant village to be sure, was infinitely stronger than that to be found in any part of the modern metropolis. Scattered data from the novels celebrating the "revolt from the village," the criticisms by intellectuals like Thorstein Veblen, and studies of contemporary backwoods settlements in the Hispanola country and the southern Appalachians indicate that spatial isolation produced a marked degree of community.

Such community disappears under urban conditions; it has no hold over the individual, for its functions are preempted by large specialized organizations in the interest of rational control, while the individual is highly mobile and is isolated in the local area only when he chooses to be. As the functional bases for intense interaction disappear, communion goes with them.

As this occurs, the small conjugal family becomes increasingly important for the individual and, indirectly, for the total society. The reason is partly one of default; as the primary community leaves the spatially defined group, the conjugal family remains and is today probably the strongest basis for communion available to most people in the large city. At the same time, in a society of increasing scale, the family is relatively free from community norms (where there is little interaction there can be neither surveillance nor sanctions), and great individuation of family patterns is possible. With the surplus of freedom, of leisure, and of money, the individual can choose between family and nonfamily living—and the family can choose between community-oriented and noncommunity local areas to live.

Thus the variations in urbanization, and in local community participation, found

in the various studies cited can be understood as part of the large-scale process which (a) destroys the primary community, (b) releases its individual components for duty in large segmental organizations, and (c) releases much time, expenditure, and behavior from community-enforced norms. The large scale society is, in this sense, one of emerging freedoms.

.

17

Human Ecology

Human ecology is the study of the distribution in space of human groups and institutions. Ecologists are interested in the spatial distribution of any phenomenon which is the result of man's social living. Ecological studies are possible because cultural values become associated with physical space, and man attaches meanings to his geographic environment.

"Ecological Patterns in an Industrial Shop," by Raymond W. Mack, describes a community in which certain residential areas are associated with ethnic minority status. This ecological definition is carried over into an industrial shop, with consequences for interaction and productivity.

In industrialized societies, men's work is segregated from their place of residence. Nowadays, it is rare to find the proprietor who lives over his store and unheard of for a laborer to live in the factory, as he might have 150 years ago. Some of the functions of contemporary industrial structure are discussed from the ecologist's point of view by Leo F. Schnore in "The Separation of Home and Work."

Raymond W. Mack

Ecological Patterns in an Industrial Shop¹

. . . . This case study applies ecological analysis to an industrial situation.

Research in ecology has often been concerned with the spatial location of members of social categories, such as Negroes or alcoholics, rather than of social groups. When the variables are actually social groups, ecological studies of segregation usually focus upon a consideration of residential segregation. Sociologists are aware,

¹ From *Social Forces*, 1954, 32:351-356. By permission.

however, that the institutional agencies of a segregated population are customarily confined to the delimited area in physical space in which their clients dwell.

The writer was a participant observer for six months in an area where segregation as an accommodation mechanism had been informally extended from residential space to the social systems of work groups, and had thus projected upon the physical space used by the industry certain patterns of social space. By social space is meant that location within certain physical boundaries is taken as a status symbol and becomes a datum in defining social relations.² Although the town in which the situations discussed here were observed contains several ethnic groups, this analysis is concerned primarily with the social processes resultant from the contacts between the two largest ethnic minorities. The present state of human ecology makes it advisable to state early in a discussion one's school, or theoretical position. The writer posits no mysterious ecological "forces" as causal factors in societal relationships. Rather, he assumes that ecological processes such as invasion and succession are the results of more general social processes such as competition, conflict, and assimilation. One theoretical example may suffice to clarify this position. Dominance is conceived of as a result of specific social and economic factors; social and economic relationships are not conceived of as resulting from a mysterious non-social force called dominance.

We shall deal first with the contacts between the residential communities of the two ethnic groups, and then with the contacts between the two work communities. This usage of the term community is consistent with Hiller's definition of the community as a social group with a locus. He says that the generic elements of all social groups are members, tests of admittance, roles of members, and norms of social relations. The community is differentiated from the group in that it adds to this list of elements locality as a datum in group composition.

The residential and industrial communities mentioned above are located in an iron-ore receiving port on the shore of Lake Erie. Most of the town's pre-Civil War settlers came from Connecticut. During the greater part of the nineteenth century, it was a trading village serving the farmers of the surrounding area. The rise of the young iron and steel industry, however, coupled with its fine natural harbor, transformed the village into a major break in transportation between the ore fields of the northwestern Great Lakes region and the steel mills within a 150-mile radius.

Due to the sudden expansion of the docks and railroad yards about 1880, there began an influx of immigrants from northern Europe sufficient to double the size of the town within a decade. Although the immigrants came in roughly equal numbers from Sweden and Finland, a few Swedes were the first to arrive, with the result that this whole population aggregate became known to the old residents as "the Swedes." Even today, although the Uptown people know that the descendants of these immigrants recognize divisions between the groups, such as the Swedish Lutheran Church and the Finnish Lutheran Church, an occasional nose is bloodied because an Uptown youth, having heard his parents refer to "those Swedes at the Harbor," calls a Finn a Swede and is coerced into a recognition of the Finn's pride in his national origin. Since the Uptown people consider both the Finns and the Swedes as one minority group and since, as an in-group which regards the rest of the town as an out-group, they consider themselves so, the remainder of this discussion will lump the two groups under the heading of Swedes.

² This definition, and the theoretical framework of this paper, are from E. T. Hiller's excellent theoretical construct of "The Community as a Social Group," *American Sociological Review*, 6 (April 1941), pp. 189-202.

Although some Irish immigrants settled there around the turn of the century, the town does not consider them to be foreigners, so they are not a major factor here. This analysis is concerned with relations between the Swedes and the other group considered by the residents of the town to be foreigners, the Italians.

The Italians came later than the Swedes; most of them arrived between 1890 and 1910. The population of the town has been relatively stable since the end of World War I, but during the forty years between its sudden boom as a shipping and railroad center and 1920, its population expanded from less than 2,000 to over 22,000.

The town is bisected by a railroad which runs east and west parallel with the lake front. The half of the town north of the east-west railroad tracks is bisected by another set of tracks connecting the docks and the railroad repair yards with the main railroad lines.

The portion of the city north of the main lines is inhabited almost entirely by the Swedes and the Italians, while the older section of the city south of the tracks is inhabited by the Uptown people, which means virtually everyone who is not of Swedish or Italian descent. In the northern section of the city, the Italians live on the east side of the dock-line tracks, the Swedes on the west side. To the Uptown people, any residence north of the east-west tracks is on the wrong side of the tracks, since it is inhabited by foreigners. To the Swedes, any residence east of the dock-line tracks is looked down on as being "Dago" or "Wop." The Italians, on the other hand, define residences on the west side of the same dividing line as being undesirable, since they are not "in the community" but among the "dumb-Swedes," a popular compound on the Italian side of the line.

Before attempting to analyze segregation as an accommodation mechanism in the work situation, it seems advisable to trace the processes which have led to the existence of three residential communities within the city.

THE RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITIES

The Swedes, since they came to work on the docks and in the railroad repair yards close by the docks, settled in the northeast portion of the town. This resulted in that section's being known as "Swedetown." Only a few years later, the Italians began to arrive in large numbers. They, too, were employed by the docks or the railroads and therefore wanted housing in the lake-front area. There followed what any student of ecological processes would expect: the Italians invaded the area of cheapest housing—"Swedetown." The Swedes had already begun to prosper due to the magnitude and expansion of the ore trade. Feeling that their section of the town was being devaluated by the Italian invasion, they began to build in the previously undeveloped area west of the dock-line tracks, an area known simply as The Harbor. The Italians accomplished a process of complete succession in "Swedetown," which has not since been challenged. The old names of the areas have never been changed to describe their new occupants, a phenomenon which the city's summer tourists find highly confusing, although the natives accept it without question. Civic leaders from "Swedetown" have recently attempted to get rid of the old name by having the area officially designated in the newspaper and on store fronts and club name prefaces as East Side, perhaps with the hope that some of the Uptowners' feeling about the foreigners would vanish with the name. As yet, however, the movement has met with little success on the informal level; Italians as well as other townspeople still refer to the area as "Swedetown."

The reader must bear in mind, then, that "Swedetown" refers to the Italian section, while The Harbor is the name of the area inhabited by the Swedes:

Despite the fact that they are incorporated within the same city limits as Uptown, both The Harbor and "Swedetown" constitute separate sociological communities. Their members, almost without exception, are all inhabitants of the physical space occupied by the communities. The reason that this is true is linked with the principal test for admittance: ethnic origin. A person who is not of Swedish or Finnish descent finds it quite impossible to join in community life at The Harbor, nor is anyone not of Italian ancestry ever really a member of the group in "Swedetown." Both the roles of members and the norms of social relations may be traced to these singular combinations of the locality datum with the ethnic origin test of admittance. At The Harbor one finds two Finnish Lutheran Churches, two Swedish Lutheran churches, the Harbor school, the Suomi Athletic Club, several filling stations, grocery stores, *saunas* (steam baths), confectioneries, cafes, and a Swedish bakery, all operated by Swedes. On the other side of the dock-line tracks are found Our Mother of Sorrows Catholic Church, its affiliated parochial school, the Columbus Street school, the East Side Young Men's Athletic and Social Club, the Sons of Italy Lodge, and several filling stations, grocery stores, confectioneries, spaghetti and ravioli houses, and cafes, all operated by Italians. Despite the opportunity of several decades for assimilation into a small American town, these two cultural minorities still have distinctive patterns of behavior different from those of Uptown or of each other. A stroll through the Harbor on a summer evening reveals large, relatively new houses, neatly trimmed hedges, families seated on front porch swings or on lawn chairs in their large, well-cared-for yards. At the confectioneries, groceries, and filling stations one sees customers make purchases quietly and leave. At the bath houses, men sit silently in the steam rooms or, having finished their "steam," lie on benches in the outer parlor and discuss work, women, or politics. After one crosses the bridge over the river and railroad tracks into "Swedetown," he is immediately struck by the fact that the people he had seen moments before were light-complexioned. Coloring is not exceedingly noticeable among the Italians or Swedes so long as the observer is with only one group or the other, but the contrast is striking. Here, too, one is struck by the difference in life's tempo and volume. Women are seated on the front steps of older houses, calling to friends passing on the walk or seated on the porch steps next door. Groups of men are clustered on the corners, by the filling stations, in the stores and bars—not always buying, but always talking. Even the children playing in the smaller, less tidy yards seem quicker and noisier.

In the above description, perhaps, lies the key to understanding the stereotypes, firmly grounded in ethnocentrism, which each group has of the other. To the Italians, the Swedes are slow, dumb, drab, or at best, dull and uninteresting. To the Swedes, the Italians are crude, immoral, gaudy, or at best, boisterous and ill-mannered. Although both groups take real pride in their Americanism, they also feel strong ties to their ethnic heritage. Hence, each ethnic minority thinks of itself as a hyphenated-American community, with the accent on the American, while each perceives the other as a community of foreigners. There are two ways, therefore, to live on the wrong side of the tracks. Residence in either portion of the lake-front area causes one to be defined as an out-group member by the Uptown people; residence on either side of the dock-line tracks causes one to be looked down upon by the population on the opposite side of the tracks.

In addition to meeting the four criteria for a social group, and the additional one of locality, which allows us to define them as communities, both areas have their separateness both from each other and from the Uptown community, further reinforced by two other differentiating data: language and religion. Language as a variant datum, of course, becomes increasingly less important with the passage of time. It is well to remember, however, that in 1930 over 17 per cent of the total population of the town was still foreign-born, and that as late as 1940 the percentage of foreign-born residents was still nearly 14. Religion as a differentiating item shows less sign of weakening so far. The Italian population is even further divorced from Uptown than the Swedish in this respect. The Lutherans are on reasonably amicable terms with the Uptown Protestants, but a minimum of effort is expended in friendly relations between the Uptown Irish Catholic Church and the Swedetown Italian Catholics.

The writer knows of no indication that the conflict between the Swedes and the Italians—which arose out of differences in language, religion, general cultural background, and out of early competition for jobs and living space—has been or is being replaced by cooperation. It is merely latent; it has been accommodated through the rather efficient medium of segregation. Segregation as an accommodation mechanism between these two groups seems partially self-perpetuating; it continually “pulling itself up by its own bootstraps.” When a man has gained the necessary money, occupational prestige, and education to give him a fair chance of being accepted by the Uptown community, his advantageous status nearly always depends upon his staying in his own community. A second generation Italian who becomes a lawyer or a doctor may have an Uptown office to satisfy the yearnings of both himself and his clients for prestige; but if he is to become and remain a successful professional man, he had best keep his residence, club membership, and church membership in “Swedetown” and send his children to the Columbus Street school. The Swedish alderman can be re-elected only so long as he lives at The Harbor and participates in its community life; the successful grocer or cafe operator must keep his social ties as well as his business establishment within his ethnic group.

With this description of the history and patterning of residential segregation, we should be prepared to analyze segregation as an accommodation mechanism in an industrial social system.

THE WORK COMMUNITIES

Adjacent to the docks is the Railroad Car Repair Shop, which consists of a large factory building and an open area about 1,000 feet wide and 3,000 feet long, containing 20 spur tracks where gondolas, or coal cars, are side-tracked for wheel and body repairs. The shop normally employs about 400 men, of whom approximately 175 are Italian and 150 are either Swedish or Finnish. About 300 of the men are directly engaged in car repair—inspecting, cutting metal patches, burning, drilling, riveting, blacksmithing, painting, driving cranes, oiling wheels, or supplying rivet gangs. The remainder of the shop's personnel are administrative workers or work in the yards as flagmen, switchmen, engineers, firemen, or brakemen. The car repair work is of two types: “light” repairs such as burning out rusted places in the side of a car and replacing them with riveted patches, and “heavy” repairs which involve tearing down the whole car and putting in new support posts or end gates. This work is done outdoors so that there is no wall or other physical barrier separating the two kinds of work. Nevertheless, the two types of repairs

are done in different sections of the yard; the men work on the "lights" on the easternmost 10 tracks and on the "heavies" on the westernmost 10 tracks. The men working on the "lights" and those working on the "heavies" are two distinct social groups having different members, tests of admittance, roles for members, and norms of social relations. If the separate work areas are considered a locality datum, the two groups may be considered as analytical communities.

All of the workers on the "heavies" are Swedes; all of the workers on the "lights" are Italians. The only exceptions are a few part-time summer workers, such as the writer. If such part-time workers are members of one of the ethnic minorities, they are assigned to the appropriate side of the repair yard. If they are from Uptown, they may be assigned to either side of the yard. However, there are seldom more than 10 or 12 Uptowners employed there, since it is not considered a desirable place for employment by Uptown people. The supply shop which dispenses new parts to repairmen is located at the northern end of the yard, and its personnel are also divided along ethnic lines. The western end of the supply room which supplies the "heavies" employs only Swedes; the eastern end which supplies the "lights" is staffed with Italians. It should be emphasized that all persons connected with the "lights"—inspectors, foremen, rivet gangs, oilers, supplymen, crane operators—are Italian. The same situation exists with regard to Swedes on the "heavies."

In analyzing the two as groups, then, it may be said that all persons employed in one of the work areas are the members of that group. As in the residential communities, the primary test of admittance is ethnic origin, although demonstration of on-the-job allegiance to the ethnic group with whom he works may suffice as a criterion of temporary admittance for an outsider, such as the writer. The roles of group members and norms of social relations demand a segregation as strict, or stricter, than that found in the residential communities. If, as occasionally happens, a "light" rivet gang gets ahead of the yard schedule and runs out of work, the members check in their equipment and go home. Even during the war, when the car shortage was acute and men were working overtime some days, the idea of a "light" rivet gang working on the "heavies" was unthinkable. When a crane is needed on the "heavies," which is more often than on the "lights" by the nature of the work, piecework gangs are sometimes delayed until a "heavy" crane is available, even though a crane might at the same time be idle on the "lights." Even so, no Swede would suggest that a crane from the "lights" drive across the invisible barrier between track 10 and track 11. If two cranes from the "heavies" are laid up for repairs simultaneously, it becomes necessary to transfer one of the cranes from the "lights." The Italian driver, however, is not transferred in such a case; his crane is loaned to one of the Swedish drivers until the broken ones are repaired. The segregation system is extended even to the lunchroom. Here again, there is no visible dividing line; there are just some tables and benches which are for the Swedes and some which are for the Italians.

This remarkable system of relations is, of course, informal. No railroad regulations prohibit an Italian's working on "heavy" car repairs, much less his eating at a "Swedish" lunch table. Local management, however, which is composed almost entirely of Uptown people, recognizes the situation by assigning new employees within the framework of the existing system. To a person familiar with the railroad unions and the railroad seniority system, the most astounding manifestation of this segregation pattern is the custom of ignoring seniority when it is in conflict with the segregated work situation. That is, if there is an opening for

a supplyman to be advanced to the position of riveter on the "lights" and the next supplyman in line for a promotion is a Swede, he is passed over, and the next Italian in line for promotion from supplyman to riveter is given the job. This practice is accepted by both local railroad management and the local union.

The writer saw no cases of attempted invasion on either side during his work experiences in the shop. Such attempts have occurred, according to informants. However, the cooperation of his fellow workers is imperative if a man is to perform his duties in an occupation such as riveting, and past experience with the effectiveness of informal sanctions usually keeps both management and individual dissidents from attempting to break the segregation pattern.

A fascinating question, of course, is how this system of organizing social space originated. We are faced with the problem, then, of tracing the ecological distribution of the groups back to the social processes which brought about that distribution and, so far as possible, inferring the conditions which caused these processes to operate. The writer was unable to contact anyone in the shop with a definite answer. A large number of informants indicated that the present system arose out of the difficulties which language differences caused in communication between the two groups. Language, however, appears to be only one of the factors making cooperation between the two groups unlikely. The most popular theory among the workers seems to be a sort of culture-and-personality school approach which, when compared with the descriptions of the roles of members and the norms of social relations in the two residential communities, is challenging. The Italians say that the Swedes are "naturally suited" to the type of work found on the "heavies": they are dull, stupid, stolid work-horses—"born rate-busters." The work on the "lights," the Italians will tell you, involves finer craftsmanship, more intelligence. The Swedes, on the other hand, claim that the work on the "lights" is a shreds and patches affair of minor importance which can be done by flighty, erratic workers, whereas the "heavies" require "real men," steady, capable workers. It seems reasonable to believe that these answers may indicate the process out of which the existing system has grown: the conflict between cultures with variant norms of conduct and of social relations. Such conflict would make it extremely difficult for a member from one of the groups to fit into the role expectations of the other group, even in a work situation. The obvious way to accommodate this conflict in the work area is to adopt the process utilized in the residential area: segregation.

CONCLUSIONS

The manifest functions of this division of labor along ethnic lines are two. Its first *raison d'être*, the avoidance of language confusions, is rapidly being outgrown. Were this the only justification for this unique system of social relations, we would be justified in labelling that system a survival, an illustration of cultural lag. The second explanation of the system, however, and the favorite of the men working in it, is that the two kinds of work call for two different national types. Both the language barrier and the "natural kind of work for that type of man" idea seem to the writer to be not causes but symptoms of the reason for work segregation. Segregation into two separate work communities along ethnic lines serves as a means for accommodating conflicts caused by extended contacts between members of two variant cultures.

A latent dysfunction of the work segregation system as an accommodation mechanism is to shut off communication and any opportunity for even limited cooperation between the two work communities.

Since both the industrial and the residential segregation systems are based primarily upon the factor of cultural differences, the industrial situation will probably be relatively static so long as the present residential communities remain unchanged. When the inter-community situation alters from one of accommodation to one where the two ethnic residential communities are being assimilated into the Uptown community, then it seems probable that the industrial segregation system will gradually disappear.

This study illustrates for one case at least the value of human ecology as a frame of reference for the industrial sociologist. Ecological analysis offers not a substitute for structural analysis but a complement to it for industrial sociology. The informal organization of this railroad repair shop is more easily discovered and better understood through the conceptual eyeglasses of the ecologist, in terms of social space and segregation. . . .

Leo F. Schnore

The Separation of Home and Work: A Problem for Human Ecology¹

I.

. . . Seen in historical perspective, the separation of place of work from place of residence is a relatively recent phenomenon and has been closely associated with the course of industrialization. Liepmann has suggested that these recurrent daily movements between home and work *supplement* migration and enhance the stability of community structure by contributing to the flexibility of industrial-economic organization. This contribution is most important in effecting adjustments to the changes that occur with the expansion and decline of particular industries, the short-distance relocation of factories, and seasonal fluctuations. . . .

The separation of home and work, however, is not without its dysfunctional features. Some attention has been directed toward the possibility of severe physiological and psychological strain upon individual employees who must travel long distances to work. In addition, there have been numerous discussions of the problems of cities themselves, increasingly threatened with a drastic shrinkage of their tax bases. The problems of financing municipal services may be expected to multiply with a continuation of the trend toward decentralization. In addition to the costs of daily movement to the family budgets of modern workers, the costs of elaborate transportation systems to the municipality must be considered. In particular, the initial capital costs of underground and overhead systems in the largest cities are enormous. Added to these, however, are operating expenses, many of which elude exact calculation. Still another increasing cost to the city is that represented by the loss of revenue arising out of traffic congestion, for component business units. A significant proportion of this congestion is brought about by the work trips of persons finding employment within the local area.

The traffic problem has persuaded planners and other interested officials to participate in such efforts as the federal program of origin-and-destination traffic studies. These surveys, jointly supported by federal, state, and municipal funds,

¹ From *Social Forces*, 1954, 32:336-343. By permission.

have been carried out in more than fifty cities, and represent a valuable new source of urban data. With the inception of such studies a large body of by-product material has become available for analysis by social scientists, and a fund of research knowledge is being rapidly accumulated.

II.

In the course of two recent studies of the residential locations of industrial employees, it has been asserted that their distribution is the consequence of the operation of an underlying "principle of least effort."² An application of this hypothesis to account for the residential distribution of industrial workers was first attempted by Carroll, whose principal argument is "that employees of industrial plants seek to minimize the distance between home and work, and that the aggregate choices of large numbers of employees will tend to produce the observed pattern."³ More recently, the staff of the Industrial Areas Study, University of North Carolina, has subscribed to this explanatory device.

The weight of Carroll's argument rests upon the observation of a gradient pattern of worker residences by distance from the workplace. "The central thesis of this paper," he says, "is that industrial workers will seek to minimize distance from home to work. This generalization was based on data showing that the number of employees resident in each successive mile zone from the plant site beyond the first few miles diminished as distance was increased."⁴ Some attention is given by Carroll to factors other than the possible motives of the industrial employees studied. Some interesting hypotheses pertaining to the possible influence upon residential distribution patterns of such variables as type of industry, wage level, and size of city are presented. In the main, however, these are conceived only as limiting conditions to the operation of the "fundamental principle" of least effort. In Carroll's words,

It will be sufficient to indicate that, while many factors are involved in the selection of homes and places of work, the persistence of the desire to minimize the distance separating workplace from home acting through each individual worker may be the single element which can create pattern out of the aggregate choices of large numbers of workers. It is, of course, obvious that these choices are differentially limited for each individual worker so that only in large aggregates can patterns begin to appear.⁵

The cause of the observed gradient distribution is thus to be found in a single dominating desire experienced by individual workers. It might be argued, however, that should an individual have at his disposal time and money in quantities sufficient to relieve him, to some extent, from the ordinary restrictions imposed by transport costs, he might locate his residence almost anywhere, and for any of a variety of motives. The latter might include, in fact, a desire to maximize the distance between home and work. The least-effort hypothesis appears to confuse motivation with its external limiting conditions.

Even if the foregoing consideration is omitted, however, the least-effort hypothesis

² This hypothesis is given its most detailed elaboration in George K. Zipf, *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, 1949). A summary exposition may be found in "The Hypothesis of the 'Minimum Equation' as a Unifying Social Principle," *American Sociological Review*, 12 (1947), pp. 627-650.

³ J. Douglas Carroll, Jr., "Home-Work Relationships of Industrial Employees" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1950), p. 21. Certain of Carroll's research findings are summarized in "Some Aspects of Home-Work Relations of Industrial Workers," *Land Economics*, 25 (1949), pp. 414-422, and in "The Relations of Homes to Work Places and the Spatial Pattern of Cities," *Social Forces*, 30 (1952), pp. 271-282.

⁴ "Home-Work Relationships of Industrial Employees," p. 130.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

remains subject to serious question on logical grounds. If the tendency to minimize effort is assumed to be *constant* throughout the population, it appears that the hypothesis offers a plausible explanation of the *concentration* of residences near work sites but fails to account for the equally obvious *scatter* away from those sites. This assumption of a constant desire to minimize effort meets still another difficulty if an explanation of change over time is attempted. Given this constant, the antecedent factors responsible for any change must be sought in the external conditions which limit the "basic desire" to minimize effort, for this desire is not conceived as a variable. Thus an explanation, in these terms, of the decentralization movement would appear to require an assumption to the effect that the desire to minimize effort has been on the wane in recent years.

These observations suggest that the factors considered by Carroll as comprising only limitations upon the operation of the least-effort principle may be those worthy of more serious study in their own right. Toward this end, certain findings from a recent study of Flint, Michigan will be presented here.⁶

III.

A. *The Distance Between Home and Work.* The fact that the distribution of worker residences assumes a gradient pattern with respect to distance might have been anticipated on the basis of Carroll's research. The upper panel of Table 1 shows that, in the case of all six plants, the great majority of workers live within

TABLE 1
PER CENT DISTRIBUTION AND RATIO OF WORKERS TO RESIDENT POPULATION OF
EMPLOYEES OF PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS IN FLINT, MICHIGAN,
BY DISTANCE, 1950

Distance Zones (In Miles)	Industrial Installation						Total
	A	B	C	D	E	F	
	Per Cent Distribution						
0-6	80.4	85.2	85.9	84.4	77.5	97.2	83.4
6-12	7.6	5.3	6.0	6.6	9.9	1.3	6.6
12-18	4.6	4.7	5.8	7.0	5.0	0.9	4.9
18-30	5.4	4.2	1.9	1.6	3.8	0.6	3.8
30+	2.0	0.6	0.4	0.4	3.8	—	1.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of Workers per 1,000 Resident Population							
0-6	90.2	62.2	36.5	27.3	21.8	13.1	251.1
6-12	63.7	29.1	19.0	16.1	10.8	1.3	140.0
12-18	35.2	23.8	17.2	15.6	10.7	0.9	103.1
18-30	2.7	1.4	0.4	0.2	0.5	*	5.2
30+	0.1	*	*	*	0.1	*	1.9
N	24,700	16,100	9,360	7,130	5,170	2,970	65,970

* Less than 0.05.

⁶ The data presented below were gathered in the origin-and-destination traffic study carried out in Flint. The author is indebted to the Michigan State Highway Department for the use of these materials. The time of the traffic survey, the summer of 1950, permitted some use of these data in combination with statistics from the decennial census. Flint, a single-industry city, had a population just in excess of 163,000 in 1950. The study reported here was confined to the 66,000 employees of the six Flint plants of the General Motors Corporation: (A) Buick Motor, (B) Chevrolet Motor, (C) Fisher Body, (D) A. C. Sparkplug—Dort Highway, (E) Chevrolet Assembly, and (F) A. C. Sparkplug—Industrial Avenue. Reference will be made to these plants by these letter designations.

six miles of their place of employment. The computation of ratios of workers to resident population, however, shows that *each plant draws workers from each of the five distance zones in accordance with the number of persons it employs*. The gradient pattern of these ratios in strict accordance with size of plant employment could not be readily deduced from prior suggestions to the effect that the average distance between home and work varies directly with the size of plant employment.

The ratio for the largest plant (A) is seen to decline steadily with distance, reaching a plateau at approximately 18 miles and beyond. The ratios for the remaining plants, however, begin to level off at the second zone, with the decline remaining in strict accordance with the size of plant employment. It is interesting to note that the only one of the smaller plants exerting any pulling power over the area in the last distance zone (plant E) is the newest of the major industrial sites in the Flint area. The tendency for newer and more rapidly expanding industrial installations to draw workers from a wider area has been noted by other investigators.

Thus the size of the plant employment and the length of time that it has been located at a given site appear to be variables of more than passing interest to one who would explain the residential distribution of industrial employees. Even if viewed as conditions to the operation of some more basic tendency, their importance should not be overlooked.

B. *The Distribution of Workers by Workshift.* The fact that the origin-and-destination data used here contain information on the time of arrival at work allows an examination of the spatial distribution of employees working on different shifts. Table 2 summarizes the results of this study. As may be seen, *the proportions of workers on the first (day) shift decline regularly with distance, while the proportions of those employed on the two remaining shifts increase as distance increases*.⁷ Again, the least-effort hypothesis suggests nothing in the way of an explanation for it assumes that the desire to minimize effort is a constant, that is, an attribute of all workers. Certain other possibilities, given no recognition in the development of the least-effort hypothesis, might be considered here.

TABLE 2
PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES OF PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS
IN FLINT, MICHIGAN, BY SHIFT, BY DISTANCE, 1950

Workshift	Distance Zone (In Miles)					Total
	0-6	6-12	12-18	18-30	30+	
First	57.3	50.7	46.3	37.8	22.9	54.5
Second	38.4	45.1	49.4	56.5	68.5	41.1
Third	4.3	4.2	4.3	5.7	8.6	4.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	38,530	4,276	3,466	2,457	722	49,451*

*The total number of cases is less than the total in Table 1 because no data were available regarding the workshift of employees who must be assumed to walk to work.

First of all, it should be remembered that more recently employed workers, those with the least accumulated seniority, are most often assigned to the afternoon and evening shifts. These are the employees hired periodically in response to fluctuations in demand, and represent "marginal workers," a concept widely used in labor force analysis. The relationship found here between workshift and distance suggests the

⁷ This same relationship between distance and workshift was found for each of the six individual plants studied, although data for the latter are not presented in this report.

hypothesis that the "marginal labor force" may also be physically marginal to a given industrial community.⁸

From the standpoint of the individual worker, residential location some distance from a center might be advantageous in two ways. For one thing, alternative sources of employment in nearby cities are more accessible. Secondly, a mode of adjustment to fluctuation in labor demand is made possible—a way of life promising more security than can be gained through industrial employment alone. Here we refer to the pattern of part-time agriculture discussed in detail by Firey.⁹

Firey identifies a trend toward what can be described as an urbanization of the originally rural population, and a ruralization of the urbanites, participating in the outward drift from the city. It is his judgment that Genesee County (of which Flint is the center) is one of those counties in Michigan within which the farm population has most fully taken to urban wage employment, while at the same time its decentralizing urban population has begun the practice of extensive gardening and part-time farming in the area surrounding the city. "Thus gardening or part-time farming," he concludes, "has in a certain sense become a way of life for a large proportion of the people in Genesee County. This is particularly true of the zone which immediately surrounds Flint and the radial bands which extend along the paved highways leading outward from the city . . . (for) within this star-like area part-time farming or gardening is the predominant pattern."¹⁰ Whether or not for the same reasons, this pattern has long been established in the continental countries, where great numbers of workers alternate between agriculture and industrial employment during the course of the year. Its emergence in this country is not surprising, since our urban communities have tended to become increasingly market-oriented in supply, demand, and employment opportunities.

Proportionately greater difficulty in securing off-season employment is encountered where the units of production are highly specialized or where the occupational specialization of the workers is great. An increase in the size of the production unit may also be expected to result in further difficulties should a temporary shutdown become necessary, since great numbers of workers are released at one time and in one place. The automobile industry, which forms the basis of Flint's economy, serves as an excellent example of this situation. The industry as a whole employs thousands and is, moreover, highly concentrated geographically. "The results," according to one observer, "are aggravated by the sensitive interlinkages among units, which necessitate that the closing of one unit be followed by the closing of

⁸ Estimates of manufacturing employment in Flint have been made for 1950, which has been identified as an extremely stable year when the magnitude of fluctuation in employment from month to month was at a minimum. These figures approximate the employment of the six General Motors plants under study. Manufacturing employment rose from 63,300 in May to a high of 67,400 in September, and then fell off to 66,400 by November. The difference of 4,100 between the high (September) and low (May) figures provides an estimate of the size of Flint's marginal labor force during this period. (These estimates were abstracted from the Monthly Estimate of the Labor Force prepared by the Flint office of the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, and appear in the appropriate issues of the *Labor Market Letter* published by that office.)

⁹ Walter Firey, *Social Aspects to Land-Use Planning in the Country-City Fringe: The Case of Flint, Michigan* (East Lansing: Michigan State Agricultural Experiment Station, Special Bulletin 339, 1946). Although Firey's study was also limited to Flint, a similar pattern has been found in many other areas. See, for example, Nathan L. Whetten and R. F. Field, *Studies of Suburbanization in Connecticut, 2, Norwick: An Industrial Part-time Farming Area* (Storrs: Connecticut State Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin, 226, 1938).

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 16-17. Statistics revealing the number and size of farm units within the county offer a measure of corroboratory evidence. As farms have increased in number there has occurred a concomitant decrease in their size.

others. Thus a cessation of activities in the automobile industry throws such large numbers out of work that it is impossible for the community to absorb them in other types of employment. . . ."¹¹

Perhaps it is this difficulty of finding other full-time employment in nearby industries that encourages the widespread part-time farming by shop workers observed by Firey. Given a location on one of the major arteries leading to the city, a factory worker is within relatively easy access of industrial employment, yet has ample land on which to raise garden crops in sufficient quantity to supplement purchased foodstuffs. Such a practice would be encouraged if he should be employed on either the late afternoon or evening workshift in the plant, for he would then be able to utilize the daylight hours in work on the land. It is even conceivable that great numbers of these workers prefer work on the later shifts, especially during the planting and harvesting seasons when the daylight hours can be used to greater advantage. It should also be remembered that the factories represent a significant source of extra income to persons whose principal occupation is farming and who maintain their rural residence. At any rate, the observed relationship between distance from workplace and the time of work may have as one consequence the stimulation of the pattern of part-time agriculturism discussed here, and it is within this broader community context that the findings might be interpreted.

C. *Ride Sharing and the Ability to Pay Costs of Transportation.* Still another matter we might consider is the ability of workers to pay the costs of transportation to and from work. Table 3 shows that *as distance increases up to approximately*

TABLE 3

PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF CARS TRAVELING TO PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS ON WORK TRIPS IN FLINT, MICHIGAN, BY NUMBER OF PERSONS IN CAR, BY DISTANCE, 1950

Number of Persons in Car	Distance Zone (In Miles)					Total
	0-6	6-12	12-18	18-30	30+	
One	79.6	62.8	55.3	44.9	61.7	75.0
Two	15.2	24.4	24.7	23.9	16.4	17.0
Three	3.1	7.8	10.2	11.0	6.6	4.3
Four	2.1	5.0	9.8	20.2	15.3	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean	1.29	1.58	1.79	2.24	1.90	1.35
N	18,315	2,038	1,505	812	274	22,944

30 miles, the proportion of cars in which only one person is traveling to work declines, while the proportions in which there are two, three, and four or more persons increases. The mean number of passengers per car also increases with distance up to this "breaking point."¹² One possible explanation for the reversal of the observed tendency in the last distance zone may be found in the widely scattered distribution, at this extreme distance, of those who must regularly travel to the city for employment. Since the area surrounding the central city increases as the square of the radial distance from it, workers are presumably more scattered at this extreme distance, and thus find it more difficult to make ride-sharing arrangements with others.

When considered in an *a priori* manner, ride-sharing might be expected to increase with distance, for such a practice is an effective method of distributing the high

¹¹ Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology* (New York: The Ronald Press, 1950), p. 312.

¹² Although not shown in Table 3, the same relationship between distance and the number of persons in the car was found for each of the six individual plants studied.

costs of automobile transportation.¹³ The significance of this practice may be realized when it is remembered that the ability to pay transport costs to and from centers of activity appears to be one of the most critical selective factors in the centrifugal shift of our decentralizing urban population. It might be suggested here that many family units which otherwise could not participate in the decentralization movement may be able to do so by virtue of such arrangements as ride-sharing. Such a minimization of transport costs, together with the added security obtained by part-time agricultural activities, may account for the presence in these peripheral areas of large numbers of families whose general economic status would otherwise not permit such location. These are the persons whose scattered residential distribution remains inexplicable when the least-effort hypothesis is utilized.

IV.

We have indicated in the foregoing sections certain apparent limitations upon the use of the least-effort hypothesis in this problem area. These limitations, for the most part, appear to be a consequence of the form in which that hypothesis is stated. The postulation of a constant attribute as a fundamental causal factor meets resistance when variation is encountered. The remaining space will be devoted to the consideration of an alternative hypothesis of an intentionally different form.

From one theoretical point of view, the daily journey to work may serve as one of the most easily perceived data in the observation of community organization. As treated by one student of human ecology, the regular ebb and flow of community activity is viewed as itself expressive of community structure. According to Hawley,

Recurrent movements, as the name indicates, comprise all those movements that are routine and repetitive. They might also be called functional, for it is by this type of movement that the functioning of the community is carried on. . . . Each [of these movements] is an integral part in an established organization and is therefore essential to the maintenance of that organization. Recurrent movements involve no break with the past, no disruption of an established order. They are the means by which an existing equilibrium is maintained.¹⁴

The increasing *spatial* differentiation of the modern community, of which the separation of home and work is one aspect, might also be considered as reflecting an increasing *functional* differentiation. Such an interpretation assumes, of course, that space presents at least one measurable dimension of community structure. This assumption is, in fact, given formal expression by Hawley when he suggests that "the distribution of the elements of [the physical] structure [of the city] form a pattern of land uses which presumably is expressive of the interdependence among the various activities comprised by the city."¹⁵

In this spatial pattern, the functional units occupying different sites may be thought of as possessing different locational requirements. One requirement common to all units, of course, is *space itself*, or room in which to operate. But units may differ in the amount of space required. Because space is limited, particularly at the center of an area, those requiring the greatest amounts of space might be expected to locate away from that center. At the same time, any location involves costs to

¹³ It has been estimated that each mile added to the daily journey to work adds an additional \$25.00 to the annual cost of work transportation alone. Richard Dewey, "Peripheral Expansion in Milwaukee County," *American Journal of Sociology*, 54 (1948), p. 121.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 326-327. The material upon which the following discussion is based was drawn from a seminar at the University of Michigan conducted by Hawley.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

the occupant by virtue of his occupancy. Costs being highest at the center, the units least able to maintain occupancy of sites at the center may be expected to be found at or near the periphery. This cost, however, is not the only one exacted from a unit.

One other key characteristic of any site is the degree of *accessibility* to other units it may have. Units may have quite specifically defined needs for accessibility to other units, and this may be taken as another locational requirement. Just as with space, moreover, this need is fulfilled only at a cost to the unit involved. The cost, in this case, is experienced as the cost of transportation, for either the movement of the members of the unit from the site to another place or for the movement of goods and services to the site occupied.

Two assumptions regarding these costs underlie this discussion. The first is that rent, or the cost of occupancy of a site, *declines with distance* from an activity center. The most frequently observed decline is at a somewhat greater than proportional rate. Secondly, transport costs are assumed to *increase with distance*, at an approximately proportional rate, although significantly modified by the method of transport utilized. If it is then assumed that costs of location represent the sum of these costs, the following hypothesis suggests itself: *The maximum distance from significant centers of activity at which a unit tends to locate is fixed at that point beyond which further savings in rent are insufficient to cover the added costs of transportation to these centers.*

It is perhaps, in the interaction of these two broadly conceived "cost" factors that an explanation of the residential distributions of employees may be found. Units obviously differ in their ability to pay both of these costs, and the family unit is no exception. First of all, the work site may be taken to represent one of the most significant "centers of activity" for the family unit of the employee. Exchanges between the family unit and the production unit at the work site—in the form of the physical movement of the worker—are frequent, so that a certain degree of access is an important requirement. Within this broad range, then, it might be expected that the cost-paying ability of the family unit becomes significant. The area in which any given unit may be able to afford location may also be fairly broad. In the aggregate, however, the area open to families of a given cost-paying ability may be distributed about the relevant centers of activity in such a manner that the gradient pattern of residential distribution becomes readily observable. Since the ability to pay costs of transport and occupancy are conceived as *variables* in this formulation, no difficulty is encountered in the fact of scatter. Indeed, such a gradient distribution would be expected to follow.

It is in the light of this hypothesis that the characteristics of the population participating in the outward drift from the city may be reasonably interpreted. Available census data indicate that the ability to pay transport costs may well be a selective factor in residential decentralization, for peripheral areas of metropolitan districts are found to be occupied by families of higher than average socioeconomic status.¹⁰ In addition to costs of transport, of course, other financial considerations are involved in peripheral location. The entire range of family purchases may be expected to be somewhat more costly in the outlying areas, at least until sufficient densities of population make possible greater economies in the

¹⁰ Outlying areas of metropolitan districts have been found to contain significantly greater proportions of persons with the following characteristics: one or more years of college education; self-employed; females not in the labor force; professionals and proprietors, managers and officials. Census of Housing data provide interesting supplementary evidence. Among other differences, the outlying areas have been found to contain higher proportions of one-family, owner-occupied homes, of larger and more recent construction.

provision of goods and services. These remarks are not intended to imply that the economic aspect of location is the only one that can be identified, or that these costs are somehow the only factors operative. Nor are space and time granted some kind of deterministic role with reference to the location of units of the community. Emphasis is placed upon spatial and temporal relations in this approach for the simple reason that the patterns and processes in which we are interested occur in a space-time context.

In addition to static descriptions of community structure, ecological theory attempts to provide some information upon the processes of change in that structure. The general approach sketched here might also prove useful in an attack upon the problem of change in community organization. The hypothesis suggested above might be utilized in accounting for changes observed in the patterns of population distribution. That important changes have occurred is well known. Although changes in costs of occupancy should not be overlooked, the long-range trend toward residential decentralization can be viewed, in this context, as a consequence of a long-range decline in transportation costs. As such, this interpretation represents a formal statement of the frequent impressionistic observation to the effect that the automobile has "released" population from the immediate confines of the city. At any rate, some attention should be directed toward the development of hypotheses suitable to the description of change, in addition to those which offer only plausible accounts for observations relating to a given point in time, as in the case of the least-effort hypothesis.

With respect to the distribution of other centers of activity significant to the functioning of the family, it has been found that many are located at a lesser average distance than that between home and workplace.¹⁷ The location of these units could also be approached through the use of hypotheses of this general order. Retail shopping centers, for example, might tend to locate at a relatively low average distance from their supporting populations (made up of family units, in the main) by virtue of the necessity for frequent exchange with those populations. The latter need may well be one of the key locational requirements of such units, and the concomitant costs could be treated from the point of view outlined here as those deriving from the necessity for a high degree of accessibility to other units. The study of the location of industrial activities and other work sites might also be approached in this manner. Treatment of the location of *all* units comprising the community would be necessary in a complete description of communal land uses.

In any event, the approach outlined here—although far from entirely satisfactory—might be productive of more general information than would one in which a single observed relationship is given priority out of proportion to its apparent significance. This discussion is intended primarily to indicate that another approach of apparently equal research feasibility is possible. The fact that the least-effort hypothesis has happened to dominate the little research already carried out in this problem area should not deter the presentation of alternative modes of explanation.

¹⁷ Trips to 20 other activities have been found to be shorter than work trips. See Donald L. Foley, "The Use of Local Facilities in a Metropolis," *American Journal of Sociology*, 56 (1950), pp. 238-246. See also Carroll, *Home-Work Relationships of Industrial Employees*, pp. 71-74 and 86 where it is noted that "trips to work are short, but shopping, school, and church trips are shorter."

18

*Metropolitan Areas
and Suburbs*

One result of extensive city growth in recent decades has been the emergence of what are termed metropolitan areas. These consist of a central city or core community and the surrounding suburban developments. In the United States the latter are defined according to certain standards of the Census Bureau as to density of numbers, marked division of labor, and social and economic (if not political) integration with the central city. In 1950 there were 168 such areas in this country.

The two papers in this chapter deal with special aspects of family life in the suburbs. In "Is a New Family Form Emerging in the Urban Fringe?" E. Gartly Jaco and Ivan Belknap address themselves to the pertinent topic of the possible new type of family which is developing in suburbia. Wendell Bell's "Familism and Suburbanization" discusses the possible return to a heavy stress on the interests and values of the traditional family as a significant feature of contemporary suburban living.

E. Gartly Jaco and Ivan Belknap

Is a New Family Form Emerging in the Urban Fringe?¹

One modern school of family sociologists, represented chiefly by Zimmerman, considers the present urban American family an alarming instance of disintegration in the familial process. This disintegration is believed to have reached such extremes that the family can no longer adequately discharge vital functions such as reproduction and socialization. Writers of this school imply that American, and Western civilization generally, faces the dilemma of social collapse through failure of the family functions, or a return to some form of the large rural or semi-rural family system.

Another school considers the modern urban family to be making a reasonably

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18, No. 5, October 1953. By permission.

satisfactory adjustment to population density, secondary relations, and diversity of urban institutions. Most demographers apparently agree that basic population trends have been in harmony with the assumptions of this latter school. Urban sociologists also have generally accepted the present urban "companionship," or small family as necessarily typical of urban communities. Burgess and Locke consider this type of family as one "which seeks to combine the values of both the old rural and the modern urban situations."²

It is the purpose of this paper to point out certain trends that may be leading toward the emergence of a variant type of urban family which may be able to maintain sufficient fertility and integration to satisfy the Zimmerman requisites and yet function adequately in the urban community. This variant type of urban family seems to be locating in the urban "fringe,"³ as a product of changing ecological and demographic forces in metropolitan regions, and as a new functional adjustment of the family to the urban way of life. Because this family apparently represents primarily an adjustment to or a product of the peripheral metropolitan ecological area, it might be tentatively termed the "fringe family."

This new family form may be only temporarily connected, however, with the urban fringe. The new family type should not be construed as being permanently or intrinsically bound up with the "fringe." The "fringe family" label is offered only as a provisional, heuristic term which implies that this family form is initially a product of contemporary urban fringe development. This form may eventually spread to other ecological areas. Further research is needed, therefore, before a precise term pertaining to the social structure of this new family type can be given.

Satisfactory proof of the existence of such family form in significant numbers will require restudy of parts of current urban family sociology. In view of the present status of sociological data on the fringe, however, such proof will require considerable field research. Little attention has been paid by sociologists to any family form associated with the outskirts of the city. Also little systematic research has been done on the fringe as a social unit. At present, census and vital statistics data are inadequate for a thorough statistical analysis of the fringe; the former offering only data for 1950 on Standard Metropolitan Areas (these will not be useful for comparisons until 1960); and the vital statistics have no fringe definition at all. The census category of "rural nonfarm" is for the present about the only index of the fringe, but it includes many non-fringe components.

TRENDS TOWARD THE FRINGE FAMILY

The following trends in American society do not prove conclusively the existence and operation of a fringe family. They do, however, indicate a very strong probability of the development of this form. Demographic, ecological, labor force, and stratification data justify the inference that such concerted forces *must* be affecting and sustained by the family system existing in such an area.

Demographic. Birth order is obviously an index of increasing or decreasing family size. The boom in first order of births during the war years has evidently not been sustained recently. However, an analysis of higher birth orders between 1942 and 1949 (comparative percentages computed by dividing the number of each birth order by total live births) reveals some noteworthy changes. (Regional Sum-

² Burgess and Locke, *The Family*; New York: American Book Co., 2nd ed., 1953, p. 143.

³ The fringe herein considered includes suburbs, satellite cities, and any other territory located immediately outside central cities whose labor force is engaged in non-farm activities.

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGES OF 3RD, 4TH, 5TH, AND 6TH BIRTH ORDERS IN U. S. BY
REGIONS, 1942 AND 1949*

Region	Birth Order							
	Third		Fourth		Fifth		Sixth	
	1942	1949	1942	1949	1942	1949	1942	1949
New England	12.3	16.1	6.2	7.4	3.4	3.5	2.0	1.9
Middle Atlantic	12.0	15.1	5.9	6.6	3.2	3.1	1.9	1.6
East North Central	12.9	16.5	6.7	7.8	3.6	3.8	2.2	2.1
West North Central	13.7	16.8	7.6	8.4	4.5	4.3	2.8	2.4
South Atlantic	13.2	15.4	8.3	8.6	5.6	5.3	4.0	3.7
East South Central	13.3	14.8	9.0	8.9	6.3	5.9	4.7	4.2
West South Central	12.5	16.1	7.2	8.9	4.6	5.4	3.1	3.5
Mountain	14.4	17.2	8.3	9.1	5.2	4.9	3.3	2.9
Pacific	11.9	17.1	5.5	7.3	2.8	3.1	1.6	1.6

* Compiled from *Vital Statistics of the United States*, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., Part II, 1942 and 1949.

maries appear in Table 1.⁴) Every state reporting has an increase in third order of births in 1949 over 1942. For fourth order of birth, 43 out of the 47 states reporting had equal or greater percentages for 1949 over 1942; the four states having less in 1949 were Arkansas, New Mexico, Tennessee, and West Virginia, the latter having the greatest disparity of only one per cent. Apparently the fourth order of birth was the peak increase in 1949 over 1942, since only 17 states had equal or higher percentages of fifth orders in 1949. For the sixth order of birth, only nine states showed an increase in 1949. In sum, between 1942 and 1949, all states had higher third order of births in 1949, and 43 out of 47 for fourth order. Seventeen states showed a consistent gain in third through fifth orders in 1949 over 1942: Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin. The first six states were consistently higher in percentages from the third through the fifth birth orders. . . . Scaff's study of a California suburb showed that the "commuting population adds young families and comparatively larger families to this community." Furthermore, "without question, the presence of the commuter group in the community introduces younger adults and children and helps to balance an age distribution that is otherwise heavily weighted by elderly people."⁵

While the census area of rural non-farm is not strictly identical to that of the urban fringe area, it does include the latter and offers a crude index of trends in the fringe. In 1949, for the first time, the number of children under 5 years of age per 1,000 women was higher in the rural non-farm area than in both urban and rural farm areas, showing a steadier and higher rise than for urban areas, while in 1949, the rural farm amount dropped. Further, the per cent distribution for 4 persons per household in 1950 was highest for rural non-farm areas as compared to both urban and rural farm areas.

⁴ Massachusetts is omitted from the New England region because of an absence of birth order data.

⁵ A. Scaff, "The Effect of Commuting on Participation in Community Organizations," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (April, 1952), p. 217.

A recent study indicates an increase both in intra-urban and inter-urban migration to fringe areas. A sustained drop in rural-urban migration and in immigration points in the direction of even further growth for the fringe.

Thus, with a spurt in higher birth orders and excess numbers of young children associated with a jump in fringe in-migration, a trend toward increased family size in the fringe can be deduced.

Ecological. Perhaps the most significant single index of the increase in the fringe population is the comparative rates of growth between 1940 and 1950: central cities grew 13 per cent; the hinterland increased 5.7 per cent; but the outlying parts of central cities showed a jump of 34.7 per cent.

Home ownership is directly related to large families, both in urban and rural areas. Census figures show that home ownership has increased 53.9 per cent between 1940 and 1950, a change which may stimulate or be stimulated by larger families. The rate of home ownership in rural non-farm areas from 1930 through 1950 has been closer to that of the rural farm than to that of the urban area.

... The growth of the urban fringe need not represent a deconcentration of urban population from central cities, but may indicate rather an expansion of urban population into broader territory. Many fringe areas exist apart from central city political boundaries only for a brief time until they become incorporated into the central city. However, the data accumulating on the ecology of the urban community do indicate a continuing increase in the distribution of the United States population into the fringe areas.

Labor Force. . . . Movement to the fringe is not confined to the middle and upper economic levels. The spread of the concept of the guaranteed annual wage in American industry, taken with the increase in fringe population, indicates a drift to the fringe and to single-family dwellings by the so-called "blue-collar" workers. The bearing of the guaranteed wage on the possibility of home ownership in this latter group is clear enough. Moreover, by "living out" and "working in," as Liepmann puts it, the blue-collar worker may paradoxically increase his family stability as he increases his job mobility. By living in the fringe, that is, the worker ceases to be tied to a particular factory or combination residential-occupational area in the city. He is free to change his jobs without the disruption of family stability caused by residential relocation.

With the increasing employment of women, single as well as married, many women who eventually marry and become mothers return to their early forms of work after their children reach a more independent age (Table 2). Increased employment of married women is conducive to fringe living. Being employed in an

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN U. S. LABOR FORCE, BY MARITAL AND FAMILIAL STATUS, 1949*

Status	Per Cent in Labor Force
All women in labor force	22.5
Women without children	28.7
With children under 6	10.0
With children some 6-11 only	24.7
With children some 12-17 only	31.3

* Adapted from A. J. Jaffe and C. D. Stewart, *Manpower Resources and Utilization*, New York: Wiley, 1951, Table 4, p. 133.

area distant from residence minimizes the conflict between the mother's familial and non-familial roles. It seems highly probable that the increase of employment of women in the higher age groups is partly an index of employment of fringe family mothers.

Liepmann has pointed out that fringe families encourage and even require "secondary earners," particularly in lower economic groups. There are equally cogent reasons for the employment of higher status fringe mothers in view of the increasing costs of educating children, intensified by the inflation which has persisted since World War II. Lower age at marriage makes such employment of mothers consistent with a higher birth rate, while their superior education permits them to seek employment affording an economic surplus after they have paid for maids, kindergartens, and other maternal surrogates for the youngest children.

Social Stratification. Scaff holds that "education and membership in a profession become a badge of acceptance" in suburbs.⁶ Coupled with its matricentric orientation, social stratification in the fringe is probably more distinct and overt than is apparent in the central city, where the "elite" is composed of professionals and their wives or widows, while industrial workers occupy lower social strata. If so, then social cleavages in the fringe may be disparate, and fixed along occupational lines.

Furthermore, if industrial workers make up the lower social strata and participate less in the suburban community, as Scaff's study indicates, then commuting by such a population may be viewed as "escape from status." That is, by "working in and living out," a worker may absent himself from his inferior social position during the working day. This would be especially true if the wife and older children are also employed. Indeed, such flexibility may make more tolerable the occupancy of a lower social position in the fringe.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FRINGE FAMILY

If one follows the clues suggested by current urban population and economic trends in the light of what is already known about the modern suburban family a number of inferences on the structure of the fringe family becomes possible. Some of the more important of these inferences involve the probable fringe family roles and the integration of this family at various stages of the institutional life cycle.

When the family selects the fringe for the sake of rearing children, this selection can be regarded as involving emphasis on the reproductive-socializing roles of father and mother. There is evidence that some movements to suburbs are carried out to improve the educational and recreational life of children. This improvement is a reciprocal affair, since in its very nature it involves not only a greater control over the children's environment but a strengthening of the significance of the parental roles and the associated roles of the siblings. . . . With the increasing employment of mothers, the shorter work day and week, and the spread of relatively higher incomes among many employed classifications, the father will come to play a more prominent role in the family and the community than was possible either in the companionship or suburban matricentric family. In general it seems likely that all the family roles in the fringe family may be enhanced by proximity of members, and by mutual functional significance.

The Burgess viewpoint of family sociology, with certain qualifications, holds

⁶ Scaff, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

that the companionship family is more in line with other urban social institutions. In view of the powerful stress required by this form on the intrinsic husband-wife relationship rather than on the father-mother bond, the companionship family may represent less of an adaptation than a negation of the family's important functions. There is an implication in this position that as the family "gives in" and loses its historical functions, it becomes better adjusted to the urban environment. Hence the fringe type of family offers at least a compromise between familistic and companionship forms while maintaining at least an apparent emerging adaptation to the urban environment.

Implicit in the strengthening of the parental bonds in the fringe family is an increased control over the courtship process, and perhaps solidarity in the old age family roles. In the central city, anonymity and diversity of interaction minimizes parental control over children in the realm of courtship and dating. In the fringe, the courtship process can be confined in some degree to peer groups selected by parents in tacit agreement with other parents of like status. This represents a compromise between parental mate choice for the children, and the theoretical free choice implied in the dating pattern of the urban youth culture. This actuarial kind of control over the courtship process by fringe parents obviously gives greater continuity to the family process as experienced by both parents and children. This continuity, together with the heightened significance of the member relationships, may be one explanation of the greater number of children in the fringe.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Burgess and Locke list six long-time family-related trends which have been disrupted by the recent war and speculate about their continuation after the war. These are: (1) The declining birth rate; (2) The consequent smaller size of the family; (3) The increase in proportion of the married to those of marriageable age; (4) The decrease in the age at marriage; (5) The increase in the proportion of all women, and of married women gainfully employed; (6) The decline in the historic functions of the family—economic, educational, recreational, religious, and protective. The apparent assumption is that, should these trends be only temporarily disrupted by the recent war, and should they continue as in the past, the companionship family will become institutionalized in the United States.

Trends pointed out in the preceding discussion, however, indicate that particularly for the rapidly increasing U. S. fringe area, a somewhat different picture is appearing: (1) Sustained fertility through higher orders of birth; (2) A consequent increase in the size of the fringe family; (3) Marriage rates for males higher in the rural non-farm areas than in both urban and rural farm areas; (4) Decrease in the age at marriage continuing; (5) Employment of both single and married women increasing, particularly for the higher age groups and with mothers of children from 12 to 17 years of age; (6) The historic functions of the family seemingly better retained in the fringe—the economic, with employment of mothers as secondary workers; the educational, in the selection of "better" schools for children; the recreational, in the encouragement of participation of children in selected peer groups and social sets; the religious, in belonging to and supporting the "right" churches, and the protective, in addition to the preceding, in providing the best care and rearing practices of medical and mental science.

There is some indication, therefore, that the interruption of the long-term trends

listed above by Burgess and Locke may have become sustained in the fringe family. We can say definitely, at least, that this interruption has been associated with an enormous increase in the fringe population between 1940 and 1950, and that the concept of the fringe family may serve sociology as one useful research hypothesis for the analysis, in a relatively unexplored area, of the demographic, ecological, community structure and working force trends we have mentioned.

If a family form of the type suggested here is beginning to appear in the urban fringe, several current postulates in the social-psychology of personality development will also have to be reconsidered. To urban sociological study, the presence and operation of this family will mean new possibilities and problems if the present trends continue toward fringe expansion of population, decentralization and subsequent relocation of industry and services in the fringe.

For the determination of the structure and function of the fringe family and the community processes associated with it, nine hypotheses are here suggested for further research.

- (1) More Protestant than Catholic or Jewish families appear to live in the fringe. If so, Protestant fertility may be rising, Catholic fertility declining, and Jewish fertility destined to continue at a low rate.
- (2) More whites than non-whites live in the fringe. If this is true, white fertility may rise, Negro fertility decline even further.
- (3) Social stratification may be more fixed and disparate in the fringe than in the central city. Analysis of stratification in the fringe should show new class criteria, and should suggest answers to such questions as whether social classes are becoming more or less numerous and rigid in the United States.
- (4) The inhabitants of fringe areas are experimenting with new forms of age and sex social organization. New perspectives on the urban cultural life cycle for childhood, youth, maturity and old age for both sexes should appear in systematic studies of the fringe.
- (5) In the fringe the kinship system is assuming a more prominent function as the basis of status. Is the strengthening of kinship in this sense making the family as important as occupation in determining status in the urban community? If occupation is still maintaining major importance as a status-basis in the fringe, is the kinship system becoming more important in maintaining occupational lines?
- (6) A strengthening of sibling as well as parental family roles occurs in the fringe family compared to the central city family. This changed significance of the sibling roles should extend the range of kinship association among age peers and modify current urban voluntary association practices.
- (7) When contrasted to the central city, the fringe presents the following differential demography: higher fertility, larger families, more marriage, more children, greater number in the labor force, more home ownership, greater fluidity, less mobility, lower mortality, more aged persons, lower age at marriage.
- (8) There is a higher rate of family participation in social institutions in the fringe than in the central city. Re-alignment of the family with urban institutions has tremendous significance for the study of contemporary social organization.
- (9) More parental control of marriage occurs in the fringe than in the central city. The influence of parents on courtship in the fringe may be such as to bring about new types of mate selection and courtship patterns differing from those associated with the urban companionship family.

Wendell Bell

Familism and Suburbanization: One Test of the Social Choice Hypothesis¹

INTRODUCTION

Social choice and population types.—Within certain population types, the relationship between the food economy and population growth fairly well resembles the conditions described by Malthus. These societies, described by Notestein as having high growth potential and described by Schultz as having endogenous relationships between the agricultural economy and population changes, contain populations which tend to expand to the limits of the food supply. In these societies, the "positive checks" of Malthus operate to control population size; birth rates remain high and relatively stable, variations in population growth being tied to variations in the death rate. Although a large proportion of the world's people still live under such conditions, it has been demonstrated that in other societies, especially large-scale industrial societies, population changes cannot be explained by changes in the agricultural sector of the economy. These societies are freed from the Malthusian limits, and population variations within them will be an expression of a wide range of alternatives for individuals, death rates being characteristically low and stable and variations in population growth being tied to variations in the birth rate rather than to variations in the death rate. Thus the pressure of the population on the food supply no longer explains population growth in such societies as the United States, and other explanatory concepts are needed. A range of available choices which may affect the birth rate have been postulated. These include *familism*, *upward vertical mobility*, and *consumership*, among others.

The three alternative choice patterns defined.—By familism is meant spending time, money, and energy on family life; marriage at young ages, a short childless time-span after marriage, large families, and other such characteristics are indicators of familism. By upward mobility is meant movement into social positions of greater prestige, property, and power.

These are fairly common notions and many writers have discussed the relationship between the family and economic systems, usually positing an inverse relationship between familism and upward vertical mobility. Recent writers have pointed out, for example, that the spending of time and money on family life may have deleterious consequences for upward mobility; and, conversely, that the spending of time and money on one's career may limit one's family life by delaying marriage or postponing children.

Those persons who eschew spending on either career or family and prefer having as high a standard of living as possible in the present represent the consumership choice pattern.² These persons expend their efforts on "having a good time," "living it up," or "enjoying life as much as possible," and they do this in ways which are unconnected with family or career goals.

¹ From *Rural Sociology*, 1956, 21:276-283. By permission.

² There is a characteristic economic consumption pattern associated with each of the choice patterns. Certain types of purchases should be more typical of those who have chosen familism, other types more typical of those who are upward-mobile, and still other types more typical of those classified in the "consumership" pattern as the term is used here.

THE HYPOTHESIS

There is some evidence that these alternative choice patterns and the recent shift of population to the suburbs may be linked together, although there does not seem to be complete agreement concerning which choice patterns are most reflected in the suburban shift. Demographic comparisons between central cities and their suburbs have shown that there is generally a higher socio-economic status group in the suburbs, suggesting that vertical mobility was involved in the suburban move. On the other hand, these comparisons also have shown for the suburbs a larger family size, more married males, more intact families, and more women not in the labor force, suggesting that a preference for familism was reflected in the outward move. Statistically analyzed surveys as well as impressionistic articles by popular writers have reflected one or another aspect of these two themes, and in some cases both themes are present.

The hypothesis of this study is *that the move to the suburbs expresses an attempt to find a location in which to conduct family life which is more suitable than that offered by central cities, i.e., that persons moving to the suburbs are principally those who have chosen familism as an important element of their life styles.* This is not offered as a complete explanation of the move to the suburbs. The sheer growth of our cities has brought about an expansion into the areas around them. This hypothesis concerns the selective or differentiating factors involved in the movement.

THE SAMPLE

One hundred interviews were obtained in two adjacent suburbs in the Chicago metropolitan area. These were Park Ridge and Des Plaines, both of which have had relatively large increases since the end of World War II. Park Ridge increased 37.6 per cent between 1940 and 1950 and about 44.6 per cent between 1950 and 1955. Des Plaines has had a somewhat larger relative growth, increasing its population 57.5 per cent between 1940 and 1950 and about 80 per cent between 1950 and 1955. Both have increased every decade since 1880; the largest relative increase over the years in each case occurred during the 1920's. Both suburbs are primarily residential in character, and are located along a Chicago and Northwestern Railway commuter line. Park Ridge has a somewhat higher average income, occupation, and education than does Des Plaines; and the sample, having been drawn from both places, contains a relatively wide range with respect to economic status characteristics. Thirty-two per cent of the sample are classified as blue-collar; 24 per cent, lower white-collar; and 44 per cent, upper white-collar.³

A sample of dwelling units was randomly drawn from those areas where about 30 per cent or more of the housing consisted of post-World War II building. Substitution of next-door neighbors was allowed in case the selected respondent refused or was not at home. Half of the field work was done on the weekends in order to obtain about an equal split between men and women respondents. The interviewing was done during the early summer of 1955. Most of the interview schedule was memorized by the interviewers, and the average interview was about 30 minutes long.

³ Professionals, managers, officials, and proprietors were classified upper white-collar; clerical and sales workers were classified lower white-collar; and craftsmen, foremen, operatives, private household workers, service workers, and laborers were classified blue-collar. None of the sample dwelling units contained persons reporting the occupations of farm laborer, farm manager, or farm proprietor.

THE FINDINGS

Sixty-eight per cent of the respondents had been living in Chicago just prior to their present move to the suburbs; 24 per cent came from nearby areas, mostly other suburbs, outside of Chicago; and only 8 per cent came from other places. Persons of lower socio-economic status were more likely to have moved from Chicago than were those of higher socio-economic status—88 per cent of the blue-collar, 62 per cent of the lower white-collar, and 57 per cent of the upper white-collar persons reported their last residence within the city limits of Chicago.

Characteristically, the suburbanites interviewed had been apartment dwellers before moving to their present residence, 65 per cent so reporting. Thus the shift to these two suburbs typically involves not only a move from the central city, but also entails a move from an apartment to a house.

The bulk of each interview was devoted to probing the reasons the respondent gave for moving to the suburbs. The reasons given for the move were classified into five broad categories (Table 1). Four-fifths of the respondents gave reasons which

TABLE 1
BROAD CLASSES OF REASONS GIVEN FOR MOVING TO THE SUBURBS, AND
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS MENTIONING EACH TYPE

Type of reason	Per cent*
Better for children	81
Enjoy life more	77
Husband's job	21
Near relatives	14
Other	3

* Since many respondents gave more than one reason, the sum of the percentages does not equal 100.

had to do with bettering conditions for their children. Three-fourths of these responses concerned physical features of the suburbs in contrast to those of the city (Table 2). More space outside the house with less traffic and cleaner area were cited as allowing the children to play out of doors "like children should," with much less worry and supervision on the part of the parents. Also, the fresh air, sunshine, and other features of "the outdoors" were mentioned as providing a "more healthy" life for the children. Living in a single-family detached house—instead of next to, above, or below other persons as in an apartment—was cited as giving the children more freedom to run and play in the house without the constant repressive demands of the parents. Also, the additional space inside the house, according to the respondents, allows the children to have a place of their own within the house, and permits them to "be children" without constantly "being on top" of their parents. Naps are less interfered with in the quiet of the suburbs.

Only a quarter of the responses having to do with moving for the children's sake referred to social factors. The most frequent reason was the belief that the schools would be better in that classes would be smaller, more individual attention would be given by the teachers, and the teachers in the suburbs would be more interested in the children as well as generally more competent than those in Chicago. Other features concerning the social aspect of suburban living thought to be better for children were the following: other children of about the same age to serve as playmates for the respondent's children; more organized activities available for children;

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIFIC REASONS IN THE "BETTER
FOR CHILDREN" CATEGORY

Specific reasons for moving to the suburbs	Per cent
<i>Physical reasons (N = 172):</i>	
More space outside house	72.3
More space inside house	19.7
"The outdoors" (fresh air, sunshine, etc.)	14.3
Less traffic	12.6
Cleaner	11.8
No neighbors in same building	6.3
Quiet	3.8
No stairs	2.1
	1.7
<i>Social reasons (N = 66):</i>	
Better schools	27.7
"Nice" children to play with	10.2
Other children to play with	9.2
More organized activities	2.5
Home of own (security)	2.5
Adults "nice" to children	1.7
Better churches	0.8
	0.8
Total reasons in this category (N = 238)	100.0

owning one's own home, which gives the children a sense of security they could never get in an apartment; other adults in the suburbs have children and, therefore, the adults treat all children with understanding; and better churches in the suburbs to which the children can go.

In 9 per cent of these responses (a third of those classed as "social") there were words to the effect that there were "nicer" children in the suburbs to serve as playmates for one's children. When this reason was given, extensive probing was employed to determine whether or not an upward mobility motif was involved. In one case this seemed to be so. The mother said, "We moved here mainly because of my daughter. The environment and schools are better, and her companions are of high caliber." (Interviewer probed "high caliber.") "I mean more highly educated families." (Interviewer asked what difference that made.) "If it's a girl I suppose you're thinking of who she's going to marry and grow up with." (Pause.) "When it comes down to it, it's a matter of income isn't it? We want to give our child the best possible chance." (Interviewer asked what she meant by "chance.") "So she can enjoy life to the fullest and live graciously, I suppose."

This case was an exception, however, for probing indicated that other respondents giving this response seemed to be referring to their belief that there are fewer "juvenile delinquents" and "bad" influences among their children's playmates in the suburbs. Thus, the response generally seems to indicate a maintenance of present social status rather than upward mobility aspirations for children.

Three-fourths of the respondents (Table 1) gave reasons for their move to the suburbs which have been classified as "enjoying life more." These are shown in detail in Table 3. In these reasons, social features were mentioned more often than the physical features of the suburbs as being important influences in the decision to move. The respondents expected more friendly neighbors, greater participation in the community, and easier living at a slower pace than they had had in the city.

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIFIC REASONS IN THE "ENJOY
LIFE MORE" CATEGORY

Specific reasons for moving to the suburbs	Per cent
<i>Physical reasons (N = 141):</i>	44.1
"The outdoors" (fresh air, sunshine, etc.)	13.1
Gardening and "puttering around the house"	10.9
Quiet	7.2
Less crowded	6.6
Cleaner	4.1
More modern conveniences in house	2.2
<i>Social reasons (N = 179):</i>	55.9
Friendly neighbors	14.1
Feeling of belonging	8.8
Easier living, slower pace	8.1
Home of own (investment)	7.2
Privacy	4.1
Age, marital, and family status the same	4.1
Financial status the same	3.1
"Higher class" of people	2.8
Education the same	1.2
Racial stock the same	1.2
Friends moved here	0.9
Occupational level the same	0.3
Total reasons in this category (N = 320)	100.0

Another theme was the "people-like-ourselves" idea. Some respondents said they wanted to live in a neighborhood where people had the same age, marital, family, financial, educational, occupational, or ethnic status as themselves. Ten per cent of the responses fell into this category, and extensive probing seemed to indicate that the mobility motif was not involved. Instead, it appeared that it was more a matter of feeling more comfortable and having more in common with persons of similar interests. For example, a white-collar man living in a predominantly blue-collar block indicated that he would move elsewhere in the suburbs because he didn't have much of a common interest with his neighbors. He went on to say that his chief concern, although by no means his only one, was the fact that none of his neighbors played bridge.

Only 9 per cent of the respondents indicated that one of their reasons for moving to the suburbs was that they expected a "higher class" of person to be living there as compared with the central city. When probed on this point, the respondents referred to higher education and income, better occupations—especially engineering and sales occupations—good manners, quiet rather than loud and boisterous habits, a gracious manner of living, and intelligence. Certainly, a mobility motif must be admitted in most of these cases, but even here some persons seemed to be trying to find a group of persons "like themselves" with which to live, rather than trying to "better themselves" socially.

The physical features which attracted these suburbanites were the fresh air, sunshine, growing trees and other characteristics of the "open country" in contrast to the central city; also, the opportunity to garden and to "putter" around their "own home" was important. The quiet, lack of congestion, and cleanliness of the

suburbs were also mentioned, as was the fact that a new house with modern conveniences was to be had in the suburbs for a lower price than its equivalent in the city.

As is also shown in Table 1, a fifth of the respondents said that the husband's job was a factor in their move to the suburbs. Of these, more than half were transferred without a promotion or increase in salary or were just moving closer to a job which they had held for some time. The others, 9 per cent of the respondents, indicated that their move was a consequence of upward mobility, although none felt that their move was consequential for future increases on the job.

SOCIAL CHOICE TYPES

The following interpretation should be accepted with caution since these findings may not hold for the movement into suburbs of different types from those studied here. Even though a fairly wide range with respect to value of homes and occupations of the respondents was included in the sample, different reasons for moving may be found in other types of suburbs, such as industrial suburbs or suburbs in which only families of the very top socio-economic stratum reside. For the two suburbs studied, however, the findings are quite convincing.

The respondents were classified with respect to the dominant theme underlying their reasons for moving to the suburbs. Upward vertical mobility does not seem to be greatly associated with choosing to live in the suburbs, despite the contention of some recent writers. In fact, only 10 per cent of the respondents could be classified as having upward mobility aspirations involved in their move to the suburbs, and even here most of these persons also had other reasons for moving.

On the other hand, 31 per cent of the respondents can be classified as exemplifying pure familism, and a familistic orientation entered into the decision to move to the suburbs in a total of 83 per cent of the cases. That familism as it enters into the suburban move is largely "conjugal familism" is indicated by the fact that only a relatively small percentage of the respondents moved in order to be closer to relatives not living with them while a much larger percentage indicated that they moved "because of the children." In fact, several who moved because of the children also noted that it was a little farther away from their relatives—a condition which they considered desirable.

In many of the responses which were categorized as familistic, it was evident that the respondents tended to think of the move to the suburbs in terms of the move from an apartment to a house. Thus, some respondents pointed out that if they could have found the same house in the city they would have preferred to live in the city. Although they realized such sections did exist within the city, they also noted that homes in them cost more than in the suburbs. Also in these responses there was the definite notion that the move from apartment to house was mutually beneficial for parent and child. In fact, several of the wives, according to their own testimony, had been on the verge of nervous collapse living with small children in an apartment. Since moving to a house in the suburbs, they reported they were no longer "nervous."

In general, the respondents reported moving because of the children, but they also reported that since they had lived in the suburbs they had learned to enjoy "suburban living" so much that they would never come back to the city. Seven per cent of the respondents, however, said that they would move back to an apartment in the city as soon as their children were married.

Ten per cent of the respondents were classified as pure examples of the consumer-

ship pattern, and an additional 43 per cent gave consumership reasons along with other reasons.

The three original life styles did not seem adequate to account for all of the responses given. A fourth theme, labeled the "quest-for-community," was apparent. This was the idea of moving to the suburbs to get more friendly neighbors, greater community participation, and a sense of belonging to the community. About 73 per cent of the respondents included such reasons as important factors in their decision to move to the suburbs, and usually this was in conjunction with the familistic orientation.

Thus the data support the hypothesis that the new suburbanites are largely persons who have chosen familism as an important element in their life styles, and in addition suggest a relationship between the desire for community participation or sense of belonging and the move to the suburbs. . . . The data of the present study . . . confirm that suburbanites, in general, desire the advantages of modern technology and many of the facilities of urban "culture." However, if anonymity, impersonality, defilement of air and land by industry, apartment living, crowding, and constant nervous stimulation are inherent in "urbanism as a way of life," as some writers have said, then the findings of this study necessitate the conclusion that the suburbanite is seeking an escape from many traditional aspects of city living. The suburbanite seems to be seeking a way of life in which family, community, and immediate enjoyment through living the "good life" are dominant and interdependent ends.

PART IV SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

19

The Analysis of Institutions

A social institution is a set of interrelated norms. It is a complex of folkways, mores, and laws integrated around some function. The institutionalized role expectations for people engaged in any social activity let us know what the society expects from its members in this situation. In other words, institutions are reflectors of cultural values.

Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke suggest that we can see a major shift in cultural values by examining an entire institution in the process of changing its focus: "The Family. From Institution to Companionship."

An important part of being initiated into an occupational subculture is learning that the institutionalized role expectations may be quite different from the written regulations. An illustration of this within the larger institutional complex of law enforcement is seen in William A. Westley's study of the enforcement of norms, "Violence and the Police."

While a group is not itself an institution, one way to discover what the governing norms are is to watch a group in action. This is clear not only from Westley's research on the police but also from Sheldon Messinger's "Organizational Transformation" in Chapter 6.

E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke

The Family: From Institution to Companionship¹

. . . [Our] basic thesis . . . is that the family in historical times has been in transition from an institution with family behavior controlled by the mores, public opinion, and law to a companionship with family behavior arising from the mutual affection and consensus of its members. The companionship form of the family is not to be conceived as having already been realized but as emerging. In fact, the conceptions of the family as an institution and as a companionship may perhaps best be defined and put to use for the understanding of the family by the ideal-construction method. The procedure for this method consists: (1) in ascertaining the most significant element in a conception; (2) in accentuating this element so as to arrive at its most extreme formulation; (3) in applying imaginatively the ideal

¹ From *The Family*, 2nd ed., pp. 22-26. New York: American Book Co., 1953. By permission.

construction thus obtained to actual situations; and (4) in determining how far this actual situation approximates the ideal construction.

From the standpoint of the ideal-construction method, the family as an institution and as a companionship would represent two polar conceptions. The most extreme theoretical formulation of the institutional family would be one in which its unity would be determined entirely by the social pressure impinging on family members. The ideal construction of the family as a companionship would focus upon the unity which develops out of mutual affection and intimate association of husband and wife and parents and children. Nowhere in time or space are these ideal constructions to be found actually in existence.

Of the historical and existing types of families the large-patriarchal type most closely approximates the ideal construction of the institutional family with its combination of the powerful sanctions of the mores, religion, and law, and the practically complete subordination of the individual members of the family to the authority of the patriarch. The modern American family residing in the apartment-house areas of the city approximates most nearly the ideal type of companionship family, in which the members enjoy a high degree of self-expression and at the same time are united by the bonds of affection, congeniality, and common interests.

A summary comparison of the historical approximations of these two ideal types will indicate the point-by-point outstanding differences between the small democratic-family unit of husband, wife, and children and the extended-patriarchal family.

The patriarchal family is authoritarian and autocratic with power vested in the head of the family and with the subordination of his wife, sons, and their wives and children, and his unmarried daughters to his authority. The modern family is democratic, based on equality of husband and wife, with consensus in making decisions and with increasing participation by children as they grow older. Marriage is arranged by parents in the patriarchal family with emphasis upon prudence, upon economic and social status, and upon adjustment of the son-in-law or daughter-in-law to the family group. In the modern family, marriage is in the hands of young people, and selection is on the basis of romance, affection, and personality adjustment to each other. Compliance with duty and the following of tradition are guiding principles of the patriarchal family. The achievement of personal happiness and the desire for innovation are watchwords of the modern family. The chief historical functions of the family—economic, educational, recreational, health, protective, and religious—are found in their fullest development in the extended-patriarchal family. These historic functions have largely departed from the modern urban family.

For decades the American family has been evolving from a small-patriarchal type revolving around the father and husband as head and authority to the democratic type. Accompanying this evolution has been the decreasing size of the family, the diminishing control of the kinship group and of the community over the family unit, and a growing sense of its independence. The external factors making for family stability, such as control by custom and community opinion, have been greatly weakened. The permanence of marriage is more and more dependent upon the tenuous bonds of affection, temperamental compatibility, and mutual interests.

The Trend to Companionship. The American family is moving toward the companionship type of family with its emphasis on affection and consensus. It is accepted by many young people in principle, although difficult to realize in practice. In the majority of families the control is still moderately paternal, in a considerable

proportion more or less maternal, and in only a small but increasing percentage by consensus of husband and wife. The proportion that includes full participation of children in the family councils is also small. The discrepancy between theory and practice is illustrated in the following instance:²

It is not easy, for example, for men to adjust themselves to their new status, to renounce their traditional claims as lord and master in the household. Sometimes this new status results in surprise and utterly unexpected decisions. In one educated and cultured family [with two daughters] the wife startled her husband one day when she said to him: . . . "I think that the four of us should discuss all important matters that arise and then take a vote, just as an experiment."

So this family of four arranged to discuss all important matters in conference and to take a vote at the conclusion. To the surprise of the man the vote usually ran three to one and that he was the one.

Spencer, writing in 1876, makes an interesting comment on the contrast between the relative roles of law and of affection in relation to the development of monogamy:³ "While permanent monogamy was being evolved, the union by law (originally the act of purchase) was regarded as the essential part of marriage and the union by affection as nonessential; and whereas at present the union by law is thought the more important and the union by affection the less important, there will come a time when the union by affection will be held of primary moment." Eighty years after these words were written Spencer's prophecy appears to be on the way to realization. Mutual affection is becoming the essential basis of marriage and the family.

Summary and Research

Family life of apes and of human beings is similar in that there is selection of a mate, interaction between the male and the female, levels of authority among father, mother, and children, and care of the child by the mother; it differs in that the family life of apes, being biologically determined, is more or less alike within a species, whereas the family life of man is culturally determined and manifests great variations. Co-operative research by biologists and social scientists may determine the relative role and interaction of biological and cultural factors in human family life.

In preliterate societies the family is of the "extended" type, being composed of several generations. Preliterate families have been classified as patrilineal and matrilineal, according to whether descent is traced on the male or female line; and as patrilocal and matrilocal, according to whether the new family resides with or near the husband's or wife's parents.

Variations among preliterate families, divergencies between the extended-family organization of ancient societies, the small-patriarchal family of medieval times, and the modern democratic family ushered in by the Industrial Revolution, and differences among families in the United States indicate that family behavior is relative to the social life and culture of a given time and place. Studies of family behavior should be within the context of the economic and social organization of the period under consideration. For instance, it would be valuable to compare a group of lower-class matriarchal families in a given city with a group of lower-class patriarchal families in the same city, in terms of resistance to social change,

² Sidney E. Goldstein, *The Meaning of Marriage and Foundations of the Family*, New York, Bloch Publishing Co., 1942, pp. 133-34.

³ Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1897 (first edition, London, 1876), I, p. 765.

personality development of the members, and special problems which arise in the different family types.

Family relations have always involved an intimate interplay between the familial and the wider social life. Economic and social conditions, the prevailing philosophies embodied in the mores, the trends of public opinion, have had in all times and places an impact upon the family and an influence upon the sentiments and attitudes of its members. Therefore an understanding of family relations in our own time must be concerned with an analysis, first, of the impact of changing conditions and culture upon the economic and social basis of the modern family, and, second, of the interaction of the members of the family as affected by this changed situation.

The form of the family which apparently is emerging under the economic and cultural conditions of American life appears to be a companionship of husband and wife and of parents and children. The fact that affection and consensus are the outstanding attributes of many American families does not mean that these are characteristic of all homes in the United States nor that they were entirely lacking in other times and places. For example, the Chinese family will be viewed . . . as representing approximations both to the institutional family in its traditional form and to the companionship family in its present trends.

It is in the framework of the family as a unity of interacting personalities and as adapting to changing economic and social situations that studies of the variety of family forms in time and space should be undertaken.

William A. Westley

Violence and the Police¹

Brutality and the third degree have been identified with the municipal police of the United States since their inauguration in 1844. These aspects of police activity have been subject to exaggeration, repeated exposure, and virulent criticism. Since they are a breach of the law by the law-enforcement agents, they constitute a serious social, but intriguing sociological, problem. Yet there is little information about or understanding of the process through which such activity arises or of the purposes which it serves.

This paper is concerned with the genesis and function of the illegal use of violence by the police and presents an explanation based on an interpretative understanding of the experience of the police as an occupational group. It shows that (a) the police accept and morally justify their illegal use of violence; (b) such acceptance and justification arise through their occupational experience; and (c) its use is functionally related to the collective occupational, as well as to the legal, purposes of the police.

The analysis which follows offers both an occupational perspective on the use of violence by the police and an explanation of policing as an occupation, from the perspective of the illegal use of violence. Thus the meaning of this use of violence is derived by relating it to the general behavior of policemen as policemen, and occupations in general are illuminated through the delineation of the manner in which a particular occupation handles one aspect of its work.

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1953, 59:34-41. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

The technical demands of a man's work tend to specify the kinds of social relationships in which he will be involved and to select the groups with whom these relationships are to be maintained. The social definition of the occupation invests its members with a common prestige position. Thus, a man's occupation is a major determining factor of his conduct and social identity. This being so, it involves more than man's work, and one must go beyond the technical in the explanation of work behavior. One must discover the occupationally derived definitions of self and conduct which arise in the involvements of technical demands, social relationships between colleagues and with the public, status, and self-conception. To understand these definitions, one must track them back to the occupational problems in which they have their genesis.

The policeman finds his most pressing problems in his relationships to the public. His is a service occupation but of an incongruous kind, since he must discipline those whom he serves. He is regarded as corrupt and inefficient by, and meets with hostility and criticism from, the public. He regards the public as his enemy, feels his occupation to be in conflict with the community, and regards himself to be a pariah. The experience and the feeling give rise to a collective emphasis on secrecy, an attempt to coerce respect from the public, and a belief that almost any means are legitimate in completing an important arrest. These are for the policeman basic occupational values. They arise from his experience, take precedence over his legal responsibilities, are central to an understanding of his conduct, and form the occupational contexts within which violence gains its meaning. This then is the background for our analysis.

The materials which follow are drawn from a case study of a municipal police department in an industrial city of approximately one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants. This study included participation in all types of police activities, ranging from walking the beat and cruising with policemen in a squad car to the observation of raids, interrogations, and the police school. It included intensive interviews with over half the men in the department who were representative as to rank, time in service, race, religion, and specific type of police job.

DUTY AND VIOLENCE

In the United States the use of violence by the police is both an occupational prerogative and a necessity. Police powers include the use of violence, for to them, within civil society, has been delegated the monopoly of the legitimate means of violence possessed by the state. Police are obliged by their duties to use violence as the only measure adequate to control and apprehension in the presence of counterviolence.

Violence in the form of the club and the gun is for the police a means of persuasion. Violence from the criminal, the drunk, the quarreling family, and the rioter arises in the course of police duty. The fighting drunk who is damaging property or assailing his fellows and who looks upon the policeman as a malicious intruder justifies for the policeman his use of force in restoring order. The armed criminal who has demonstrated a casual regard for the lives of others and a general hatred of the policeman forces the use of violence by the police in the pursuit of duty. Every policeman has some such experiences, and they proliferate in police lore. They constitute a common-sense and legal justification for the use of violence by the police and for training policemen in the skills of violence. Thus, from experience in the pursuit of their legally prescribed duties, the police develop a justification for the use of violence. They come to see it as good, as useful, and as their own. Further.

more, although legally their use of violence is limited to the requirements of the arrest and the protection of themselves and the community, the contingencies of their occupation lead them to enlarge the area in which violence may be used. Two kinds of experience—that with respect to the conviction of the felon and that with respect to the control of sexual conduct—will illustrate how and why the illegal use of violence arises.

1. *The conviction of the felon.*—The apprehension and conviction of the felon is, for the policeman, the essence of police work. It is the source of prestige both within and outside police circles, it has career implications, and it is a major source of justification for the existence of the police before a critical and often hostile public. Out of these conditions a legitimation for the illegal use of violence is wrought.

The career and prestige implication of the "good pinch"² elevate it to a major end in the conduct of the policeman. It is an end which is justified both legally and through public opinion as one which should be of great concern to the police. Therefore it takes precedence over other duties and tends to justify strong means. Both trickery and violence are such means. The "third degree" has been criticized for many years, and extensive administrative controls have been devised in an effort to eliminate it. Police persistence in the face of that attitude suggests that the illegal use of violence is regarded as functional to their work. It also indicates a tendency to regard the third degree as a legitimate means for obtaining the conviction of the felon. However, to understand the strength of this legitimation, one must include other factors: the competition between patrolman and detectives and the publicity value of convictions for the police department.

The patrolman has less access to cases that might result in the "good pinch" than the detective. Such cases are assigned to the detective, and for their solution he will reap the credit. Even where the patrolman first detects the crime, or actually apprehends the possible offender, the case is likely to be turned over to the detective. Therefore patrolmen are eager to obtain evidence and make the arrest before the arrival of the detectives. Intimidation and actual violence frequently come into play under these conditions. This is illustrated in the following case recounted by a young patrolman when he was questioned as to the situations in which he felt that the use of force was necessary:

One time Joe and I found three guys in a car, and we found that they had a gun down between the seats. We wanted to find out who owned that gun before the dicks arrived so that we could make a good pinch. They told us.

Patrolmen feel that little credit is forthcoming from a clean beat (a crimeless beat), while a number of good arrests really stands out on the record. To a great extent this is actually the case, since a good arrest results in good newspaper publicity, and the policeman who has made many "good pinches" has prestige among his colleagues.

A further justification for the illegal use of violence arises from the fact that almost every police department is under continuous criticism from the community, which tends to assign its own moral responsibilities to the police. The police are therefore faced with the task of justifying themselves to the public, both as individuals and as a group. They feel that the solution of major criminal cases serves this function. This is illustrated in the following statement:

² Policemen, in the case studied, use this term to mean an arrest which (a) is politically clear and (b) likely to bring them esteem. Generally it refers to felonies, but in the case of a "real" vice drive it may include the arrest and conviction of an important bookie.

There is a case I remember of four Negroes who held up a filling station. We got a description of them and picked them up. Then we took them down to the station and really worked them over. I guess that everybody that came into the station that night had a hand in it, and they were in pretty bad shape. Do you think that sounds cruel? Well, you know what we got out of it? We broke a big case in ——— There was a mob of twenty guys, burglars and stick-up men, and eighteen of them are in the pen now. Sometimes you have to get rough with them, see. The way I figure it is, if you can get a clue that a man is a pro and if he won't co-operate, tell you what you want to know, it is justified to rough him up a little, up to a point. You know how it is. You feel that the end justifies the means.

It is easier for the police to justify themselves to the community through the dramatic solution of big crimes than through orderly and responsible completion of their routine duties. Although they may be criticized for failures in routine areas, the criticism for the failure to solve big crimes is more intense and sets off a criticism of their work in noncriminal areas. The pressure to solve important cases therefore becomes strong. The following statement, made in reference to the use of violence in interrogations, demonstrates the point:

If it's a big case and there is a lot of pressure on you and they tell you you can't go home until the case is finished, then naturally you are going to lose patience.

The policeman's response to this pressure is to extend the use of violence to its illegal utilization in interrogations. The apprehension of the felon or the "good pinch" thus constitutes a basis for justifying the illegal use of violence.

2. *Control of sexual conduct.*—The police are responsible for the enforcement of laws regulating sexual conduct. This includes the suppression of sexual deviation and the protection of the public from advances and attacks of persons of deviant sexual tendencies. Here the police face a difficult task. The victims of such deviants are notoriously unwilling to co-operate, since popular curiosity and gossip about sexual crimes and the sanctions against the open discussion of sexual activities make it embarrassing for the victim to admit or describe a deviant sexual advance or attack and cause him to feel that he gains a kind of guilt by association from such admissions. Thus the police find that frequently the victims will refuse to identify or testify against the deviant.

These difficulties are intensified by the fact that, once the community becomes aware of sexual depredations, the reports of such activity multiply well beyond reasonable expectations. Since the bulk of these reports will be false, they add to the confusion of the police and consequently to the elusiveness of the offender.

The difficulties of the police are further aggravated by extreme public demand for the apprehension of the offender. The hysteria and alarm generated by reports of a peeping Tom, a rapist, or an exhibitionist result in great public pressure on the police; and, should the activities continue, the public becomes violently critical of police efficiency. The police, who feel insecure in their relationship to the public, are extremely sensitive to this criticism and feel that they must act in response to the demands made by the political and moral leaders of the community.

Thus the police find themselves caught in a dilemma. Apprehension is extremely difficult because of the confusion created by public hysteria and the scarcity of witnesses, but the police are compelled to action by extremely public demands. They dissolve this dilemma through the illegal utilization of violence.

A statement of this "misuse" of police powers is represented in the remarks of a patrolman:

Now in my own case when I catch a guy like that I just pick him up and take him into

the woods and beat him until he can't crawl. I have had seventeen cases like that in the last couple of years. I tell that guy that if I catch him doing that again I will take him out to those woods and I will shoot him. I tell him that I carry a second gun on me just in case I find guys like him and that I will plant it in his hand and say that he tried to kill and that no jury will convict me.

This statement is extreme and is not representative of policemen in general. In many instances the policeman is likely to act in a different fashion. This is illustrated in the following statement of a rookie who described what happened when he and his partner investigated a parked car which had aroused their suspicions:

He [the partner] went up there and pretty soon he called me, and there were a couple of fellows in the car with their pants open. I couldn't understand it. I kept looking around for where the woman would be. They were both pretty plastered. One was a young kid about eighteen years old, and the other was an older man. We decided, with the kid so drunk, that bringing him in would only really ruin his reputation, and we told him to go home. Otherwise we would have pinched them. During the time we were talking to them they offered us twenty-eight dollars, and I was going to pinch them when they showed the money, but my partner said, "Never mind, let them go."

Nevertheless, most policemen would apply no sanctions against a colleague who took the more extreme view of the right to use violence and would openly support some milder form of illegal coercion. This is illustrated in the statement of another rookie:

They feel that its okay to rough a man up in the case of sex crimes. One of the older men advised me that if the courts didn't punish a man we should. He told me about a sex crime, the story about it, and then said that the law says the policeman has the right to use the amount of force necessary to make an arrest and that in that kind of a crime you can use just a little more force. They feel definitely, for example, in extreme cases like rape, that if a man was guilty he ought to be punished even if you could not get any evidence on him. My feeling is that all the men on the force feel that way, at least from what they have told me.

Furthermore, the police believe, and with some justification it seems, that the community supports their definition of the situation and that they are operating in terms of an implicit directive.

The point of this discussion is that the control of sexual conduct is so difficult and the demand for it so incessant that the police come to sanction the illegal use of violence in obtaining that control. This does not imply that all policemen treat all sex deviants brutally, for, as the above quotations indicate, such is not the case. Rather, it indicates that this use of violence is permitted and condoned by the police and that they come to think of it as a resource more extensive than is included in the legal definition.

LEGITIMATION OF VIOLENCE

The preceding discussion has indicated two ways in which the experience of the police encourages them to use violence as a general resource in the achievement of their occupational ends and thus to sanction its illegal use. The experience, thus, makes violence acceptable to the policeman as a generalized means. We now wish to indicate the particular basis on which this general resource is legitimated. In particular we wish to point out the extent to which the policeman tends to transfer violence from a legal resource to a personal resource, one which he uses to further his own ends.

Seventy-three policemen, drawn from all ranks and constituting approximately 50 per cent of the patrolmen, were asked, "When do you think a policeman is justified in roughing a man up?" The intent of the question was to get them to legitimate the use of violence. Their replies are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1*
BASES FOR THE USE OF FORCE NAMED BY 73 POLICEMEN

Type of Response	Frequency	Percentage
(A) Disrespect for police	27	37
(B) When impossible to avoid	17	23
(C) To obtain information	14	19
(D) To make an arrest	6	8
(E) For the hardened criminal	5	7
(F) When you know man is guilty	2	3
(G) For sex criminals	2	3
Total	73	100

* Many respondents described more than one type of situation which they felt called for the use of violence. The "reason" which was either (a) given most heatedly and at greatest length and/or (b) given first was used to characterize the respondent's answer to the question. However, this table is exhaustive of the types of replies which were given.

An inspection of the types and distribution of the responses indicates (1) that violence is legitimated by illegal ends (A, C, E, F, G) in 69 per cent of the cases; (2) that violence is legitimated in terms of purely personal or group ends (A) in 37 per cent of the cases (this is important, since it is the largest single reason for the use of violence given); and (3) that legal ends are the bases for legitimation in 31 per cent of the cases (B and D). However, this probably represents a distortion of the true feelings of some of these men, since both the police chief and the community had been severely critical of the use of violence by the men, and the respondents had a tendency to be very cautious with the interviewer, whom some of them never fully trusted. Furthermore, since all the men were conscious of the chief's policy and of public criticism, it seems likely that those who did justify the use of violence for illegal and personal ends no longer recognized the illegality involved. They probably believed that such ends fully represented a moral legitimation for their use of violence.

The most significant finding is that at least 37 per cent of the men believed that it was legitimate to use violence to coerce respect. This suggests that policemen use the resource of violence to persuade their audience (the public) to respect their occupational status. In terms of the policeman's definition of the situation, the individual who lacks respect for the police, the "wise guy" who talks back, or any individual who acts or talks in a disrespectful way, deserves brutality. This idea is epitomized in admonitions given to the rookies such as, "You gotta make them respect you" and "You gotta act tough." Examples of some of the responses to the preceding question that fall into the "disrespect for the police" category follow:

Well, there are cases. For example, when you stop a fellow for a routine questioning, say a wise guy, and he starts talking back to you and telling you you are no good and that sort of thing. You know you can take a man in on a disorderly conduct charge, but you can practically never make it stick. So what you do in a case like that is to egg the guy on until he makes a remark where you can justifiably slap him and, then, if he fights back, you can call it resisting arrest.

Well, it varies in different cases. Most of the police use punishment if the fellow gives them any trouble. Usually you can judge a man who will give you trouble though. *If there is any slight resistance*, you can go all out on him. You shouldn't do it in the street though. Wait until you are in the squad car, because, even if you are in the right and a guy takes a poke at you, just when you are hitting back somebody's just likely to come around the corner, and what he will say is that you are beating the guy with your club.

Well, a prisoner deserves to be hit when he goes to the point where he tries to put you below him.

You gotta get rough when a man's language becomes very bad, when he is trying to make a fool of you in front of everybody else. I think most policemen try to treat people in a nice way, but usually you have to talk pretty rough. That's the only way to set a man down, to make him show a little respect.

If a fellow called a policeman a filthy name, a slap in the mouth would be a good thing, especially if it was out in the public where calling a policeman a bad name would look bad for the police.

There was the incident of a fellow I picked up. I was on the beat, and I was taking him down to the station. There were people following us. He kept saying that I wasn't in the army. Well, he kept going on like that, and I finally had to bust him one. I had to do it. The people would have thought I was afraid otherwise.

These results suggest (1) that the police believe that these private or group ends constitute a moral legitimation for violence which is equal *or superior* to the legitimation derived from the law and (2) that the monopoly of violence delegated to the police, by the state, to enforce the ends of the state has been appropriated by the police as a personal resource to be used for personal and group ends.

THE USE OF VIOLENCE

The sanctions for the use of violence arising from occupational experience and the fact that policemen morally justify even its illegal use may suggest that violence is employed with great frequency and little provocation. Such an impression would be erroneous, for the actual use of violence is limited by other considerations, such as individual inclinations, the threat of detection, and a sensitivity to public reactions.

Individual policemen vary of course in psychological disposition and past experience. All have been drawn from the larger community which tends to condemn the use of violence and therefore have internalized with varying degrees of intensity this other definition of violence. Their experience as policemen creates a new dimension to their self-conceptions and gives them a new perspective on the use of violence. But individual men vary in the degree to which they assimilate this new conception of self. Therefore, the amount of violence which is used and the frequency with which it is employed will vary among policemen according to their individual propensities. However, policemen cannot and do not employ sanctions against their colleagues for using violence, and individual men who personally condemn the use of violence and avoid it whenever possible refuse openly to condemn acts of violence by other men on the force. Thus, the collective sanction for the use of violence permits those men who are inclined to its use to employ it without fear.

All policemen, however, are conscious of the dangers of the illegal use of violence. If detected, they may be subject to a lawsuit and possibly dismissal from the force. Therefore, they limit its use to what they think they can get away with. Thus, they recognize that, if a man is guilty of a serious crime, it is easy to "cover up" for their

brutality by accusing him of resisting arrest, and the extent to which they believe a man guilty tends to act as a precondition to the use of violence.

The policeman, in common with members of other occupations, is sensitive to the evaluation of his occupation by the public. A man's work is an important aspect of his status, and to the extent that he is identified with his work (by himself and/or the community) he finds that his self-esteem requires the justification and social elevation of his work. Since policemen are low in the occupational prestige scale, subject to continuous criticism, and in constant contact with this criticizing and evaluating public, they are profoundly involved in justifying their work and its tactics to the public and to themselves. The way in which the police emphasize the solution of big crimes and their violent solution to the problem of the control of sexual conduct illustrate this concern. However, different portions of the public have differing definitions of conduct and are of differential importance to the policeman, and the way in which the police define different portions of the public has an effect on whether or not they will use violence.

The police believe that certain groups of persons will respond only to fear and rough treatment. In the city studied they defined both Negroes and slum dwellers in this category. The following statements, each by a different man, typify the manner in which they discriminate the public:

In the good districts you appeal to people's judgment and explain the law to them. In the South Side the only way is to appear like you are the boss.

You can't ask them a question and get an answer that is not a lie. In the South Side the only way to walk into a tavern is to walk in swaggering as if you own the place and if somebody is standing in your way give him an elbow and push him aside.

The colored people understand one thing. The policeman is the law, and he is going to treat you rough and that's the way you have to treat them. Personally, I don't think the colored are trying to help themselves one bit. If you don't treat them rough, they will sit right on top of your head.

Discriminations with respect to the public are largely based on the political power of the group, the degree to which the police believe that the group is potentially criminal, and the type of treatment which the police believe will elicit respect from it.

Variations in the administration and community setting of the police will introduce variations in their use of violence. Thus, a thoroughly corrupt police department will use violence in supporting the ends of this corruption, while a carefully administrated nonpolitical department can go a long way toward reducing the illegal use of violence. However, wherever the basic conditions here described are present it will be very difficult to eradicate the illegal use of violence.

Given these conditions, violence will be used when necessary to the pursuit of duty or when basic occupational values are threatened. Thus a threat to the respect with which the policeman believes his occupation should be regarded or the opportunity to make a "good pinch" will tend to evoke its use.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper sets forth an explanation of the illegal use of violence by the police based on an interpretative understanding of their occupational experience. Therefore, it contains a description and analysis of *their* interpretation of *their* experience.

The policeman uses violence illegally because such usage is seen as just, acceptable, and, at times, expected by his colleague group and because it constitutes an effective means for solving problems in obtaining status and self-esteem which

policemen as policemen have in common. Since the ends for which violence is illegally used are conceived to be both just and important, they function to justify, to the policeman, the illegal use of violence as a general means. Since "brutality" is strongly criticized by the larger community, the policeman must devise a defense of his brutality to himself and the community, and the defense in turn gives a deeper and more lasting justification to the "misuse of violence." This process then results in a transfer in property from the state to the colleague group. The means of violence which were originally a property of the state, in loan to its law-enforcement agent, the police, are in a psychological sense confiscated by the police, to be conceived of as a personal property to be used at their discretion. This, then, is the explanation of the illegal use of violence by the police which results from viewing it in terms of the police as an occupational group.

The explanation of the illegal use of violence by the police offers an illuminating perspective on the social nature of their occupation. The analysis of their use of brutality in dealing with sexual deviants and felons shows that it is a result of their desire to defend and improve their social status in the absence of effective legal means. This desire in turn is directly related to and makes sense in terms of the low status of the police in the community, which results in a driving need on the part of policemen to assert and improve their status. Their general legitimation of the use of violence *primarily* in terms of coercing respect and making a "good pinch" clearly points out the existence of occupational goals, which are independent of and take precedence over their legal mandate. The existence of such goals and patterns of conduct indicates that the policeman has made of his occupation a preoccupation and invested in it a large aspect of his self.

20

The Family

The family is the oldest human group and the basic one. While the particular form of family structure (organization) may and does vary from society to society, the central foci of family activities everywhere are child-bearing, childrearing, and the initial induction of the child into the culture of a given society—in short, socialization.

Sripati Chandrasekhar in "Mao's War with the Chinese Family" shows the malleability of fundamental institutions under strong political pressure and ideological rationalizations. However, it should be borne in mind that extensive modifications in traditional family life were already under way in China before the Communists came into power in that country.

An increasingly important problem in family life in Western Europe and the United States concerns the role and status of older, retired members with respect to their children and other relatives. This topic is discussed by Robert J. Havighurst in "Flexibility and the Social Roles of the Retired." The author gives some sound advice regarding more adequate personal and social adjustments of retired people.

Sripati Chandrasekhar

Mao's War With the Chinese Family¹

The years of shock treatment administered by the Chinese Communists have rendered virtually impossible any reconstitution of the pre-"liberation" form of Chinese society. Of all the institutions that have been affected, the most important is the family.

The family in China, as in other parts of the world, has been the single major factor in insuring the stability and survival of the essentials of human civilization. From the time of Confucius, China's emperors and philosophers realized its importance as a fundamental social unit and its tremendous role in determining the character and structure of society.

In the "Book of Poetry," edited by Confucius, it is said, "No one is to be looked up to like a father. No one is to be depended on like a mother." During those times certain "criminals" were held to be worse than murderers. They were: "The son who does not serve his father respectfully, but greatly wounds his father's heart; and the father who cannot cherish his son but hates him; and the younger brother who does not bear in mind the evident intention of Heaven, and will not respect his elder brother; and the elder brother who forgets the tender regard in which he should hold his younger brother, and is unfriendly to him."

Through the centuries these theoretical directives of good behavior and family loyalty gradually took root to the extent that not only businesses but even government became family matters. Men did not usually associate with strangers in any venture, but with their kin. In China the greatest loyalty was always given not to the state, or to religion, but to the smallest group—the family.

One aspect of the Communist assault on traditional Chinese society has been the technique of denunciation, destroying loyalty among relatives.

The campaign of denunciations began within two years of the Communists' seizure of power. On Feb. 21, 1951, the Government promulgated the "Regulation of the People's Republic of China for Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries." This regulation was intended to suppress all opposition to the Communist regime and its policies. One extraordinary feature was that penalties were decreed for offenses committed before the promulgation of the measure.

A major effect of this regulation has been the demoralization of age-old familial loyalties. In the name of waging a war against anti-Government counter-revolutionaries, the Government in effect tried to break the bonds between husband and wife, parents and children, one relative and another. For the first time in China's long and checkered history it became a virtue and an imperative patriotic duty to bear witness against one's kith and kin.

¹ From the *New York Times Magazine*, May 17, 1959, pp. 21, 71-73. By permission.

Why did the Chinese give up their traditional and intimate loyalties so easily? The answer is simply that people do not like to face death. One can face social ostracism, economic disinheritance and political persecution, but strong must be the soul that is ready to die for love of one's relations, especially when such love and emotion have been declared reactionary, unpatriotic and unacceptable by society at large. The much-publicized open mass trials and accusations became so terrorizing that the thought uppermost in the mind of every Chinese, once the drive had begun, was survival.

Chinese newspapers, magazines, films and official pronouncements of recent years record countless instances of sons and daughters accusing their parents (interestingly enough, few parents turned against their children) and wives turning against their husbands, and sometimes vice versa, all in the name of the patriotic duty of ferreting out anti-Government elements. Although such denunciations are not now so widespread as during the height of the drive, they still continue.

This drive has sown seeds of suspicion between one member and another in almost every family. Distrust has now become the watchword and no one can confide one's thoughts, not to speak of one's deeds, to another, however intimate the relationship between the two may be. Thus demoralization has set in, disrupting the cherished values inherent in the traditional close family of the Chinese.

Another aspect of the assault on traditional society has been the emancipation of women for, although this has included many desirable reforms, it has also contributed to the disruption of the old family system.

Arranged marriages have been abolished. A young man or woman can marry anyone of his or her choice provided the local Communist party and precinct police raise no objections. Concubinage and prostitution have been strictly outlawed. Monogamy has become the rule. Married women can retain their maiden names if they desire. Women have also obtained freedom of divorce.

On the economic front, women can hold property—at least such property as is still permitted to private ownership. But perhaps the most important reform is that women's wages are paid directly to them, not to their husbands or fathers. I was told that this simple and just change in itself had reduced the family patriarch to an impotent position, and that male domination in the family had vanished.

The imposition of central authority has been an equally revolutionary change. The Chinese have been known throughout centuries for their rugged individualism. The people, particularly the rural folk, have gone about their daily business, through all their ups and downs, relying on their traditional knowledge and common sense, animated, if unconsciously, by the belief that they were governed best when they were governed least. They seldom came in contact with even provincial authority, not to speak of any directions from the nation's capital.

This age-old disregard for central authority is now gone forever. Peiping has tightened its hold on the remotest areas. In distant villages people's contact with the thought, actions and directives of the capital is alive, thanks to the radio. The nation's administration is now close-knit and Peiping's directives are carried out speedily and efficiently all over the country.

The effects of all these changes can be seen most vividly in the commune, the most extreme form of communized society known. These communes have been set up in rural areas all over the country. Peiping's official claim is that they include 90 per cent of the rural population—some 500,000,000 people. My estimate is that, in fact, only 100,000,000 to 200,000,000 are living communal lives. But Government

spokesmen frankly state that they will not rest until the whole country has become one vast commune.

I had occasion to visit four communes—the northernmost was some six miles north of Peiping and the southernmost was near Chengchow. Of the four, two were show places—one, the Sputnik Commune, and the other, Chili-yin, known as The Commune of the Sixteen Guarantees. I spent a whole day in the latter and saw something of every aspect of the commune's life.

The Communists are not only not apologetic but positively proud of the transformations wrought in Chili-yin over a short period of time. Here, they have not only challenged but have swept away the concepts of centuries.

As we stepped out of the jeep, my interpreter, the city official from Chengchow who accompanied us and I were cordially greeted by a stocky peasant in the inevitable blue uniform—the director of the commune. He was very happy, he said, to welcome “the scientist from India, our great and friendly neighbor.” As we walked to his modest rural office—the home of an ex-landlord—he observed that he himself was a good example of what Chairman Mao and communism had done for the nation.

“Before liberation I was the exploited son of a farmhand who never owned a mou of land. I did not know where India was. But now I am the People's Director and, thanks to intense study of world problems and international relations, I have come to know India as our great neighbor and friend who is fighting for China and peace.”

We went round the commune—innumerable crèches of chubby infants, kindergartens overflowing with well-fed children singing the now familiar songs, “Socialism Is Good,” “Communes Are Good” and “Chairman Mao Is Our Savior”: the Middle Schools and the Red and Expert Schools—all coeducational—and their attached hostels, clinics and kitchens.

The Red and Expert Schools take in peasants and workers, youths and adults, who have had no formal education, and give them intense part-time instruction at two levels. At the first level the student is taught the “universal truths” of the Communist classics. At the second level, he is trained in his particular specialty—it may be plowing or welding or weaving, tinkering or tailoring. The students also work on the farms and in the factories that belong to the commune. They become in a real sense Reds and experts, and they need know nothing else to play their robot roles in the new order.

The principal of the Red and Expert School was ebullient. “This kind of school is new and is not yet known even in other People's Republics,” he told me. “Here we demonstrate that virtue is teachable and human nature can be changed. And learning here is no longer the privilege of the limited few but the birthright of all.”

We stopped at random at the home of a peasant. It was a small mud affair, extremely clean and neat. We were introduced to a peasant couple in their thirties. They greeted us by clapping their hands and we reciprocated. They formerly had been what were called “middle” peasants, neither rich nor poor. The house had three large rooms which the couple's sizable family had occupied before the commune was organized. Now the family had been dispersed. The couple, who formerly owned the house, had been allotted one room, and two other couples, strangers from a near-by village, had moved into the two other rooms.

“My old parents have gone to the Happy Home for the Aged. My two sons are in the Middle School hostel. I am happy for them because they are getting an edu-

cation—the new education that will make them experts. But it is the baby I miss.” The wife said this, looked at the official, and added, “Of course, I can now work hard and happily, knowing that my baby is well taken care of.”

“How old is the baby?” I asked.

“About 3,” was the reply.

“Can’t you visit the baby?” I wanted to know.

“Of course, my husband and I can and we do. But we are so very busy with work, study and meetings,” she said, in a tone half proud and half sad, “that we haven’t very much time for the baby.”

“Of course, we realize that we have to work hard and produce more to defeat the American enemy and get back Taiwan,” her husband intervened. His statement seemed inspired by the presence of the official, but it is possible that he meant it. In China one gets so used to hearing statements like this that I wasn’t surprised to hear it from this young peasant.

“Can you bring your child home if he falls ill?” I asked the mother.

“Of course, I can spend some time with my baby if he is ill, and if the person in charge of the crèche sends for me,” she replied.

In the crèches we visited, the children did look happy and cheerful. Everything was clean, and the orderlies and the women in charge even wore cotton surgical masks. The children in their padded clothes—houses are very poorly heated all over China because of a fuel shortage—played with their crude commune-made toys.

I raised the question of children’s illnesses and parental visits with the woman in charge of one crèche. “We have a Western-trained, as well as a traditional, doctor,” she said. “Both examine all sick babies and give them what is considered the best treatment under the circumstances. Sometimes we send for the parents, but more often not. We find their knowledge of how to care for their infants is certainly inferior. The doctor and nurse know more about what is good for the babies than the parents.”

Among the institutions we visited was a dormitory for unmarried men and women. The occupants were roughly in the 20-25 age group. Some were waiting to get married and move into rooms allotted to married couples.

In this group was an occasional married man or woman. The women were introduced as “Worker” or “Producer,” not as “Mrs. X” or “Mrs. Y.” I inquired into the reason for separation. “The spouse is probably a very skilled worker and in demand elsewhere in some other town,” I was told. “But the separation is temporary until the authorities can find a suitable job for the partner in the same area.” It is not uncommon to come across married women working on teams in communities miles away from their husbands.

There is a belief outside China that the separation of husbands and wives sometimes found in the communes is a deliberate one. Some external observers have jumped to the conclusion that the communes are trying to solve the country’s population problem through such separation, but I inquired into this matter in some detail and have satisfied myself that these separations are temporary and accidental and not designed by the authorities for any demographic purpose.

I visited a Happy Home for the Aged where one old lady—about 70, perhaps—took me to her little room and showed me proudly a new woolen blanket that was lying on her *k’ang* (built-in bed). “Are you happy here?” I asked her as she handed me a handful of shelled peanuts.

“Oh, yes, I am; but I miss my grandchildren,” she said, adding, perhaps as an afterthought, “I know they are getting a useful education somewhere.”

Through their vague and indirect remarks—or more often through their silence to my questions—I could discern these people's unhappiness over the disruption of their families. In the past, there were times when they did not have enough to eat or blankets enough in winter, but this was more than compensated for by the warmth of family loyalty and affections. Those days are gone and now they have material necessities but not emotional security.

Even the most casual observer could not have helped seeing that the average adult looked sullen and unhappy. He followed official directions and did his duty, but dejection and misery are impossible to conceal. We have incredible poverty in some of India's villages, but such poverty has never been a barrier to banter and humor, and even, oddly enough, gaiety. This I completely missed in the communes and the countryside of China.

The director invited me to a simple but adequate lunch in his own office. It consisted of meat dumplings, which we dipped in a hot sauce, a sweet dish and endless cups of hot tea. Everyone enjoyed the lunch and the director, obviously satisfied and happy, recalled his days as a landless farmhand in this village before "liberation."

"These meat dumplings were a great luxury then, because we couldn't afford meat. We had this dish only once a year during a festive occasion. Now we can have this delicacy any time we want." And he served me a few more hot dumplings.

I asked the director whether anyone could leave the commune for some other place in China. He was genuinely surprised at my question, as if the thought had never occurred to him.

"I cannot imagine anyone wanting to leave this place," he replied. "Please don't forget that this commune came into existence because the people themselves demanded it."

He then explained that migration within China was controlled by a permit system. The permit goes with the ration card which enables one to buy rice, oil and pork in the cities and other non-commune areas.

In the communes there is no need for ration cards because everybody eats in the common mess halls. Hence anyone leaving a commune—unless on official business or with special permission—would be unable to obtain food elsewhere. Furthermore, one of the duties of street committees is to inform their daily meetings of both new arrivals and persons missing from the community street. So desertion from the communes is hazardous. Anyone caught is usually condemned to hard labor in one of the remote areas which are being developed.

"Can one go out of the commune to visit friends or relatives?" I asked.

"Permission may be granted under special circumstances, but actually such requests have not come to me so far," the director assured me.

This is a model commune—"the latest development, where we have gone one step ahead of the Soviet Union," as officials in Peiping repeatedly told me.

Everyone works according to his or her ability and all are given their basic needs. Everyone's loyalty is dedicated to the all-powerful state and its demands and directives. Food, clothing, housing, education, medical care, recreation and burial are guaranteed. What more can one ask for? The tentacles of the state embrace every aspect and account for every hour of one's life. Leisure, privacy and solitude have become dreadful vices. Abiding emotional attachments are suppressed in the name of the new Moloch of state and production.

What is likely to be the end of this new way of life? Will the worm someday

ture, and a silent revolution of angry men and women overthrow the communes? Or will the communes evolve in time a new human species—robots that respond to the radio? It is rash to prophesy.

Robert J. Havighurst

Flexibility and the Social Roles of the Retired¹

Research has established the fact that activity in a wide variety of social roles is positively related to happiness and good social adjustment in old age and also that a high degree of activity in a given social role is positively related to happiness and good social adjustment. The reasons are implicit in the definition of a social role—a pattern of activity which many people commonly fill and which is expected by society. . . . The ordinary person has the opportunity to fill a variety of social roles—parent, homemaker, husband or wife, son or daughter, member of a kinship group, member of an informal friendship group, club member, worker, church member, citizen, user of leisure time.

But at the ages from about 50 to about 75 he is deprived of several social roles or at least must see them reduced. At the same time he grows discontented unless he is able to compensate for this by increasing activity in other roles or by the developing of new ones; that is, by role flexibility.

Several circumstances bring about wide-spread role-changing in the period from 50 to 75. Some roles are intensified, some are reduced, some may be intensified by effort, and today there are some new roles open to those later in life.

INTENSIFIED ROLES

The role of homemaker, for men or for women, may be engaged in with more energy and bring more satisfaction as people grow older. With children grown up and going away, the role of parent is relaxed, and people often have more time and more money to put into making an enjoyable home. They may secure a new house while in the fifties, sixties, or even seventies, and spend a great deal of time in decorating it and in gardening, in entertaining, and simply in relaxing before the open fire or sitting out in the sun or the shade.

As a person grows older, he may attend church more frequently and spend more time in Bible-reading and in church organizations.

REDUCED ROLES

For most people retirement from work comes in the sixties, and the rewards in money and public regard that an active worker enjoys are now denied him.

The role of parent is reduced for many as early as the forties. At least by the end of the fifties most people have largely lost the active, responsible, time-consuming role of father or mother, even though still living in close relations with their adult children.

Of course, the role of husband or wife is often terminated by the death of one partner. Half of the married women in the United States are widows before they

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1954, 59: 309-311. By permission of The University of Chicago Press

reach 70. Men lose this role, on the average, much later in life. But both sexes experience a reduction in some conjugal activities, especially in decreasing physical sex relations. Though a few people actually are more active in the role of spouse as they grow older, and thereby gain a great deal of satisfaction, that is not the common lot.

Club or association membership usually declines after the age of 60. One drops out or loses the leadership while continuing to belong.

ROLES THAT MAY BE INTENSIFIED

Several roles may possibly be intensified, but this requires special effort.

Older people can easily devote more time and energy to the role of citizen than they did when younger. They have time to read, to attend meetings, to work on committees, and in the ripeness of their experience they can often contribute a sounder judgment than was theirs when younger.

With the status that age gives them, and the time to visit and write letters, older people can enjoy family life on a wide scale with relatives as well as with their own children.

The older person has more time to be a friend, neighbor, and member of a social clique, and he may use his leisure and perhaps his money on such things as travel, gardening, and hobbies.

NEW ROLES

The outstanding new role available to older people is that of grandparent, which is often a great source of satisfaction. Involving, as it does, little responsibility for discipline, it often allows a full enjoyment of children and younger people.

FLEXIBILITY IN ROLE CHANGING

For most people, the set of habits which constitutes a role is changed only with difficulty. To change roles easily and increase or reduce activity in a given role requires a personal quality which we shall call "role flexibility." Consider the changes in role which may be made by a man just before and after age 65 when he was automatically retired from his work.

Since he must give up most of the friendships he has enjoyed with fellow-workers on his job, he may find another place where he can be with old friends and make new ones. He may spend more time with friends at his club; indeed, he may join a club for this very purpose. He may use a park for the same ends, sitting on a park bench with others in pleasant weather, or lounging in a park building when it is wet or cold. Or he may use his church for finding friends and things to do.

He may make a routine out of his leisure to fill the void left by the loss of routines centered about his job. The job got him up in the morning, structured his day for him, and sent him home tired but satisfied. Now he may develop a new and more leisurely routine, getting the morning paper and reading it, tending the furnace and starting a fire in the fireplace, reading the mail, doing the marketing, working in the garden just before lunch, taking a nap after lunch, going to the library or the park or a clubroom for a couple of hours in the afternoon; reading the evening paper, eating supper, going to a meeting or a movie or listening to the radio, and going slowly to bed. This routine is unexciting to a younger person, but to an older person it may give all the satisfactions that the swifter tempo and more energetic activity of his earlier routine afforded.

The satisfaction of creative activity and new experience which he once got from his work, he may, now that he is retired, get from hobbies. He may take up painting or wood- or metalworking; he may turn to gardening with greater interest; to travel or to reading; and in these activities he finds even greater satisfaction than he earlier found in his work.

One who has served others in his work may get a similar satisfaction from civic activities, such as serving on a board of directors or on a committee of social agencies, or working for a political cause, or going in for church work. The prestige that success in work gave may be secured from heightened civic activities or from developing a hobby, such as growing roses, painting, or cabinet work.

Perhaps the satisfaction ordinarily coming from work which is most difficult to secure from other roles is self-respect or the sense of worth. But research reveals that some people find it in an avocation, skilfully performed, in music or art, for example, or civic activities.

CONDITIONS THAT MAKE FOR ROLE FLEXIBILITY

How does a person achieve role flexibility? Probably the best assurance of role flexibility in later years is a reasonably successful experience in a variety of roles during the middle years, the emphasis being on *reasonably* and *variety*, for outstanding success in certain roles in middle age sometimes makes for rigidity. For instance, a man who, as a worker, develops a set of habits which support and satisfy him to the time of his retirement is often ill prepared to adapt himself to other roles when retirement terminates the first role. For instance: a man who has been a success as a schoolteacher and a school principal is now 55 years old. He works harder than ever at committee work, is active in his professional association, and seeks summer-school teaching in a teachers' college. He dreads the thought of retirement. Another teacher, of about the same age, is gradually letting down. He has built himself a summer cabin on a lake and goes there as soon as school is out in the summer. He is head of the ushers' committee of his church. Retirement is no great threat to him, except for the loss of income.

The deliberate cultivation of role flexibility after about the age of 50 may be wise. This involves choosing of new leisure activities, the joining of new associations, the deliberate moving to a new home or the remodeling of an old one. Residents of the northern part of the United States might cultivate role flexibility by taking a winter vacation annually and going to a variety of warm places, depending upon taste and pocketbook. This would create new satisfaction in leisure and perhaps lead to moving to a warmer climate upon retirement. Women whose children have left home might explore alternatives among jobs and civic activities.

These are things which an individual might do on his own. But what might an employer do, or a pastor, or a superintendent of schools, or an adult educator, if he wished to help people to cultivate role flexibility? He might encourage them to join groups with interests and aims different from what they have had in the past: an art group for a teacher of science; a discussion group for a housewife whose large family has grown up; a men's brotherhood in the church for a man who has worked on a lathe. If he is a flexible person, this may be enough; but at their age most people will need encouragement to help them over the difficulties of facing strange situations and learning new skills.

This is where a group, all of whose members are trying new activities, will give mutual support. In such a group, people discover that their own difficulties are

not unique. Quite a number of people faced with reduced activity and satisfactions as they grow older would be helped by advice from a pastor, a supervisor, or a professional counselor. The latter may help the individual to take stock of his present activities, their limitations and their potentialities, and then to decide what roles to develop for himself.

Can role flexibility be learned? The movement through adulthood and old age involves changes in role activity. As one's children grow up and move away, as one's parents grow old and feeble, as physical energy and attractiveness decrease, as death takes away husbands, wives, and friends, as retirement takes away work, as the fires of ambition die down—as these things happen, people must learn to get new satisfactions in place of old ones, out of new activities in place of old ones. They must withdraw emotional capital from one role and invest it in another one.

Modern life puts a premium on role flexibility without necessarily making role flexibility easier to gain. The problem for social science and for adult education is to learn the conditions under which the capacity may be acquired and to discover ways of helping all kinds of people to increase it.

21

Education

All societies contain some structures in which new members are socialized into functioning adults. In many societies, a significant proportion of this socialization is accomplished through formal organizations: citizenship schools for immigrants, public schools for children, Sunday Schools, on-the-job training in factories, and so on. In all societies, however, part of the task of transmitting the culture must be performed in a less formal setting. While children learn a great deal from their playmates, they usually receive most of their early guidance and shaping from their parents. In "Social Class and the Exercise of Parental Authority," Melvin L. Kohn offers some clues as to how people learn class subcultures. If parents in different strata see their roles in the socialization function differently, their children will learn through different sets of experiences.

The role of the socializing agent in a more formal situation is discussed by Howard S. Becker in "The Career of the Chicago Public School Teacher." Note the pertinence of this article to the material presented in Chapter 13, on social mobility.

Melvin L. Kohn

Social Class and the Exercise of Parental Authority¹

Much past research on the relationship between social class and the exercise of parental authority has been concerned with the question of whether or not working-class parents typically employ different techniques from those used by middle-class parents in dealing with their children's misbehavior. Bronfenbrenner has summarized the results of twenty-five years of investigation in this area as indicating that: "In matters of discipline, working-class parents are consistently more likely to employ physical punishment, while middle-class families rely more on reasoning, isolation, appeals to guilt, and other methods involving the threat of loss of love."²

The studies to which Bronfenbrenner refers have relied primarily on parents' generalized statements about their usual or their preferred methods of dealing with discipline problems—irrespective of what the particular problem might be. But obviously not all discipline problems evoke the same kinds of parental response. In some sense, after all, the punishment fits the crime. *Under what conditions* do parents of a given social class punish their children physically, reason with them, isolate them—or ignore their actions altogether?

The present study attempts to specify the practices of middle- and working-class parents in various circumstances, and from this information to develop a more general interpretation of the relationship of social class to the exercise of parental authority.

SAMPLE AND METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

Washington, D.C.—the locus of this study—has a large proportion of people employed by government, relatively little heavy industry, few recent immigrants, a white working class drawn heavily from rural areas, and a large proportion of Negroes, particularly at lower economic levels. Generalizations based on this or any other sample of one city during one limited period of time are, of course, tentative.

Our intent in selecting the families to be studied was to secure approximately two hundred representative white working-class families and another two hundred representative white middle-class families, each family having a child within a narrowly delimited age range. We decided on fifth-grade children in order to be able to direct the interviews to relationships involving a child old enough to have a developed capacity for verbal communication.

The sampling procedure involved two steps: the first, selection of Census tracts. Tracts with 20 per cent or more Negro population were excluded, as were those in the highest quartile with respect to median income. From among the remaining tracts we then selected four with a predominantly working-class population, four predominantly middle-class, and three having large proportions of each. The final

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1959, 24:352-366. By permission.

² Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Socialization and Social Class Through Time and Space," in Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley, editors, *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York: Holt, 1958, p. 424. This article provides a fine analytic summary of past research on class and family, as well as a bibliography of the major studies in this field.

selection of tracts was based on their occupational distribution and their median income, education, rent (of rented homes), and property value (of owner-occupied homes). The second step in the sampling procedure involved selection of families. From the records made available by the public and parochial school systems, we compiled lists of all fifth-grade children whose families lived in the selected tracts. Two hundred families were then randomly selected from among those in which the father had a "white-collar" occupation and another two hundred from among those in which the father had a manual occupation.

In all four hundred families, the mothers were to be interviewed. In every fourth family we also scheduled interviews with the father and the fifth-grade child. (When a broken family fell into this sub-sample, a substitute was chosen from our overall sample, but the broken family was retained in the overall sample.)

When interviews with both parents were scheduled, two members of the staff visited the home together—a male to interview the father, a female to interview the mother. The interviews were conducted independently, in separate rooms, but with essentially identical schedules. The first person to complete his interview with the parent interviewed the child.

We secured the cooperation of 86 per cent of the families where the mother alone was to be interviewed, and 82 per cent of the families where mother, father, and child were to be interviewed. Rates of non-response do not vary by social class, type of neighborhood, or type of school. This of course does not rule out other possible selective biases introduced by the non-respondents.

Index of Social Class. Each family's social class position was determined by the Hollingshead Index of Social Position, assigning the father's occupational status a relative weight of 7 and his educational status a weight of 4. Here we consider Hollingshead's Classes I, II, and III to be "middle-class," and Classes IV and V as "working-class." The middle-class sample is composed of two fairly distinct groups: Classes I and II are almost entirely professionals, proprietors, or managers, with at least some college training. Class III is made up of small shopkeepers, clerks, and salespersons, but includes a small number of foremen and skilled workers of unusually high educational status. The working-class sample is composed entirely of manual workers, but preponderantly those of higher skill levels. These families are of the "stable working class" rather than "lower class" in the sense that the men have steady jobs and in that their education, income, and skill levels are above those of the lowest socio-economic strata.

THE CONTEXT OF AUTHORITY

The context for our study of parents' reactions to specific disciplinary situations is provided by a cursory examination of three general aspects of authority: the relative role of mother and father in making family decisions, the relative role of mother and father in setting limits upon the children's freedom of movement or activity, and the frequency with which mother and father resort to physical punishment to enforce obedience. From none of these perspectives do we find any appreciable difference between middle- and working-class families. Middle-class parents' and children's evaluations of the extent to which each parent participates in the making of day-to-day decisions, major family decisions, and the decisions that affect the fifth-grade child most directly, are quite similar to those of working-class parents and children. Nor is there any appreciable difference between the social classes in mothers', fathers', or children's evaluations of which parent is stricter, more likely to restrict the children's freedom, "lay down the law" when the child

misbehaves, or dominate the child. Finally, middle-class parents report that they make use of physical punishment about as frequently as do working-class parents.

Nevertheless, there are distinct differences in the conditions under which middle- and working-class parents resort to physical punishment. We shall see that parents of both social classes reserve physical punishment for fairly extreme circumstances. But even in these extreme circumstances, some actions that are intolerable to working-class parents are not punished by middle-class parents, and other actions intolerable to middle-class parents are not punished by working-class parents.

In attempting to specify the conditions under which middle- and working-class parents use physical punishment, we rely here on parent's reported reactions to eight types of situation: the child's wild play, fighting with his brothers or sisters, fighting with other children, really losing his temper, refusing to do what his parent tells him to do, "swiping" something from home or from other children, smoking cigarettes, and using language his parent doesn't want him to use.

Parents were questioned in some detail about each of these situations. We asked, for example, whether or not the fifth-grade child ever loses his temper; precisely what he does when he loses his temper; what the parent "generally does when he acts this way"; whether he "ever finds it necessary to do anything else" and, if so, "under what circumstances" and what else he does.

Parents' reports on their reactions to their children's behavior were classified according to the following scheme:

1. Ignore: not doing anything about it.
2. Scold, admonish to be good, demand that he stop, inquire into causes of behavior, scream at him, threaten to punish him. (It has proved impossible to differentiate these several verbal reactions reliably from interview material. We could not determine, for example, whether or not a parent's reported attempt to discover the causes of a fight was in fact a scolding. Therefore we have reluctantly decided to treat these several responses as a single category.)
3. Separate from other children or divert attention: removing the child from the situation or providing alternative activities.
4. Punish or coerce: (a) Punish physically—everything from a slap to a spanking. (b) Isolate—confining child *alone* for a period of time, for example, sending him to bed during the day. (c) Restrict usual activities—limiting his freedom of movement or activity short of isolation, for example, not letting him play outside.

THE EXERCISE OF MATERNAL AUTHORITY

Most mothers—in both social classes—report that their *usual* response in the eight situations about which we inquired is to ignore the child's actions altogether, or at most to admonish him. Few mothers isolate or restrict their children at this stage of things, and virtually none punishes them physically. One can not conclude that mothers of either social class are especially quick to resort to physical punishment or to other forms of coercion.

But when their children persist in wild play, fighting with their brothers or sisters, or displays of temper, both middle- and working-class mothers are apt to turn to one or another form of punishment. Working-class mothers are more likely than are middle-class mothers to do so in the case of their sons' prolonged loss of temper; middle-class mothers, on the other hand, are more likely to punish their sons for refusing to do as they are told.

Working-class mothers are more likely than are middle-class mothers to resort to *physical* punishment when their sons persist in wild play or fighting with

brothers or sisters, or when their daughters fight with other children. There may be in addition a general, albeit slight, greater tendency for working-class mothers to resort to physical punishment no matter what the situation. (In thirteen of sixteen comparisons, a somewhat larger proportion of working-class than of middle-class mothers report using physical punishment, although only in the three comparisons noted above is the difference large enough for us to be confident that it is not simply a chance occurrence.) But we previously noted that middle-class mothers say they use physical punishment about as *frequently* as do working-class mothers. Therefore, it is not likely that working-class mothers' propensity to use physical punishment is sufficiently greater than that of middle-class mothers to be of serious import. A more important difference lies in the conditions under which mothers of the two social classes punish their children physically.

The Conditions under Which Working-Class Mothers Punish Their Sons Physically. Working-class mothers are apt to resort to physical punishment when the immediate consequences of their sons' disobedient acts are most extreme, and to refrain from using punishment when its use might provoke an even greater disturbance.

We have noted two actions for which working-class mothers are more likely than are middle-class mothers to punish their sons physically: wild play and fighting with their brothers or sisters. In either situation, the more extreme their sons' actions, the more likely are working-class mothers to use physical punishment. Those whose descriptions of their sons' wild play indicate that it is nothing more than boisterousness or running around are no more apt to resort to physical punishment than are middle-class mothers in the same circumstances. But those whose descriptions of wild play include elements that we see as aggression or destruction are far more likely than are middle-class mothers to employ physical punishment. Similarly, working-class mothers are not appreciably more likely than are middle-class mothers to punish their sons physically for fights with brothers or sisters when the "fights" are no more than arguments, but they are more likely to resort to physical punishment when the fights involve physical combat.

This suggests that the more extreme forms of wild play and fighting are particularly intolerable to working-class mothers, and less so to middle-class mothers. This impression is sustained by the fact that those working-class mothers who consider themselves unusually strict and "ready to lay down the law" are especially likely to punish their sons physically for physical combat with brothers or sisters. And those working-class mothers who describe themselves as easily angered by their sons' actions or unwilling to "give in" to them are especially likely to use physical punishment for aggressively wild play. They cannot or will not tolerate these forms of aggressive behavior.

But working-class mothers do not find all aggressive behavior intolerable. They are far less likely to punish their sons physically for fights with friends or neighbors than for equally serious fights with brothers or sisters. It would appear that it is not for aggressive behavior as such, but for the disturbances arising out of aggressive behavior, that working-class boys are punished. Their mothers seem unwilling or unable to tolerate the immediate consequences of their sons' aggressive acts.

The responsiveness of working-class mothers to immediate consequences is demonstrated anew by a consideration of the conditions under which they do *not* punish their sons. They shun punishment if it might provoke a disturbance more serious than that already underway.

There is ample evidence presented above that working-class mothers are prone

to punish their sons physically for acts of disobedience. Furthermore, they are more likely than are middle-class mothers to report that on the last occasion they used physical punishment it was invoked in response to disobedience. But there is a world of difference between punishing a boy for violating a negative injunction and punishing him for not doing something he is positively enjoined to do. Working-class mothers appear to be far more likely to punish their sons for the former type of disobedience than for the latter. In fact, they are less likely than are middle-class mothers to punish their sons for refusing to do things they have been told to do.

The immediate consequences of acquiescing to a son's refusal may be trivial—often nothing more than doing a minor household chore when he will not comply. However, under some conditions—specifically, when the boy is adamant about his refusal—the consequences of forcing him to do as he is told may be serious. Working-class mothers are highly unlikely to punish their sons—physically or in any other way—in such circumstances. No working-class mother who described her son's refusals as prolonged delays under conditions where he had unquestionably heard the order, or as an act of outright defiance, told us that she punished him physically, restricted his activities, or isolated him. They were more likely than were middle-class mothers to tell us that they took no action at all under these circumstances. Nor does this indicate indifference. The interview reports indicate that these mothers do make an attempt to secure compliance, but then back down. This is especially true of those who say they are "easily upset" by their sons' actions. They seem unable to bring themselves to take strong action, but are hardly indifferent.

The Conditions under Which Middle-Class Mothers Punish Their Sons Physically. It is clear that middle-class and working-class mothers make different discriminations in their use of physical punishment. Middle-class mothers seem to punish or refrain from punishing on the basis of their interpretation of the child's intent. Most indicative of this are their responses to wild play and loss of temper. They are not likely to punish their sons physically for wild play, however serious it may be. Nor are they particularly likely to punish them physically for loss of temper when it is manifested only as pouting, yelling, or sulking. But a violent or aggressive outburst of temper is far more likely to elicit physical punishment. In these circumstances, middle-class mothers are as prone as their working-class counterparts to punish their sons physically.

The descriptions of temper-loss classified here as "a violent or aggressive outburst" are quite similar to the descriptions of wild play classified as "willful aggression or destruction." Working-class mothers respond to the one much as they do to the other. But middle-class mothers are far more likely to punish their sons physically for what they call loss of temper than for behavior defined as wild play. They appear to find the child's loss of temper, but not his wild play, particularly intolerable.

There is one salient respect in which an outburst of temper may be quite different from wild play: the outburst may be directed against the mother herself. Short of a frontal assault, however, this is largely a matter of the mother's interpretation. The interview reports indicate that the distinction between wild play and loss of temper was most often made in terms of the child's presumed intent, as judged by his preceding actions. If in the course of play he became very excited, this was not judged to be loss of temper—however extreme his actions. But if his actions seemed to stem from the frustration of not having his own way, they were judged to

indicate loss of temper. The overt behavior in the two types of situation might be, and often was, nearly identical.

The Conditions under Which Mothers Punish Their Daughters. Middle-class mothers appear to respond to their daughters' actions much as they do to their sons'. But working-class mothers are more likely to use physical punishment when their sons play wildly or fight with brothers or sisters than when their daughters do so. This tendency, however, reflects the fact that boys' wild play and fighting are more apt to be extreme. Daughters are only slightly less likely to be punished physically for behavior which is actually similar. They are, in fact, *more* likely to be punished physically when they swipe something or fight with children other than brothers or sisters. (Nevertheless, working-class mothers are far less likely to punish their daughters physically for fights with friends than for equally serious fights with brothers or sisters. In this crucial respect, their treatment of boys and of girls is much the same.)

The most dramatic difference in the working-class mothers' response to boys and to girls occurs when the child defiantly refuses to do as he is told: boys are permitted to have their own way, while girls are punished physically. Something more is expected of a girl than of a boy—she must not only refrain from doing what she's not supposed to do, but must also carry out actions her mother wants her to do.

There is no indication in these data that working-class mothers are more prone to examine their daughters' than their sons' intent, but clearly, the actions are evaluated differently. We shall return to the question of why this is so.

Hypothetical Reactions. Whenever a mother told us that her child had *not* performed an action about which we inquired, we asked her what she thought she would do if the situation did occur. Middle-class mothers who said that a given situation had not occurred thought that they would probably respond in ways almost identical to those noted by mothers who said that it had taken place. This is not the case for working-class mothers. Although no working-class mother who declared that her son had swiped something, smoked, or defiantly refused to carry out an order reported punishing him physically, roughly one-fifth of those who said that their sons had not done these things expected to use this sanction if the situation were to occur.

It is possible, of course, that those working-class mothers who are most prone to use physical punishment are unwilling to admit that their sons misbehave, or have somehow forestalled their sons' misbehavior. This does not seem likely, however, for in circumstances when working-class mothers are quite likely to use physical punishment—when their sons engage in aggressively wild play—those who say that they have not faced the situation are quite unlikely to predict that they would resort to physical punishment. (Roughly one-fifth of such mothers think that they would do so—about the same proportion as those who think that they would punish their sons physically for swiping something, smoking, or being defiant.)

It seems, then, that working-class mothers are unable to envisage either the conditions under which they would be very likely to use physical punishment or the conditions under which they would be very unlikely to do so. Considering the degree to which they are responsive to immediate circumstances, this conclusion should not be surprising.

PATERNAL AUTHORITY

In considering fathers' reactions to their children's behavior, we rely on interviews both with a sub-sample of eighty-two fathers and the much larger sample of

mothers. The small number of interviews with fathers limits us severely in attempting to take account of the sex of the child and the father's description of the child's behavior. Thus we are forced to interweave the analysis of fathers' self-reports with wives' reports on their behavior. This procedure is not entirely satisfactory, for reasons presented in the next section.

Working-class fathers are appreciably less likely than are their wives to say that they punish their sons physically for wild play. In fact, they are no more likely than are middle-class fathers to report using physical punishment in this situation. This reflects the fact that few working-class fathers describe their sons' wild play as anything more than boisterousness—for which they are most unlikely to punish boys physically. However, those few working-class mothers who indicate that their husbands are exposed to *aggressively* wild play are far more likely than are middle-class mothers to report that in these extreme circumstances their husbands resort to physical punishment. It would appear that working-class fathers respond in two ways: if the child's behavior does not compel their attention, they are apt to ignore it; but if it is sufficiently disruptive, they are very likely to use physical punishment. They may be even more responsive to immediate consequences than are their wives.

Middle-class fathers apparently are a good deal more likely than are their wives to punish sons physically for fighting with their brothers or sisters. This seems to be true however serious the fights. Thus, middle-class fathers are as likely as are working-class fathers to resort to physical punishment when their sons fight. Nevertheless, working-class fathers are somewhat more likely to report using physical punishment, and considerably more likely to report using isolation or restriction, when their sons' fights are *serious*. The wives' reports lead to the same conclusion.

In other respects as well, our information indicates that the major conclusions about the conditions under which mothers of the two social classes punish their children physically, noted above, also apply to fathers. In particular, middle-class mothers say that their husbands are far more likely to punish their sons physically for severe loss of temper than for aggressively wild play. (The small number of fathers' reports on reactions to severe loss of temper prevents our determining whether or not fathers agree.) Working-class mothers, furthermore, tell us that their husbands are not likely to punish their sons' defiant refusals to do as they are told, but are likely to punish their daughters physically for similar behavior. (The few fathers' reports relevant to this issue are consistent with this finding.)

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA

Although we have reports from all three relevant persons in a representative subsample of these families, there remains the question as to whether or not disinterested observers would present similar descriptions. Moreover, interview responses are in their nature limited: we cannot differentiate reliably among various types of verbal behavior; we cannot tell whether or not a parent expresses his displeasure by grouching, assuming an air of martyrdom, or simply "acting differently;" and we do not know to what degree any of a parent's actions may be interpreted by his child as a withdrawal of love.

Each respondent has summarized a number of his own and another's actions. We do not know how frequently situations of a given type have occurred,³ or how

³ It is primarily for this reason that one cannot draw from our data on parents' reactions to specific types of situations the inference that working-class parents use physical punishment more often than do middle-class parents.

consistent a parent's reactions have been. Nor can we, for example, assume from a parent's description of his child's fights as arguments, that the child never fights physically.

On the other hand, the parents' ability to differentiate between what they generally do and what they do in more pressing circumstances gives reason for confidence in the findings. So does the fact that the relationships we have found between social class and mothers' reactions are not appreciably modified by controlling other relevant variables (including mother's age, size of the family, ordinal position of the child in the family, length of time the family has lived in the neighborhood, the socio-economic status of the neighborhood, whether or not the mother has a job, and if so what type of job, whether or not she has been socially mobile or feels socially mobile, her social class identification, her level of education, her religious background, whether her background is rural or urban, whether or not she reads popular literature on child-rearing, and whether or not her husband works for the government.)

Furthermore, the information provided by the sub-sample of fathers and children enables us to check some of the inferences we have drawn from mothers' reports. We asked each father, for example, "What does your wife generally do when [child] fights with his brothers or sisters?" Although the question parallels "What do *you* generally do . . . ?", it was put immediately after we asked him what he does in circumstances other than those that usually prevail. Most parents seem to have answered with the latter circumstances in mind. This precludes a comparison of what fathers say they do with what they say their wives do in exactly the same circumstances. But it does give us some basis for judging whether or not our inferences about social class differences in the conditions under which mothers use physical punishment are supported by what husbands tell us.

The only respect in which the fathers' reports of their wives' reactions raise a question about the inferences we have drawn is that two of the nine working-class fathers who say that their sons defiantly refuse to do as they are told also report that their wives punish the boys. Perhaps, then, we have overstated the case in concluding that working-class mothers are singularly unlikely to punish their sons for defiance.

Concerning the fathers' reactions, it appears that interviews with fathers and with mothers yield much the same conclusions. This holds even for the conclusion that working-class fathers are unlikely to punish their sons for a defiant refusal.

The children, too, were asked about their parents' reactions in three of the situations: fights with brothers and sisters, fights with other children, and loss of temper. The information provided by middle-class children, although based on few interviews, is entirely consistent with their parents' reports. But working-class boys are rather unlikely to tell us that their mothers punish them *physically* for fighting with brothers or sisters or for loss of temper. They acknowledge that their fathers do so, but they report that their mothers isolate or restrict them for such actions.

INTERPRETATION

Neither middle- nor working-class parents resort to punishment as a first recourse when their children misbehave. It seems, instead, that parents of both social classes initially post limits for their children. But children sometimes persist in their misbehavior despite their parents' attempts to forestall them. At this juncture, parents may turn to physical punishment.

The conditions under which they punish their children physically, or refrain

from doing so, appear to be quite different for the two social classes. *Working-class parents are more likely to respond in terms of the immediate consequences of the child's actions, middle-class parents in terms of their interpretation of the child's intent in acting as he does.* This should not be interpreted to imply that while middle-class parents act on the basis of long-range goals for their children's development, working-class parents do not. On the contrary, we believe that parents of *both* social classes act on the basis of long-range goals—but that the goals are quite different.

In an earlier study we have examined the relation of social class to the values parents most wish to see incorporated into their children's behavior.⁴ We concluded that parents are most likely to accord high priority to those values which seem both important, in the sense that failure to achieve them would affect the child's future adversely, and problematic, in the sense that they are difficult to achieve. For working-class parents, the "important but problematic" centers around qualities that assure *respectability*; for middle-class parents, it centers around *internalized standards of conduct*. In the first instance, desirable behavior consists essentially of not violating proscriptions; in the second, of acting according to the dictates of one's own principles. Here the act becomes less important than the actor's intent.

We believe that the reactions of parents of both social classes to their children's undesired behavior are entirely appropriate to their values. To say that working-class parents are particularly responsive to consequences and relatively unconcerned about intent, is equivalent to saying that their efforts are directed to enjoining disobedient, disreputable acts. To say that middle-class parents are more concerned about intent is equivalent to saying that their efforts are directed to encouraging their children to develop internalized standards and to act on the basis of these standards rather than externally imposed rules.

To see parents' reactions to their children's misbehavior as a function of their values helps to answer several questions which otherwise may be perplexing.

First, why are working-class parents so much more likely to punish their children physically for fighting than for arguing with their brothers or sisters?—or for aggressively wild play than for boisterousness? The answer seems to be that disreputability is defined in terms of consequences: the measure of disreputability is the degree to which the act transgresses rules of propriety. Fighting and wild play are disobedient, disreputable behaviors only when sufficiently extreme to be seen as transgressions of rules.

Second, why are working-class parents more likely to administer physical punishment when their daughters fight with friends, swipe something, or defiantly refuse to do as they are told than when their sons act in these ways? The answer seems to lie in different conceptions of what is right and proper for boys and for girls. What may be taken as acceptable behavior (perhaps even as an assertion of manliness) in a pre-adolescent boy may be thought thoroughly unlady-like in a young girl. Working-class parents differentiate quite clearly between the qualities they regard as desirable for their daughters (happiness, manners, neatness, and cleanliness) and those they hold out for their sons (dependability, being a good student, and ambition). They want their daughters to be "little ladies" (a term that kept recurring in the interviews) and their sons to be manly. This being the case, the criteria of disobedience are necessarily different for boys and for girls. Obedience is valued highly for both. But working-class mothers who value obedience

⁴ Melvin L. Kohn, "Social Class and Parental Values," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (January, 1959), pp. 337-351.

most highly punish their daughters physically for refusing to carry out parental requests and orders, while they are much less likely to take any action when their sons do so.

Middle-class parents make little or no distinction between what they regard as desirable for boys and for girls—the issue for both sexes is whether or not the child acts in accord with internalized principles. Therefore, the conduct of both boys and girls should be judged by the same criterion: intent. Our evidence supports this interpretation.

Finally, why do middle-class parents react so differently to aggressively wild play and to outbursts of temper? Why do they interpret these overtly similar behaviors as implying radically different intent? The answer is provided by the fundamental importance they attach to internal standards for governing one's relationships with other people and, in the final analysis, with one's self.

Wild play, however extreme, does not necessarily represent a loss of *self-control*, although it may indicate that the parent has lost control over the child. It may be regarded as a childish form of emotional expression—unpleasant, but bearable, since there are virtues in allowing its free expression in a ten- or eleven-year old. This is evidenced by the fact that those middle-class mothers who accord highest priority in their scheme of values to their children's happiness are least likely to punish wild play. An outburst of temper, however, may signal serious difficulty in the child's efforts at self-mastery; it is the type of behavior most likely to distress the parent who has tried to inculcate in his child the virtue of maintaining self-control. Again, the evidence supports the interpretation: those parents who value self-control most highly are most likely to punish their children for loss of temper.

If middle-class parents are to act in accord with their values, they must take explicit account of subjective and emotional factors, including the possible effects of punishment. They give considerable evidence that they do so. For example, when asked if there are any ways in which they would prefer to act differently toward the child, they are likely to cite the desirability of fuller understanding. When the child does poorly in school, they often try to be supportive, while working-class parents are likely to respond negatively. Of course, parents can rationalize. It is easy to believe that behavior which is at the moment infuriating ought to be punished. One gains the impression, however, that although middle-class parents may punish when angry, they try to restrain themselves—as they apparently do when they believe their children's actions to be wild play.

The working-class orientation, on the other hand, excludes or minimizes considerations of subjective intent, and places few restraints on the impulse to punish the child when his behavior is out of bounds. Instead, it provides a positive rationale for punishing the child in precisely those circumstances when one might most like to do so.

Howard S. Becker

The Career of the Chicago Public Schoolteacher¹

The concept of *career* has proved of great use in understanding and analyzing the dynamics of work organizations and the movement and fate of individuals within them. The term refers, to paraphrase Hall, to the patterned series of adjustments

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1952, 57:470-477. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

made by the individual to the "network of institutions, formal organizations, and informal relationships"² in which the work of the occupation is performed. This series of adjustments is typically considered in terms of movement up or down between positions differentiated by their rank in some formal or informal hierarchy of prestige, influence, and income. The literature in the field has devoted itself primarily to an analysis of the types, stages, and contingencies of careers, so conceived, in various occupations. We may refer to such mobility through a hierarchy of ranked positions, if a spatial metaphor be allowed, as the *vertical* aspect of the career.

By focusing our attention on this aspect of career movement, we may tend to overlook what might, in contrast, be called the *horizontal* aspect of the career: movement among the positions available at one level of such a hierarchy. It need not be assumed that occupational positions which share some characteristics because of their similar rank in a formal structure are identical in all respects. They may, in fact, differ widely in the configuration of the occupation's basic problems which they present. That is, all positions at one level of a work hierarchy, while theoretically identical, may not be equally easy or rewarding places in which to work. Given this fact, people tend to move in patterned ways among the possible positions, seeking that situation which affords the most desirable setting in which to meet and grapple with the basic problems of their work. In some occupations more than others, and for some individuals more than others, this kind of career movement assumes greater importance than the vertical variety, sometimes to such an extent that the entire career line consists of movement entirely at one level of a work hierarchy.

The teachers of the Chicago public schools are a group whose careers typically tend toward this latter extreme. Although it is possible for any educationally qualified teacher to take the examination for the position of principal and attempt ascent through the school system's administrative hierarchy, few make the effort. Most see their careers purely in teaching, in terms of movement among the various schools in the Chicago system.³ Even those attempting this kind of vertical mobility anticipate a stay of some years in the teacher category and, during that time, see that segment of their career in much the same way. This paper will analyze the nature of this area of career movement among teachers and will describe the types of careers found in this group. These, of course, are not the only patterns which we may expect to find in this horizontal plane of career movement. It remains for further research in other occupations to discern other career varieties and the conditions under which each type occurs.

The analysis is based on interviews with sixty teachers in the Chicago system. The interviewing was unstructured to a large extent and varied somewhat with each interviewee, according to the difficulty encountered in overcoming teachers' distrust and fear of speaking to outsiders. Despite this resistance, based on anxiety regarding the consequences of being interviewed, material of sufficient validity for the analysis undertaken here was secured through insisting that all general statements of attitude be backed up with concrete descriptions of actual experience. This procedure, it is felt, forced the interviewees to disclose more than they otherwise might have by

² Oswald Hall, "The Stages of a Medical Career," *American Journal of Sociology*, 53 (March, 1948), 327.

³ The Chicago system has a high enough salary schedule and sufficient security safeguards to be safe as a system in which a person can make his entire career, thus differing from smaller school systems in which the teacher does not expect to spend her whole working life.

requiring them to give enough factual material to make their general statements plausible and coherent.

I

The positions open to a particular teacher in the system at a given time appear, in general, quite similar, all having about the same prestige, income, and power attached to them. This is not to deny the existence of variations in income created by the operation of seniority rules or of differences in informal power and prestige based on length of service and length of stay in a given school. The fact remains that, for an individual with a given amount of seniority who is about to begin in a school new to her, all teaching positions in the Chicago system are the same with regard to prestige, influence, and income.

Though the available teaching positions in the city schools are similar in formal characteristics, they differ widely in terms of the configuration of the occupation's basic work problems which they present. The teacher's career consists of movement among these various schools in search of the most satisfactory position in which to work, that being the position in which these problems are least aggravated and most susceptible of solution. Work problems arise in the teacher's relations with the important categories of people in the structure of the school: children, parents, principal, and other teachers. Her most difficult problems arise in her interaction with her pupils. Teachers feel that the form and degree of the latter problems vary considerably with the social-class background of the students.

Without going into any detailed analysis of these problems, I will simply summarize the teacher's view of them and of their relation to the various social-class groups which might furnish her with students. The interviewees typically distinguished three class groups: (1) a bottom stratum, probably equivalent to the lower-lower and parts of the upper-lower class, and including, for the teacher, all Negroes; (2) an upper stratum, probably equivalent to the upper-middle class; and (3) a middle stratum, probably equivalent to the lower-middle and parts of the upper-lower class. Three major kinds of problems were described as arising in dealings with pupils: (1) the problem of *teaching*, producing some change in the child's skills and knowledge which can be attributed to one's own efforts; (2) the problem of *discipline*, maintaining order and control over the children's activity; and (3) the problem of what may be termed *moral acceptability*, bringing one's self to bear some traits of the children which one considers immoral and revolting. The teacher feels that the lowest group, "slum" children, is difficult to teach, uncontrollable and violent in the sphere of discipline, and morally unacceptable on all scores, from physical cleanliness to the spheres of sex and "ambition to get ahead." Children of the upper group, from the "better neighborhoods," were felt to be quick learners and easy to teach but somewhat "spoiled" and difficult to control and lacking in the important moral traits of politeness and respect for elders. The middle group was considered to be hard-working but slow to learn, extremely easy to control, and most acceptable on the moral level.

Other important problems arise in interaction with parents, principal, and colleagues and revolve primarily around the issue of authority. Parents of the highest status groups and certain kinds of principals are extremely threatening to the authority the teacher feels basic to the maintenance of her role; in certain situations colleagues, too, may act in such a way as to diminish her authority.

Thus, positions at the teaching level may be very satisfactory or highly undesirable, depending on the presence or absence of the "right" kind of pupils, parents,

principal, and colleagues. Where any of these positions are filled by the "wrong" kind of person, the teacher feels that she is in an unfavorable situation in which to deal with the important problems of her work. Teachers in schools of this kind are dissatisfied and wish to move to schools where "working conditions" will be more satisfactory.

Career movement for the Chicago teacher is, in essence, movement from one school to another, some schools being more and others less satisfactory places in which to work. Such movement is accomplished under the Board of Education's rules governing transfer, which allow a teacher, after serving in a position for more than a year, to request transfer to one of as many as ten other positions. Movement to one of these positions is possible when an opening occurs for which there is no applicant whose request is of longer standing, and transfer takes place upon approval by the principal of the new school.

The career patterns which are to be found in this social matrix are not expected to be typical of all career movements of this horizontal type. It is likely that their presence will be limited to occupational organizations which, like the Chicago school system, are impersonal and bureaucratic and in which mobility is accomplished primarily through the manipulation of formal procedures.

II

The greatest problems of work are found in lower-class schools and, consequently, most movement in the system is a result of dissatisfaction with the social-class composition of these school populations. Movement in the system, then, tends to be out from the "slums" to the "better" neighborhoods, primarily in terms of the characteristics of the pupils. Since there are few or no requests for transfer to "slum" schools, the need for teachers is filled by the assignment to such schools of teachers beginning careers in the Chicago system. Thus, the new teacher typically begins her career in the least desirable kind of school. From this beginning two major types of careers were found to develop.

The first variety of career is characterized by an immediate attempt to move to a "better" school in a "better" neighborhood. The majority of interviewees reporting first assignment to a "slum" school had already made or were in the process of making such a transfer. The attitude is well put in this quotation:

When you first get assigned you almost naturally get assigned to one of those poorer schools, because those naturally are among the first to have openings because people are always transferring out of them to other schools. Then you go and request to be transferred to other schools nearer your home or in some nicer neighborhood. Naturally the vacancies don't come as quickly in those schools because people want to stay there once they get there. I think that every teacher strives to get into a nicer neighborhood.

Making a successful move of this kind is contingent on several factors. First, one must have fairly precise knowledge as to which schools are "good" and which are not, so that one may make requests wisely. Without such knowledge, which is acquired through access to the "grapevine," what appears to be a desirable move may prove to be nothing more than a jump from the frying pan into the fire, as the following teacher's experience indicates:

When I put my name down for the ten schools I put my name down for one school out around ——— ["nice" neighborhood]. I didn't know anything about it, what the principal was like or anything, but it had a short list. Well, I heard later from several people that I had really made a mistake. They had a principal there that was really a terror. She just made it miserable for everyone.

But I was telling you about what happened to me. Or almost did. After I had heard about this principal, I heard that she was down one day to observe me. Well, I was really frightened. If she had taken me I would have been out of luck, I would have had to stay there a year. But she never showed up in my room. . . . But, whatever it was, I was certainly happy that I didn't have to go there. It just shows that you have to be careful about what school you pick.

Second, one must not be of an ethnic type or have a personal reputation which will cause the principal to use his power of informal rejection. Though a transferee may be rejected through formal bureaucratic procedure, the principal finds it easier and less embarrassing to get the same result through this method, described by a Negro teacher:

All he's got to do is say, "I don't think you'll be very happy at our school." You take the hint. Because if the principal decides you're going to be unhappy, you will be, don't worry. No question about that. He can fix it so that you have every discipline problem in the grade you're teaching right in your room. That's enough to do it right there. So it really doesn't pay to go if you're not wanted. You can fight it if you want, but I'm too old for that kind of thing now.

This has the effect of destroying the attractive qualities of the school to which transfer was desired and of turning choice in a new direction.

Finally, one must be patient enough to wait for the transfer to the "right" school to be consummated, not succumbing to the temptation to transfer to a less desirable but more accessible school:

When I got assigned to ——— [Negro school], for instance, I went right downtown and signed on ten lists in this vicinity. I've lived out here for twenty-five years and I expect to stay here, so I signed for those schools and decided I'd wait ten years if necessary, till I found a vacancy in the vicinity.

The majority of teachers have careers of this type, in which an initial stay in an undesirable "slum" school is followed by manipulation of the transfer system in such a way as to achieve assignment to a more desirable kind of school.

Thirteen of the interviewees, however, had careers of a different type, characterized by a permanent adjustment to the "slum" school situation. These careers were the product of a process of adjustment to the particular work situation, which, while operating in all schools, is seen most clearly where it has such a radical effect on the further development of the career, tying the teacher to a school which would otherwise be considered undesirable. The process begins when the teacher, for any of a number of possible reasons, remains in the undesirable school for a number of years. During this stay changes take place in the teacher and in the character of her relations with other members of the school's social structure which make this unsatisfactory school an easier place in which to work and which change the teacher's view of the benefits to be gained by transferring elsewhere. Under the appropriate circumstances, a person's entire career may be spent in one such school.

During this initial stay changes take place in the teacher's skills and attitudes which ease the discomfort of teaching at the "slum" school. First, she learns new teaching and disciplinary techniques which enable her to deal adequately with "slum" children, although they are not suited for use with other social-class groups:

Technically, you're not supposed to lay a hand on a kid. Well, they don't, technically. But there are a lot of ways of handling a kid so that it doesn't show—and then it's the teacher's word against the kid's, so the kid hasn't got a chance. Like dear Mrs. G—— She gets mad at a kid, she takes him out in the hall. She gets him stood up against the

wall. Then she's got a way of chucking the kid under the chin, only hard, so that it knocks his head back against the wall. It doesn't leave a mark on him. But when he comes back in that room he can hardly see straight, he's so knocked out.

Further, the teacher learns to revise her expectations with regard to the amount of material she can teach and learns to be satisfied with a smaller accomplishment; a principal of a "slum" school described such an adjustment on the part of her teachers:

Our teachers are pretty well satisfied if the children can read and do simple number work when they leave here. . . . They're just trying to get these basic things over. So that if the children go to high school they'll be able to make some kind of showing and keep their heads above water.

She thus acquires a routine of work which is customary, congenial, and predictable to the point that any change would require a drastic change in deep-seated habits.

Finally, she finds for herself explanations for actions of the children which she has previously found revolting and immoral, and these explanations allow her to "understand" the behavior of the children as human, rather than as the activity of lunatics or animals:

I finally received my permanent assignment at E——. That's that big colored school. Frankly, I wasn't ready for anything like that. I thought I'd go crazy those first few months I was there. I wasn't used to that kind of restlessness and noise. The room was never really quiet at all. There was always a low undertone, a humming, of conversation, whispering, and shoving. . . . I didn't think I would ever be able to stand it. But as I came to understand them, then it seemed different. When I could understand the conditions they were brought up in, the kind of family life and home background that they had, it seemed more natural that they should act that way. And I really kind of got used to it after awhile.

At the same time that these changes are taking place in the teacher's perspectives, she is also gradually being integrated into the network of social relations that make up the school in such a way as to ease the problems associated with the "slum" school. In the first place, the teacher, during a long stay in a school, comes to be accepted by the other teachers as a trustworthy equal and acquires positions of influence and prestige in the informal colleague structure. These changes make it easier for her to maintain her position of authority vis-à-vis children and principal. Any move from the school would mean a loss of such position and its advantages and the need to win colleague acceptance elsewhere.

Second, the problem of discipline is eased when the teacher's reputation for firmness begins to do the work of maintaining order for her: "I have no trouble with the children. Once you establish a reputation and they know what to expect, they respect you and you have no trouble. Of course, that's different for a new teacher, but when you're established that's no problem at all."

Finally, problems of maintaining one's authority in relation to parents lessen as one comes to be a "fixture" in the community and builds up stable and enduring relationships with its families: "But, as I say, when you've been in that neighborhood as long as I have everyone knows you, and you've been into half their homes, and there's never any trouble at all."

The "slum" school is thus, if not ideal, at least bearable and predictable for the teacher who has adjusted to it. She has taken the worst the situation has to offer and has learned to get along with it. She is tied to the school by the routine she has developed to suit its requirements and by the relationships she has built up with

others in the school organization. These very adjustments cause her, at the same time, to fear a move to any new school, which would necessitate a rebuilding of these relationships and a complete reorganization of her work techniques and routine. The move to a school in a "better" neighborhood is particularly feared, desirable as it seems in the abstract, because the teacher used to the relative freedom of the "slum" school is not sure whether the advantages to be gained in such a move would not be outweighed by the constraint imposed by "interfering" parents and "spoiled" children and by the difficulties to be encountered in integrating into a new school structure. This complete adjustment to a particular work situation thus acts as a brake on further mobility through the system.

III

Either of these career patterns results, finally, in the teacher's achieving a position in which she is more or less settled in a work environment which she regards as predictable and satisfactory. Once this occurs, her position and career are subject to dangers occasioned by ecological and administrative events which cause radical changes in the incumbents of important positions in the school structure.

Ecological invasion of a neighborhood produces changes in the social-class group from which pupils and parents of a given school are recruited. This, in turn, changes the nature and intensity of the teacher's work problems and upsets the teacher who has been accustomed to working with a higher status group than the one to which she thus falls heir. The total effect is the destruction of what was once a satisfying place in which to work, a position from which no move was intended:

I've been at this school for about twenty years. It was a lovely school when I first went there. . . . Of course, the neighborhood has changed quite a bit since I've been there. It's not what it used to be.

The neighborhood used to be ninety, ninety-five per cent Jewish. Now I don't think there are over forty per cent Jews. The rest are Greek. Italian, a few Irish, it's pretty mixed now. And the children aren't as nice as they used to be.

Ecological and demographic processes may likewise create a change in the age structure of a population which causes a decrease in the number of teachers needed in a particular school and a consequent loss of the position in that school for the person last added to the staff. The effect of neighborhood invasion may be to turn the career in the direction of adjustment to the new group, while the change in local age structure may turn the career back to the earlier phase, in which transfer to a "nicer" school was sought.

A satisfactory position may also be changed for the worse by a change in principal through transfer or retirement. The departure of a principal may produce changes of such dimension in the school atmosphere as to force teachers to transfer elsewhere. Where the principal has been a major force upholding the teachers' authority in the face of attacks by children and parents, a change can produce a disastrous increase in the problems of discipline and parental interference:

I'm tempted to blame most of it on our new principal. . . . [The old principal] kept excellent order. Now the children don't seem to have the same feeling about this man. They're not afraid of him, they don't respect him. And the discipline in the school has suffered tremendously. The whole school is less orderly now.

This problem is considered most serious when the change takes place in a "slum" school in which the discipline problem has been kept under control primarily through the efforts of a strict principal. Reactions to such an event, and consequent

career development, vary in schools in different social-class areas. Such a change in a "slum" school usually produces an immediate and tremendous increase in teacher turnover. A teacher who had been through such an experience estimated that faculty turnover through transfer rose from almost nothing to 60 per cent or more during the year following the change. Where the change takes place in a "nicer," upper-middle-class school, teachers are reluctant to move and give up their hard-won positions, preferring to take a chance on the qualities of the new incumbent. Only if he is particularly unsatisfying are they likely to transfer.

Another fear is that a change in principals will destroy the existing allocation of privilege and influence among the teachers, the new principal failing to act in terms of the informal understandings of the teachers with regard to these matters. The following quotations describe two new principals who acted in this fashion:

He knows what he wants and he does it. Several of the older teachers have tried to explain a few things to him, but he won't have any part of it. Not that they did it in a domineering way or anything, but he just doesn't like that.

He's a goodhearted man, he really means well, but he simply doesn't know anything about running a school. He gets things all mixed up, listens to people he shouldn't pay any attention to. . . . Some people assert themselves and tell him what to do, and he listens to them when he shouldn't.

These statements are the reaction of more strongly entrenched, "older" teachers who depend greatly for their power on their influence with the principal. Their dissatisfaction with a new principal seldom affects their careers to the point of causing them to move to another school. On the other hand, the coming of a new principal may be to the great advantage of and ardently desired by younger, less influential teachers. The effect of such an event on the career of a younger teacher is illustrated in this quotation:

I was ready to transfer because of the old principal. I just couldn't stand it. But when this new man came in and turned out to be so good, I went downtown and took my name off the transfer list. I want to stay there now. . . . Some of those teachers have been there as long as thirty years, you see, and they feel like they really own the place. They want everything done their way. They always had things their way and they were pretty mad when this new principal didn't take to all their ideas.

Any of these events may affect the career, then, in any of several ways, depending on the state of the career development at the time the event occurs. The effect of any event must be seen in the context of the type of adjustment made by the individual to the institutional organization in which she works.

IV

This paper has demonstrated the existence, among Chicago schoolteachers, of what has been called a "horizontal" plane of career strivings and movements and has traced the kind of career patterns which occur, at this level, in a public bureaucracy where movement is achieved through manipulation of formal procedures. It suggests that studies of other occupations, in which greater emphasis on vertical movement may obscure the presence and effects of such horizontal mobility, might well direct their attention to such phenomena.

Further research might also explore in detail the relations between the horizontal mobility discussed here and the vertical mobility more prominent in many occupations. Studies in a number of occupations might give us answers to questions like this: To what extent, and under what circumstances, will a person forego actions

which might provide him with a better working situation at one level of an occupational hierarchy in the hope of receiving greater rewards through vertical mobility?

... Turning the problem around, we may ask to what extent a person will give up possible vertical mobility which might interfere with the successful adjustment he has made in terms of horizontal career movement. A suggestion as to the kinds of relationships and processes to be found here comes from the following statement made by a high-school teacher with regard to mobility within the school system:

That's one reason why a lot of people aren't interested in taking principal's exams. Supposing they pass and their first assignment is to some school like M—— or T——. And it's likely to be at some low-class colored school like that, because people are always dying to get out of schools like that. . . . Those schools are nearly always vacant, so that you have a very good chance of being assigned there when you start in. A lot of people I know will say, "Why should I leave a nice neighborhood like Morgan Park or South Shore or Hyde Park to go down to a school like that?" . . . These guys figure, "I should get mixed up with something like that? I like it better where I am."

Finally, we have explored the phenomenon of adjustment to a particular work situation in terms of changes in the individual's perspectives and social relationships and have noted the way in which such adjustment acted to tie the individual to the particular situation and to make it difficult for him to consider movement to another. We may speculate as to the importance and effects of such a process in the vertical mobility prominent in many occupations. One further research problem might be suggested: What are the social mechanisms which function, in occupations where such adjustment is not allowed to remain undisturbed, to bridge the transition between work situations, to break the ties binding the individual to one situation, and to effect a new adjustment elsewhere?

22

Religion

Religion is concerned with beliefs in, and responses to, the supernatural. Again, though the particular structures may differ greatly from society to society, all peoples—nonliterate and literate alike—have some kind of religious belief system and some set of practices related to it.

Father Thomas' "Religious Training in a Roman Catholic Family" is an illustration of the induction of the child into the beliefs and practices of a religious faith. It also points out some of the difficulties raised by the current impact of secularism on Roman Catholics in this country. (The problem is not unknown among Protestants and Jews.)

The selection by Louis Schneider and Sanford M. Dornbusch, "Inspirational Religious Literature: From Latent to Manifest Functions of Religion," shows how social beliefs and social habits often produce not only expected but also non-intended results, which are nonetheless significant.

John L. Thomas, S.J.

Religious Training in the Roman Catholic Family¹

Persons professionally concerned in the promotion of organized religion agree that one of the most important functions of the family is the inculcation of Christian ideals and practices in the rising generation. In the *Final Report* of the White House Conference on Children in a Democracy, it is stated that "the primary responsibility in the religious development of the child rests upon parents in the family. It is in this intimate and personal group that the attitudes of the child are first formed—attitudes that in the view of many psychologists profoundly affect the adult life of the growing person." On the other hand, it is generally assumed that the contemporary family is declining as a religious institution. Since the religious functioning of the family is affected by trends in religion as well as by trends in the family, this decline is considered an urban, rather than a rural, phenomenon and one which affects the various religious sects differently.

The factual basis for these hypotheses is somewhat meager. The source most frequently cited is an investigation of the declining religious function of the family conducted in 1930 under the auspices of the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. Family participation in four religious practices was studied. Samples were taken of school children in rural areas, in villages, and in cities of various sizes. It was found that about one in eight white American-born school children of the seventh, eighth, and ninth grades participated in family prayers. Little difference in the practice of this custom was noted between the city and the country. Church attendance was the only activity participated in by more than half the families (85 per cent of the rural and 40 per cent of the urban). The percentage of rural and urban families reading the Bible together was 22 and 10, respectively; the percentage saying grace before meals was 38 and 30, respectively. Acting on the assumption that decreases in a function can be measured by comparing the prevalence of an activity in the city with its prevalence in the country, since the country preceded the city in point of time, some writers, on the basis of the White House study, advanced the hypothesis that there has been a decided decline in at least three religious practices. These data are for families rather than for individuals.

It is not an easy task to ascertain the nature or the extent of the religious training which American families now give their children. Religious training implies a knowledge of a set of dogmas and practices. It is the basic orientation of life toward the supernatural. In practice, it is the interpretation and ordering of actions in terms of an absolute set of moral values. Obviously, it is difficult to measure child training in such a subject. However, it seems that some valid conclusions can be drawn from a study of the dogmas and practices which the child is taught at

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1951, 57:178-183. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

home. Granting that knowledge of dogma and prayer is not the whole of religious training, nevertheless, in a highly institutionalized religion such as the Roman Catholic, understanding of dogma and practice in prayer generally constitute a considerable part of this training.

The present study is an investigation of some aspects of the religious training which Roman Catholic children receive at home. Since the Roman Catholic church in the United States has established an extensive system of parochial schools, where children are formally instructed and trained in religion, it is difficult to distinguish the role of the family in the religious training from that of the school. The writer attempted to avoid this difficulty by confining his study to an investigation of the religious training which the child receives *before* he enters the parochial school. This, however, reveals much more than the role which the family plays in the religious training of the preschool child; it throws considerable light on the religious function of the family throughout the child's entire life. It should be remembered that Roman Catholic parents are urged to start religious training and instruction "from the cradle." It is unlikely that a family which has neglected its obligations to the child *before* school will assume them after he has been put into the very efficient hands of the parochial schoolteacher. Hence the study of the religious training of the preschool child throws considerable light on religious home training.

Full investigation of this highly important problem involves the following questions: (1) What formal religious instruction and training do parents give their preschool children? Judged on the basis of traditional expectation, what items are stressed or neglected in this training? (2) Are there regional differences in the preschool religious training of children? (3) Do rural and urban families differ in the amount of religious instruction and training given the child in the home?

Taking up the first set of questions, our problem was to formulate a list of items which would enable us to measure the religious training of the preschool child. After considerable discussion, experienced and competent first-grade teachers, representing six different religious teaching congregations, chose ten items. Their selection was based on the following considerations: (1) the items were such that the child could learn them rather easily if given some assistance by the parent; (2) this knowledge was in conformity with traditional expectations, that is, it was generally assumed that the child was so instructed by parents. Ten items were selected and were grouped under two headings: knowledge of prayers and knowledge of dogmas.

Under the first heading information was sought on the child's knowledge of the following prayers: (1) the Sign of the Cross, (2) the Lord's Prayer, (3) the "Hail Mary"—the traditional prayer of the Roman Catholic church to the Blessed Mother, (4) the prayer for grace at meals, (5) the prayer to the Guardian Angel—this is a traditional childhood devotion in the church. Under the heading of dogma, the child's knowledge of the following items was tested: (1) the story of the Creation, (2) the story of Adam and Eve, (3) the story of Christmas—the birthday of Christ as distinguished from Santa Claus and the giving of gifts, (4) the presence of Christ in the church—the belief of the real presence of Christ in the Host preserved on the altar, (5) the story of the Crucifix. No profound theological explanation of these dogmas was expected of the child, but he was supposed to be generally acquainted with them.

Over five hundred sisters, teaching the first grade and representing a large number of religious teaching congregations, agreed to co-operate in the study. The majority

of them were contacted by a letter in which the purpose of the study was explained, and they were asked to secure the information on the ten items in the questionnaire at the opening of the fall term of 1950. Although this entailed considerable additional work, many of them had informed us that they made a rough check of the religious training of their new students anyway, so that the securing of the additional detailed information we were seeking did not represent too great a burden. The present study is based on the returns from 446 schools located in 33 different states. The number of children examined was a little over sixteen thousand. Actually, we received returns on several thousand more, but these were either in kindergartens or in mixed classes, that is, classes in which part of the children had attended some type of kindergarten and, consequently, had been subjected to a certain amount of religious training away from home.

Table 1 gives the results for the group as a whole. The data found in this table

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF PRESCHOOL CHILDREN RECEIVING RELIGIOUS
INSTRUCTION AT HOME

Item	Percentage
<i>Knows prayers:</i>	
1. The Sign of the Cross	52.9
2. The Lord's Prayer	23.2
3. The "Hail Mary"	33.0
4. Grace at meals	14.1
5. Prayer to Guardian Angel	15.5
<i>Understands dogma:</i>	
1. Story of Creation	24.9
2. Story of Adam and Eve	13.1
3. Meaning of Christmas	34.2
4. Presence of Christ in church	33.0
5. Story of the Crucifix	30.6

will be most meaningful if considered as presenting a pattern. One may quibble about this or that particular item employed in the study, but the over-all picture presents a fairly uniform pattern. With the exception of the item dealing with the Sign of the Cross, one-third or less of the children showed the expected amount of home training. In other words, the formal religious instruction and training which the majority of Roman Catholic families give their preschool children seems very inadequate when judged by traditional expectations. Unfortunately, we do not possess adequate information on the religious home training of children in the past: very possibly, a considerable gap has always existed between traditional expectations and actual practice. Consequently, the data presented in Table 1 should be considered as a fairly adequate picture of the difference between expectation and practice today, whether conditions were different a generation or two ago can only be surmised. However, it is of some interest to indicate a few of the more surprising deviations from the expected, as revealed by our data. For example, the customary childhood prayer to the Guardian Angel is evidently not taught in most of the homes. The small percentage of those who knew the prayer for grace at meals indicates that this traditional practice is most honored in the breach, although an alternate explanation may be that grace is recited by one of the parents while the child remains at attention. The lack of knowledge displayed by two-thirds of

the children in regard to items 3, 4, and 5, listed under dogma, was also unexpected. The story of Christmas is one which children grasp very readily, and the ritual of the church on this feast is so elaborate that it is difficult to understand how they could forget the story, provided that the parents had made some effort to explain it. However, as one teacher remarked, "No matter how I put the question, the same answer came back: Christmas meant only Santa and gifts!" The realization of the real presence of Christ on the altar seems rather easy for the child: the reason he is expected to be on his good behavior in church is because it is the "house of God," and the reverent behavior of the faithful during Mass could hardly escape his attention. But it seems that parents do not take their young children to church, or, if they do, they do not explain their actions. The Crucifix is the most universal of Roman Catholic symbols. The failure of over two-thirds of the children to know its meaning suggests that it is not a prominent symbol in the modern Catholic home.

Obviously, one cannot conclude on the basis of our data that two-thirds of the Catholic families in this country are giving their children no religious training. One may conclude, however, that they are not training and instructing them according to traditional expectations. Further, given the nature of Catholic belief and practice, it is difficult to understand how parents can give their children very extensive religious training if they neglect the basic items specified in our questionnaire. As one first-grade teacher remarked, "In regard to religious training, we have to start right from the beginning. It seems that modern parents are too busy to instruct their little ones!"

Our second problem was to investigate regional differences. In a country as large and religiously diversified as our own, sectional differences were to be expected. The country was divided into regions according to the sixfold division advocated by Odum. Since we are not interested in comparing knowledge of individual items, we have used a twofold classification, combining the five items dealing with knowledge of prayers under one heading and the five dealing with understanding of dogma under a second. Table 2 gives the percentages by region. The Northwest and the Southeast differ significantly from the general average for the five items combined under the heading "Knows Prayers." Considering our present scant knowledge of the Roman Catholic populations of these regions, it would be hazardous to venture an explanation. However, we might point out that a relatively high percentage of the Roman Catholic population in the Northwest is rural, and, as we shall see,

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF PRESCHOOL CHILDREN RECEIVING RELIGIOUS
TRAINING AT HOME, BY REGION

Region	Knows Prayers (5 Items)	Under- stands Dogma (5 Items)
Northwest (2,490 children)	34.9	33.0
Southwest (751 children)	27.2	38.8
Middle states (6,641 children)	27.6	27.8
Northeast (2,201 children)	26.4	27.1
Far West (2,644 children)	25.2	20.1
Southeast (1,374 children)	23.1	20.1
General average	27.7	27.2

rural families tend to give their children more religious instruction than do urban. This probably accounts for the difference. A tentative explanation for the relatively poor showing of the Southeast is that the Roman Catholic population there is only a small percentage of the total—a circumstance leading to a very high rate of mixed marriage. Studies of mixed marriage lead us to expect less religious training of offspring. For the five items combined under the heading, "Understands Dogma," the Southwest and Far West also differed significantly from the general average. We do know something about the Roman Catholic population in the Southwest: a good percentage of the schools studied had a considerable number of Spanish or Mexican children. Their teachers pointed out that these bilingual children are retarded to some extent in their knowledge of prayers but show better than average understanding of fundamental religious dogmas.

The third problem was whether urban and rural families differ in the amount of religious training given the child at home. The children in our sample were fairly representative of the Roman Catholic population as a whole, since 17.5 per cent were rural and 82.5 per cent were urban. According to the best available data, the Roman Catholic population in this country is 19.4 per cent rural and 80.6 per cent urban. Table 3 gives the percentages for the rural and urban children for the

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF PRESCHOOL CHILDREN FROM RURAL AND URBAN FAMILIES
RECEIVING RELIGIOUS TRAINING IN THE HOME

Item	Rural (2,816)	Urban (13,285)
<i>Knows prayers:</i>		
1. The Sign of the Cross	61.8	51.3
2. The Lord's Prayer	27.7	22.4
3. The "Hail Mary"	39.2	31.9
4. Grace at meals	17.5	13.5
5. Prayer to Guardian Angel	18.0	15.1
<i>Understands dogma:</i>		
1. Story of Creation	29.1	24.1
2. Story of Adam and Eve	12.9	12.2
3. The meaning of Christmas	32.8	34.7
4. Presence of Christ in church	36.7	32.3
5. The story of the Crucifix	34.6	29.8

country as a whole. Considered as a group, the rural children differ significantly from the urban in their knowledge of prayers. In their understanding of dogma the rural children also display superior home training, with the exception of items 2 and 3, where the differences are not significant. However, this over-all picture of urban and rural differences is deceptive. If we break down the data into regions, it becomes apparent at once that the urban-rural relation is not uniform throughout the country. Table 4 gives the percentages for urban and rural children by region. It appears that the religious training received at home by urban children in the Southwest, Northeast, and Southeast is equal to, or superior to, that received by rural children in these same areas. It would be interesting to speculate on the reasons for these regional differences, but our present inadequate knowledge of their religious characteristics would render any explanation dubious. However,

Table 4 does show that generalizations about urban-rural differences in the religious training of children cannot be made without taking regional differences into consideration.

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF URBAN AND RURAL PRESCHOOL CHILDREN RECEIVING
RELIGIOUS TRAINING AT HOME, BY REGION

Region	Knows Prayers (5 Items)	Under- stands Dogma (5 Items)
<i>Northwest:</i>		
Urban (1,954)	32.4	32.0
Rural (536)	44.3	36.3
<i>Southwest:</i>		
Urban (494)	29.3	40.5
Rural (257)	22.9	36.6
<i>Middle states:</i>		
Urban (5,530)	26.1	27.2
Rural (1,111)	35.2	30.5
<i>Northeast:</i>		
Urban (1,963)	27.3	28.1
Rural (238)	19.6	20.2
<i>Far West:</i>		
Urban (2,237)	23.9	19.4
Rural (407)	32.1	23.8
<i>Southeast:</i>		
Urban (1,107)	23.2	19.5
Rural (267)	22.6	22.0

Returning to the questions posed earlier in the paper, we may summarize our findings as follows:

1. The religious training of the preschool child at home as measured by the ten items employed in the present study falls far short of traditional expectations.
2. Regional differences in religious home training are apparent. It is probable that diverse ethnic backgrounds and the relative scarcity of the Roman Catholic population account for a considerable amount of the deviation from the general average.
3. There is evidence that urban and rural families differ in the amount of religious training given the preschool child. Nevertheless, the pattern is not uniform throughout the country: regional differences must be considered if any meaningful comparisons are to be made.

In conclusion, therefore, it can be stated that this project has made some small beginning in studying the important function of the family in the religious training of the child. There is room for a great deal more research. Our study is open to the criticism that we have stressed formal knowledge at the expense of motivation and religious "outlook." On the other hand, given the organized character of Roman Catholic belief and practice, it seems legitimate to conclude that where there is no formal knowledge there is little religious training.

Louis Schneider and Sanford M. Dornbusch

Inspirational Religious Literature: From Latent to Manifest Functions of Religion¹

The inspirational religious literature is known to be enormously popular. The books of Norman Vincent Peale today, of Bruce Barton a generation ago, and of numerous of their close intellectual relatives and imitators have achieved staggering sales. Sociologists have left comment on it to journalists or theologians or gifted outsiders. But it is of significance for the analysis of "cultural drift," with broad general implications. In this article, a brief survey of the inspirational religious literature and a summary of its dominant trends and themes, attention is given to a special phase which is of considerable sociological import.

The literature is by no means unitary, but strains or trends in it exhibit prominent elements of unity. Ralph Waldo Trine's *In Tune with the Infinite*, Bruce Barton's *The Man Nobody Knows*, Henry C. Link's *The Return to Religion*, and Peale's *A Guide to Confident Living* and *The Power of Positive Thinking* suggest for purposes of definition four criteria to which the items of literature should conform: (a) they assume the general validity of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition; (b) they aim to inspire with the hope of salvation here or in an afterlife; (c) they recommend use of techniques to achieve salvation, in whatever sense salvation might be understood; and (d) they address themselves to the "everyday problems" of "everyday people." The books vary in the balance among the four points.

The general validity of the Judeo-Christian tradition is assumed among these works with significant vagueness. Specific theological doctrines, such as of Christ's soteriological mission, or specific theological discussions, as of Christ's status as a member of the Trinity, are hard to find. More likely, there will be found discussion of a transcendent "something" about which a professed theologian could say practically nothing. Daniel Poling confesses, "I began saying in the morning two words, 'I believe'—those two words with nothing added."

The literature also holds forth the hope of some kind of salvation. In the seventy-five years covered in the survey eschatological interest has declined. But, while concern with the next world fades increasingly, salvation comes quite conclusively to mean salvation in this world: release from poverty or handicapping inhibition in personal relations or from ill health or emotional disequilibrium. But salvation in this secular sense is held forth as a definite hope and even a promise.²

The inspirational literature bristles with techniques to attain peace and power which range from putting one's self "in tune with the infinite" by some intuitive twist of the psyche to sensing a deity in the chair by one's bed at night; from reconstructing failures as trifles or even as successes to whispering to one's self a promise of good things to come. These practices, finally, are represented as helpful

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1957, 62:476-481. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

² So Emmet Fox: "If only you will find out the thing God intends you to do, and will do it, you will find that all doors will open to you; all obstacles in your path will melt away; you will be acclaimed a brilliant success; you will be most liberally rewarded from the monetary point of view; and you will be gloriously happy" (*Power through Constructive Thinking* [New York: Harper & Bros., 1932]), p. 23.

to ordinary men and women in solving their everyday problems, but this³ point needs no elaboration here.

Elements of this kind may be found in a variety of other places, for example, in Augustine's *Confessions* or Thomas à Kempis' *Imitation of Christ*. But these documents differ in affirming faith unequivocally. Moreover, the salvation they envisage is not of this world. The ends they set out lack the concrete, tangible quality of such goals as business success or emotional "adjustment," and, consequently, they hardly bristle with the techniques with which the modern literature is filled. True, in a certain sense there is some overlap, as, for instance, in the case of prayer, which is often recommended; but there are obvious differences between devotional prayer and prayer that, not very subtly, is instrumental. On the other hand, the literature, not only on its own recognizances, is in some sense "religious." Advertisements that promise to add six inches to the chests of scrawny men are "inspirational" in tone, but they make no pretensions to being religious and cannot qualify as inspirational religious literature.

A dominant trend in the literature through the decades is secularization; for instance, suffering has lost its "meaningfulness" and more and more is described as senseless misery, best gotten rid of. No longer divinely or transcendently significant, suffering figures as a pathological experience calling for a psychiatrist or a minister trained in counseling. Again, the deity as represented in the literature is in process of transformation: his existence in some objective sense is no longer insisted upon, and he often approximates a consciously useful fiction. The "hero" appears more and more as the "well-adjusted" man, who does not question existing social institutions and who, ideally successful both in a business or in professional sense, feels no emotional pain. Finally, there is a strong bias against the "unscientific" and for equating religion and "science."

In American thought William James, in effect, substituted, "I believe because it is useful" for "I believe because it is so"—or even, with Tertullian, "because it is impossible"—an idea which abounds in the inspirational religious literature. Or the best is made of both worlds in a combination such as, "I feel it is absurd; but, since it is useful, I shall insist that it is true." Thus, Henry Link avers, "I believe in God because I have found that without the belief in someone more important than themselves, people fail to achieve their own potential importance." And he adds later: "Agnosticism is an intellectual disease, and faith in fallacies is better than no faith at all."³ Writers like Harry Emerson Fosdick will go only a certain distance in this direction. Fosdick asserts:

The explanation of the rise of cults like Christian Science and New Thought is obvious. While the old-line churches were largely concerning themselves with dogma, ritual, and organization, multitudes of folk were starving for available spiritual power with which to live. These cults arose to meet this need, and with all their mistaken attitudes . . . they have genuinely served millions of people by *translating religion into terms of power available for daily use*.⁴

But if Fosdick is willing to go only thus far, others are willing to go beyond him. The literature consistently emphasizes "God-power" as divine flow into men, sustaining and aiding them in some materially useful sense to the point where the deity often becomes simply a psychological device. The strain toward instrumentalization is so strong in Peale, for example, that one must by inference from his

³ *The Return to Religion*, pp. 34, 63. New York: Macmillan Co., 1936.

⁴ *As I See Religion*, pp. 17-18 (italics ours). New York: Harper & Bros., 1932.

work assign to God as a primary function the dispensing of divine vitamins to men eager for health and wealth.

A kind of spiritual technology has also been developed, inseparable, of course, from the instrumental element. Standard religious procedures like prayer are constantly recommended, although often with a characteristic twist, as in Peale when he urges: "Learn to pray correctly, scientifically. Employ tested and proven methods. Avoid slipshod praying."⁵ Self-exhortation, another frequently suggested procedure, undoubtedly has affinities with more "classical" religious procedures, for example: "I believe," "Christ is with me," "In everything I do God helps," "I cannot lose." Again, stress is placed on special psychic states, perhaps with physical props simultaneously suggested—for example, a state of receptivity to "God-power." A notable set of recommendations depends upon converting spiritual principles into magic. Thus, as in some of the work of Lloyd Douglas, which is frequently only a fictional transcript of inspirational religious literature, he who gives without letting anyone know it is repaid a thousand fold, both magically and materially; he becomes a great success. An outcome not only of impossible physics but—in the light of the principle, "cast your bread upon the waters" and cognate exhortations—of a dubious spirituality, this can be described as spiritual technology.

Other trends include, as the quotation above from Fosdick illustrates, a definitely antiritualistic, antidogmatic, anti-institutional (antiorganizational) strain. The stress is most emphatically on religious "experience" as might be expected.

In marking the transition from latent to manifest functions of religion, one must distinguish between a *primary* and a *secondary* religious sequence. A good enough text for the primary sequence is afforded by the biblical prescription and promise, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you." "Faith" is thus urged, but it is urged as primary; its possible "fruits" are only hinted at. The notion that Job might have been seeking to be "well adjusted" simply on the basis of the Book of Job is incongruous. The primary religious sequence may be roughly rendered, then, as follows: Faith → Action → "Results" (for example, emotional equanimity).

But the modern inspirational literature more or less deliberately reverses this sequence. It starts from the observation (here assumed to be correct) that what is loosely called "faith" *can* bring about "peace of mind" and cognate desired ends. It does not, so to say, start with "the Kingdom of God," that is, with what may be called "classical" religious belief, because the belief is thought to be *true*. (Of course, it may incidentally hold out for the truth of such doctrine as it happens to retain.) It relies on a secondary sequence that begins with a projection or presentation of the desirability of all manner of "good things," mainly wealth and emotional or physical health. This secondary sequence becomes, then, "Results" (in prospect) → Action → Faith (or, possibly, also "Results" → Faith → Action), "action" being largely on the lines of spiritual technology. The modern spiritual technology may in a number of ways be a substitute for older religious ritual. If it is acknowledged that at times, when men have believed sincerely and devotedly, serenity or calm has come to them, it has clearly often come as a *by-product*. Serenity, calm, and the like have been latent functions of religious faith and devotion. It is not necessary to claim that they have been *unqualifiedly* latent; differences of degree may well be crucial. But the inspirational religious literature makes these latent functions of religion manifest and pursues them as aims.

⁵ *A Guide to Confident Living*, p. 114. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948.

The shift from latent to manifest raises the question: Can the same "results" be obtained? A task facing sociological theory is the classification and explanation of cases in which the transition has different kinds of results. If, say, factory workers can be inspired by a demonstration of the full nature and final uses of the product to which their seemingly disjointed individual efforts have led, it does not follow that an analogous service will always be performed by a demonstration to the religious that their efforts to "find God" afford them "peace of mind." Nor is there any reason to think that faith will be enhanced if it is also shown, directly or by implication, that gaining peace of mind is the point of religious practice in the first place. Here, too, differences of degrees are important. That the inspirational religious literature does not always make an outright and unqualified shift from latent to manifest but often stops short of an uninhibited assertion that the *object* of faith is to attain power or peace of mind is of sociological interest.

Thus, curiously, the religious begin to look on their own activity in the manner of functionally oriented sociologists and psychologists. The question is whether, in doing so, they do not endanger the religious function; or perhaps these are all signs that faith has already lapsed, the efforts to exhibit its virtues being proof. In this connection it is pertinent to look back to a recent paper by William Kolb, who poses a "moral dilemma" for sociologists of religion who affirm the "integrating" function and necessity of belief in ultimates while themselves holding that belief to be illusory:

To spread the idea that a belief in ultimate validity of values is necessary but illusory would be to destroy society through destroying or confusing this belief. Yet to urge people to accept the idea that there is an ontic realm of values while believing oneself that such an idea is false is deliberately to deprive people of the knowledge necessary for their freedom and dignity.⁶

Many of the purveyors of inspirational religion may represent a kind of halfway house. At one extreme we would find followers of the "old-time religion," unreserved believers that their creed has objective validity, who, at times, incidentally reap material benefits from it. At another extreme, are "positivistic" functional sociologists, quite prepared to find religion increasing the solidarity of the group, drawing the deviant individual back to it, and so on, while unconvinced themselves. Inspirational religion is somewhere between these extremes, somewhat fluctuating and unsure, yet with a powerful instrumental bent. Faith, again, is "the answer"—enjoined in the first instance not because the religious content that it affirms is above all "true," but just because it is "the answer." The concentration on "the answer," the results, already half-suggests an "illusion." The presumed primary "truth," put into the background from the very absence of attention to it, becomes the more dubious the less stress it receives and the vaguer it gets. The impulse to make religion "useful" is understandable, but the deliberate effort to do so may be self-defeating.

⁶ W. L. Kolb, "Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of Religion: The Growth of a Moral Dilemma," *Social Forces*, 1953, 31:309.

23

The Economic Order

One can argue that Americans put more emphasis on a free enterprise economy than they do on democracy or monotheism; certainly we show a tendency in patriotic fervor to equate the three. There is no need to argue that the economic order is a central institution in our culture. People in the labor force generally spend more waking hours with their work than with their families.

"The Status of Jobs and Occupations as Evaluated by an Urban Negro Sample," by Morgan C. Brown, shows that the values on which institutional norms are based may look somewhat different from the perspective of minority status.

In "The Union Organizer and His Tactics," Bernard Karsh, Joel Seidman, and Daisy M. Lilienthal offer an analysis of a role which has helped alter the economic order of the United States.

Morgan C. Brown

**The Status of Jobs and Occupations as Evaluated
by an Urban Negro Sample¹**

This paper is a brief report of a study dealing with the status of jobs and occupations as evaluated by Negroes of Columbus, Ohio. The author attempted to make a small-scale test of the hypothesis that Negro evaluation of jobs and occupations differs significantly from that of white Americans as reflected in the North-Hatt job-scale of the mid-1940's.² The latter scale includes ninety different jobs of varying occupational levels as evaluated by a nation-wide cross-section of the adult white U. S. population. North and Hatt discovered that white respondents gave the highest status rating to the U. S. Supreme Court Justice. Physician and State Governor tied for second place, with Cabinet Member in the Federal Government, Diplomat in the U. S. Foreign Service, and Mayor of a Large City occupying the next highest positions, in descending order. Respondents gave the lowest prestige or

¹ From *American Sociological Review*, 1955, 20:561-566. By permission.

² Cecil C. North and Paul K. Hatt, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation." *Opinion News* (September 1, 1947), p. 3.

status ratings to the jobs of Bartender, Janitor, Garbage Collector, Street-sweeper, and Shoe shiner.

Since the North-Hatt study, new considerations have arisen with respect to how Negroes might have rated the occupations, or how the total list of jobs might have appeared in scalar order had Negro persons been included in the study sample. Interest in the evaluations by Negroes may have had its genesis partly in the finding that characteristic attitudes and values derive from the social and cultural setting, and that, due to conditions which differentiate the white and Negro populations sociologically, Negroes tend at times to respond to social and economic factors quite unlike the larger population. Among the purposes of the present study, therefore, were the following: (1) to discover the evaluation of a list of jobs and occupations by Negro respondents; (2) to determine how the obtained evaluation compared with that of white Americans during 1947 as reflected in the nation-wide North-Hatt study,³ and (3) to attempt to arrive at some attributes of job prestige and, thereby, obtain total measurements of values (jobs) through the technique of measuring specific identifiable components.

METHOD

A list of 129 jobs and occupations was obtained by interviewing adult Negroes who lived in various sections of the city of Columbus, Ohio and who were thought to be representative of all socio-economic categories.⁴ These jobs were ranked by a sample of thirty Negroes from various socio-economic backgrounds by the use of the 5-point alternate response scale used by North and Hatt.⁵ When the obtained rankings of sixty-five of the jobs were correlated with the rankings which these same sixty-five occupations received in the North-Hatt study, a $+0.92$ rho resulted. Ten jobs from each extreme of the obtained continuum of occupations were then listed on 3" by 5" cards, labelled Card A and Card B, and respondents were asked, randomly, to state factors which they thought differentiated one set of jobs as a whole from the other, the assumption being, of course, that the two sets of jobs were of dissimilar status levels. The procedure was continued until, instead of new suggestions, the responses tended to represent mere extensions of previously obtained information. This latter technique was an attempt to "get behind" the prestige rankings in order to obtain some knowledge with respect to the configuration of factors or "inner qualities" assessed by persons as having relationship to the status rankings. It was noted, accordingly, that respondents designated the "better jobs" as those which appeared at the upper extreme of the aforementioned job continuum, and which were listed on Card A. Respondents characterized the jobs listed on Card A as follows:

1. The jobs were *greatly necessary* for the public welfare.
2. Persons within the community who performed the jobs were accorded *more than usual respect*.

³ It was assumed that although there may have been changes in the values of white persons with respect to jobs and occupations since 1947, these changes would not be of such magnitude as to render a comparison useless.

⁴ The ninety jobs listed in the North-Hatt scale were not used in this study because there was no assurance that Negroes were familiar with the North-Hatt jobs. In the selection of jobs for the above study, preliminary interviews were made with more than 1,000 Negro residents, each of whom was asked to enumerate as many jobs, irrespective of status, as he could think of. Listing of a specific job by five respondents was arbitrarily taken as indicating that the job was familiar enough to Negro respondents for inclusion in the total listing of jobs. Of 129 jobs obtained, 65 had been rated in the North-Hatt study.

⁵ According to the North-Hatt response pattern, a job evaluated as "Excellent" was assigned an arbitrary weight of 100; "Good," 80; "Average," 60; "Somewhat below average," 40; and "Poor," 20. "I don't know" answers, evaluated as 0, were not included in the computation of mean scores.

3. The jobs were *clean*.
4. Extensive *education* or *training* was required for entry into the jobs.
5. In terms of *talent* or *skill*, persons who could perform the jobs were rare.
6. *Good salaries* were earned.
7. The jobs afforded considerable *leisure time* for recreation and/or vacations.
8. Persons performing the jobs were accepted as *authorities in the community*.
9. The occupations had *high standings* which could be traced back into history.
10. Great *muscular effort* or *physical exertion* was not required when performing the jobs.
11. The jobs had a *religious-moral-altruistic* tradition in connection with the social life of the people.

No respondent, singly, suggested all of the eleven *a priori* items; rather, the above dimensions or "inner qualities" were thought to be especially associated with high-status jobs by a cross-section of the adult Negro population of Columbus, which included housewives, laborers, business and professional persons, college students, "men on the street," and others, each of whom jotted down his or her viewpoints on sheets of paper which were supplied for this purpose. The total viewpoints were broken down by a panel of three sociologists and classified under thirteen relatively distinct headings. Two of the categories—"Job permanence" and "Relative absence of physical danger in connection with job performance"—were later discarded because items pertaining to these categories had been suggested by too few respondents.⁶

Although the above items or dimensions were recognized as not mutually exclusive, a 5-point arbitrary response scale was devised to measure the degree to which a final study sample of 200 respondents would feel that the specific attribute denoted in each statement is associated with each job. . . .

Standardization of the Instrument. With respect to validity, high and low scores of selected occupations, after use of the instrument, tended to conform to the generalized evaluations of persons who were interviewed during the early stages of the investigation, and with common-sense judgments. At the same time, the instrument threw statistical light upon the problem at hand.

Concerning reliability, the instrument was tested by having the thirty original judges re-rate each job in terms of the eleven dimensions, a Pearsonian r of $+.83$ resulting. A retest four weeks later among the same thirty judges yielded a Pearsonian r of $+.89$. When the scores obtained in the latter operation were correlated with the verbal scores which the jobs originally had received, a Pearsonian r of $+.81$ obtained. A version of the split-half technique—separately computing the rankings of males and females, and correlating these with each other—yielded a ρ of $+.91$.

The Sample. In this investigation the study sample consisted of 200 persons who were obtained by random selection from the universe of 46,000 Negro residents of Columbus. The sample was based in part upon data obtained through study of the Seventeenth Census of the United States. Examination of census figures pertaining to characteristics of the Negro population of Columbus with special reference to the local housing of Negroes, number of persons per dwelling unit, sex ratio, and related data, revealed that a representative study sample could be secured through field visits to every seventh house in each of the four predominantly Negro districts of the city. In pursuing this plan, provisions were made for inclusion in the sample of "secondary families"—those living in the households of other people. In the place

"Job permanence" was suggested by only three respondents, while "Absence of physical danger" was suggested by four respondents. Items pertaining to each of the other categories were suggested by not less than fifteen persons.

of thirteen persons who were never found at home, substitutions were made from the specific streets or neighborhoods concerned. The factors of sex, approximate age, home ownership, occupation, and type or worth of house lived in, were held constant in the substitution process. Chi-square tests revealed that the obtained sample did not differ significantly from the non-white universe in terms of sex, age, educational, and occupational characteristics.

Although the original study dealt with a comparison of the status scores of sixty-five jobs, Table 1 presents the scores of only forty-five of the more representative jobs and occupations as evaluated by the study sample of 200 respondents.

FINDINGS

Table 1 discloses that many of the North-Hatt mean scores which pertain to the jobs under comparison are similar to the mean scores in this study. The combined mean score for the total sixty-five jobs as rated by the nation-wide sample of whites was 72.16, with a standard deviation of 15.66. The combined mean score for the sixty-five jobs, as rated by the 200 Negro respondents of Columbus, Ohio, was 71.60, with a standard deviation of 14.74. The critical ratio for the difference between the two combined mean scores was .52 (insignificant), while the Pearsonian correlation between the two columns of mean scores was found to be $+.94$, with standard error of $+.01$.

Notwithstanding the general conformity in ratings between the two samples, there were eleven instances (italicized in Table 1) in which the rating of a job by the Negro respondents was five or more points lower than the rating by the North-Hatt sample. Among jobs having great variation in mean score are those of Farm Tenant and Farm Owner. These deviations by Negro respondents from the nation-wide ratings may be interpreted as responses related to the life experiences of the population under study, and as expressive of tendencies implicit in the established social relations. Personal background data pertaining to the sample revealed that 55 per cent were born, and partly reared, in southern United States. It is probable that some of these persons, when rating the above jobs, may have associated farm tenancy with inequitable landlord-tenant relations, based in poverty and exploitation—a phenomenon with which some respondents from southern areas were familiar. As a matter of fact, subsequent interviews revealed that some respondents, when commenting upon the status and role of the Farm Tenant, made frequent reference to “unfair crop share,” “poor schools,” and “lack of . . . [technical] . . . devices”—characteristic land-tenure conditions associated with the farm tenancy of the southern region in past decades. It is likely, furthermore, that relative cultural isolation and the unequal competition encountered by rural Negroes for productive farm lands may have been associated, in similar manner, with the related job of Farm Owner. Irrespective of whether these aforementioned phenomena are real or fancied in the South today, such background experiences on the part of a responding population would be expected to be reflected objectively in the job ratings.

With respect to other italicized jobs in Table 1, data of U. S. Bureau of the Census reveal that Negro workers are greatly underrepresented in each of them. The latter suggests that the discrepancy in the ratings of many of these remaining jobs may have resulted to some extent from relative unfamiliarity of respondents with the jobs, in addition, of course, to numerous other factors.

Concerning the ten jobs (capitalized in Table 1) which were rated at least five points higher by the Negro study sample than by white respondents in the North-Hatt study, it may be stated that Negro workers have not as yet had the opportunity

to participate freely in the economic spirit and tradition of urban, competitive, community life. As a consequence of this differentiation, it sometimes has been assumed that selected jobs might be assessed more valuable or prestigious by Negroes from the standpoint of the *status* and *meaning* of these jobs in the restricted Negro society than when evaluated from a broader perspective. The jobs of School Teacher, Mor-

TABLE 1

MEAN SCORES OF FORTY-FIVE JOBS AND OCCUPATIONS AS EVALUATED BY THE STUDY SAMPLE AND COMPARED WITH NORTH-HATT SCORES, COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1954

Occupation*	North-Hatt Rating†	Ratings by Study Sample											Mean Score‡
		Necessity of the Job	Respect Received	Education or Training Required	Talent or Skill Necessary	Salary	"Time Off" for Recreation	Standing in History	Cleanliness	Muscular Strength Involved	Authority	Altruism	
U. S. Supreme Court Justice	96	98	96	98	96	96	84	98	96	92	98	94	95
Doctor of medicine	93	100	96	100	98	98	60	98	84	82	94	92	91
State governor	93	98	96	96	94	96	76	96	96	90	96	90	93
Cabinet member in the Fed. Government	92	94	94	96	94	94	78	94	96	90	94	84	91
U. S. diplomat (foreign service)	92	92	94	94	92	90	72	94	94	88	90	80	89
College professor	89	96	92	98	90	82	82	92	94	90	88	82	89
U. S. Congressman	89	98	90	92	90	94	82	96	94	92	96	84	91
Minister	87	98	94	82	80	72	70	96	94	90	96	100	88
Architect	86	86	80	82	92	90	76	84	88	82	62	58	80
Chemist	86	94	82	96	92	84	66	90	78	86	80	72	83
Dentist	86	96	86	96	94	94	66	88	78	80	72	82	84
Lawyer	86	92	86	94	90	90	70	96	92	86	90	80	87
Atomic scientist (nuclear physicist)	86	94	94	100	98	96	62	96	90	88	92	86	90
Psychologist	85	88	84	96	92	90	76	86	92	88	84	72	86
Engineer, civil	84	88	76	86	88	88	68	78	60	70	70	64	70
Artist	83	66	72	78	90	74	80	86	72	82	60	60	74
Sociologist	82	86	76	90	86	80	64	80	92	88	78	76	81
Accountant	81	82	70	80	74	74	60	70	88	88	62	58	73
Biologist	81	90	82	94	92	84	70	80	78	86	82	72	82
Novelist	80	70	80	80	90	84	66	90	92	88	70	66	79
Economist	79	82	84	90	82	86	68	82	92	88	90	70	83
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER	79	100	86	82	84	68	86	88	92	88	86	86	86
County Agricultural agent	77	78	74	76	76	72	66	70	64	74	74	70	72
Railroad engineer	77	84	70	72	72	76	56	68	48	64	54	60	65
Farm owner	76	98	66	56	68	76	58	72	50	62	66	68	67
Newspaper columnist	74	68	78	80	82	84	68	72	86	88	68	66	76
Electrician	73	84	68	74	80	78	60	68	54	68	58	56	68
Machinist	73	78	64	68	72	70	58	60	38	60	56	56	62

* Occupations given in italics were rated at least five points lower by the Negro sample than by the North-Hatt white sample; capitalized occupations, at least five points higher.

† North-Hatt scores represent opinion of nation-wide sample of 2,900 white persons.

‡ Ratings of jobs by study sample of 200 Negroes of Columbus, Ohio. Mean scores are the arithmetic means of the eleven independent attribute ratings pertaining to a job. Attribute ratings were arrived at by formula: $M = \frac{\sum}{200}$. Original scores, obtained by a weighted response pattern of from 1 (lowest possible rating) to 5 (highest possible rating), were multiplied by 20 in order that scores of the two samples would be comparable.

TABLE 1—CONTINUED

Occupation*	Ratings by Study Sample												Mean Score†
	North-Hatt Rating†	Necessity of the Job	Respect Received	Education or Training Required	Talent or Skill Necessary	Salary	"Time Off" for Recreation	Standing in History	Cleanliness	Muscular Strength Involved	Authority	Altruism	
SOCIAL WORKER ("WELFARE WORKER")	73	90	78	82	72	68	62	80	82	88	80	88	79
MORTICIAN ("UNDERTAKER")	72	94	88	84	88	92	70	84	66	70	70	82	80
Farm tenant	68	80	44	38	46	42	54	42	32	50	48	58	48
Traveling salesman	68	54	54	58	64	62	60	50	82	80	52	48	60
Mail carrier (post office)	66	88	70	64	58	64	60	70	68	60	58	64	65
Carpenter	65	84	68	70	82	78	60	66	46	60	58	64	67
Plumber	63	88	64	64	68	80	56	62	28	48	50	58	60
LABOR UNION OFFICIAL (local)	62	72	74	64	70	74	70	64	82	88	70	64	72
BARBER	59	82	64	58	64	66	60	62	74	78	52	58	65
Truck driver	54	70	52	50	62	60	54	50	50	56	52	54	55
NIGHT CLUB SINGER	52	40	54	52	78	78	78	46	84	88	36	34	60
Coal miner	49	90	52	42	54	70	60	56	20	38	40	54	52
HEAD-WAITER IN A HOTEL DINING ROOM ("RESTAURANT WAITER")	48	54	52	44	50	60	54	52	78	72	42	54	55
Janitor	44	70	44	28	36	44	52	44	30	54	36	56	45
GARBAGE COLLECTOR	35	86	42	26	28	52	50	36	22	52	34	52	43
STREET SWEEPER	34	70	38	22	28	48	56	30	30	54	28	44	40
SHOE SHINER	33	40	32	24	32	34	52	34	38	68	28	36	38

tician, and Social Worker particularly have been known to represent the "top" jobs at which Negro persons are employed in many cities. When considered in terms of this study, the disparities in the mean scores of these jobs suggest a differential evaluation.

Moreover, it should be pointed out that the matter of limited occupational employment for urban Negroes constitutes a problem-situation which is observed with rather considerable concern by some social actionists, and consequent efforts directed toward the expansion of job opportunities for Negro workers have become social-action goals of numerous human relations organizations in urban areas. Theoretical students may obtain some understanding both of the social actionists' concern with this phenomenon and of the interrelations of relatively narrow occupational horizon and aggregate response through observing the status scores of the capitalized jobs which are found at the lower end of the job continuum in Table 1. These latter jobs received low mean scores which revealed that Negro respondents considered them of low status and generally distasteful in the light of present-day occupational trends; however, the jobs were evaluated in a slightly less distasteful light, statistically and comparatively, by the Negro study sample whose respondents had only a limited number of jobs to choose from, than by the North-Hatt sample which doubtless had less restricted occupational opportunities.

Many additional inferences may, of course, be drawn from these above data.

CONCLUSIONS

In the present study, and by the specific techniques employed, the hypothesis pertaining to the existence of significant differences in the evaluations of jobs and occupations by Columbus, Ohio, Negroes from those held eight years ago by a nation-wide sample of adult white Americans was not substantiated.

Like the white respondents who rated the jobs in 1947, Negro respondents in the Columbus study did not evaluate all jobs as being of equal social status. The mean scores of occupations differed widely, resulting in the formation of a rank system or continuum of jobs.

Only forty-five of the total sixty-five jobs under comparison were presented in this report. Negro respondents, however, rated ten of the sixty-five jobs five or more points higher than did the North-Hatt respondents, and eleven jobs were rated by them five or more points lower. An attempt was made to interpret the differential evaluation in the light both of the prevailing social situation and life experiences of the populations under comparison.

The present investigation suggests a need for comparative studies among other population aggregates of varying status levels for purposes of comparison with present findings.

Bernard Karsh, Joel Seidman, and Daisy M. Lilienthal

The Union Organizer and His Tactics: A Case Study¹

The formation of a local union that can win collective-bargaining rights and establish itself as a relatively permanent organization in its plant or industry depends upon a combination of circumstances. There must be widespread dissatisfaction among the work group, potential leaders devoted to the idea of unionism, and economic conditions not unfavorable to it. In addition, there must be guidance in the critical early period by an experienced and resourceful union representative who has behind him the prestige and financial resources of a powerful organization. This guidance is typically furnished, under present conditions, by the professional union organizer, whose job it is to seek out promising situations in his industry within his assigned territory, stimulate the organization of unions, and continue to furnish assistance as the local group requires.

The union organizer has no set of rules by which to operate. He must be able to appraise elements of strength and weakness and make quick decisions as to when to organize and when to leave, when to accept a contract settlement and when to urge a strike. He must be a skilful tactician, able to counter the moves of employer, nonunion leader, or rival union head in fluid and rapidly changing situations. He must be alert, flexible, and imaginative, adapting his methods to local peculiarities and improvising new tactics as these are called for. He must be able to match wits as well as organizational strength against the employer, who has, generally, the advantages of greater economic resources, close association with the workers, political influence, and community prestige. The organizer's world is a pragmatic one in which the success of the organizing effort is the standard according to which he is judged.

This paper is a report upon a single organizing effort and the tactics employed by the chief organizer and the member of his staff intimately involved in the effort.

¹ From *American Journal of Sociology*, 1953, 59:113-122. By permission of The University of Chicago Press.

While situations vary widely, this one may nevertheless serve to illustrate many of the problems that confront the union organizer and the ways in which he seeks to solve them.

THE MILL, THE COMMUNITY, AND THE WORKERS

The plant, a knitting mill employing 180 workers, is located in a small town in a relatively isolated midwestern area. For more than a generation the town has been dominated by the family that owns the mill, as well as several other business enterprises, and whose influence is also felt in the political, social, and religious life of the community. Not until World War II did unionism extend beyond the skilled trades to embrace several of the factories in this and a neighboring community. The knitting-mill employees, however, lagged behind this general move toward unionization. Most were women whose husbands or fathers were the primary wage-earners; they tended to be at a medium to low level of skill in an area in which few alternative means of employment were available; their interest in unionism was limited, since the risks involved and the disparity between their apparent weakness and the strength of the town's leading family appeared too great. Many of them, moreover, had grown up with the member of the family who managed the mill and admired him personally just as they respected the economic power and social prestige that his family represented.

Nevertheless, the women in the knitting mill were not untouched by the spread of unionism during the war years, which swept many of their husbands and fathers into the growing unions, mostly those affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. The AF of L central labor body was anxious to organize the mill, the largest non-union enterprise in the town, which they believed was a drag upon wage rates in the community. Learning that some of the knitting-mill employees were interested in organization, the officers of the central labor body informed an officer of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, the AF of L union most active in the industry.

THE ORGANIZING EFFORTS IN 1947

Following this lead, the chief organizer in the area for the ILGWU, Frank _____,² launched an organizing campaign among the employees and assigned a member of his staff to spend her full time on the effort. She found that, while a number of the workers were dissatisfied with wages and working conditions and were interested in forming a union, none wanted her interests to become known, not even to fellow-employees. There was widespread fear that those who took an open part in the campaign would lose their jobs and fail to find satisfactory employment elsewhere in the community. The organizer was careful, therefore, to protect the identity of every union sympathizer. Frank recalled:

We didn't want to put those people who had signed up in the position where the company would know of them, and we had promised that we wouldn't. So we couldn't use any of the open methods such as handbills or meetings, and it had to be done on the QT.

The organizer contacted prospective members individually, starting with those whose names had been furnished by the officers of the central labor body. These employees in turn told her of others who would probably prove interested. "Don't use my name," she would be told, "but I know that Susie or May or Jane is very

² All personal names in this article have been withheld or changed, but no other matter has been altered.

much interested. I think that she, too, wants a union." While this was the primary organizing technique used, the organizer also made some contacts by waiting across the street until a worker left the plant, following her, and then stopping her to talk. Occasionally she would board the city bus after it had loaded workers at the plant gate, sit next to one, and talk to her about joining the union.

It was hoped that, if a substantial proportion of the workers joined, the campaign could be brought into the open, but two weeks of effort by the organizer produced only about twenty-five signed cards. The entire burden, moreover, rested on the organizer herself, since no workers were found who were willing to take an active role in the campaign and assume leadership inside the mill. At just this point the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, convincing Frank that the campaign was doomed to failure at that time. Frank said:

When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed and the people saw the companies' blasts in the newspapers, a difficult organizing campaign became almost impossible. . . . The original fear of the employer plus the Taft-Hartley Act made me—and I was the only one who made the decision—made it advisable to pull out before anyone was hurt, before it became public.

1950—THE PRELIMINARY SURVEY

Three years later a few of the workers in the mill again told officials of the central labor body of their dissatisfaction with conditions in the mill and their desire to unionize, and again this information was forwarded to the area officials of the ILGWU. Frank assigned another of his staff members, Helen ———, to survey the local situation and report on the prospects of success if the organizing drive were renewed. Helen went to the town to learn something of conditions in the mill and the attitudes of the workers. She was interested in finding out what line of garments was being manufactured, how many workers were employed, what tasks they were performing and at what level of skill, what wages they were receiving, and how they felt toward the company, their fellow-workers, and the union. As Helen put it:

If you send an organizer out and she comes out with the information that the people don't want a union, that their wage scale is good, that their treatment in the shop, their working conditions are good, and that they don't want any part of a union, then the organizer doesn't stay there very long.

Helen contacted an official of the central labor body and through him made arrangements to meet with one of the knitting-mill workers whose husband was also active in the central body. She was seeking not only information about wages and working conditions but also an employee who could take leadership for the union inside the mill. She wanted one who was a natural leader of the work group, who was both courageous and calm, and who was respected by supervisors as well as by her fellow-workers. Helen thought she saw such a person in a knitting-mill employee who dropped in while she was visiting the home of her first contact. Helen reported:

I could tell by the conversation that Dorothy was very respected in the shop by the group; that when things went wrong she was not afraid to express her opinion and that different groups in the shop came to her to tell her their troubles. I could see . . . the management respected her opinion too; when she complained enough, they would do the things she wanted.

The next evening Helen went to see Dorothy, to ask her, in the event an organ-

izing effort was made, whether she would use her car to show Helen where the workers lived and whether she would find out in a quiet manner what the workers thought of a union. Dorothy had never heard of the ILGWU until this time, however, and wanted time to learn something about it; two weeks later she wrote to Helen to tell her that she would be glad to help if the union tried to organize the mill.

By this time the union officials had become convinced that the plant could be organized. There was dissatisfaction among the employees over the minimum guaranteed wage rates, plus a general belief that piece-work rates in the mill were too low; moreover, many of the workers felt that work was not equitably distributed by the supervisors, and some of the floorladies were believed to be dividing the work so that a few favorites, receiving the materials that were easiest to work on and which paid the highest rates, consistently earned more than fellow-workers at the same level of skill. Most important, from the point of view of the organizer, employees were found who were willing to aid actively in the campaign, an essential factor if success was to be achieved.

1950 ORGANIZING TACTICS

When Helen returned to the town several weeks later to begin work in earnest, she placed the emphasis on secrecy, personal contacts, an organizing approach tailored to the dissatisfactions of the prospective member, and the involvement in the campaign of a number of workers inside the mill. A number of workers, fearful of layoff or other action by the company, were willing to sign union cards only after the organizer had assured them that their names would be kept secret—a pledge that the organizer scrupulously kept. One worker reported:

I found out later [after being visited by the organizer] that many had joined, but you'd never know it. You wouldn't know if your next-door neighbor was in—it was so secret. . . . You'd ask someone if she belonged, and you'd never get no satisfaction. They were scared of getting laid off.

Most of the early organizing work was concentrated into two long week ends, during which Helen, after being briefed on a worker by Dorothy, contacted her individually. Helen had no set approach. Instead she encouraged her prospects to air their grievances and then emphasized the value of unionism in meeting the specific problem. Helen described her method as follows:

Each one of these members I contacted personally. Dorothy would park her car a block away from the house and wait for me. In advance Dorothy had told me all she knew about this person—what department she worked in, things about her personal life, if she was married and whether or not her husband was a union member and how many children she had, how much money she made and how long she worked in the shop, and, in general, what type of person she was and things like that. Each person had to be talked to differently. I would introduce myself and ask them to let me come in and talk to them for a few minutes about the union. I would encourage them to do the talking, and, through what they told me about themselves and their jobs, I had the answers for them. Having worked in a shop for fifteen years, I knew about what to look for.

These workers who felt some sense of dissatisfaction found Helen a very sympathetic listener. In addition to complaints about the floorladies and the shop manager, which were widespread, a number of other grievances were aired. A worker whose pay had been cut a year earlier was told that that could not have happened if a union had been in existence. A cutter who was earning \$1.00 an hour was told

that a good cutter should be earning much more—at least \$1.50-\$1.75 an hour. A worker who had been employed for five years on a part-time basis was told that she had seniority rights and under union conditions would be able to work steadily. Workers were told that piece rates would be raised under union conditions and that working conditions would be improved. One worker related:

They'd explain the difference from other shops. We found out there was a lot of difference between us and other shops. We were the lowest-paid shop in the country, we were told.

Though no names were mentioned, Helen would tell prospective members that a large number of employees had already signed up, without specifying the number. Or she would say that male knitters, skilled workers who enjoyed a lot of prestige in the plant, had already joined. The knitters were among the first to join the union and had been among the small group which had previously contacted the local central labor body and expressed their desire to be unionized. However, they reacted negatively to Helen, whom they felt to be unfamiliar with their special problems. As one knitter reported: "I wanted to see a man—all she talked about was needle work and didn't have any idea what knitting was. Then Frank came up here, and that was better." The knitters signed up with the union after the chief organizer visited the community. Though the prestige of the knitters lent much to the union's cause and facilitated Helen's work, their physical and social separateness in the mill limited the contribution they made. Nevertheless, they remained a key group and a very important asset to the organizing drive.

Helen's technique, then, was to listen patiently to the complaints of individual workers and seize on the details of their experience in the plant in order to build up their sense of dissatisfaction, emphasizing the justice of their claims. Others in their own work group shared the grievance, she pointed out, whereas in shops organized by the ILGWU workers were spared these unhappy experiences. Thus, by emphasizing wages, seniority, treatment by supervisors, or grievance procedure as seemed best suited to the complaints she heard, she sought ways to transform individual dissatisfaction into a collective condition of unrest and to persuade her listeners that their grievances could not have arisen or would not have been permitted to continue in a unionized shop.

In addition to signing up members herself, Helen formed an "inside" organizing committee.

I got a couple of girls from each department and called them a committee. I tried to make them feel important—tried to make them feel that they were doing very important work and contributing a lot to build the union. They were responsible for getting names and contacting girls in their departments. I would call department meetings, and these girls would try to get everyone from their department interested in coming to meet with me in my hotel room. . . . They would start telling me all of their problems and discussing wages and conditions. I would let them talk, and I would act as if I couldn't believe a company could let conditions like that exist. Most of the time they would be angry to think I couldn't believe them, and they would start explaining more thoroughly and bring their pay envelopes, and that's what I wanted. In most cases before they left most of them would become members. And the next meeting someone else would be curious and come to the meeting or tell the girls who were members that they would like to have me call on her. This worked beautifully—for one group would boast "all but two of my group are members," or "I have the most members in my department."

Helen's tactics and personality impressed many employees and influenced their

decision to join the union. A machine operator recalled that "it was her efficiency—she knew what she was talking about, and she got results because she did it the right way." A sorter reported that Helen's personality impressed her: "She was awfully nice—a sociable type of person. You felt free around her because she seemed like she was one of us. . . . She was just so friendly and she fit right in here."

As a result of these tactics—house calls, formation of an inside organizing committee, and meetings of small groups with the organizer in her hotel room—in addition, of course, to the pleasing personality of the organizer herself—news of union activity spread rapidly through the plant, and by the end of the second week of active organizing Helen had obtained signed cards from 72 of the 180 workers in the plant. With 40 per cent of the employees in the union, the organizer decided that the time had come to bring the campaign out into the open. As chief organizer in the area, Frank was responsible for choosing the right moment to call a general meeting. He described the criteria on which he based the decision:

When we reached the stage where we had enough members, so that they were a large enough group where the company couldn't go ahead and fire one or two and stop it [the organizing drive], and also when they had gained strength and confidence from each other through knowing each other as union members, then we held an open meeting.

Leaflets were distributed at the plant announcing the time and place of the first meeting, and the organizers were overjoyed to find more than a hundred workers, a majority of the employees, in attendance.

THE EMPLOYER'S COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Until the first open meeting was held the employer took little or no notice of the organizing drive. The large turnout for the meeting, however, convinced him that it was necessary to take vigorous steps to counter the drive. His first step was to mail to each employee a letter asserting that wages and conditions at the plant were good, that unionism could bring no benefit, and that the organizers were professional labor promoters interested primarily in their dues. The workers were reminded that they enjoyed the legal right to refuse to join the union, and they were warned that union membership would subject them to the "commands" of union officials, who would force them to engage in "picketing and similar outside union activities." Other letters followed, and the employer began to call meetings inside the mill during working hours at which he gave his presentation of the company's position.

Meanwhile the union asked for recognition by the company on the basis of its membership, and, when this was refused, it filed a petition for an election with the NLRB. The company argued against the holding of an election on the ground that signatures on the cards were not valid. Following hearings, the Board ordered an election, which resulted in a 57 per cent vote for the union. The company contested the election on the ground that "coercive propaganda" was handed out at the polls. After several months the Board ruled in favor of the union, whereupon the company asked the Board to reconsider; this was refused, and the union was finally certified, almost six months after the election had been held. Contract negotiations then began that were likewise to be dragged out for three months without any substantial progress. In the meantime some of the workers were becoming restless and impatient. The union's chief organizer received several letters from leaders of the local group charging that the union was not being militant enough. One letter declared that the union head was "letting grass grow under your feet . . . the girls

at the mill are all disgusted [with the delays in certification], and, if you don't get going, the union will fold like a tent." Frank thus assessed the situation:

On the part of some people there was a feeling of frustration and the desire to start screaming or go on strike to overcome this frustration. . . . They started thinking, "Well, the company was right in the first instance—that John Miller [manager of the mill] and the Miller family was much too big for any union to come in and set themselves up, and that, despite everything Frank had said to us, there will never be a union here."

Frank sought in every way possible to allay these feelings. He assured the local leaders over and over again that the union was doing all in its power to avoid delay and obtain a contract. He pointed out that the union had invested a tremendous amount of time, effort, and money to build the local union and that responsibility for the long delay rested with the company. The simplest course of action would be to call a strike, but it was the union's policy, he stated, to take every possible step before it asked its members to go on strike. Meanwhile it was necessary for the local leaders in the shop to "get all the people to understand the company's delaying tactics and build up sentiment for a strike. If and when that time comes, we want to be sure that we have a large percentage of the people on the picket line and not inside the shop working." If it became necessary to call a strike, Frank told the local leaders, the way needed to be carefully prepared.

A responsible union does not go into a strike haphazardly any more than a country goes into a war haphazardly. . . . We will choose a time when the company's business is expanding and it will hurt the most. We will also want to be sure that we have a substantial number of people who will go on strike so that we have some reason to expect a quick victory.

THE EMPLOYER AND THE IN-GROUP, OUT-GROUP RELATIONSHIP

The chief factor in Frank's reluctance to call a strike was the strong feeling of identification with their employer that still persisted among the new union members. The fact that some of the most eager local leaders tended to place the blame for the delays upon the union rather than the company was for Frank an indication that the union had not yet won the complete loyalty of even its leading members. Typically, the union organizer places upon the employer the blame for the dissatisfaction experienced by the employees. In this case, however, this was not possible, for John Miller was a symbol of authority and prestige and a member of an influential and highly respected family. Though the organizers realized that, if the union was to be successful, the workers would have to shift to the union their loyalty to and identification with the employer, there was danger of alienating prospective members if John Miller were openly attacked and denounced.

In her home visits early in the organizing campaign, Helen found that much discussion centered on John Miller. When this occurred, Helen would express her belief that Mr. Miller, "being the nice person everybody said he was, we would only be too glad to work with him, for our union is not here to injure the company, because if the company isn't making any money we can't expect to get increased wages for the people." She pointed out ways in which the union could help the employer to have a more efficient plant; "how, with everyone working together, both management and the people would be far better off. . . . I was convincing them that they were helping the company."

The high regard that the workers had for their employer was shown in interviews later conducted by the authors. Mr. Miller called most of the workers by their given

names, and in turn most of them called him "John." Several workers reported that on some problems they were able to come to him directly and obtain satisfaction. Some of them had grown up with him in the same small town, and all found him to be a well-mannered person with a pleasant way of dealing with people.

Because of this general high regard, Frank changed his usual approach to the employer. As Frank put it:

I worked under wraps prior to the strike because I felt, and I think I was right, that a lot of people would resent any direct attack on Miller as a person, and I had to do it in a round-about way to show that, regardless of what kind of individual John Miller is, as an employer he's a ———. But I never dared to express myself very strongly for fear that some people might take his side. . . . In the early stages of the organizing, the people had such liking for him that it had to be the floorlady who was responsible or Uncle Paul who was responsible, but John Miller was a good guy. I had to go along with this. Although I never said he was a good guy, I had to pull my punches.

When the organizer did refer to the employer, in speeches or leaflets, it was always in terms of the abstraction, "the Company," which could be interpreted in various ways by different employees. To some it meant the floorlady; to others, the foreman or the superintendent; and, to still others, it could mean the manager, the stockholders, or the family to which they all belonged.

Frank's task was to break down this identification of the workers with their employer and to foster in its place an in-group, out-group relationship between union members and employer. This developed very slowly, despite all the delays in the certification and negotiations; several members of the local negotiating committee held the company's attorney responsible for the delays, while others blamed the union for not forcing the issues. Very few workers believed that the employer held the key to the situation. Frank repeatedly pointed out that attorneys act not on their own but under instructions from their client. Frank sought also to convince the workers that John Miller and his family were doing everything possible to keep out the union by "trying to kill us off through his stalling and more stalling." Frank constantly used the argument that the company would rather deal with weak individual workers than with a strong international union. His efforts bore fruit as the workers' identification with the employer slowly diminished, and increased loyalty to the union developed in its place.

THE UNION CALLS A STRIKE

The union's basic contract demands included recognition, wage increases, a union shop, a seniority system, union participation in the setting of piece rates, improved vacation and holiday benefits, and company-paid health insurance. For three months negotiations dragged on without progress on any but minor issues. A federal conciliator, after attending three meetings, reported that the two sides were so far apart that his office could be of no help. It appeared to the union organizers that the company was stalling while seeking to break up the union through appeals to employees.

A final effort to reach some agreement was made at a two-day bargaining session, at the end of which the parties found themselves almost at the same point at which negotiations had started. The union representatives hoped to avoid a strike, because they did not know how many of the workers would support one, and they were willing to accept any reasonable compromise that would permit the union to live. As Frank put it:

We didn't want to call a strike. . . . We got some minor concessions, but nothing major that would permit the union to remain in existence. We knew that without any form of union security, without any wage increases, the granting of a couple of paid holidays or some other very minor adjustments would be considered a defeat by the people in the shop for all their time and effort. . . . We knew that there were so many people that were not in the union that before a year was up there would be no vestige of a union left. . . . We had instructions from the International vice-president to accept any sort of reasonable opportunity to last for one year, hoping that within that one year we could consolidate our forces, we could build, and we could prepare for the following year and then improve our contract.

The union leaders felt that to accept the company's terms would mean the end of the union. Nor could they pull out of the situation, since they had too great an investment of time and money and felt that this would be a desertion of the people who had joined. The only recourse was to strike, and they quickly called a meeting at which a strike was unanimously approved. The strike lasted for sixteen weeks before being brought to a successful conclusion for the union. The problems presented by these later events, however, are beyond the scope of this article.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has sought to illustrate the role of the professional organizer in a union organizing campaign. It seems reasonably clear that, had professional organizers not been involved, the plant would not have been organized at that time. Yet the presence of an organizer is only one of the factors required. Professional organizers failed in 1947, and they conducted a preliminary survey before they decided that conditions in 1950 would permit them to succeed. Clearly a condition of unrest, a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction, is essential if workers are to be successful in forming a union. The professional organizer does not create this condition; he probes for it, brings it to the surface, emphasizes it, and seeks to place the responsibility for it with the employer and to convince the worker that his sense of grievance could be removed by unionization. The organizer, finding general individual unrest, seeks to transform it into a collective condition and to channel it into the direction of group action through the formation of a union. He serves as much more than a catalytic agent, however, for he brings with him his experiences and the economic and political resources of a national organization, and he determines tactics and objectives until the local group has gained enough experience to share in directing its affairs.

The union, to workers in an isolated small town, is an abstraction, of which the organizer is the only tangible embodiment. While the workers are told that the organizer represents a body with perhaps hundreds of thousands of members, they are apt to respond in large measure in the crucial early days according to their estimate of the organizer himself. Therefore his personality becomes important, for he sells himself along with, and perhaps as much as, his union; he must inspire confidence and be the kind of person the workers admire and like to be friendly with. At the same time his task is greatly facilitated if he is enough like the employees in socioeconomic background, national origin, and similar respects to be accepted readily by them as a friend and associate.

In all these respects Helen was admirably suited for work among the employees of this mill. Her home was in a small town in the same general area, and she had worked for fifteen years in a garment plant there, filling a variety of unpaid union

offices, before joining the organizing staff. A middle-aged motherly sort of person, she readily inspired confidence among the employees. The union's choice in 1947 had been less fortunate, for a younger woman, raised in a large eastern city and college trained, had then been sent in to organize. This is not to suggest that Helen would have succeeded in 1947 or that the younger organizer would have failed in 1950, for there were obvious differences in the intensity of dissatisfactions and the number of workers affected by it. In addition, the local labor movement which, for the most part, had been organized during the war period, was a few years older and considerably more experienced by 1950. In the postwar period, and particularly after 1947, knitting-mill workers had seen members of their families and neighbors engage in strikes and not lose their jobs. Thus, by 1950, the fear of the employer's displeasure had decreased, and union officials were no longer convinced, after three years of experience under the Taft-Hartley Act, that organizing drives in this region of the country were doomed to failure.

Whatever his personality, however, the organizer is not likely to succeed unless his tactics are adapted to his organizing situation. He must be able to emphasize that aspect of unionism which will attract the worker he is trying to convince; he must be able to judge when to work in secret and when to come out into the open; he must know when to make concessions and when to urge a strike; he must be able to meet the employer's counteroffensive and devise tactics to offset it. Without imagination and flexibility, he is unlikely to be very successful.

In this particular small-town setting the personal approach through home visits was not only feasible but also of great importance. As a result of the work setup, communication and personal contacts had been at a minimum in the mill. Most workers had only personal versions and explanations of their dissatisfactions, and these were vague and not crystallized into clear-cut and specific complaints. By playing the role of the sympathetic listener, the organizer left it to the worker to define his dissatisfactions for himself. At the same time she strengthened the workers' feelings of security and need for justification by adjusting her approach to the fears, doubts, and experiences of each. Further, this opportunity to talk at length about one's experiences probably contributed to a greater awareness and strengthening of dissatisfactions, since it can be assumed that, after the organizer left, the discussion was carried on with members of the family, many of whom were union members.

The personal approach had the additional advantage of constantly enabling the organizer further to assess the prevailing sentiments, attitudes, and relationships in the mill. The sensitivity of the organizer was correspondingly increased, and interaction with other workers was facilitated. This approach was important, since individuals were more prone to accept guidance from members of their own community than from "outsiders."

In a crisis situation such as this there is no sharp line which can be drawn between workers' loyalty to their employer and to the union. A degree of overlap almost inevitably exists. Accordingly, one of the prime objectives of the organizer was to polarize the loyalty of the workers toward the union. This required the building of an in-group feeling that embraced the union members, both inside the plant and elsewhere, and excluded the employer and his supervisory force. As against this the employer may seek to promote a group solidarity that will include everyone associated with the enterprise, from the owners to the unskilled worker, with all other persons, including the union organizers, considered outsiders. The

struggle is carried on within the consciousness of the individual worker as he responds to these conflicting pressures and decides on his own course of action.

To achieve the necessary shift in identification and to lead the worker to lay the blame for the prolonged negotiations squarely upon the employer, the organizer used a number of techniques, among which the building and use of an in-plant leadership was most important. Helen gave the more aggressive personalities in the mill a role as new leaders of the union and overcame their feelings of fear and insecurity by assigning to them positions of status in a powerful organization and by singling them out for special meetings and close association with the organizers. It was primarily these in-plant leaders rather than the organizers who communicated to the workers the developments during negotiations, since the workers were more likely to have confidence in the judgment of co-workers whom they had known for many years. Under the guidance of the organizers, these in-plant leaders appealed to groups of workers with different interests. On the one hand, the repeated emphasis on the union's patience, good will, and tolerance appealed to those who were still hesitant to turn against the employer; it convinced them that the "union was really trying its best" and that a strike might be the only alternative. On the other hand, the hesitancy to call a strike increased tension and restlessness among those who from the very beginning of organization had shown greater willingness to fight for their demands. The union became a central issue in the conversation in the mill, and the tension and restlessness of those who were urging a strike were communicated to others.

From the very first, the organizers sought to lay a sound basis for group action. Only after there was sufficient evidence that group cohesiveness had developed could the campaign be carried out into the open. While the emphasis on "secrecy" gave the individual a sense of security, the organizers also knew that the news of union activity would spread rapidly through the shop. Increasing communication between the workers thus not only contributed to a merging of individual dissatisfactions but also tended to give the individual a sense of collective support which in turn encouraged more workers to join the union and increased the willingness of the union members to persist in their demands.

The organizers recognized that many of the workers faced a conflict between their desire to improve shop conditions and their feelings of loyalty and attachment to the employer. An effort was made to increase their dissatisfactions by contrasting their conditions with those prevailing in the unionized sectors of the industry. By divorcing the employer's role as manager of the mill from his other roles in the community, the organizer sought to criticize Miller's behavior without challenging his integrity as a person. By laying the blame primarily on other supervisors or by talking vaguely about an abstraction, "the Company," the organizers attempted to avoid direct criticism of the employer, thereby diminishing the possibility of antagonizing individual workers. As Frank pointed out, his tactic was to "let the situation speak for itself."

There are times, needless to say, when even the most resourceful organizer will not succeed. If there is no serious dissatisfaction among the workers or if they too greatly fear the consequences of the employer's displeasure, his efforts may be doomed to failure. In other cases no professional organizer is even needed, for anyone might be successful. Despite the different economic and social conditions that prevail in various parts of this country, however, there are countless situations where the personality and resourcefulness of the professional labor organizer make the difference between unionization and continuation under nonunion conditions.

24

Political Sociology

Every society has provisions in its normative structure for maintaining order. A large part of this function is met by informal sanctions: by such social control as gossip, ridicule, or ostracism. The more formal social controls reside in the political structure.

Melvin M. Tumin reports research on a fascinating problem: who are the people willing to resist the formally constituted authority of the government because its ruling runs contrary to strongly held personal values? Studying reactions to a court decision which is almost universally unpopular in the area where he did his research, Tumin was able to scale the people according to the degree of what he calls their "readiness and resistance to desegregation." He then examines the "hard core" of resisters to see how they differ from their neighbors.

The final article, by John P. Roche and Milton M. Gordon, approaches a question of perennial interest: "Can Morality Be Legislated?"

Melvin M. Tumin

Readiness and Resistance to Desegregation: A Social Portrait
of the Hard Core¹

It is a popular notion that the South is a homogeneous unit so far as its attitudes toward desegregation are concerned. But that is wrong on the state level where there are strategic and crucial differences between the so-called seven hard-core states and the other ten states most frequently included in the southern region. And it is also wrong *within* any one of these states, hard or soft core, for here, too, there are unmistakable differences in the degree of readiness for or resistance to the social changes implied in the term desegregation. To blur these differences is to make a serious mistake. In doing so, one will lose sight of the available points of vantage and leverage, at which the exertion of the proper forces can either harden or soften, spread or diminish the existing resistances.

What is true between and within southern states also applies to southern individuals. For it seems equally unmistakable that—as Myrdal so elegantly asserted—

¹ From *Social Forces*, 1958, 36:256-263. By permission.

there are rank orders of resistance, such that any single white may offer no resistance or objection at all to working side by side with a Negro, yet may furiously oppose any attempt to make it customary for a Negro to sit on the same seat on the bus.

There is a continuum, then, of resistance, a social and a personal continuum. More properly this should be put in the plural. Each individual, and each social unit, taken as a collective set of attitudes, can be described as a profile defined by different scores or points on a number of scales, his location on any one of these varying within the situation in which it is proposed that the Negro be treated as an equal.

These general assertions are borne out by our findings in a study recently made in Guilford County, North Carolina. The explicit aim was to discover the qualities and quantities of readiness and resistance to desegregation among a group of some 300 white, male, adult (about 18 years old) members of the work force in Guilford County. Adequate resources made it possible to draw a random, stratified area-probability sample of the white, male, adult work force of the county, in which the rural and urban populations are proportionately represented.

From the data collected in this study we are able to put together a composite social portrait of type-persons, distinguished from each other by their relative resistance to desegregation, as this is revealed in their answers to a set of questions concerning the desegregation of the public schools. One group of these—the hard core—is called by that name here because it rejects desegregation unequivocally and without apparent reservation, but, more importantly, indicated, at variance with its neighbors, that it is willing to use force if necessary to prevent desegregation. Our report here will shortly focus upon this group, examining in what aspects it resembles and how it differs from other, less intransigent and committed southerners.

Material was secured from these persons by a set of questions, put to them in face-to-face interviews, by a group of graduate students enrolled in the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton University. Generous support by that school operating on a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, had made it possible to inventory the literature, work over the leading suggestions and hypotheses in the literature during numerous seminars, conduct preliminary field explorations and engage in pilot and pre-testing of our instruments, both in Princeton and in North Carolina. Similarly, generous cooperation from the Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina and other persons connected with the University had made it possible for the students to become quickly and efficiently oriented to the local mores and the strategies of interviewing, so that many of the expectable gaffs were avoided. It is our estimate that rapport was generally high and responses correspondingly frank and informative. Loss through refusal was gratifyingly low.

The interview questions were designed explicitly to test current hypotheses concerning the relationship between readiness for desegregation and a host of sociological background variables such as age, education, income and residence; and between the former, and a set of other variables, such as educational and occupational mobility, contact with Negroes, and exposure to the mass media.

As measures of readiness for desegregation, we constructed five sets of questions, all of which later proved to constitute scales of the Guttman type.

The first set probed for the respondent's image of the Negro, as an inferior, superior, or equal creature with the white, in regard to intelligence, ambition, morality, and responsibility.

The second questioned the ideological fancies of the respondent, in terms of how, *in general*, he would, if he could, arrange the relations among Negroes and whites in a set of eight situations (the scale was ultimately reduced to six of these eight), including: neighborhood co-residence, co-dining on a private basis, co-dining in restaurants, school attendance, church attendance, having Negroes for supervisors over whites, riding on buses, and working side by side on an equal status basis.

The third scale asked about the same situations but put the question in terms of how the respondent would *feel* if he found himself in such a situation.

The fourth scale then asked what the respondent *would do* if and when he found himself faced with these facts.

The fifth scale focused specifically on the schools and asked the respondent to approve or disapprove of a series of four proposals offered as ways in which to prevent the desegregation of the schools.

In this study, we will focus primarily on the responses given to this last set of questions. As put to the respondents, they read:

a) Some people have suggested that the Supreme Court Decision ordering desegregation was wrong and that the States ought to be permitted to decide for themselves on this question. The proposal is to go through the process of getting an amendment to the United States Constitution to take power away from the Supreme Court. How do you feel about this kind of proposal to try to amend the U. S. Constitution?

1. strongly approve
2. approve
3. undecided
4. disapprove
5. strongly disapprove

b) In Texas, the Governor has threatened to withhold State school funds from any school district which desegregates the schools, i.e., which permits Negro children to attend the same schools as white children. How do you feel about withholding State money from school districts here in North Carolina—if and when any of these districts start letting Negro children go to school together with white children?

1. strongly approve
2. approve
3. undecided
4. disapprove
5. strongly disapprove

c) Some people have suggested that if need be, the public schools ought to be closed altogether rather than have Negro and white children go to school together. How do you feel about this?

1. strongly approve
2. approve
3. undecided
4. disapprove
5. strongly disapprove

d) Once in a while you hear it said, too, that if need be, people ought to get together and resist with force any attempts to mix Negro and white children in the same schools. How do you feel about this?

1. strongly approve
2. approve
3. undecided
4. disapprove
5. strongly disapprove

Strong approval, approval, and undecided were classed as the segregationist type

of response; disapproval or strong disapproval were classed as desegregationist. On this basis, the percentage segregationist response to these questions is shown in Table 1. Scale analysis yielded a co-efficient of reproducibility of 95.7. The scale consists of five points ranging from extreme segregationist, defined by the score of IV, to extreme desegregationist, who receives a score of 0. The distribution of the respondents through these scale score types is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 1
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Question	Percent Giving Prosegregationist Answer
Amend the Constitution	77.3
Withhold state funds	55.6
Close the public schools	43.5
Use force if necessary	24.8

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF SCALE SCORES QUESTIONS ON SCHOOLS

Scale Score	Number	Percent
0	50	17.5
I	58	20.3
II	53	18.6
III	71	24.8
IV	54	18.9
Total	286	100.0

We may now examine the extent to which the different scale score groups are distributed on a number of other characteristics, such as age, education, income, and similar sociological characteristics. For purposes of convenience the scale score IV group, that which approves of all alternatives, will be referred to, variously, as the hard core and the resisters, while the 0 group, those who approved of none of the measures, will be referred to as the desegregators and the ready-ones.

AGE

Table 3 shows the age-makeup of the different scale score groups. Testing reveals no significant difference in mean ages between any of the groups. The hard core group is the youngest, with a mean age of almost 40 years, and its adjacent scale score group, the III group, is the oldest, with a mean age of almost 44 years. But even this difference failed to reach the .05 level of significance.

TABLE 3
AGE

Scale Score Group	Mean Age
0	
I	41.4
II	41.4
III	42.2
IV	43.7
	39.8

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

The total sample, according to religious affiliation, is distributed as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

Religious Denomination	Number	Percent
Catholic	3	1.0
Jewish	1	.4
Other	3	1.0
None	23	8.0
Baptist	103	35.9
Methodist	79	27.5
Episcopalian	10	3.5
Quaker	3	1.0
Presbyterian	20	7.0
Other Protestant Denominations	39	13.6
No information	3	1.0
Total	287	100.0

When we compare our scale score groups for the percentage of various denominations present in each, we find that religious affiliation is thoroughly non-discriminating. None of the groups differs significantly from any other in its percentages of Baptists or of Methodists (the two most numerous). The N's in the other categories are too small to warrant testing of differences.

RELIGIOSITY

Our data also permitted us to divide our sample according to the frequency of their church attendance. We distinguished between (1) those who never attend, (2) those who attend less than once a month, (3) attend less than once a week, (4) once a week or more, and (5) those who attend daily. We assigned the numbers 1-5 to each of these groups in that order, and calculated mean religiosity rates in that way. The results are seen in Table 5. From this table one sees that the most ready and the most resistant groups are the least religious, averaging less than once-a-week attendance. But the other groups are only slightly more religious, and analysis of differences shows no significant differences between the means of religiosity of any of the groups. Not one of the groups averages as much as once-a-week attendance.

TABLE 5
RELIGIOSITY

Scale Score Group	Frequency of Church Attendance*
0	
I	2.9
II	3.0
III	3.1
IV	2.9
	2.8

* For calculating means, never = 1, less than once a month = 2, less than once a week = 3, once a week or more = 4, daily = 5.

RESIDENCE

Does residence matter? Our sample was divided into four groups: (1) those who have resided in a rural area in the county more than five years, or stable-rurals; (2) those in rural area less than five years, or recent-rurals; (3) those in urban area more than five years, or stable-urbans; and (4) those in urban area less than five years, or recent-urbans.

The results of testing here are not regularly patterned. The groups do not differ at all on their percentages of stable residents, whether urban or rural. And, when we focus on the rural-urban difference alone, we find that the IV group, differs from the O, I and III groups, but not from the II group, on the percent rural, with the higher percentages in the hard core group (See Table 6). The only other

TABLE 6

RESIDENCE

Scale Score Group	Percent Stable Residence	Percent Rural Residence
O	80.0	22.0
I	86.4	33.9
II	83.0	41.5
III	80.3	32.4
IV	83.3	51.9

difference which is significant is between the O group and the II group, with the higher percent rurals in favor of the latter group. The major drift of these differences is generally in favor of a significantly higher percentage of rural residents in the hard core group.

INCOME

The distribution of income reveals a patterned and regular relationship between income and attitudes toward school desegregation. The higher the income, the more ready for desegregation, without exception. Mean annual incomes for the five scale score groups, starting with the least segregationist and going down to the hard core, are shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7

INCOME

Scale Score Groups	Mean Annual Income (Dollars)
O	\$6,194
I	5,915
II	4,940
III	4,592
IV	3,500

Testing for significance of differences between these means shows that the IV, or hard core, group differs significantly from each of the others; and that the O, or ready, group differs from the II and III as well as from the IV group. The intervening groups do not differ significantly from each other. It is as though there were a polarization of incomes as well as of attitudes toward desegregation.

OCCUPATION

If we raise the ordinary expectation that occupational distributions will closely correspond to income spreads, we will not be disappointed. We tested for this in two ways. First, we examined the percent white collar workers in each of the scale score groups. Their distributions are seen in Table 8. The significant differences here are again between the IV, or hard core, group and each of the others. None of the other differences reaches significance.

TABLE 8
WHITE COLLAR WORKERS

Scale Score Groups	Percent White Collar
0	71.4
I	64.4
II	64.2
III	58.6
IV	35.8

If we narrow the focus somewhat and examine the percent professionals in each of the groups, the results are indicated in Table 9. It is the most ready group which is set off from all the others here. For it is only between this group and each of the others that the differences in percent of professionals reach significance, with none of the other differences between the other groups getting to this point.

TABLE 9
PROFESSIONALS

Scale Score Groups	Percent Professionals
0	22.4
I	10.2
II	9.4
III	5.7
IV	1.8

EDUCATION

As one would expect there is a close correspondence between the educational differences and the differences in income. The mean number of years of school completed for the five groups are shown in Table 10. Testing for significance of

TABLE 10
YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED

Scale Score Groups	Years of School Completed
0	10.1
I	9.7
II	9.3
III	9.5
IV	8.0

differences here reveals that the IV group differs significantly again from each of the other groups, and that none of the other differences reaches statistical significance. Here, as in previous findings, the hard-core group is set off from all the others. The same finding is repeated when we test differences between the groups

on their percentages of respondents who have nine or more years of school. The distributions are seen in Table 11.

TABLE 11
HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION OR MORE

Scale Score Groups	Percent with 9 or More Years of School
0	72.0
I	67.8
II	62.3
III	64.8
IV	40.7

FATHER-SON EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY

Another comparison of interest takes mobility of son from father's educational achievements as a possible factor, and compares the variously resistant groups on their percentages of those where the father has *less* than nine years of school and the respondent *nine or more* years. Here we find that the groups do not differ at all. Mobility, then, as measured by difference between fathers and sons on formal education does not seem to be related to differences in attitudes toward segregation. Table 12 shows the percent of each scale score group of respondents who had nine or more years of school but whose fathers had only eight or less.

TABLE 12
EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY

Scale Score Groups	Percent Respondents with 9 or More Whose Fathers Had 8 or Less
0	44.0
I	33.9
II	39.6
III	46.5
IV	35.2

FATHER-SON OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

If we define mobility by differences between the respondents and their fathers on white vs. blue collar work, we find that there are no significant differences between any pair of the groups on their percentages of respondents with white collar jobs whose fathers were manual or blue-collar workers. Table 13 shows the percentages on this item.

TABLE 13
OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

Scale Score Groups	Percent with Respondents White Collar and Fathers Blue Collar
0	26.0
I	23.7
II	32.1
III	23.9
IV	20.4

WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS

When we focus on the occupations of the respondents alone and compare the percent in each group who work at white-collar jobs, some significant differences do appear. All of these differences occur between the hard core and the other groups, with the former having a significantly lower percentage of white-collar workers than any of the other groups. It appears, in short, that status more than mobility makes a difference, and serves to set off, as did formal education, the hard core from all the other groups. Table 14 shows the percent distributions.

TABLE 14
WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS

Scale Score Groups	Percent White-Collar Workers
0	71.4
I	64.4
II	64.2
III	58.6
IV	35.8

EXPOSURE TO THE MASS MEDIA

The groups present an interesting pattern of differences in their respective degrees of exposure to the mass media. Again, the hard core has a significantly lower mean exposure rate than all the other groups. But there is further differentiation, such that the III group differs from the 0 group. All these differences are in the expected direction, namely, the more ready for desegregation, the more exposed to the mass media. Table 15 shows the distribution of the groups through the various degrees of exposure to the mass media.

TABLE 15
EXPOSURE TO THE MASS MEDIA

Scale Score Groups	Mean Exposure Rate*
0	2.8
I	2.5
II	2.7
III	2.3
IV	2.1

* Maximum exposure = 4.

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

Here, then, are some fundamental similarities and differences among our various attitude types. If we may ignore certain minor reversals and irregularities, in the interest of drawing together a collective portrait of the hard-core group as it compares with the other four groups, that summary sketch would read as follows:

The hard core is slightly younger than its neighbors.

It belongs to the same churches in about the same proportions.

It attends church about as frequently.

It is as stable in its residence patterns, but is somewhat more concentrated in the rural areas.

Its earning power is significantly lower than all its neighbors'.

There are many fewer white collar workers in the group, and many fewer professionals, proportionately speaking.

All the other groups have significantly higher averages of number of years of school completed, though the actual differences are not very large.

Similarly, the hard core has a significantly smaller percentage of members who have achieved nine or more years of schooling. In this regard, it stands differentiated from all the other groups.

The hard core is not different from the other groups in the percentage of its members who have gone on in school beyond the grammar school level achieved by their fathers.

In the same vein, members of the hard-core group have moved as frequently as members of the other groups out of the manual-work situations of their fathers into white-collar work of their own.

The mass society, through the agencies of the mass media, does not impinge upon the hard core to nearly the same extent as upon the other groups.

Can we distill any over-all patterns? Several suggested themselves in varying degrees of clarity. The most forceful impression is that of a significant difference between the hard core, those who would use force, from all others, on the basic equipment for improving life chances in this society: education, income, and occupation. In these regards, they seem to be at the bottom of the southern heap. It may very well be this relatively low position in the southern status hierarchy which urges them to such intransigent resistance to any improvement of the status of the Negro. For, clearly, in a moving and changing status system, it is they, the low men on the totem pole, who are most threatened by the surge upward of the Negroes.

Where this polarization of hard core vs. all others is not present, the most frequent other pattern is a graduation of scores, almost always, except for the status-contacts, in the directions which the literature of race relations has taught us to expect. That is, the more of the good things in life, the more in contact with the larger world, the more exposed to the urban metropolis and its impulses toward change, the more ready for desegregation does the southern sample here studied appear to be.

The least well indicated, yet the most suggestive pattern, is that of a split between the most ready group and all the other groups. For instance, those who disapprove of all measures proposed as ways to prevent desegregation seem to be recruited from a qualitatively different level of education, occupation, income, alertness to the news and the larger world. It is as though there is a cut-off point which must be reached, defined by the averages on the various items characteristic of the ready group, before that kind of readiness, indicated by an unwillingness to go against the law of the larger land, becomes a reality.

If we put these three patterns together, one gets the strong impression of a group of people who are graded into each other in many important social characteristics, and who therefore must be considered the *same* kinds of people, with the important reservation that their positions on the graded continua often are correlated with distinct differences in their attitudes. There is no evidence in our study to indicate that the hard core is a sick and malicious group, nor that the ready ones are substantially free of pathologies which affect the other groups. Rather, the hard core seems to be sufficiently far along toward the lower end of the continua to form a distinct and distinguishable entity. So, too, but not quite so forcibly, the ready ones seem to be sufficiently far along toward the more advantageous ends of the continua to emerge as an entity distinguishable from the rest of the population.

We may think of the ways in which these two extreme groups are set off from the others in terms of different sets of norms and responsibility-reward systems into

which they are integrated. The hard core seems to view the emergent and changing social system as one which does not contain enough by way of promised satisfaction in return for adherence to the new norms, and so seems to reject the emergent system in preference for the more traditional form of social organization. The ready group, by contrast, has good reason to see the emergent system as containing promises of even more of the relatively advantaged positions which they have come to enjoy, and hence they seem to welcome, or at least, to refuse to impede, the development of the new system.

We are suggesting, in short, that it is not a difference between mental health and mental sickness; or between integration and anomie. Rather, since there is some degree of option between a traditional and a new system and since the balance of responsibility and reward strikes each group as different, one seeks to retain the old, and the other seeks to institute the new.

Yet the metaphor in which we have put this difference carries in its vocabulary too much of the actors' subjective definitions of the situations. For it seems clear, from the materials on self-perception and self-image, relative to various others, that ordinary measures of subjective definitions do not indicate as much difference in the self-images as one would expect from the sharp differences in attitudes toward the new ideas. By contrast, the *objective* indices of difference in such things as income, occupation, education, and the like, do correspond far more closely with the differences in attitudes.

Could it be, then, that the actors here are responding to the pressures of the system upon them in ways unknown to them consciously and unverbalizable by them, and hence not as easily discoverable from a codification of their views of life as from a straightforward analysis of their positions in the social order?

Could it also be, then, that, if the inequalities in position and life chances between the hard core and the others were to be reduced over time, the differences between their attitudes toward the Negroes and desegregation would be correspondingly reduced, again in ways unknown to and unperceived by them, and perhaps in spite of their verbalizations to the contrary? Some such destratification and equalization seem to be strongly indicated by our findings.

John P. Roche and Milton M. Gordon

Can Morality Be Legislated?¹

The Supreme Court is pondering its decision on how and when to carry out its ruling of a year ago that public school segregation is unconstitutional. It is therefore timely to examine the relationship between law and mores, between the decrees of courts and Legislatures and the vast body of community beliefs which shape private action.

While it is not perhaps customary to think of the Supreme Court as a legislative body, the cold fact is that in the desegregation cases, the nine justices have undertaken to rewrite public policy in at least seventeen states and innumerable communities. Indeed, it would be difficult to find a recent Congressional enactment that equals in impact and scope this judicial holding. Whether one approves or disapproves of such judicial acts, it is clear that the court has undertaken a monu-

¹ From the *New York Times Magazine*, May 22, 1955, pp. 10, 42, 44, 49. By permission.

mental project in the field of social engineering, and one obviously based on the assumption that morality *can* be legislated.

Opponents of the desegregation decision have, with the exception of a fringe of overt white supremacists, largely founded their dissent on the principle that law can not move faster than public opinion, that legal norms which do not reflect community sentiment are unenforceable. They cite the dismal failure of Prohibition as a case in point, urging that basic social change—however desirable—must come from the bottom, from a shift in “grass-roots” convictions.

On the other hand, the court’s supporters maintain that virtually every statute and judicial decree is, to some extent, a regulation of morality. Indeed, they suggest, if the moral standards of individuals were not susceptible to state definition and regulation, we would never have emerged from primitive barbarism.

In this article, we shall examine from the viewpoint of the social scientist the evidence on both sides of the question, and see if it is possible to extract any meaningful conclusions.

First of all, we must delve into the relationship that exists in a democratic society between law and community attitudes. While this is a treacherous area, full of pitfalls for the unwary generalizer, it seems clear that, as distinguished from a totalitarian society, law in a democracy is founded on consensus. That is to say that the basic sanctions are applied not by the police, but by the community. The jury system institutionalizes this responsibility in such cases as “mercy killings” or those involving “the unwritten law” by finding citizens who have unquestionably killed “not guilty.”

Conversely, juries applying other sections of the criminal code—notably those penalizing subversion—will often bring in verdicts of “guilty” based not so much on technical guilt as upon the proposition that the defendant should be taken out of circulation. In another area of the law, insurance companies, faced with damage suits, have learned to shun juries like the plague. Indeed, they will frequently make unjustified out-of-court settlements in preference to facing a jury that begins its labors with the seeming assumption that no insurance company of any standing would miss \$100,000.

From this it should be clear that in the United States law is a great deal more, and simultaneously a great deal less, than a command of the sovereign. Thus one can safely say that no piece of legislation, or judicial decision, which does not have its roots in community beliefs, has a chance of being effectively carried out.

To this extent, it is undeniable that morality cannot be legislated; it would be impossible, for example, to make canasta playing a capital offense *in fact*, even if the bridge-players’ lobby were successful in getting such a law on the books. This is a fanciful example, but in our view the Volstead Act and the Eighteenth Amendment were no less unrealistic in objective: like H. L. Mencken’s friend, Americans seem willing to vote for Prohibition as long as they can stagger to the polls.

Excluding these extreme efforts to legislate morality, which are obviously unsound, we now come to the heart of the problem: Under what circumstances will an individual accept distasteful regulation of his actions? To put it another way: What are the criteria which lead an individual to adjust his acts to the demands of the state?

Specifically, why do people pay taxes when they disagree strongly with the uses to which the money will be put? A large-scale tax revolt, as the French have recently discovered, is almost impossible to check without recourse to martial law and police state methods, but the average taxpayer grouches and pays. While

Americans are not, by and large, as law-abiding as their British cousins, it is probably fair to say that most of us obey most laws without even reflecting on their merits.

This problem of the basis of legal norms has proved a fascinating one to sociologists. In the past fifteen years some significant new thinking on the subject has grown out of empirical research, more incisive analysis, and general observation of large-scale experiences with legal desegregation in important areas of American life such as employment, public housing and the Armed Forces.

The older categorical view stated in classic fashion by the sociologist William Graham Sumner, was that law could never move ahead of the customs or mores of the people—that legislation which was not firmly rooted in popular folkways was doomed to failure. The implication was that social change must always be glacier-like in its movement and that mass change in attitudes must precede legislative action.

The newer viewpoint is based on a more sophisticated and realistic analysis of social processes. In the first place, it questions the older way of stating the problem in terms of all or nothing. Any large, complex society, with its multiplicity of social backgrounds and individual experiences, contains varying mores and attitudes within itself. On any given piece of legislation there will not just be supporters and enemies; rather there will be many points of view, ranging from unconditional support, through indifference, to unmitigated opposition.

Thus, the degree of success that will attend such an enactment is the result of a highly complex series of interactions and adjustments among people with diverse attitudes toward the measure itself and toward the imposition of legal authority. Furthermore, it is predictable that a large segment of the population will be basically neutral, if not totally indifferent.

To put the matter in an even broader framework, the prediction of behavior must take into consideration not only the attitudes of the individual but also the *total social situation* in which his behavior is to be formulated and expressed. For instance, people with ethnic prejudice are likely to express themselves in a social clique where, say, anti-Semitic jokes are *au fait*, but will restrain themselves in a group where such remarks are greeted with hostility. Once the bigot realizes that he must pay a social price for his anti-Semitism, he is likely to think twice before exposing himself to the penalty.

In this connection, Robert K. Merton, Columbia sociologist, has set up an incisive classification, suggesting that four major groups can be delineated:

(1) The all-weather liberal, who can be expected to oppose prejudice and race discrimination under any set of social conditions; (2) the fair-weather liberal, who is not himself prejudiced, but who will stand silent or passively support discrimination if it is easier and more profitable to do so; (3) the fair-weather illiberal, who has prejudices, but is not prepared to pay a significant price for expressing them in behavior, preferring rather to take the easier course of conformity; and (4) the all-weather illiberal, who is prepared to fight to the last ditch for his prejudices at whatever cost in social disapproval.

If we apply this classification to such a problem as desegregation, it immediately becomes apparent that the critical strata, so far as success or failure is concerned, are groups two and three. Group one will support the proposal with vigor and group four will oppose it bitterly, but groups two and three will carry the day.

But because groups two and three are not crusaders, are not strongly motivated, they are particularly susceptible to the symbolism of law. Thus the fact that fair

employment practices have been incorporated into law, or that the Supreme Court has held school segregation unconstitutional, will itself tend to direct their thinking toward compliance.

The symbols of state power are to the undedicated non-revolutionary mighty and awesome things, and he will think long and hard before he commits himself to subversive action. Consequently the law tends to become, in another of Merton's phrases, a "self-fulfilling prophecy"; that is, a statute tends to create a climate of opinion favorable to its own enforcement. As John Locke long ago pointed out, the great roadblock to revolution is not the police but the habits of obedience which lead the law-abiding majority to refrain from even legitimate and justified resistance.

American experience over the past decade and a half seems to confirm this hypothesis. By legislative action, executive order and judicial decision, the race prejudices of Americans have been denied public sanction. Fair employment practices commissions, of national scope during the war and subsequently operative in a number of states and municipalities, integration of the Armed Forces, integration of many segregated schools, elimination of "white primaries" and removal of racial restrictions in many professional associations—all these have provided a living laboratory for the study of the impact of law on the mores.

At virtually every stage in the development, strong voices were raised to plead that morality could not be legislated, that an end to discrimination must await an unprejudiced public. Yet, the results indicate a high degree of compliance, some covert evasion, and only a few instances of violent resistance.

Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the success of desegregation laws or orders need not be measured against a hypothetical standard of 100 per cent but against the usual standards of law enforcement. Even laws against homicide and rape, which have overwhelming community support, are occasionally violated.

But, while laws may restrain behavior, is there any evidence to indicate that attitudes are affected? Here the evidence seems clear: the law itself plays an important part in the educational process. Again the key to analysis is the social situation.

Legislation and administrative orders which have prohibited discrimination in such areas as employment, the Armed Forces, public housing, and professional associations have brought people of various races together—often with initial reluctance—in normal day-to-day contact on an "equal-status" basis where the emphasis is on doing a job together. Contact of this kind gives people a chance to know one another as individual human beings with similar interests, problems and capabilities. In this type of interaction racial stereotypes are likely to be weakened and dispelled.

Such a favorable change of attitude as a result of personal contact has been reported in a number of studies. In one carefully designed research project, Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins found that white housewives who had been assigned to public housing projects which were racially integrated tended to develop favorable attitudes toward Negroes, while the vast majority of those who occupied segregated housing tended to remain the same in their racial views. A study of integration in the Army reached a similar conclusion.

Findings such as these support a considerably broader and more complex conception of the relations between legal norms and human acts and attitudes than did the older, simpler Sumner thesis. In this more comprehensive analysis, law itself is seen as a force which, in its impact, does more than prohibit or compel specific behavior. Indeed, in its operation, law actually provides the setting for types of social relationships—relationships which may have a profound effect on the very attitudes which are necessary to adequate enforcement of the statute in question.

We thus come down to the final and crucial problem. It is plain that under some circumstances morality can be legislated, while under other conditions, the laws prove impotent. But what are the specific factors which must be evaluated? What criteria can be offered as a guide to intelligent and effective action in these touchy areas of belief, superstition and vested prejudice? The following four considerations are suggested as a beginning:

First, the amount of opposition and its geographical spread. If a random of 15 per cent of the population, roughly gauged, oppose some regulation, there will probably be little difficulty in gaining public acceptance and enforcement. However, and this is particularly relevant to the desegregation problem, if the 15 per cent all live in one compact geographical area where they constitute a majority, control local government and supply juries, the magnitude of the problem is much greater.

Second, the intensity of opposition. This is a qualitative matter, for, to paraphrase George Orwell, while all Americans are created equal, some are more equal than others. A proposal which is militantly opposed by "opinion-formers" in the American community—for example, ministers, lawyers, newspaper editors—will have much harder sledding than a nosecount of the opponents would seem to justify, and, conversely, a measure which receives the support of this key group, or significant segments of it, can overcome a numerically large resistance.

Much of the success of the Negro in overcoming his legal, social and economic disabilities has been an outgrowth of the strong stand on his behalf taken by church leaders, journalists, trade unionists, business men and politicians who have created a climate of opinion favorable to Negro claims and who have based their assertions on the values which constitute the American Creed: Equality of treatment under law and human brotherhood under God. With this quality of support, much can be accomplished even against great numbers.

Third, the degree to which sanctions can be administered. Here we turn to the practical problems of enforcement, and it is at this point that Prohibition really should have run aground long before it was incorporated into public policy. Home manufacture of alcoholic beverages has, according to well informed sources, even survived in the Soviet Union, and if the M. V. D. is incapable of banning private brew, there is little reason to suspect that a democratic society could handle the job.

It can not be emphasized too often that general principles of morality are no stronger than the instruments by which they are implemented; it would thus be legislative folly to try to prohibit people from disliking Jews, Negroes, Catholics, or Protestants. However, making gin in the bathtub, or disliking minorities, is not action equivalent to segregating school children on the basis of their pigmentation.

Because it is nearly impossible to regulate what goes on in millions of private homes, it does not follow that enforcement of desegregation in public institutions will be equally difficult. In sum, false and misleading analogies must be avoided, and each proposal must be examined on its merits to determine whether or not it is enforceable.

Fourth, the diligence of enforcement. It is extremely important that enforceable regulations be diligently enforced. This is particularly true in the initial period when public attitudes (specifically the attitudes of Merton's groups two and three) are in the process of formation. Flagrant refusal to obey usually is designed as a symbolic act to rally the undecided, and strong action at such a time will convince many wavering minds that the best course is compliance.

The Milford, Del., episode—where parents, stirred up by agitators, refused to send their children to a desegregated school—is a good case-study of what should

not happen; there vigorous action by the state authorities, such as occurred under similar circumstances in Baltimore, would have dampened the ardor of the fanatics and decimated their fellow-travelers. The danger is that successful symbolic defiance plants the dragon seed and brings into the resistance movement those who would otherwise remain interested and sympathetic spectators—at a distance.

In short, to ask, "Can morality be legislated?", is actually to pose the wrong question. What types of morality, under what conditions, and with what techniques for enforcement are qualitative considerations which fragment the question into more answerable units. Our analysis suggests that, although large-scale local considerations may call for special circumstances of implementation, the majesty of the law, when supported by the collective conscience of a people and the healing power of the social situation, in the long run will not only enforce morality but create it.

Index

- BARKER, GORDON H., AND ADAMS, W. THOMAS, *The Social Structure of a Correctional Institution*, 40-46
- BECKER, HOWARD S., *The Career of the Chicago Public Schoolteacher*, 291-299
- BELL, WENDELL, *Familism and Suburbanization: One Test of the Social Choice Hypothesis*, 253-259
- BLAU, PETER M., *Cooperation and Competition in a Bureaucracy*, 120-125
- BROOM, LEONARD, *The Social Differentiation of Jamaica*, 165-173
- BROOM, LEONARD, AND KITSUSE, JOHN I., *The Validation of Acculturation: A Condition to Ethnic Assimilation*, 117-120
- BROWN, MORGAN C., *The Status of Jobs and Occupations as Evaluated by an Urban Negro Sample*, 310-316
- BURGESS, ERNEST W., AND LOCKE, HARVEY J., *The Family: From Institution to Companionship*, 261-264
- CAMERON, WILLIAM BRUCE, *The Elements of Statistical Confusion, Or: What Does the Mean Mean?*, 7-11
- CHANDRASEKHAR, SRIPATI, *Mao's War With the Chinese Family*, 273-278
- CHINYO, ELY, *The Tradition of Opportunity and the Aspirations of Automobile Workers*, 174-181
- COTTRELL, W. F., *Death by Dieselization: A Case Study of Reaction to Technological Change*, 78-84
- DAVIS, KINGSLEY, *The Origin and Growth of Urbanization in the World*, 214-223
- GOLD, RAY, *Janitors Versus Tenants: A Status-Income Dilemma*, 127-135
- GREER, SCOTT, *Individual Participation in Mass Society*, 223-230
- HAVIGHURST, ROBERT J., *Flexibility and the Social Roles of the Retired*, 278-281
- JACO, E. GARTLY, AND BELKNAP, IVAN, *Is a New Family Form Emerging in the Urban Fringe?*, 246-252
- KARSH, BERNARD, SEIDMAN, JOEL, AND LILIENTHAL, DAISY M., *The Union Organizer and His Tactics: A Case Study*, 316-326
- KEPHART, WILLIAM M., *Negro Visibility*, 161-165
- KOHN, MELVIN L., *Social Class and the Exercise of Parental Authority*, 282-291
- LEWIS, OSCAR, *Peasant Culture in India and Mexico: A Comparative Analysis*, 47-59
- MACK, RAYMOND W., *Ecological Patterns in an Industrial Shop*, 230-237
- MACK, RAYMOND W., MURPHY, RAYMOND J., AND YELLIN, SEYMOUR, *The Protestant Ethic, Level of Aspiration, and Social Mobility: An Empirical Test*, 181-187
- MESSINGER, SHELDON L., *Organizational Transformation: A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement*, 84-90
- MINER, HORACE, *Body Ritual Among the Nacirema*, 59-62
- OGBURN, WILLIAM F., *Population, Private Ownership, Technology, and the Standard of Living*, 203-208
- RECKLESS, WALTER C., DINITZ, SIMON, AND MURRAY, ELLEN, *Self-Concept as an Insulation Against Delinquency*, 91-94

- REIS, ALBERT J. JR., AND KITAGAWA, EVELYN M., Demographic Characteristics and Job Mobility of Migrants in Six Cities, 209-214
- ROBINSON, W. S., Bias, Probability, and Trial by Jury, 146-152
- ROCHE, JOHN P., AND GORDON, MILTON M., Can Morality be Legislated?, 337-342
- ROSENFELD, EVA, Social Stratification in a "Classless" Society, 152-160
- SCHNEIDER, LOUIS, AND DORNBUSCH, SANFORD M., Inspirational Religious Literature: From Latent to Manifest Functions of Religion, 306-309
- SCHNORE, LEO F., The Separation of Home and Work: A Problem for Human Ecology, 237-245
- SEEMAN, MELVIN, Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership, 94-101
- SMIGEL, ERWIN O., Public Attitudes toward Stealing as Related to the Size of the Victim Organization, 70-77
- STEPHAN, FREDERICK F., Sampling, 3-7
- STONE, GREGORY P., AND FORM, WILLIAM H., Instabilities in Status: The Problems of Hierarchy in the Community Study of Status Arrangements, 136-145
- SYKES, GRESHAM M., Men, Merchants and Toughs: A Study of Reactions to Imprisonment, 63-70
- TAEUBER, IRENE B., Population Policies in Communist China, 193-202
- THOMAS, JOHN L. (S. J.), Religious Training in the Roman Catholic Family, 300-305
- TOBY, JACKSON, Undermining the Student's Faith in the Validity of Personal Experience, 2
- TUMIN, MELVIN M., Readiness and Resistance to Desegregation: A Social Portrait of the Hard Core, 327-337
- TURNER, RALPH H., AND SURACE, SAMUEL J., Zoot-Suiters and Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd Behavior, 13-20
- VANCE, RUPERT B., Is Theory for Demographers?, 188-193
- VOGT, EVON Z., AND O'DEA, THOMAS F., A Comparative Study of the Role of Values in Social Action in Two Southwestern Communities, 102-111
- WEINBERG, S. KIRSON, AND AROND, HENRY, The Occupational Culture of the Boxer, 31-40
- WEINSTEIN, EUGENE A., Weights Assigned by Children to Criteria of Prestige, 111-116
- WESTLEY, WILLIAM A., Violence and the Police, 264-272
- WRIGHT, CHARLES R., AND HYMAN, HERBERT H., Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys, 20-30

EURASIA'S

BOOKS ON HISTORY

	<i>Rs. nP.</i>
<i>A History of the World by Alice Magenis and John Conard Appel, H.</i>	12-50
<i>The Army of the Indian Moghuls by William Irvine</i>	15-00
<i>History of World Civilization by Swain</i>	12-50
<i>History of the Punjab by M. Latif</i>	20-00
<i>The World in the Twentieth Century by Snyder, Louis L.</i>	2-50
<i>Modern Japan : A Brief History by Tiedemann, Arthur</i>	2-50
<i>British Constitutional History Since 1832 by Schuyler, Robert L. and Weston, Corrine C.</i>	2-50
<i>Basic History of Modern Germany by Snyder Louis L.</i>	2-50
<i>Basic History of Modern Russia by Kohn, Hans</i>	2-50
<i>The North Atlantic Civilization by Kraus, Michael</i>	2-50
<i>Basic History of American Business by Cochran, Thomas C.</i>	2-50
<i>Modern China—Brief History by Rowe David Nelson</i>	2-50
<i>Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917—1941 by Kennan, George F.</i>	2-50
<i>Major Documents in American Economic History Vol. I by Hacker Louis M.</i>	2-50
<i>Major Documents in American Economic History Vol. II by Hacker Louis M.</i>	2-50
